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ABSTRACT
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP:
THE FUTURE OF NEO-CORPORATISM IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY
FEBRUARY 2008
PAUL S. ADAMS, B.A., GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY
M.A., FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Eric S. Einhom
The impact of European integration and the emergence of a multi-level system of
governance within the European Union have begun to challenge the pre-existing systems
of governance in many European states. There has been a prevalent belief that the new
modes of governance have been supplanting domestic political structures especially in
the areas of political economy. Much literature argued that neo-corporatism was being
subsumed by the enormity of the European Union and its new mechanisms of
governance. However, this research illustrates that the results of the Europeanization of
neo-corporatist social partnerships are far from uniform and monolithic. There exists a
tremendous diversity and differentiation amongst the methods, results, and preferences of
European integration allowing considerable necessity for specific cases studies in policy
areas. Further, in using previously developed models of Europeanization it has been
discovered that such models fail to accurately and fully explain the pattern of diversity
and differentiation that exists in the Europeanization process. The cases of German and
Austrian social partnership illustrate such differentiation and continuing challenges and
are the focal points of this research.
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CHAPTER 1
EUROPEANIZATION & THE SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP
Introduction
This research endeavors to uncover, measure, and analyze the impact of European
integration and governance upon domestic neo-corporatist political structures,
collectively known as the social partnership, in Austria and Germany. During the last two
decades, scholars have documented a remarkable decline in the efficacy and utility of
neo-corporatist structures of policymaking and governance throughout Europe. (Streeck
and Schnutter 1991; Crepaz 1992; Goebyn 1993) It has been suggested that European
integration and its resulting particularistic and multi-level patterns of governance and
policymaking have been significant contributors to this decline in neo-corporatism.
(Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991)
The results of this research will demonstrate that European integration and
governance is having a number of measurable impacts on the social partnership in both
Austria and Germany, though with significant variation between and within the cases.
However, given other endogenous and exogenous pressures including globalization,
structural economic change, post-materialism, and domestic political changes, the overall
impact of Europeanization on neo-corporatist policymaking regimes has actually been
modest. This research shall demonstrate that while there has been significant structural
change in the German social partnership since the 1980s, Europeanization has had a
somewhat haphazard role in such change. Conversely, while Austria has seen only
intermediate structural change to its system of social partnership, this transformation has
been more greatly influenced, though still at relatively modest levels, by Europeanization.
This is not to say that important changes have not taken place. While the structures and
processes of the social partnerships have seen only modest alteration by Europeanization,
the net impact and utility of such structures has certainly undergone significant change.
With the increased intensity, scope, and progress of European integration and
governance since the 1980s, domestic political structures have become far more
susceptible to the forces of Europeanization. National neo-corporatist structures are no
exception. However, the impact of such Europeanization has been decidedly differential
amongst the EU member states. (Schmidt 2006; Hertier 2001; Falkner 2004; Dyson 2003;
Hix and Goetz 2001; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001 ) It will be herein argued that
variations in the impact and responses to European integration and governance lie in the
specific institutionalization of the social partnership in each state's policymaking and
governance patterns. Neo-corporatist systems, while generally in decline and undergoing
structural change since the 1980s, may continue to survive, influence the policymaking
process, and provide effective governance within their domestic political systems, and
potentially at the European level, provided that they exhibit adaptability and
compatibility vis-a-vis European modes of governance.
This research endeavors to understand and explain the impact of European
integration and governance upon neo-corporatism within the context of the scholarship of
Europeanization. The bulk of the Europeanization literature seeks to comprehend how
European integration transforms, or fails to transform, domestic political policies,
institutions, processes, or structures. This research will comparatively analyze the
specific institutional and political characteristics of the German and Austrian social
partnerships so as to understand and explain if, when, how, and to what extent European
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integration and governance is causing domestic structural change or continuity. The
conclusions uncovered show a decidedly inconsistent and variable pattern of influence
and impact in the German and Austria cases. This may suggest significant and
fundamental weaknesses in the models of Europeanization developed so far.
European Integration & Europeanization
In most Europeanization research, European integration and governance are
utilized and defined as a source of pressure upon national neo-corporatist political
structures, in essence it is interested in how member states adapt to the “evolving
European public sphere”. (Schmidt 2006) The term Europeanization is generally applied
to the approach and literature that studies the types and methods of change or continuity
brought forth though the process of European integration. Hence it is a very much “top-
down” emphasis on how processes, policies, and pressures from the supranational level
impinge upon, alter, or transform processes, institutions, actors, and structures at the
domestic level. (Borzel and Risse 2003)
However, much like the term globalization, Europeanization is more properly
descriptive of a complex multi-level process and regime of interactions. rather than a
single level or unidirectional force. (Dyson 2003; Schuppert 2006; Schmidt 2006) While
many think of globalization as something that happens to states, societies, and actors in
the international system, it is much better defined as the product of interaction between
both global and domestic forces in shaping the international order. Globalization is not
merely an international phenomenon that happens to states, cultures, and people. It is also
the constitutive process of actors responding to the pressures of globalism, such as those
favoring global free trade, global telecommunications and media connectivity.
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recognition of global environmental and health threats, and universal human rights,
within their domestic political, social, and economic institutions while simultaneously
attempting to affect the globalization process through political organizations, regimes and
norms of behavior. (Adams 2001, 2002, 2007) In eseence, globalization cannot be
construed as a unidirectional process. Nor can it be assumed to have a teleological
conclusion.
Europeanization should be conceptualized in a similar vein. It is not only the force
and institutionalization of European integration that creates Europeanization. It is also a
constitutive and interactive process between the European-levels of governance with
domestic-level actors, institutions, and processes seeking to shape the European order.
(Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006; Schuppert 2006) Notably, Europeanization differs from
globalization in that it has a more advanced level of institutionalization through the rules,
regulations, agencies, and institutions of the European Union (EU). While the World
Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations (UN), International Criminal Court (ICC),
World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) seem to provide some institutional
organization to the forces of global integration, in comparison to the supranational
authority vested in the European Union, globalization falls far behind the level of
supranationalism found w ithin the EU. (Hennis 2001 ; Weber 2001
)
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The member states of the European Union have ceded unparalleled levels of
authority to the supranational institution, making it far more autonomous than most other
international organizations. The EU fundamentally shapes not just the policies of its
members (and potential members and neighbors), but can also shape the very nature of
policymaking, politics, economic, and social organization within its member states
through its institutional and legal authority. (Schmidt 2006)
Understanding the scope, process, institutions, and structures of European
integration has drawn a tremendous bounty of scholarly and policy attention in both
international relations and comparative politics. The Europeanization approach is only
one such approach within the scholarship of European integration. Yet it is a fast growing
approach. The majority of European integration analysis has been traditionally dominated
by the overarching goal of understanding how and why states engage in the integration
process. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Schmidt 2006) This is a decidedly interstate and purely
intergovernmental level of analysis that seeks to assess integration in terms of the
negotiation, compromise, debate, preferences, and interests of the states taking part in the
process. (Deutsch 1957, 1967; Dinan 1994; Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Pinder 1998;
Tsoukalis 1997) There is also significant scholarship focused upon the institutional
design and framework by which the EU operates. As both an international and
supranational organization with many state-like characteristics and functions, the EU
itself has become synonymous with European integration and is often the central variable
in its explanation. (Cram 1997; Hix 2005; Nugent 2001 , 2006)
While these two approaches to studying European integration are valuable they do
tend to discount the transformational impact of European integration upon political
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systems, processes, institutions, and structures within member states. (Lodge 2000) This
is not to say that the specific content and institutionalization of integration policy have
been ignored. Quite to the contrary, there have been a number of important and
influential works on the process and effects of European integration upon national and
regional economic sectors and policy outputs. (Button, Haynes, and Stough 1998;
Eliassen and Sjovaag 1999; Fennell 1997; Gardner 1996; Grant, 1997; Knill and
Lenschow 1998; Kurzer 1993; McCormick 2001 ) These studies of integration tend to
focus upon quantifiable and tangible regulatory, policy, and market effects of EU
policymaking.
Yet scholarship has only recently begun to encompass an under-appreciated
aspect of European integration, the impact upon national political processes and
structures. This growing Europeanization scholarship is addressing how the integration of
Europe and the creation, administration, and expansion of a European level of economic
and political governance fundamentally challenges or modifies existing norms, political
institutions and processes, or structures, at the state level. (Alter 2001; Andersen and
Eliassen 1993; Hooghe 1996; Sbragia 1992; Lodge 2000; Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003;
Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006)
Structure implies far more than policy outputs and preferences. Domestic
structures are regularized and patterned relationships that are stable over time. This
encompasses not just policy but also the formal and informal institutions, as well as the
norms and beliefs upon which such institutions and policymaking processes rely.
(Schmidt 2006) The social partnership in both Germany and Austria are notable precisely
because of their traditional structural role in policymaking and governance within their
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political systems. The structure of social partnership includes not just specific agencies,
commissions, and other formal institutions, but also the informal patterns of behavior,
norms, expectations, and regularized processes that legitimate and underlie the systems.
The Europeanization scholarship has generally encapsulated a domestic structural
approach seeking to understand and explain the supranational sources of domestic change
or continuity. This genre of integration studies also includes the creation, growth, and
maintenance of a multi-tiered system of governance (supranational, regional, national,
sub-national) amongst the member states and the EU. This is often collectively classified
under the banner of multi-level governance within integration scholarship. (Goetz and
Hix 2001; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; Hooghe 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001;
Kmll 2001; Streeck 1991; Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003)
The creation of a multi-tiered system of governance is one of the notable
transformational impacts of European integration. Neo-corporatist institutions and
processes at the national level may be subject to such transformational influence. Neo-
corporatist institutions and processes have been integral features of the postwar economic
and political systems, and successes, of many states, including the cases of this research,
Austria and Germany. Yet the Europeanization of national political systems could
challenge the persistence and efficacy of neo-corporatism at the national level. Some
scholars initially believed that neo-corporatist institutions and structures at the European-
level might supplant those at the state-level. (Gorges 1996)
However, the creation of salient European level neo-corporatism has failed to
materialize and the vast majority of integration scholarship tends to discount this as likely
in the current context of EU policymaking institutions and structures. (Streeck and
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Schmitter 1991; Sargent 1985; Greenwood 2003a; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998;
Streeck 1991 ) As Hix and Goetz posit, Brussels is more like Washington in its “richness,
complexity, pluralism, and openness of the ‘policy community' than any other national
capital in Europe”. (2000, 8) EU-level governance does have some semblances of neo-
corporatism in its social dialogue and common agricultural policy, yet it is far from a
duplication of national structures at the supranational level. (Berger 1981; Sargent 1985;
Compston and Greenwood 2001; Greenwood 2003a; Dyson 2003) Perhaps policymaking
at the European governance has even heralded an entirely new form of governance that
does not fit well into the preexisting models. (Falkner 2000; Pelinka 1999; Schuppert
2006; Schmidt 2006) As Dyson suggests, the interweaving of EU and domestic levels and
forms of governance has created a new political dynamic. (2003) Schmidt sees the EU as
a compound policymaking system in which governance is highly dispersed and
somewhat irregular. Hence, the EU-level of policymaking diverges from most national
patterns suggesting adaptation pressures for almost all forms of governance. (Schmidt
2006; Hertier and Knill 2001; Falkner 2000) This may have specific implications for the
future of neo-corporatism at both the national and supranational levels. The current and
future exigencies and opportunities for neo-corporatism at the EU level will be discussed
in both chapters three and eight.
The Europeanization literature seeks to assess if, how, and when state-level
institutions, processes, and actors adapt to the forces of European-level economic and
political governance. In essence, it seeks to determine how European integration
correlates to or causes domestic change or continuity. For Hix and Goetz,
Europeanization has two types of impacts upon domestic actors and institutions:
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( 1 ) the delegation of policy competences to the European
level and the resulting political outcomes constrain domestic
choice, reinforce certain policy and institutional developments,
and provide a catalyst for change in others; and
(2) the establishment of a higher level of governance
institutions provides new opportunities to exit from domestic
constraints, either to promote certain policies, or to veto others,
or to secure informational advantages. (2000, 8)
To paraphrase, existing domestic institutions’ choices are now more greatly shaped or
limited by the capabilities of the European Ehuon that may lead to structural and
procedural changes in the domestic institutions themselves. (Lodge 2000; Schmidt 2006)
In addition, actors and interests in domestic political systems have new conduits to
bypass national policymaking institutions and proceed directly to the supranational level
of the EU. As Schmidt posits, “the focus of interest access and influence has moved from
national capitals to Brussels” as once-domestically oriented and organized social,
economic, and civil society groups become “enmeshed in an EU policy-formulation
process which involves a vast array of actors in a highly complex set of interactions with
multiple points of entry”. (2006)
The primary theoretical models of this work rest in the scholarship of Simon Mix,
Klaus Goetz, Adrienne Heritier, Vivien A. Schmidt, Christoph Knill, Thomas Risse-
Kappen, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso, as well as others, who have provided
valuable scholarship and frameworks by which to analyze the impacts of Europeanization
upon formal and informal institutions and structures at the state level. (Hix and Goetz
2000; Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Kmll 2001; Heritier 2001; Schmidt
2006) This literature and the framework it provides will be explored in much greater
detail in later chapters of this research
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In essence, the Europeanization framework seeks to explain variation amongst
member states' adaptation to the process of European integration since the results show
“neither wholesale convergence nor continuing divergence of national policy structures,
institutions, and other patterned relationships." Rather, the evidence tends to support the
conclusion that national institutions and features do matter and tend to result in “domestic
adaptation with national colors'’. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 1 ) The
impacts of Europeanization upon domestic structures are inconsistent and variable.
(Schmidt 2006) In some cases, the existing political structures at the national level are
generally compatible with the requirements and forces of Europeanization. These
preexisting structures “fit” and work within the new Europeanized order. In fact, some
national institutions and structures may be reinforced and empowered by European
integration. EU regional policies may have helped reinforce preexisting regional
authority in states like Germany or those with existent devolutionary processes such as in
Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy. (Borzel 1999, 2001, 2002; Hix and Goetz 2000)
However, the greater the misfit between European institutions and processes and
the domestic structures the greater the transformational force, what Risse, Cowles, and
Caporaso call adapational pressure and Hix and Goetz label as catalyst. (Risse-Kappen.
Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000; Schmidt 2006) Yet domestic structural
change does not uniformly result from increased adapational pressures of
Europeanization. (Lodge 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006; Heritier and Knill 2001)
While the framework assesses how Europeanization places adaptational pressure on
states to converge with European standards, it additionally addresses the states' response
to such pressures is dependent upon the presence or absence of particular domestic
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characteristics. These may include specific mediating factors at the state-level: multiple
veto points, facilitating formal institutions, organizational and policymaking cultures,
differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and
Caporaso 2001, 2) For Hix and Goetz, the likelihood of domestic change increases when
domestic actors, institutions, or processes have increased opportunities at the European
level in three areas: new exit pathways, new veto powers, and gaining informational
advantage. (2000, 13) All of these measurements and criteria will be discussed in greater
detail in chapters two and eight.
These frameworks provide a reasonably elegant rubric for assessing the impact of
Europeanization upon the neo-corporatist structures of the Austrian and German political
systems. Both social partnerships are influenced to some extent by European integration
and governance, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters. However, as much of
the Europeanization scholarship suggests, the necessity to adapt can only be discerned by
analyzing how well the social partnership fits or misfits the institutions and processes of
European integration. Essentially, misfit between EU and national modes of governance
is a necessary precondition for domestic structural change. (Schmidt 2006; Borzel and
Risse 2003; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001 ) Hence Europeanization will cause
significant adaptational pressure on systems that exhibit strong misfit as might occur in
national patterns of social partnership.
However, the results of this misfit and increased adaptational pressures are neither
automatic nor consistent across member states. Europeanization has generally discovered
the dominance of differential responses to similar pressures based upon the specific
institutional features of the national systems. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001;
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Schmidt 2006) Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso argue that the variable responses to
European level adaptational pressures from state to state are explained by the presence or
absence of the mediating factors. Hence the Europeanization framework suggested by
Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso should provide, if accurate, a regularized or predictable
pattern of domestic structural change in neo-corporatism stemming from the
adapatational pressures of Europeanization filtered through the mediating factors of
domestic institutionalization. (2001)
The results, if successful, would provide context from the German and Austrian
cases for assessing the impact of Europeanization on Dutch, Danish, Irish, Belgian,
Spanish, Swedish, Swiss social partnerships and neo-corporatist structures. The results, if
supporting and reaffirming the Europeanization framework, would also suggest broader
applicability of the model to other domestic structures that may be under adaptational
pressures from Europeanization. Hence this is not only an analysis and study of the
Austrian and German social partnerships but also a test of the applicability and viability
of the Europeanization frameworks that have been previously developed. (Risse. Cowles,
and Caporaso 2001 ; Borzel and Risse 2003; Schmidt 2006)
It should be noted that the Europeanization frameworks have tended to define
European integration and governance as independent variables. However, it seems clear
that it is in fact not truly independent from the impact of the very state-level institutions
that are being analyzed in this research. European integration itself has had an indirect
effect by creating new social, economic, and political schisms based upon pro-European
and Euro-skeptical preferences and ideologies that cut across traditional left-right
divisions. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 1 1; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Dyson 2003; Paterson
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2003) In addition, the neo-corporatist structures and actors in European states are likely
to have some measurable influence over the state's integration interests and policies.
(Schmidt, 2006)
It is herein recognized that disaggregating the supranational level of the European
Union from the domestic level of the member states is both problematic and potentially
unsolvable. European integration may beget domestic change that begets changes to
European integration. This system is one that has feedback and readjustments occurring
on both sides of the equation. (Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) However, by delimiting
European integration and its Europeanizing effects upon the social partnership in the
German and Austrian systems, perhaps we can glimpse an important and transformational
mechanism of the European integration process that will be useful in better understanding
the totality of the relationship between the European Union and its member states. This
debate over the “top-down” versus “bottom-up” Europeanization will be revisited in the
concluding chapter, as it is an important element in assessing the applicability and
viability of the dominant Europeanization frameworks.
Theoretical Considerations: Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism
The social partnerships in Austria and Germany are forms of neo-corporatist
interest representation, policymaking, and governance. Neo-corporatism and corporatism,
in both theory and practice, will be explored in greater detail in later chapters. However, a
cursory introduction seems warranted at this point. Corporatism is both a theoretical
concept and an institutional method of organizing interest group activity and behavior.
While there are debates over numerous and varying definitions, corporatism is a form of
limited or regulated interest group representation and organization.
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Most corporatist systems are typified by social, economic, or other forms of
interest groups being granted, licensed, or endowed with a representative monopoly over
a specific sector of social, economic, or labor activity and a guaranteed or even veto,
position in the policymaking process. (Cawson 1986; Lehmbruch 1982; Chalmers 1985;
Collier and Collier 1979; Wiarda 1997) Additionally, in some systems these groups are
often empowered or tasked to perform quasi-regulatory and direct administrative
functions over their membership as well as in areas of economic policy, vocational
education, social insurance, labor-capital relations, and labor market governance.
(Katzenstein 1987; O’Sullivan 1988; Williamson 1985; Cox 1988)
The primary competing theory of interest group organization and politics is
pluralism. The distinctions between pluralism and corporatism will be further explored in
chapter three. Primarily the distinctions are of participatory openness and the role of the
state. Corporatism, and its more modem democratic form found in neo-corporatism,
regulates or coordinates interest group activity by limiting the number of participants,
narrowing the range of policy options, and usually relying upon the state to play an
important role in intermediating, negotiating, or directing the policymaking process.
(Wiarda 1997; Cox 1988) This is most dissimilar from pluralism which places few
restrictions on either the numbers or activities of interest groups in the political system.
However, many have argued that pluralism often creates large inequalities and
disparities that belie its supposed liberal and democratic emphasis. (Lowi 1979; Olson
1965) Importantly, pluralism also tends to envision the state playing a less interventionist
role in the policymaking process. (Zeigler 1988; Wiarda 1997; Williamson 1989)
Though, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, in some eases the decline of neo-
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corporatism has resulted in greater reliance upon a direct state role in the policymaking
and governance processes commensurate with the decline of the other ma jor corporatist
actors. (Vail 2003; Falkner and Talos 1994)
While pluralism has often been associated with liberalism and democracy,
corporatism has often been linked with authoritarianism especially in the cases of
Southern Europe and Latin America, and perhaps rightfully so. (Field 1938; Sarti 1971;
Wiarda 1968; Grayson 1998) The regimes of Benito Mussolini in Italy, Francisco Franco
in Spain, Antonio Salazar in Portugal, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Lazaro Cardenas and the
Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) in Mexico, and Juan Peron in Argentina used
corporatist frameworks and ideology as important tools of state power and dictatorship.
(Wiarda 1981, 1997; Malloy 1977; Adams 2004)
Yet the association of corporatism with authoritarianism ignores a large number
of cases in free and democratic societies especially in Europe. Hence the term neo-
corporatism has been regularly used to differentiate between authoritarian and democratic
variants of corporatism. Neo-corporatism describes democratic or non-authoritarian
versions of corporatist institutions that emerged primarily in Western Europe, including
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden,
and Norway, during the early and mid-twentieth century. (Adams 2004; Chalmers 1985;
Williamson 1985; Williamson 1989) These neo-corporatist arrangements have been more
commonly labeled as the “social partnership” in many states, eschewing use of the
corporatist terminology and its perceived authoritarian stigma, as well as to provide a
more accessible label for mass political consumption. Nonetheless, they share many of
the fundamanetal and essential characteristics of corporatism.
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This research will attempt to address a fundamental question regarding change
and neo-corporatism that has not been adequately addressed by the scholarship. While
many have theorized about the factors and features underlying the creation and
maintenance of corporatist and neo-corporatist institutions and processes, there has been
a dearth of persuasive theory and argument regarding the potential for neo-corporatist
change or transformation. Much of the existing work assumes that the decline of neo-
corporatism will necessarily result in the creation of more neo-liberal and pluralist
institutions and regimes. (Crepaz 1994; Gerlich 1992; Gobeyn 1993; Streeck 1991;
Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Schmidt 2006) However, corporatism and neo-corporatism
may be far more than mere steppingstones on the path to the inevitable neo-liberal and
pluralist future. The very challenges to the existing neo-corporatist order may be the
building blocks of future iterations of social partnership. (Wiarda 1997)
While neo-corporatism may not universally fit into the processes and structures of
European multi-level governance, some neo-corporatist structures may very well fit or
adapt to the new European environment. (Falkner 1997, 2000, 2001, Falkner and Leiber
2004; Heinisch 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) The results could encompass anything
between minor institutional and technocratic reforms with relatively few long-term
implications or wholesale transformation of neo-corporatist structures that permanently
impact the efficacy and viability of the social partnership altogether. Hence this research
shall necessarily endeavor to analyze the compatibility or fit of neo-corporatism and
European modes of governance.
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The underlying theoretical, social, economic, and political foundations of
corporatism and neo-corporatism may themselves suggest a high level of susceptibility to
pressures from European integration and governance. Put simply, neo-corporatism may
have some critical and foundational characteristics that make it less than fully compatible
with the process of European integration and multi-level governance. (Streeck and
Schmitter 1991 ) However, it may also have some characteristics that are amenable to
multilevel governance and there is always the opportunity for institutions, actors, and
structures to adapt and thrive in changed environments. (Katzenstein 2003; Falkner 2000,
2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)
This research shall explore to what extent neo-corporatism meshes with the
process of European integration and governance through a review of the relevant theories
and literature of corporatism and neo-corporatism starting with its philosophical roots,
major premises and assumptions, and empirical historical results of its implementation It
will uncover and analyze to what extent corporatism and neo-corporatism are capable of
fitting into the context of European modes of supranational and multi-level governance.
While many elements of corporatism appear to be antithetical to these trends, they
are not exhaustively so. Hence, while the essential underpinnings of corporatism and neo-
corporatism may create some misfit between their domestic structures and the process of
European integration and governance, the results are not absolute and are significantly
dependent upon particularistic structural and institutional responses by the domestic
systems. (Schmidt 2006) In Europeanization tenns, neo-corporatism may not be a perfect
or even good fit with the current modes of European governance but the eventual
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outcomes of that misfit are quite variable. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Hertier
and Kmll 2001; Schmidt 2006)
As noted earlier, not all elements of neo-corporatism are necessarily divergent
with institutions and practices of governance at the European level. To begin, there are
still debates over how to categorize the European policymaking model. As Falkner and
others suggest, the EU may be an entirely new form of governance that fails to fit well
w ith any preexisting models of policymaking whether pluralist, corporatist, or statist.
(Falkner 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) Hence it should not be surprising that the
Europeanization scholarship generally argues that there are few cases of absolute
divergence or convergence. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Lodge 2000)
However, there are degrees of convergence and divergence based on national institutional
variables. As will be illustrated and argued in chapter three, there seems to be sufficient
divergence between neo-corporatism and European multi-level governance to suggest at
least some misfit and therefore heighten adaptational pressures upon national structures
of social partnership. (Falkner 1997, 2001; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Dyson 2003)
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Even those that suggest a relative fit between neo-corporatism and EU modes of
policymaking and governance admit to important misfits and misalignments on a number
of fronts and in a number of sectors. ( Schmidt 2006) The organizations, ideals, and
conditions elemental to corporatism and neo-corporatism may sometimes run counter to
those of European modes of governance. However, even with increased adaptational
pressure placed upon neo-corporatist structures by European integration and governance,
adoption of domestic political structural change is not uniform. Variations in the national
institutionalization of neo-corporatism through the social partnership in each state should
determine the scope and pace of structural change or of continuity.
Cases: The Social Partnership in Austria and Germany
Corporatism and neo-corporatism are found in almost infinite varieties and the
social partnerships are just some forms amongst many. (Williamson 1985; Cawson 1985,
1986) Just as amongst democracies, institutional and political distinctions amongst neo-
corporatist regimes often matter a great deal. Many neo-corporatist regimes are broadly
known as Sozialpartnerschaft or social partnership in which consensual policymaking
institutions and processes between major business interests, organized labor, agriculture,
and the state were developed in several European states beginning in the early twentieth
century. While there are similarities between the social partnerships of Germany and
Austria there are also critical differences. (Heimsch 2000) The variation amongst the
social partnerships can be based on cultural, economic, social, historical, institutional,
and political developments. While Germany and Austria are facing similar challenges to
their social partnerships from a number of forces including European modes of
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governance, the impacts, consequences of, and responses to such forces may vary. This
research will provide a comparative analysis of the preconditions, development,
institutions, functions, and structures of the social partnership in both states as well as an
assessment of how such distinctions in the social partnership have impacted their
development and changes since the end of World War II.
A fundamental question is, of course, why does structural transformation of the
social partnership matter in these, or any, cases? In essence, a possible response to the
pressures and transformation of state-level social partnerships very well might be “so
what”. The political, social, cultural institutionalization of the social partnership in
European states suggests that a careful and sober analysis of its potential transformation
is justified. The social partnership is often given significant credit for contributing to both
economic prosperity and political stability during the postwar era in states such as
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
and others.
While the amount of credit to which it is entitled is subject to some debate, there
is general acceptance as well as meaningful evidence that the social partnership made a
tangible contribution in providing the basis for remarkable levels of both economic
growth and political stability in these states. (Katzenstein 1978, 1984, 1985, 1987;
Pekkarinen et al. 1992; Scholten 1987) By establishing a consensual system of interest
representation and policymaking, it is often argued that the postwar miracles of Germany,
Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands were even more miraculous in
economic and political terms.
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By the 1990s, many scholars, analysts, and policymakers suggested that the social
partnership was in decline or perhaps even at the brink of extinction. (Gerlich 1992;
Gobeyn 1993; Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Schmitter and Grote 1997)
However, most analysis has not tended to suggest that the social partnership and neo-
corporatism are disappearing or being abandoned rather they are becoming less critical
features of many European state’s political systems. Arend Lijphardt argued “the efficacy
of corporatist structures and the frequency of their use has decreased, not that these
structures themselves have disappeared or are being dismantled”. (1999, I 73) The impact
of Europeanization in the overall decline of neo-corporatism is rather contested. (Streeck
and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 2001; Falkner 2000; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Schmidt
2006) Nonetheless, the bulk of the analyses of the past twenty years have pointed to some
significant marginalization or decline in the social partnership and other neo-corporatist
structures in many states including Germany and Austria and the role of Europeanization
has often been prominent.
The social partnerships of postwar Germany and Austria do indeed seem to have
been structurally transformed, or are still undergoing transformation, by numerous
economic, social, and political phenomena occurring at the domestic, regional, and global
levels. The transformation of Europe from an era of industrialism to post-industrialism,
changing social and political identities, the economic and political integration of Europe,
and the globalization of domestic economies have put pressure upon the postwar social
partnerships in all European states, not just the states that are the subject of this research.
While this research will focus upon the forces from European integration and
governance, it does not in any way discount or fail to recognize the specific national or
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global social, economic, and political forces that are also potentially influencing and
transforming domestic political institutions within European states. It is likely that the
transformation of the social partnership is linked to phenomena at all levels, national,
regional, and global. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) Disaggregating these forces is difficult,
and perhaps impossible. (Haverland 2005; Schmidt 2006) However, due to the
supranational character of the EU and the increasing power of its modes of governance to
limit or transform national institutions and policymaking, it seems reasonable and
profitable to limit this research endeavor to attempt to evaluate the specific impact of
European integration and governance upon the social partnership. This would have
inherent scholarly value for future research assessing the impact of other national,
regional, and global forces potentially challenging the social partnership as well as in
assessing to what extent Europeanization might transform other domestic political
structures.
This research shall assess and analyze the Austrian and German social
partnerships within the context of Europeanization framework established by Risse,
Cowles, and Caporaso, amongst others. While both German and Austrian neo-corporatist
structures may be facing adaptational pressure, the likelihood and types of domestic
structural change should vary. A key question and analytical focus is in explaining not
only such variances but what is likely to contribute to such variances.
According to the framework, the German and Austrian states’ responses to
pressures of Europeanization are dependent upon the presence or absence of five
mediating factors; multiple veto points, facilitating formal institutions, organizational and
policymaking cultures, differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning.
(Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001 ) In addition, and as will be integrated into and
throughout this research, Hix and Goetz identify several related factors that would also
explain domestic institutional change: new exit pathways, new veto powers, and gaining
informational advantages. (2000)
Risse, Cowles and Caporaso and Hix and Goetz argue that it is these specific
domestic institutional features of the social partnership and their relevant policy actors
that are primarily deterministic of how each will structurally adapts to the pressures of the
new European economic, social, and political environment. Logically, neo-corporatist
regimes that are characterized by adaptability and flexibility towards modes of European
integration and governance may very well survive and maintain efficacy, even if in a
more limited form. The adaptive qualities of the social partnership, correlating to the
eight overall mediating factors, are therefore central in understanding and analyzing its
ability to meet the challenges of European integration and governance. (Risse, Cowles,
and Caporaso 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000)
Within the context of Europeanization, responsiveness and tlexibility of the social
partnership would be necessary for such structures to adapt to the integrated European
environment. Less flexible and more static regimes and actors would potentially be less
likely to undertake domestic political structural change, leaving structures that would
potentially lack efficacy, effectiveness, and salience. This is one of the most
fundamentally intriguing aspects of the Europeanization of the social partnership due in
no small part to the longstanding argument that the social partnership was successful
precisely because of its inherent flexibility and responsiveness to changes in the
international and regional economic environment. (Katzenstein 19X4, 1985)
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The primary argument made by many, most notably articulated by Katzenstein, is
that the social partnership allowed greater national flexibility and responsiveness to the
international economy, allowing these states’ economies to flourish during the postwar
era. The social partnership provided institutions and processes that allowed expedient
implementation of national economic policy. Katzenstein argues that this was best
typified by the smaller European polities such as the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland,
and the Scandinavian states which faced “less than advantageous conditions” in the
global economic environment of the postwar world. (Katzenstein 1984, 19) Smaller
states' abilities to compete and thrive in the international marketplace were far more
precarious than larger states, whose internal market size and strength provided
comparative advantages. For Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian
states, the neo-corporatist solution of the social partnership was strongly connected with
their foreign economic policy strategies of ensuring survival in a growing global
economy. (Katzenstein 1978, 1980, 1984, 1985, 1987)
Given the scale of their state and its economy, this should not have been a primary
concern of the postwar German republic. Upon reconstruction, no small feat in itself, the
German economy dwarfed that of its smaller neighbors and established itself amongst the
dominant European and global economies. Yet, despite its economic size and capability,
the German political economy looks similar those across their Austrian frontiers.
Katzenstein argues that the German political economy “comes closer than any other large
industrial state to the logic by which political life in the small European states is
organized”. (Katzenstein 1985, 3 1 ) The trauma of the war and the scope of reconstruction
required a national consensus on a range of economic and social issues. It also resulted in
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a state that ceded regulatory, quasi-govemmental, and direct economic governance roles
to the social partners representing business, labor, and agriculture. Even after immediate
reconstruction, the maintenance of the social partnership and the state’s “semi-
sovereignty” continued to be a fundamental feature of German political and economic
success. (Katzenstein 1987)
Hence the social partnership was more than a mere product of foreign economic
policy; it was also a product of ideological and political choice. Katzenstein’s defining
characteristics of democratic corporatism include not only the institutions of consensus
but also “an ideology of social partnership expressed the national level”. ( 1984, 27)
Austria, Germany, and other states adopted the social partnership not merely to address
particular political, economic, and social dilemmas of the postwar world, but also
because they possessed what might be called an “elective affinity” for neo-corporatist
policymaking institutions and procedures. (Schmitter 1979) The pillarization of Dutch
society into its Calvinist, Catholic, and Socialist components, the longstanding and
unsettled conflict between the conservative right and social democratic left in Austria,
and the social necessity for rebuilding an inclusive, stable, and democratic German state
in the rubble of World War II all placed extraordinary social and cultural emphasis upon
creation of political institutions and structures that promoted accommodation and
consensus over division and competition. ( Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Katzenstein 1987;
Lijphart 1968; Schmidt 2006)
Hence, while the social partnership is a product of economic and political
institutional events it was also backed by political cultural and ideological ideals of the
postwar Austrian and German societies. The debates over the institutional and political
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cultural bases of neo-corporatism and the social partnership will be explored in much
greater detail in chapters three, four, and five. Nonetheless, the social partnership reflects
more than an institutional solution to political economic dilemmas facing states; it also
often represents a cultural and historical tradition of accommodative politics.
(Katzenstein 1985; Lijphart 1975, 1999)
In addition to its economic impacts, the social partnership also requires, promotes,
and reinforces a stable political relationship between the major interest groups, political
parties, and the institutions of the state. The functions of the social partnership are
dependent upon a high level of coordination, compromise, and collectivity between the
major socio-economic and political actors in the system. It necessitates a prerequisite
willingness to work consensually and within an accepted narrow range of possible
political maneuvers and policy processes. The ability to consensually formulate and
expediently implement economic policy must be based on mutually accepted and agreed
upon political institutions and procedures. Hence, “economic flexibility is contingent on
political stability”. (Katzenstein 1984, 85) Lack of political stability, such as public
efforts to block or veto the policymaking process by major economic actors, labor
groups, political parties, or other major political actors would undermine consensus-
driven institutions. Therefore, as the social partnership is built upon the foundations of
consensus, the ability for the social partnership to maintain efficacy, effectiveness, and
salience is dependent upon political stability. Without such stability, consensus becomes
difficult to manufacture and the neo-corporatist institutions fail to achieve their primary
tasks. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985, 1987; Lijphart 1975, 1999; Scholten 1987; Casey and
Gold 2000)
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Stability between business and labor was of paramount importance during the
postwar era. Stability was necessary to fully execute an effective and efficient
reconstruction, to construct new political and social institutions, and to face a new world
in which European states would be economically eclipsed by the United States and the
Soviet Union. While business and labor still vigorously competed for their respective
interests, the debate and conflict was contained, or incorporated, under the auspices of the
state’s neo-corporatist institutions rather than in the public realm. The social partnerships
were responsible for managing labor-capital conflict so as to generate results beneficial to
the entire state. An important underlying element of the social partnership, and neo-
corporatism in general, is a conception of a national economic interest that underlies the
rationale for consensual capital-state-labor relations. This solidarity to a greater national
good is a necessary element for the social partnership to function properly. (Katzenstein
1984, 1987; Pelinka 1999)
As Austrian and German economies have become more integrated into the
European and global economies, all sectors, firms, and labor organizations within both
states have, by necessity, reconstituted their interests in relation to the new economic
environment. In earlier eras, German and Austrian interests may have been both willing
and able to commit themselves to the ideals of solidarity and consensus within the social
partnership. Striving to achieve results that benefited all of German and Austrian
societies was both a necessity of the postwar era and a political and philosophical choice.
However, in the new era of globally and regionally integrated economies, firms are far
more susceptible to foreign competition and dependence upon foreign markets for
profitability while unions struggle to hold on to the remaining manufacturing jobs not
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exported overseas. This has undermined the commitment to the social partnership by
many of the interests who constituted the backbone of the postwar social partnerships in
both states. (Adams 2002a; Greenwood 2003; Streeck 1996; Schmidt 2006) These
mechanisms and consequences will be explored more fully in later chapters of this
research.
Labor-business stability was paralleled by extraordinary political stability in both
states during the postwar era. While there were electoral changes, the scale of such
change was often small. While electoral fortunes changed the balance in favor of one
party or coalition to another, the results of electoral change did not necessarily beget
major policy changes in the area of the social partnership. In Germany, the dominance of
the Christian Democratic Party/Christian Socialist Party (CDU/CSU) was interrupted
only in the late 1960s and the emergence of a grand coalition with the Social Democratic
Party (SDP). In Austria, the Socialist Party of Austria (SPO) and the Austrian People's
Party (OVP) had governed together in a grand coalition during seven of the thirteen terms
since 1945. Smaller third parties such as the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in Germany
and the Freedom Party (FPO) in Austria often acted as kingmaker coalition partners with
one of the larger parties. Nonetheless, the system showed remarkable continuity that has
“facilitated smooth changes in government and precluded radical policy shifts”. (Vail
2003; Katzenstein 1987; Pelinka 1998)
This required that political parties, while still democratically competitive amongst
one another, must actively engage and marshal the consensus-making process even when
their own electoral or parliamentary fortunes provide them with a majority. Hence while
electoral results might periodically shift the balance between parties or coalitions, the end
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results of the election process are far less transformational than those in more pluralist
systems. (Daalder 1987; Lijphart 1975; Muller 1996; Pulzer 1974; Scholten 1987; Sully
1981; Katzenstein 1987) The social partnership requires that parties refrain from radical
majoritarian policy shifts that would endanger the broader consensus-building institutions
and processes. Thomandl and Fuerboeck note that in Austria the social partnership
brought not only “virtually complete freedom from strikes and lockouts” but “internal
stability in party politics” as well. (1986, vii)
At issue is whether the social partnership, in the post-Cold War, post-industrial
post-Maastricht, and post-Uruguay Rounds global environment, remains as flexible as
Katzenstein and others suggest. The very flexibility of the social partnership is critical in
understanding how well such domestic institutions may respond and adapt to pressures
and forces of Europeanization. However, the crisis of the social partnership has generally
been ascribed to its inherent inflexibility of the social partnerships to adjust to the
challenges of thelate 20 th and early 2U' centuries. (The Economist 2003; Crepaz 1995;
Gerlich 1992; Gobeyn 1993; Heinisch 2000) The future survival and efficacy of the
social partnership will depend upon its flexibility to adjust and adapt to changing
international, regional, and domestic atmospheres.
In the language of Europeanization, how well does the social partnership adapt to
the multi-level governance and policymaking process that is emblematic of an integrated
European Union? As Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse argue, the ability of domestic
institutions to adapt into a wider European context is highly deterministic of the
institution’s success and survival. (2001) Hence, if social partnerships are flexible,
fluidic, and adaptive, neo-corporatism may be able to integrate itself into the institutions
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of multi-level European governance or at least may be more capable of cohabitating and
complementing with the new environment of multi-level governance. However, if the
domestic institutions of the social partnership are not nearly as responsive, reactive, and
adaptive as has once been argued, they will face growing challenges in maintaining
legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficacy in the policymaking and governance process.
(Falkner 2001; Heinisch 2000; Dyson 2003) As Hix and Goetz postulate, if domestic
actors and interests see enough strategic value in bypassing the national institutions for
institutions and policymaking processes at the supranational level of the EU, the viability
and efficacy of such domestic structures would likely steadily diminish. (2000)
Over the past two decades there has been growing evidence and analysis
suggesting the social partnership is in an increasingly severe state of decline or crisis and
perhaps is an “institutional dinosaur” nearing extinction. (Crepaz 1995; Gobeyn 1993,
1993a; Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991) Economically, prosperity and high
levels of annual growth have been replaced by increased structural unemployment and
glacially slow GDP growth especially in Austria and Germany. This has also been met
with greater business-labor unrest. But more importantly, many have suggested that the
social partnership is a critical factor contributing to these states being less economically
competitive and responsive to European and global economic challenges. (Pelinka 1998,
1999; Heinisch 2000; The Economist 2003) While Katzenstein and others have argued
that the social partnership was critical to increasing flexibility and responsiveness in the
German and Austrian economic policies, many current critiques and analyses have
reversed this conclusion. (Crepaz 1995; Gobeyn 1993; Streeck and Schmitter 1991;
Streeck 1991; Rose 2000; Schmitter and Grote 1997)
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The current trends in corporatist scholarship and public accounts tend to view the
social partnership as stoically inflexible and acting as a brake on efficient economies and
economic policymaking. At this point a peculiar chicken and egg question emerges. Has
the increasing instability of political and economic actors contributed to the demise of
effective social partnerships, or have less effective social partnerships led to diminishing
solidarity and increasing conflict amongst political and economic actors? Much research
has posited that European integration and governance is a substantial force upon the
social partnerships in Germany and Austria. Hence one answer is that social partnerships
are being pressured by European integration and governance in a mutually reinforcing
pattern that both lessens the efficacy of the domestic neo-corporatist structures while
simultaneously providing conduits for national-level social and economic interests to
bypass domestic institutions for those at the European level. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Dyson
2003; Schmidt 2006) While one can speculate that the increasing pace of European
integration that began in the mid 1980s signifies the “starting line”, it is perhaps
impossible to distinguish which force came first. The final result has been a cyclical
pattern of adapational pressure and catalysts upon the domestic structures of the social
partnership by European integration and governance. (Haverland 2005; Dyson 2003) The
variation in response and adaptation by the social partnership is what is being measured
and analyzed in this research and is therefore of primary concern. As the Europeanization
framework argues, each state’s specific institutionalization of the social partnership is
deterministic of how well neo-corporatist structures will continue to thrive and survive in
an ever-European economic and political atmosphere.
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Results: The Future of the Social Partnership
For Austria and Germany, the postwar social partnership reflected the social,
economic, and political cleavages of the late 19 th and first half of the 20th centuries. The
social partnership was designed and implemented to address the issues and dilemmas of
those decades, and to a great extent it was successful in rebuilding postwar economies,
addressing the demand for increased social stability, dramatically increasing the welfare
state, and boosting economic competitiveness and overall prosperity. The social
partnership is in many ways a victim of its own successes. (Luther and Muller 1 992;
Pelinka 1998, 1999) By transforming its political and economic systems so brilliantly, the
postwar social partnerships were perhaps left without salience and efficacy to address the
new problems of affluence, social peace, post-materialism, globalization,
Europeanization, and post-industrialism. The postwar social partnership may have
become anachronistic or even an institutionalized strategy to win the last war rather than
the current ones. The “exhausting grind of consensus” now often ascribed to the social
partnership was once an expedient and effective method of manufacturing consensual and
collective economic policy and governance. ( The Economist 2003)
Interestingly, the lack of flexibility and fluidity in the social partnership is both
one of its credits and deficits. Important socio-economic interests could not be easily
marginalized from the policymaking process, which made legitimate and successful
consensus not only possible but also necessary. (Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Gobeyn
1993; Hancock 1989; Katzenstein 1978; Lijphart 1968) On the other hand, the overall
success of the model has led to significant social and economic change that brought about
high levels of affluence, peace, and prosperity that brought European integration, and
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economic expansion that beget globalization, all of which have altered the underlying
demand for the postwar institutions of the social partnerships in the first place. While
there are fundamental challenges from European integration and governance, as well as
from other forces such as post-industrialism, post-materialism, and globalization, to the
traditional postwar model of social partnership in Austria and Germany this does not
necessary lead to the conclusion that the result will be extinction. While the postwar
social partnerships have perhaps become somewhat incompatible to the post-industrial,
post-Maastricht, and globalized economies and polities of Germany and Austria, evolved
neo-corporatist policymaking and interest representation structures may possibly continue
to possess effectiveness and efficacy in the policymaking and governance of the state.
(Heinisch 2000) As Schmitter has suggested, neo-corporatism possesses a “dynastic
continuity punctuated by periodic demise and subsequent resurrection”. ( 1989, 72;
Schmitter and Grote 1997)
As will be demonstrated in later chapters, the underlying economic, cultural,
political, and social characteristics of Austria and Germany still seem to possess an
elective affinity for consensual processes of interest articulation and policy formation.
And w hile the postwar social partnerships may have lost some of their utility and
efficacy, their adaptation or evolution from industrialized, state-oriented fixtures to
postindustrial and Europeanized structures could bolster the overall effectiveness,
efficacy, and salience of social partnerships in addressing the social, economic, and
political divisions of the twenty-first century rather than the twentieth. (Schmitter and
Grote 1997) Wiarda argues as the “industrial phase of corporatist tripartite relationships
is fading, new postindustrial issues (education, healthcare, welfare, the environment.
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others) are coming to the fore”. (1997, 175) However, the failure of social partnerships to
adapt or evolve to this new European, global, and postindustrial atmosphere could have
important and lasting consequences for its future viability.
As will be assessed in subsequent chapters, the results for the German and
Austrian cases are mixed and remain unsettled. Both states’ social partnerships are facing
some adaptational pressures from Europeanization as well as other forces and have
undergone measurable structural transformation. (Crepaz 1995; Kitschelt and Streeck
2004; Rose 2000; Vail 2003; Heinisch 2000; Falkner 2001; Dyson 2003) Yet the
development, meaning, scope, and implications of these transformations have been
differentiated between the Austrian and German models because of the divergent
institutionalization and structures of social partnership as well as other endogenous and
exogenous forces. (Heinisch 2000) The social partnership is facing innumerable
challenges from forces at the domestic, regional, and global level. This research is
primarily concerned with how and why national political structures fit or misfit, adapt or
fail to adapt, converge or diverge, to the pressures of European integration and
governance. While Europeanization is having some impact on social partnership in
Austria and Germany, it is a differentiated and unequal one.
This research also has a larger goal of illuminating and assessing the impact of
European integration and governance upon domestic political structures and the utility of
the existing Europeanization frameworks. The Europeanization of domestic political
institutions, processes and structures has emerged as an important and notable
consequence of the development of European integration and governance. The past
twenty-five years have seen an unparalleled widening and deepening of the EU and its
34
supranational policy authority and influence over its growing number of member states.
(Dinan 1994; Hooghe 2001; Kourvetaris and Moschonas 1996; McCormick 2004;
Nugent 2001; Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Scharpf 1996; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and
Fligstein 2001 ) The Europeanization of policy and policymaking processes has
potentially critical implications for the ways in which national actors and institutions
operate in their day-to-day duties of governance. (Lodge 2000; Knill 2001 ; Dyson 2003;
Schmidt 2006)
The transformational power of European integration and governance has been
generally under-appreciated by integration scholarship until the last decade; this research
hopes to add to the growing demand for such studies. The results do, however, bring into
question many of the assumptions, processes, and applications of the existing
Europeanization framework and the top-down tendencies of the models that have
dominated the literature for the past decade. The Europeanization framework of fit and
misfit, adaptational pressures, and mediating institutional factors has significant deficits
and failings. These will be more fully explored in chapter eight. However, the German
and Austrian cases demonstrate that the process of Europeanization is so extraordinarily
complex and differentiated both between and even within member states, that a formal
structural framework such as the one created by Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso is
insufficient in capturing and explaining the universe of forces, counterforces, multi-level
constitution, and interaction that is taking place between the EU and its members states’
domestic political structures. The dominant top-down approach to Europeanization fails
to accurately or fully represent the true nature and complexity that abounds within the
process of European-domestic interactions. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Hix and
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Goetz 2000; Borzel and Risse 2003) As many scholars have begun to suggest, a top-
down approach only illuminates part of the Europeanization process. An effective and
accurate approach must include dynamics that are top-down, bottom-up, or both.
(Schmidt 2006; Radaelli 2003; Featherstone 2003; Hertier and Knill 2001; Falkner 1997,
2000; Falkner and Feiber 2004)
In conclusion, this research seeks to illuminate and add to the existing theories
and empirical data regarding the crisis of neo-corporatism and the social partnership,
within an analytical context that helps explain if, why, and to what extent such systems
might be more or less susceptible to pressures such as Europeanization (Adams 2002b;
Einhom and Fogue 2004; Verdier and Breen 2001; Weber 2001 ; Wiarda 2001 ) While the
tenor of most neo-corporatist literature has been decidedly pessimistic for at least the last
two decades, this research also hopes to shed light upon the conditions and environments
in which neo-corporatism and the social partnership are more likely to thrive and survive.
Hence, there is a normative bias in this research towards the appreciation and support of
such regimes as those that have been successful at bringing social peace, economic
prosperity, and political stability to so many states for so long. There is an inherent belief
that social partnership deserves, and will likely achieve, more than a mere epitaph.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Definimz Europeanization
European integration has been a dynamic topic for many scholars of international
relations and comparative politics since the immediate postwar period of the 1 940s and
1950s. (Mitrany 1943; Haas 1958) However, as brought forth in the introductory chapter
of this research, much of the scholarship that emerged since its inception adopted
decidedly interstate and intergovernmental perspectives that rest on a primary assumption
that integration is dominantly the result of sovereign states and their negotiation,
compromise, and cooperation. (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Moravcsik 1998; Hix and
Goetz 2000)
To date, much of the scholarship still rests upon state-centric assumptions and
envisages the integration of Europe as purely interstate and intergovernmental
phenomenon. The process of policymaking and governance of the European Union is the
outcome of bargaining amongst states and can be explained as serving "the ultimate goals
of national governments.” (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2) The state-centric approaches to
integration espouse limited agency to the integration and governance of the European
Union itself. While states must decide jointly, they always can abstain from instituting
important changes, hence no state is “forced into deeper collaboration than it really
wants” since states are sovereign and capable of defending national interests through
numerous conduits of EU structures and bargaining. (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 3)
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This does not mean that all state-centric approaches have ignored the effects of
the domestic political arena upon each state's bargaining position and interests in the
process of European integration. The functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches
encompass domestic interests, elites, and national political parties as important variables
rather than viewing states as monolithic unitary actors. (Mitrany 1943; Haas 1958; Hix
and Goetz 2000) Nonetheless neo-functionalism, as well as liberal institutionalism,
continues to view the integration process as a bottom-up, state-level to Europe-level
affair. While governments are limited by domestic considerations, these national
governments monopolize the integration process. Yet, the view of states as the only
agents of change and force in European integration seems decidedly barren in helping to
understand the complexity and impact of policymaking and governance inside the
European Union.
While this state of affairs may have been tenable and perhaps understandable
given the proclivities of international relations and comparative politics as distinct fields,
the position is hardly sustainable given the development of a “multi-level European
polity” and the “increasingly porous” nature of the boundary separating comparative
politics and international relations in explaining and understanding European integration.
(Hix and Goetz 2000, 2; Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) While traditional
integration literature sought to understand and explain how and why states pursued and
affected the process of European integration, Hix and Goetz suggest much less effort has
gone “into thinking about the reverse effect: European integration as an explanatory
factor in domestic political continuity or change”. (2000, 1
)
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This research squarely falls into a growing and important divergence from the
traditional state-centric, neo-functionalist, and intergovernmental approaches. The
Europeanization approach combines elements of international relations and comparative
politics, much like the European Union itself. While focusing upon domestic institutions,
policies, and structures which usually fall under the bailiwick of comparative politics, it
also encompasses the effects of supranational and international forces upon power,
identity, and sovereignty which would likely fall under the aegis of international
relations. Hence, the Europeanization approach is not only illuminating an oft neglected
and yet expanding element of European integration scholarship; it is also attempting to
partially bridge the gap between comparative politics and international relations.
Broadly, the term Europeanization has often been interchangeable with European
integration. Yet, Europeanization is more properly applied to the types and methods of
domestic change or continuity brought forth though the process of European integration.
As Kevin Featherstone suggests, Europeanization is “most often associated with domestic
adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership”.
(Featherstone, 2003, 7) Hence, Europeanization is best thought of as one of several
approaches to explaining and understanding the process and implications of European
integration. These include not only the previously mentioned approaches that focus upon
interstate and intergovernmental aspects of integration, but also others that focus upon the
supranational institutional and organizational features of the European Union. (Dinan
1994; McCormick 2004; Nugent 2006) Yet the Europeanization literature is
differentiated by its primary focus upon the domestic implications and consequences of
European integration.
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The simplistic definition of Europeanization utilized by Frank Schimmelfennig is
“a process in which states adopt EU rules”. (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 7)
Schimmelfennig's research was designed to measure and classify the likelihood and form
of adoption of European Union rules by the Central and Eastern European states that
acceded in 2004 and 2007, as well as future and current candidates for membership like
Croatia and Turkey. The adoption of the acquis communautaire by member states is
amongst the most notable and impressive forms of Europeanization. Members must
integrate and adopt over 80,000 pages of EU regulations, legislation, findings, and rules
into their domestic political and legal and systems. This often requires reorganization and
rearrangement of bureaucratic, legal, and economic policymaking processes and
institutions up to and including constitutional amendments. Adoption of the acquis is
notably transformational of new and pending members' institutions. (Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier 2005, 2) Aligning ones national legal and political system to that of the
European Union is no small feat often requiring years of negotiation followed by years of
implementation especially for states that are still in the process of institutionalizing
democratic political institutions and market-based economies. (Hix and Goetz 2000)
Schimmelfennig's definition and research does not necessarily fall outside the
state-centric model of European integration scholarship by defining states and national
interests as the important variables of rule adoption. But his research does also stress the
importance of the EU and NATO as institutions and actors in the process of seeking
compliance and reform by the candidate and member states, so it perhaps falls into both
the state-centric and Europeanization categories of scholarship. (Schimmelfennig 2003;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) However, his definition of Europeanization seems
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far too narrow considering the wider social, political, and economic impacts of European
integration. Europeanization is far more than mere likelihood and form of rule adoption;
European integration may fundamentally alter the social, political, cultural, and economic
behavior and institutions of states and polities. Defining Europeanization as mere rule
adoption, even allowing for national variation to pace and form, marginalizes the overall
force that European integration and governance may place upon national political
systems.
First are the obvious sector-specific economic consequences of integration. The
Europeanization of national monetary, fiscal, transportation, telecommunications,
agricultural, energy, mining, industrial, banking, insurance, and financial markets may
often fundamentally transform the relationship between the state, national markets, firms,
subnational governments, interest groups, and other actors. (Button, Haynes, and Stough
1998; Fennell 1997; Kurzer 1993; McCormick 2001 ) These are the consequences of
state-level policy being subsumed and made subservient to European-level policy. But
while these are primarily changes in policy, best described as harmonization or
adaptation, there may also be concurrent changes to the states' political structures. There
is tremendous variation from sector to sector and amongst policy areas within the
European integration project. In some areas such as agriculture and trade policy, the
effects of integration for state-level policy have been long institutionalized, while in some
areas such as education, immigration, and home affairs, the role and impact of the
European Union upon the policy area still developing. (Dyson 2003)
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Again, harmonizing ones' policies to that of the EU is no small feat and again
often requires years of negotiation followed by decades of implementation for candidates
and longstanding members alike. But more importantly, the process by which states and
their institutions adapt, or fail to adapt, to the new European environment is central in this
research. While EU policy may change what kinds of subsidies, regulations, and
limitations Dutch, German, British, Irish and Greek parliaments and bureaucracies may
place upon certain sectors or elements of the economy, these studies do not necessarily
uncover any change in the fundamental structures of organization or operation of
parliaments, bureaucracies, or other institutions at the state-level. It is primarily output
oriented and focused upon how Europeanization affects the policy choices and actions of
the member states. In essence, while much of Europeanization scholarship has been
focused upon the effects of European integration on member states’ transportation,
telecommunication, agricultural, immigration, trade, and monetary policies, less
emphasis has been placed how the creation of a European-level of governance
fundamentally changes patterns of the policymaking processes as well as the competency
and efficacy of state-level institutions such as legal systems, parliaments, bureaucracies,
and other formal and informal structures. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt
2006)
The process of European integration and the operation of an EU-level of
governance may place extraordinary force upon state-level institutions, processes, and
structures to transform not only the eventual policies each state may adopt but also the
manners, methods, institutions, and processes of state-level policymaking itself.
(Schmidt, 2006) Europeanization is not just about alignment and harmonization of rules,
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laws, and policy but about the potential of European integration to alter or transform the
political structures at the state level. (Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003) As Christopher Knill
suggests:
EU policies put pressure on national administrations because
of the structural requirements they tend to imply... a regulation
may call for the creation of new structures (e.g., an environmental
agency), the centralisation or decentralisation of regulatory
processes (e.g., by introducing uniform reporting requirements to
a central authority), or it may demand horizontal organizational
change (e.g., by requiring the co-ordination of previously distinct
administrative tasks). (2001, 3)
Additionally, the effects of Europeanization can be both direct and indirect. Direct
impacts require institutional and structural reform or change to conform to EU-level
norms and standards. Examples such at the EMU, Stability and Growth Pact, ECJ
jurisdiction, and many elements of the single market regime tend to have rather strict and
universal implications for member states. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Dyson 2003) However,
even in these cases there are allowable or perceivable variances from EU standards
suggesting a far more “soft” approach to Europeanization. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and
Leiber 2004; Dyson 2003)
More interesting and perhaps more important are the indirect effects of European
integration and governance. These are effects on policy styles and norms that while not
formally or directly challenged by EU directives or action are nonetheless influential in
reshaping and altering existing national patterns of political behavior. European
integration and governance has created new divisions within member states' electorates,
parties, interest associations, social groups, and other actors. Europeanization may also
alter the types of issues and priorities of issues within domestic political contexts.
Further, the constant and repetitive constitution of EU-national relations creates a pattern
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of expectations and behavior that national actors socially learn and begin to replicate.
(Risse 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003; Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003) Hence
Europeanization is not limited to the formal and strictly institutional, it is also a source or
nonnative and structural change in domestic political systems. (Hix and Goetz 2000;
Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003)
Hix and Goetz concisely enumerate why European integration has become
impossible to ignore as a relevant source of domestic political change. First, policy
powers once exclusively found in domestic level political institutions have been
delegated to the supranational level. Nearly 80% of all rules governing the production,
distribution, and exchange of goods, services, capital, and labor in the European market
are under the aegis of the European Union. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 4) The restrictions
placed upon national governments to harmonize to Europe-wide standards are significant.
Second, the European Union does have direct redistributional capacity so as to engender
compliance. While its overall budget is rather small at 1 .27% of GDP, in key areas such
as agriculture and regional development, the EU’s budgetary power is more significant.
(Hix and Goetz 2000, 5) Third, the operation of a single-currency by the European
Central Bank (ECB) gives the EU a powerful role in macro-economic stabilization and
national budgeting. The EU Growth and Stability Pact constricts sovereign budgetary and
discretion under the ever-vigilant eyes of the ECB and the Council of Economic and
Finance Ministers. This constant surveillance and regulation forces states to continually
align and justify national budget processes within a broader European context. (Hix and
Goetz 2000, 5-6) Fourth, states have begun, especially since the Single European Act of
1985 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, to delegate greater competencies to the EU in
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the areas ofjudicial, interior, and home affairs, immigration and asylum, and foreign and
defense policies. (Dyson 2003) Hence the EU is widening its efficacy beyond market
regulation. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly for this and other Europeanization
research, is that the new policy environment of the EU has been paralleled by the creation
of a new level of governance at the European level. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 6)
The institutionalization and empowerment of EU-level structures on top of
existing national structures has enormous implications for the national political systems
themselves. While the member states set long-term policy agendas and the formal
delegation of the powers to the EU, EU-level institutions have important authority and
discretion in the use of such powers. The European Commission is rather
monopolistically responsible for legislative initiatives in regulation and budget
expenditures. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has adopted supremacy over domestic
law when there is a conflict between the two levels. The creation of a European-level also
has more subtly discemable implications on the policymaking process by creating a new
arena and environment in which interests, public and private, may choose to promote and
represent their causes. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 6-9; Borzel and Risse 2003; Dyson 2003)
As Hix and Goetz posit, Europeanization has two types of potential impact upon
domestic institutions and private and public actors;
(3) the delegation of policy competences to the European
level and the resulting political outcomes constrain domestic
choice, reinforce certain policy and institutional developments,
and provide a catalyst for change in others; and
(4) the establishment of a higher level of governance
institutions provides new opportunities to exit from domestic
constraints, either to promote certain policies, or to veto others,
or to secure informational advantages. (2000, 10)
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The dispute over the differential meanings of “Europeanization” challenges the
scholarship and its application. However, there are always such disagreements amongst
scholars and Europeanization is not immune. Perhaps Europeanization can best defined
as the “domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly” from
European integration. (Featherstone 2003, 7) Perhaps more complex, yet also valuable, is
the definition of Europeanization as “the process of influence deriving from European
decisions and impacting... policies and political and administrative structures”. (Heritier
1999, 3)
In this context, Europeanization emerges as a distinct analytical focus stressing
and highlighting key issues and phenomena of European integration:
. . .adaptation of institutional settings in the broadest sense
(of rules, procedures, norms, practices) at different political
levels in response to the dynamics of integration. .
.
emergence of new, cross-national policy networks and
communities., .nature of policy mimicry and transfer
between states and subnational authorities... shifts in
cognition, discourse, and identity affecting policy in response
to European developments. . .restructuring the strategic
opportunities available to domestic actors, as EU commitments,
having a differential impact on such actors, may serve as a source of
leverage. (Featherstone 2003, 19-20)
As Featherstone suggests, this new focus upon integration's impact upon the domestic
creates new and challenging research questions that reinvigorate and add to the European
integration scholarship. Europeanization literature can go beyond asking under what
conditions European states choose to integrate but asks questions that reverse the thinking
from state to Europe to Europe to state:
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How does Europeanization affect the interest and ideas,
actors and institutions within the European Union? What
is the impact of the European Union on policy processes?
Why does adaptational pressure lead to policy convergence
between states in some sectors, but not in others?
(Featherstone 2003, 20)
While most Europeanization literature has been primarily institutional in its
outlook and theoretical underpinnings, it is not exclusively so. It may also include many
social and political patterns of behavior including identity. Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso
argue that Europeanization encompasses structures such as “formal and informal rules,
norms, regulations, procedures, and practices” which go beyond formal institutions and
organizations of governance. (2001, 6) While encompassing a broad range of forces and
effects, from mere policy harmonization to wholesale structural change, this definition
does distinguish Europeanization literature from the neo-functionalist and
intergovernmental scholarship as well as delimit the focus to the effects of European
integration upon state or subnational governance.
The Europeanization literature treats European integration as the independent
variable and state-level political institutions and processes as the dependent variables
Clearly in reality, the relationship is cyclical and interdependent. (Dyson 2003; Schmidt
2006) This may be a significant weakness of the Europeanization framework and much
of the core of the existing scholarship and will be addressed in greater detail in chapter
eight. However, at this stage, it is important to intellectually disaggregate the ways in
which European integration and governance impacts domestic political structures so as to
potentially learn how such impacts may lead to change or continuity.
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One important potential impact is the creation of a multi-level policymaking
process between the EU and national levels of governance. This may alter how actors
strategically operate within both national and supranational environments. (Hix and
Goetz 2000; Dyson 2003) The existence of “two-level” or multi-level strategies has been
explored and analyzed in game theory and rational choice literature as well as case
studies of specific diplomatic engagements. (Rosenau 1969; Putnam 1988) The
entanglement of domestic and international politics has led to numerous opportunities in
which the politics at one level of analysis might impact and shape decisions at another.
This is found notably in the scholarship of domestic sources of foreign policy and,
probably most notably, the impact of internal politics upon foreign economic policy.
(Gourevitch 1978; Katzenstein 1978) The creation and existence of multi-level
governance amongst the states and institutions of the European Union suggests that actors
can and may likely adopt two-level strategies towards the policymaking process,
significantly impacting the efficacy and effectiveness, as well as the policy outputs, of
domestic level structures.
The domestic impact of European integration can be measured at either the state
or subnational level. While this specific research is focused upon state-level neo-
corporatist institutions and processes, the impact of integration can also be measured
upon subnational structures of governance such as regional or local assemblies, councils,
parliaments, courts, and other policymaking or consultative institutions. (Borzel 2002;
Goldsmith 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) European
integration also obviously influences candidate and potential candidate states through
conditionality requirements. (Schimmelfennig 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
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2005) Hence Europeanization is not limited to current members of the European Union
The integration of Europe is even influential in transforming states that have opted
against membership. Non-member states' political structures, such as in Switzerland and
Norway, are strongly interdependent upon EU-trade, transportation, communication,
energy, and immigration networks and may therefore also be shaped by forces of
European integration despite the lack of formal membership or candidacy. In 2006, for
instance, EU rules banning numerous air carriers from Africa and Asia from operating in
the EU also are enforceable in Norway and Switzerland under existing transportation
treaties and arrangements. (Associated Press 2006) While this clearly affects Swiss and
Norwegian transport policy, what may be more important is the fact that Swiss and
Norwegian policymaking, in a wide range of issue areas, must account for and adapt to
European-level governance. (Dupont and Sciarim 2001; Fischer, Nicolet, and Sciarmi
2002; Kux and Sverdrup 2000; Hix and Goetz 2000)
Europeanization is differentiated from most other European integration
scholarship by attempting to understand and explain if, how, when, and to what extent
European integration and governance leads to change or continuity in domestic level
structures and institutions. In Hix and Goetz’ terms, Europeanization is focused upon
“European integration as an explanatory factor in domestic political continuity or
change”. (2000, 1)
Hence the Europeanization approach has been dominantly a “top-down" approach
that seeks to explain the impact of supranational patterns and structures of policymaking,
governance, and action upon domestic structures and patterns. (Lodge 2006) Much of the
early Europeanization literature assumed a hierarchical relationship between the EU and
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member states and tended to emphasize the process of national adjustment to EU-level
directives and norms or patterns of policymaking. (Streeck and Schmitter 1999) Yet this
dominance may be waning.
Europeanization has also become more focused on the “bottom-up” means in
which European integration and governance is constituted. This has focused on the
differential responses of member states and their structures to European integration and
governance and the interplay and penetration of top-down and bottom-up dynamics.
(Dyson 2003; Schuppert 2006; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Schmidt 1996, 2006; Hix
and Goetz 2000, 2001; Lodge 2006) The true measure and complexity of
Europeanization is the mutually constituted, ever-evolving model of negotiation,
compromise, bargaining, interaction, bureaucratization, legislation, administration,
adjudication, and interpenetration of the subnational, national, and supranational
institutions and actors that encompass the totality of the European political system.
(Schuppert 2006; Lodge 2006; Dyson 2003)
While this research will use the Europeanization framework of Cowles, Risse, and
Caporaso to understand and explain the impact of European integration upon neo-
corporatist structures in Germany and Austria, there is recognition that their top-down
approach may have significant limitations. Hence, in chapter eight, this research will also
assess the applicability and viability of their framework and will conclude to what extent
their approach succeeds or fails in capturing the Europeanization process of the German
and Austrian social partnerships.
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The Scope of Europeanization
Measuring the impact and consequences of European integration upon states’
political systems and structures is at the core of Europeanization scholarship. Yet it
would be inaccurate to say that there is always an impact of European integration to
measure. While many have sought to discover and explain cases of isomorphism, when
states adapt institutions and processes to an identical and uniform Europeanized model,
these are extraordinarily rare. Martin Lodge posited:
Europeanisation itself implies a seemingly unavoidable,
irresistible shift toward a common (European) practice away
from traditionally diverse national public policies.
(2000, 89)
The isomorphism of state institutions and processes is actually quite uncommon
and lies at the heart of Europeanization scholarship that is attempting to explain and
understand the wide variation in response and adaptation to the forces of European
integration. The results of the scholarship show little isomorphism, rather it has
uncovered that “the domestic impact of European politics is not characterized by a clear
and consistent picture”. (Knill 2001, 3) The effects of integration result in “neither
wholesale convergence nor continuing divergence of national policy structures,
institutions, and other patterned relationships”. ( Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso
2001, 1 ) Hence differential responses and adaptation to European integration is the
primary question that Europeanization hopes to explain and understand. (Lodge 2000;
Schmidt 2006)
We not only observe administrative convergence, but
also (and to a similar extent) divergence or persistence
of administrative differences across member states”
(Kmll 2001, 3)
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Europeanization does not always lead to state-level structural change. In many
areas, Europeanization may have little or no bearing. (Schmidt 2006) In some
circumstances, the EU forgoes establishing supranational policy in lieu of state-level or
subnational governance. The concept of subsidiarity is most notable. As Tiersky states:
The Maastricht Treaty established the principle of
subsidiarity, a concept that attempts to define which
decisions are to be taken at which levels. Issues of
primary local importance are to be taken as close to
the citizen as possible. Subsidiarity was introduced in
part as a response to fears of excessive centralization
of powers in Brussels.” (2004, 44)
Paradoxically, while subsidiarity was designed to protect the continued
persistence and efficacy of state and local governance on many issues, it has actually had
a Europeanizing impact in increasing the role and prominence of subnational
governments and governance in states where subnational power was historically weak or
even in the creation of transnational regional governance. (Borzel 2001, 2002; Loughlin
1996; Schmidt 2006) So, even in circumstances where the European Union defers from
supranational regulatory authority, the manner in which it defers and its overall
increasing importance may have tangible impacts upon state and subnational structures of
governance. Therefore, it is fruitful to think of Europeanization as a process that exists
beyond explicit institutionalization at the supranational level. The implications of
European integration may often stem directly from explicit European-level policymaking
and institutions, yet it may just as often stem from indirect, implicit, and ideational
forces. (Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006; Schuppert 2006)
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Even when European integration explicitly calls upon states to conform or comply
to EU-level structures of governance, some state-level structures require little to no
change to operate within the new European context. Many state-level structures may be
compatible and even reinforced by European-level policy, in essence, these institutions
and processes “fit” (Heritier 1999, 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000; Risse-Kappen, Cowles,
and Caporaso 2001; Schmidt 2006). Measuring fit will be discussed in later sections of
this chapter. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the forces of Europeanization
do not necessarily result in significant transformation of state-level structures.
Even if state-level structures do not fit and face significant pressure from
European integration to adapt, change, or transform, there is remarkable variation
amongst institutions as to whether and how adaptation takes place. The changes that may
take place are not necessarily isomorphic; they have national flavor and variety. Hence
while there may be significant pressure towards and implementation of convergence, the
end result is almost never isomorphic convergence. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Lodge
2000; Schmidt 2006) The results tend to support the conclusion that national institutions
and features do matter and result in “domestic adaptation with national colors” to
European integration. (Risse-Kappen. Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 1
)
Europeanization is a rather broad range of political, economic, and social
phenomena resulting from the impact of European-level governance upon state-level
governance. The range can include the rather pedestrian but still Herculean task of
administrative and bureaucratic harmonization with the acquis communautaire
,
to
significant limitations on executive, bureaucratic, parliamentary, or other institutional
policy choice and action over issue areas, to the more significant structural change of
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economic, social, and political institutions and processes. Europeanization encompasses
them all: policy, process, and polities. (Schmidt 2006) The common links that connect
this broad range of political phenomena is that each is impacted, to some extent, by
European-level patterns and structures of integration and governance.
Measurinu Europeanization
As stated above, the effects of Europeanization are rarely isomorphic. (Lodge
2000; Schmidt 2006) State-level institutions, actors, and structures respond and react in a
myriad of manners to pressures created by European integration and governance. The
fundamental thesis of most Europeanization literature is trying to explain and understand
how, when, why, and to what extent such variation takes place. (Heritier 1999; Knill
2001; Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Schmidt 2006) This research will
assess if, how, when, and to what extent neo-corporatist structures are being transformed
by European integration but will also explain the variation in response between the social
partnerships in Germany and Austria.
Some corporatist and neo-corporatist literature, which will be discussed and
analyzed in much greater detail in chapter three, does touch upon the issues of
Europeanization (Gorges 1996; Compston and Greenwood 2001; Sargent 1985)
However, most of these analyses are interested in how interest groups interact with the
European policymaking institutions rather than explaining the implications of European
integration and the European policymaking process upon the domestic neo-corporatist
structures. In addition, some scholarship has been dedicated to investigation the
compatibility and adaptation of specific actors, such as unions, business associations, and
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fanning interests to Europeanization. (Cowles 2001; Greenwood 2003; Greenwood
2003a) Yet there has been little analysis of the impact of Europeanization on neo-
corporatism and social partnerships as structures of governance in member states.
Streeck and Schnntter made an important leap by suggesting that the structures
and patterns at the European level would eclipse those at the national level, especially
where neo-corporatism has been traditionally dominant. Their work has been rather
hegemonic in the area of study and has led most resulting scholarship to begin with the
assumption that there is a link between the decline of national neo-corporatism and the
rise of transnational pluralism within the EU. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991
)
However, as some other recent scholars have argued, there may be significant Haws in
their supposition. (Compston 1998; Falkner and Leiber 2004) First, the European model
of policymaking and governance may not be particularly pluralist and may in actuality be
a new model of governance that exhibits pluralist, statist, corporatist, consociational, and
other features simultaneously. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Borzel 1999; Cram 1997;
Sbragia 1992; Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003) Second, the decline of neo-corporatism,
while generally occurring, has been rather differentiated amongst and even within EU
member states suggesting more variables at play. (Heiniseh 2000; Compston 1998;
Schuppert 2006; Schmidt 2006) Third, the decline in neo-corporatism in some states may
have less to do with the growth of EU-level models or patterns of policymaking and
governance and may be linked far more strongly to other exogenous or endogenous
variables.
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Hence, measuring the impact of European integration upon these states' neo-
corporatist structures will be of critical interest. The first primary question that must be
addressed is to whether each state is under identical or equal pressures from European
models of governance and policymaking. This is rather difficult to assess given the nature
of the European Union's fragmented policymaking and governance patterns and the
differences amongst the states themselves. (Schmidt 2006) There have been numerous
instances where states have been treated differently by the European Union and its
policymaking and governance patterns. The differential cases of German and Portuguese
violations of the Growth and Stability Pact, the non-adoption of the Euro by Sweden,
Denmark, and the UK, and the British rebate from the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) are most notable. As Hix and Goetz and others observe, many EU regulations,
such as in areas of workers’ rights, allow a “high degree of freedom for member states to
interpret the rules in the process of transposing EU law into domestic legislation". (2000,
4; Scharpf 1996; Schmidt 2006) European-level integration and policymaking is often a
negotiated and compromised affair, hence there is some measurable level of variation in
how and when rules and policies of the EU are applied to or adopted by the member
states. (Hertier 2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)
Importantly, European integration and governance may affect national patterns of
neo-corporatism in several different ways through competency shifting and
implementation. One primary way that Europeanization can impact domestic social
partnership is by shifting issues and policies out of the national political arena to the
European level. In doing so, the social partnership loses influence in both in the specific
policy sector and more broadly as an actor inside the political system. The policymaking
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process at the EU level may allow some continued role for social partners to play, but
these are usually weaker or purely advisory roles hence the loss of domestic influence is
not offset by increased authority at other levels.
The second primary way that Europeanization affects domestic social partnership
is the method of implementation of EU directives and policy. EU directives may set
explicit conditions of implementation by member states that may either enhance or
detract from domestic social partnership and partners. These include a range of options.
First directives may explicitly call on states to use their social partners to implement new
policies and reforms. Second, provisions in the directives may encourage member states
to use existing social partners or even create new social partners to accomplish
implementation. These include a growing number of directives suggesting that the “best
practice” of implementation of directives in some policy areas be through social
partnership. Finally, EU directives may set specific conditions that require full or
uniform applicability of new rules that may contradict national patterns of variation and
differentiation amongst social partners. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Schmidt 2006) Hence,
Europeanization may have both negative and positive implications for the continued
efficacy and necessity of social partnership and social partners.
Another important feature in the Europeanization scholarship regarding social
partnership is case selection so as to provide sufficient control over variables. As
Haverland suggests, the problem of case selection and methodology in Europeanization
research has been problematic and a bit haphazard. (2005) This research's selection of
Austria and Germany meets several important criteria and perhaps misses on others. First,
Haverland suggests the use of non-EU member states so as to produce a control so as to
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suggest or prove causality. (2005) This might have been possible by selecting a non-EU
member that utilizes neo-corporatist structures such as Switzerland or Norway. Or one
could choose member states that have and have not adopted particular EU regimes to
create control and test cases. However, there are limitations to this strategy. First, non-EU
members such as Norway and Switzerland may be broadly impacted by European
integration even without membership, up to an including domestic political structural
changes. Plus, as Haverland notes, with such a small universe of potential cases, this
strategy may be impractical. A second suggestion is through the use of counterfactual or
imaginary cases. (Haverland 2005; Schmitter 1999) This surely increases the case
universe but also seems impractical, as it tends to require an incredible imaginary
construction to complete and operationalize.
One additional problem is the differential membership periods of states. While
Germany has been a member of the EU and its proto-organizations since its inception as
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, Austria is a rather recent member
joining only in 1995. Hence Austria, it could be argued, is facing much more immediate
and revolutionary adaptational pressures than the other states. Conversely, while
Germany is a long-standing member in comparison to Austria, the scope and pace of
European integration has been increasingly notably since the mid-1980s and the adoption
of the Single European Act in 1985 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 . Hence the gap
between German and Austrian membership may not be as large as one might suspect.
However, there might certainly be some additional adapational pressure on Austria, and
its institutions and actors, due to a more compressed timeframe for full adoption and
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incorporation of EU laws and procedures. (Heinisch 2000) This will be discussed further
in the chapters on Austria as well in the assessment and conclusion.
Nonetheless, while differential responses of state-level institutions and structures
to European integration is sometimes linked to specific variances in EU standards and
implementation, it is more often the result of the characteristics and institutions at the
domestic level that explain the differential response. Therefore, variation amongst the
social partnerships response to European integration and multi-level governance is most
likely attributable to variation at the domestic level rather than by any significant
differentiation by the EU and its policies towards the German and Austrian systems. This
focuses the attention of this research upon the domestic institutionalization of the social
partnership is Germany and Austria. The variation amongst social partnerships becomes
the primary variable in explaining and understanding the differential responses to
European integration and governance.
Hence this research will begin by attempting to measure the compatibility of the
German and Austrian social partnerships to the European modes of multi-level
governance and integration. Measuring compatibility of domestic structures to that of the
European-level or multi-level mode governance has been a critical feature of
Europeanization literature. This is an attempt to assess the “goodness of fit” between the
institutions and processes of European integration and the institutions and processes at
the German and Austrian state levels. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Heritier 1999, 2001;
Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)
Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso label this as “adaptational pressure” which they
define as “the extent to which domestic institutions would have to change in order to
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comply with European rules and policies”. (2001, 6) For Hix and Goetz, adaptational
pressure is known as “catalyst” in which European-level governance acts to “produce
new institutional forms” at the state-level. (Goetz 2000, 1 1 ) This fit not only applies to
policy output but to institutions and other policymaking and formulating structures as
well.
European-level governance may impact domestic structures by providing a new
“structure of opportunities” for domestic actors. Domestic actors may seek the use the
very existence of EU-level of governance to bypass, reinforce, or otherwise alter their
participation and solidarity to state-level structures. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 12) Actors will
do this when there is advantage to do so. Hix and Goetz suggest three such instances.
First, actors may exit the domestic arena for the European level when they are blocked
from achieving a desired policy or outcome at the domestic one. Second, and related to
the first, actors may seek to use the European level to veto domestic actions. Third, actors
may use the European level to gain an informational advantage in the domestic arena by
framing debates and agendas due to greater conformity to and knowledge of European-
level governance. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 12-13)
All three instances are more likely when actors or institutions calculate that
operating at the EU level provides opportunities unavailable at the domestic level alone.
It does not mean that such interests will cease operating at the national level or that
national level structures must necessarily succumb to European-level governance.
However, it certainly does change the manner and methods by which actors and
institutions operate, as well as the very nature of the actors and institutions themselves.
The potential lure of regularly taking issues to the European-level diminishes the absolute
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and monopolistic power of state-level institutions to function as they may once have. This
would likely create even greater impetus for interests and actors to potentially eschew the
state-level structures for European-level institutions or at least to create a far more
complex system of multi-level governance in which interests and actors regularly operate
at both state and supranational levels in the policymaking process. (Hix and Goetz 2000,
12; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Dyson 2003; Schmidt
2006)
Hence Hix and Goetz are using a melding of institutional and rational choice
approaches to measure and analyze the impact of European integration upon domestic
political systems and actors. The catalyst for change or continuity is derived from the
calculations of actors as to whether or not to bypass the domestic level for the European
one. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 14) This fits well within the nested game framework of
“rational choice institutionalism” such as that of Tsebelis, Scharpf, and others who see
the emergence of a two-level game for actors. (Scharpf 1985, 1993; Tsebelis 1990) But it
is also a form of institutional learning in which domestic structures adapt or fail to adapt
to the new multi-level and European environment and consequently alter, or fail to alter,
rules, procedures, processes, and functions that are more compatible with the new
European political universe. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Schmidt 2006)
For Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso measuring Europeanization is far less
emblematic of rational choice institutionalism and is best described as structuralism.
First, Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso have a broader understanding and usage of
institutions to also include structural characteristics and phenomena such as political
culture, identity, state-society relations, as well as formal institutions and actors. Hence, it
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includes both formal and informal political and social institutions and arrangements,
which they widely term as structure. The framework distinguishes between and
encapsulates what they term policy structures and system-wide domestic structures. As
for policy structures, they express interest in not only changes in “policy subject matter”
but also in the “political legal, and administrative structures that interpret and carry out
policy” at the domestic level. Mode broadly, they also encompass system-wide domestic
structures such as national legal systems, national administrative traditions, territorial
structures, interest association and intermediation, and collective understandings of state
and identity. Second, the intervening variables are less tied to actors’ preferences and
interests, but more attuned to actors' and institutions' practices and norms as explanations
of domestic structural change. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 6) Hence while there
is considerable overlap between Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, there
are important differences in measuring what variables are important in the
Europeanization of domestic political systems and structures.
Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso utilize a three-step approach to analyzing
Europeanization and domestic structural change. As seen below in Figure 1, the model
attempts to explain domestic structural change as a product of the forces of
Europeanization within the context of two sets of intervening variables, adaptational
pressures and mediating practices. Adaptational pressures are defined as the “goodness of
fit” between European and national processes, settings, rules, and practices. (Risse-
Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 6) Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso distinguish two
casual pathways in which Europeanization may exert adaptational pressure on domestic
structures. First, European-level policy may lead to a misfit between EU-level rules and
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domestic-level regulations. These circumstances would place adaptational pressure upon
domestic political and administrative structures, especially upon formal domestic
institutions and governments to make specific policy changes. Second, European-level
governance may exert strong adaptational pressures on embedded domestic structures
that include national styles of governance and even deeply rooted understandings of
identity and political behavior. These circumstances place adaptational pressure upon
national norms, routines, state-society relations, and other structural features. (Risse-
Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 8)
Figure 1. Model of Europeanization
Thus, European-level and multi-level governance tends to create different degrees
of adaptational pressure dependent upon the goodness of tit between domestic and
European levels of governance and structure. (Hertier 2001 ) State-level responses to such
pressure are therefore hardly isomorphic. Some state-level structures may tit and face
little or no adaptational pressure; hence little transformation or change would be
necessary or likely. (Schmidt 2006) Institutions would be likely to adopt minor changes
that are strongly compatible with the existing modes and principles of operation.
However, even when adaptational pressure is perhaps only moderate, the likelihood of
change is not purely reliant upon the mere existence of such pressures. The variation
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amongst similar structures in states facing similar adaptational pressures does not
necessarily result in convergence to a single form or pattern. This has been illustrated by
cases where there is meaningful adaptational pressure from European integration and
institutions that challenge existing national structures. (Lodge 2000; Borzel 2002;
Heritier 2001 ; Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006) In these cases, there is wide variation in
response amongst states and their structures to the adaptational pressures. In some cases,
national institutions, policies, and structures are defended at great cost by seeking
variance from European-level rules, changing existing European-level laws or
competencies, or the creation of a stalemate between European and domestic levels of
governance. In other cases, however, domestic structures were adjusted despite high costs
in monetary, political, or cultural terms. (Sbragia 2001 ) Accounting for such variation is
the focus of the third step in the Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso model of Europeanization:
mediating factors. (2001
)
In cases of strong adaptational pressures due to misfits between European and
domestic levels of governance, the presence or absence of mediating factors which are
critical in assessing when domestic structural change or continuity should be expected.
According to Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, state-level responses to adaptational pressure
is dependent upon five mediating factors: multiple veto points, facilitating formal
institutions, organizational and policymaking cultures, differential empowerment of
domestic actors, and learning. (2001
)
The existence of multiple veto points in a given state-level structure impedes
structural adaptation by decentralizing power across the political system and allowing
more actors to have a say in political decision making. The more power is dispersed, the
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more difficult it is to create a domestic coalition to introduce and implement changes
necessary to reduce the adaptational pressures of European-level governance. (Risse-
Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 9) Scharpf and Heritier have argued that certain
decentralized features of the German and Italian political systems and policymaking
process have slowed or blocked implementation of structural adjustment to European-
level pressures in decision-making and transport policy. (Heritier 2001; Scharpf 1985)
Hence, systems that institutionalize powerful and multiple veto points might be
particularly susceptible to stalemates that inhibit structural reform. (Dyson 2003; Schmidt
2006)
The existence of mediating formal institutions works in the opposite manner of
multiple veto points in allowing actors to introduce and matriculate structural change at
the domestic level. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 9) Most notable in
domestic judicial systems, some existing national courts were able to rather easily adapt
to the primary ruling mechanism and the European Court of Justice in that the system of
referral and court hierarchy was already institutionalized at the national level. (Alter
2001; Conant 2001 ) However, states that lack institutions that can introduce and manage
structural change may find adaptation far more problematic.
Political and organizational cultures refer to the “prevailing collective
understandings of appropriate behavior” often based upon informal, normative, social,
and political cultural structures that guide and constrain political action. (Risse-Kappen,
Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 10) These can be assessed and measured in the formal and
informal mechanisms of the policymaking and implementation process. Most notable are
the systems of consensual or cooperative decision-making cultures found in Germany,
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Austria, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands, the historically confrontational relationships
between the regions and the central governments in Spain and Italy, the statist
centralization of France, the social democratic solidarity of Sweden, the strong church-
state ties in Ireland, the history and adherence of direct democracy in Sw itzerland, and
populist nationalism in Poland. (Borzel 2002; Einhom 2002; Katzenstein 1984; Lijphart
1975; Streeck 1996; Zeigler 1993; Schmidt 2006) These features of states' political
cultures, norms, and collective understandings play an important role in determining the
appropriateness of some actions versus others. Hence, some of the adaptational pressures
of European integration may fail to be translated into change precisely due to their sharp
conflict with existing political and organizational cultures that consider such reforms,
even under strong adaptational pressure, antithetical to national identities and ideals and
beyond what is politically acceptable and appropriate.
Because structural change will likely lead to a redistribution and reorganization of
political capabilities in a state system, the relevant actors and the differential
empowerment of such actors is also influential upon the direction and intensity of
structural change or continuity. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 1 1 ) While
some have argued that European integration has led to greater autonomy of national
executives over other domestic actors in areas of European policy, Europeanization can
lead to a redistribution of powers amongst a variety of actors including national
executives, legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, regional governments, interest
associations, and firms. (Goetz 2000; Moravcsik 1998; Schmidt 1996; Schuppert 2006;
Dyson 2003) Hence Europeanization may change the power relationship between actors
and the state. (Cowles 2001; Kitschelt 1986) Similar to the rational institutional
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arguments of Hix and Goetz, actors or groups of actors may seek structural change to
increase their net political power at the expense of others who likely oppose such reform
for obvious rationale. Hence Europeanization is not merely focused upon the impact of
the supranantional upon the national level but also of the internal mechanations of the
political systems in the engagement of the Europeanization process.
The fifth and final mediating factor for Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso is learning.
Rather than merely reflecting given empowerment and preferential interests of actors and
institutions ate the domestic level, Europeanization may also lead to transformations of
the actors’ interests and identities. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 12) The
effects of Europeanization upon citizenship, identity, and interests may fall far more into
the social constructivist and social learning literature of international relations but there
are important implications of such change upon domestic structures of governance.
European integration itself may lead to new political, social, and economic identities that
fundamentally alter existing domestic structures that rely upon static actor and
institutional roles. (Checkel 2001; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Risse-Kappen 2001)
The most notable examples might be the Europeanization of business interests.
Firms once grounded and co-opted into national economic interests and policymaking
structures, have become far more European in outlook, market penetration, foreign
investment, logistics, production, distribution, and have often adopted a more European
identity in the stead of a national one. (Coen and Dannreuther 2003) While these firms
pursue and promote an ever more European identity with multinational interests and
goals towards freer regional trade, other firms and business interests, such as farmers,
small businesses, partially state-owned or heavily subsidized firms, may pursue even
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more protection from competition. European integration itself may cause a split amongst
existing firms, interests, and associations along integrationist and Euroskepticist lines.
(Marks and Steenbergen 2004) Hence Europeanization is not merely a process of the
supranational but is also a source of domestic contestation and conflict amongst actors
and interests that may utilize Europeanization for specific self-interested rationale.
Despite their differences, the models espoused by Hix and Goetz and Risse,
Cowles, and Caporaso essentially are measuring the same phenomena. Both are
attempting to understand and explain when and why domestic change or continuity exists
in the face of forces of European integration. Both models also have created a framework
to assess when and why change is more likely than continuity. For Hix and Goetz, change
is more likely in two instances, when the locus of a particular policy area is delegated to
the European-level and when exit, veto, and informational incentives are present for
actors or institutions to pursue European or multi-level strategies. (2000) The first
instance is dominantly institutional in approach while the second is nested primarily in
rational choice literature, or as labeled by Tsebelis, Scharpf and others, rational
institutionalism. (Scharpf 1993; Tsebelis 1990) The Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso
framework is far more structured and concise (see figure 1). It proposes a three-step flow
of casual relationships that lead to domestic structural change or continuity. (Risse,
Cowles, and Caporaso 2001 ) While dominantly historical institutional in approach, there
are also strong elements of rational choice and, especially in Risse, social learning and
constructivism. (Risse 2001)
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While clearly not the entire universe of Europeanization scholarship, the efforts
by Hix and Goetz and Risse. Cowles, and Caporaso are emblematic of the most
determined efforts to clarify and bind the disparate threads of Europeanization literature.
In addition, they provide a framework to analyze the impact and implications of
European integration upon domestic neo-corporatist structures such as the social
partnerships of Austria and Germany. As will be discussed in the proceeding sections, the
frameworks of Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cow les, and Caporaso may be compatible and
useful in such a role. Hence this research will use these models as the basis of
investigation and analysis of the impact of European integration upon domestic neo-
corporatist structures in Austria and Germany. Hence it shall also be a test of the utility of
their models as much as it is an assessment of Austrian and German social partnerships.
Assessing Europeanization as a Framework
Utilization of the Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso frameworks
seems appropriate in attempting to assess the impact of European integration upon
domestic neo-corporatist structures for numerous reasons. However, it must also be noted
that the Europeanization literature is not specifically a single theoretical approach or
model. While “Europeanisation has all the hallmarks of an emergent field of inquiry... the
systematic study of Europeanisation effects is still in its infancy”. (Hix and Goetz 2000.
15; Kmll 2001; Hertier 2001) As illustrated by Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and
Caporaso, there is no one standard of terminology or even an overarching agreement as to
defining Europeanization itself.
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In addition, there is substantive analytical and methodological diversity within the
Europeanization approach. While it is dominantly institutional, it is not exclusively so.
Hix and Goetz take a far more rational choice direction in explaining Europeanization
while studies such as those by Tarrow and Risse follow a far more social constructivist
course by focusing upon the effects of Europeanization upon national identity, civil
society relationships, and norms. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Checkel 2001; Risse-Kappen
2001; Tarrow 1995; Schuppert 2006) While some scholars has focused upon the
Europeanization of specific formal legislative, executive, judicial, and bureaucratic
institutions, many also have more broadly understood institutions to also include the
norms, processes, procedures, and other informal features of national political systems
which along with the formal institutions may be best defined as structure. Hence,
Europeanization as an approach encompasses a wide range of formal and informal
institutions, processes, actors, and other phenomenon. (Featherstone 2003)
It should be noted that the Europeanization scholarship discussed previously tends
highly emphasize the concept of misfit. For almost all the scholars, the assessment of
misfit or incongruence is the first stage of research in explaining the impact of
Europeanization on domestic political systems and structures. Hence misfit has become a
necessary condition in explaining European-initiated structural change at the domestic
level. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Schmidt 2006) However, as will be explored in later
chapters, assessing misfit is actually quite difficult and there is tremendous variation and
diversity across states even with similar patterns of policymaking, such as neo-
corporatism, or even within single member states themselves. This research shall suggest
in the concluding chapter, that this first step may be somewhat inappropriate and
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impossible to regularize in any meaningful way. The misfit of a particular institution,
policy, or structure while suggested to be an a priori condition actually appears to be far
more of after the fact conclusion regarding the adaptation or reform process. Some even
suggest that misfit has little or nothing to do with specific structural changes stemming
from Europeanization and that change and continuity rest entirely within the
particularistic national, sectoral, or policy environments and institutions of the member
states. (Hertier and Knill 2001 ) The final assessment of the utility and applicability of the
Europeanization framework will appear in the concluding chapter.
Because Europeanization broadly encompasses bits and pieces from several
approaches including new institutionalism, rational choice, social constructivism, and
political culture this may tempt one to criticize Europeanization for lack of rigor.
However, its primary strength may be found in the adaptability and flexibility of the
approach to coalesce disparate but interrelated concepts and phenomena of European
integration and provide a more satisfactory and explanatory understanding of the
consequences of Europeanization. As a toolbox, the Europeanization approach provides a
variety of levers, wrenches, pliers, hammers, screwdrivers, and other implements by
which to assess and analyze the effects of European-level governance upon state-level
structures. The proper tool to assess the effects of Europeanization upon national
bureaucracies may not always be the correct one to understand the effects upon public
opinion, interest groups, or regional identities.
This is why the Europeanization approach seems strongly suited to this research.
The very flexibility of the Europeanization approach allows one to assess the impact of
European integration upon a domestic political structure such as neo-corporatism that
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exists not only as a formal institution but also as a normative and political cultural
element of the society. Neo-corporatism, as will be discussed in the next chapter, is not
merely a set of formal institutions and procedures. Many elements of neo-corporatist
regimes are implicit, informal, and nonnative rather than explicitly institutionalized by
the state. Hence, merely an institutional or rational choice approach to analyzing the
impact of European integration upon the formal institutions and procedures of the social
partnership would yield some results, but not necessarily an accurate or full explanation
and understanding of the wider effects upon the underlying social, economic, and
political basis for neo-corporatism.
Conversely, a purely social learning or constructivist approach would omit
important institutional and procedural elements that complete and compliment the
analysis of European integration’s effects upon domestic structures of neo-corporatism.
(Falkner and Leiber 2004) Intergovernmental, interstate, and neo-functional analyses
have yielded results that help explain how neo-corporatist institutions and actors have
driven or opposed European integration within the policymaking institutions of the state.
(Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Moravcsik 1998; Scharpf 1996; Hertier 2001 ) Yet, these
say little about the forces that European integration and governance play in potentially
changing or transforming the domestic institutions, actors, and structures themselves. In
all, given this research’s interest in understanding and explaining the manners in which
European integration and governance may transform domestic neo-corporatist structures,
the frameworks of Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso seem initially
appropriate.
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Measuring the Europeanization of the Social Partnership
This research will explore and explain if, how, when, and to what extent European
modes of integration and governance transform domestic neo-corporatist structures like
the social partnership in Austria and Germany. This research will use the frameworks
provided by Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and C'aporaso to assess and explain the
consequences of European integration upon neo-corporatist structures. The first step of
the framework is to determine the extent to which European integration creates catalyst
for change in domestic neo-corporatist structures. As Hix and Goetz posit:
The delegation of policy competences to the European
level and the resulting political outcomes constrain domestic
choice, reinforce certain policy and institutional developments,
and provide a catalyst for change in others;
( 2000 , 10 )
This w ill also incorporate the first and second step of the Risse, Cow les, and Caporaso
model that assesses the goodness of fit of domestic neo-corporatist structures in the
context of European and multi-level governance. (2001
)
As will be discussed in later chapters, neo-corporatist institutions may be
susceptible to Europeanization precisely because of their monopolistic and rather rigid
interest intermediation structures. These may not fit well with the European-level of
governance that exhibits a far more mixed, novel, and perhaps pluralist form of interest
representation, intermediation, and governance. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Falkner 2000;
Greenwood 2003; Streeck and Schmitter 1991 ) As will be explored in chapter three, the
Europeanization process may threaten neo-corporatism. The neo-corporatist institutional
raison d’etre of seeking and implementing national forms of economic interest
intermediation, policymaking, and governance may be fundamentally eroded by the
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creation of supranational European levels of economic and political governance. Hence,
as will be argued in later chapters, European integration has the potential to
fundamentally challenge national neo-corporatist models and ideals. (Hertier 2001;
Adams 2002, 2004; Falkner 2000; Streeck 1991 ) In the terminology of Hix and Goetz,
the creation of European levels of governance constrains the effectiveness and efficacy of
domestic neo-corporatist structures and elicits catalyst for domestic interests and actors to
seek change or continuity. (2000, 1 1) In Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso’s terms, neo-
corporatism may provide a misfit with the existence and patterns of governance at the
European level thereby placing strong adaptational pressure upon such structures to be
transformed. (2001)
European integration and governance may provide a source of adaptational
pressure and catalyst upon neo-corporatist structures that were explicitly designed to
structure and limit the representation and intermediation of interests at the state level.
They relied upon a monopoly of sovereignty, authority, and state power to implement
and, if necessary, coerce domestic actors to abide by such consensus-building structures.
(Crepaz 1994; Crepaz and Lijphart 1995; Encamacion 1999; Gobeyn 1993; Lijphart
1969; Lijphart 1984; Streeck and Schmitter 1991) The creation of European-level or
multi-level governance may undermine some of the fundamental bases of neo-
corporatism in theory and practice, producing strong adaptational pressure and catalyst.
The second task of assessment in this research will attempt to use the Hix and
Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso models to explain the variations in response of
the Austrian and German social partnerships to these adaptational forces and catalysts.
The institutionalization and social commitment to neo-corporatism result in differential
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responses to the forces of European integration in Germany and Austria. Hence, there is
neither isomorphic convergence nor divergence amongst the social partnerships of the
German and Austria systems towards a single European manner or model of interest
representation and intermediation. The institutional and normative variations result in
differential structures of opportunities and mediating factors from state to state. Hence,
while forces of European integration are pressuring social partnerships in both states, the
structures react differentially due to unique institutional features. (Hix and Goetz 2000;
Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Hertier 2001 ) A comparative analysis of the
institutionalization, development, and structures of social partnership in Austria and
Germany will be explored in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
Using Hix and Goetz’ model, this research will assess and explain why and under
what conditions actors and institutions may seek to alter or abandon domestic neo-
corporatist institutions. When European-level governance provides exits, vetoes, or
informational advantages unavailable at the domestic level, actors and institutions will be
more likely to alter strategies, procedures, or identities that may fundamentally erode or
transform other domestic structures. For example, multinational firms (which likely have
both national and multinational interests) that are constrained by domestic peak
associations or neo-corporatist institutions and processes may individually, or as a group,
seek relief, veto, or protection at the supranational level. (Coen and Dannreuther 2003;
Hayward 1995; Schmidt 2006) This is not strictly limited to multinational firms. Unions,
environmental groups, human rights organizations, linguistic and ethnic entities, regional
and local governments, political parties, and innumerable other domestic actors all have
sought action at the European level on a wide range of policy issues. (Greenwood 2003;
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Sbragia 1992; Streeck 2005; Hix and Goetz 2000; Hertier 2001; Schmidt 2006) In the
terms of Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, structural change becomes more or less likely due
to the existence or absence of the five mediating factors; multiple veto points, facilitating
formal institutions, organizational and policymaking cultures, differential empowerment
of domestic actors, and learning. (2001) The differential institutional aspects of neo-
corporatist social partnerships, that will be detailed in chapters four through seven,
exhibit differential structural opportunities and institutional features and are the primary
explanatory variables, using the Europeanization framework, in understanding and
explaining the variations in response to adaptational pressures amongst the Austrian and
German social partnerships.
Under force from European integration, the continuity and change found in the
social partnerships of Austria and Germany may be explained by using the frameworks
provided by Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso. This research will use
these frameworks to explain and understand if and when European integration and
governance provide adaptational pressure and catalyst to domestic neo-corporatist
structures but also if and why there is variation amongst the social partnerships in their
response to such pressures. The end results will assess to what extent Europeanization is
the direct source of structural political changes to the social partnerships in Germany and
Austria as well as what types of changes result from such these pressures. Further, it will
assess to what extent the Europeanization framework has been useful and viable in this
endeavor.
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In the case of the social partnerships, there will be a meaningful range in
adaptational pressure and catalyst as well as mediating factors and structural
opportunities amongst the German and Austrian cases. While both are under some
adaptational pressure and catalyst for change, there are variations. Austria, due to its
more recent accession and need to adjust in a short period of time is probably under
slightly more adaptational pressure that Germany, a member in the EU since its
foundation. Additionally, Germany due to its political clout and influence within the EU
is far more likely to be able to drive and influence EU policy than the much smaller and
recently admitted Austria. (Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) In essence, the misfit between
domestic structures, including neo-corporatism, and European integration and governance
is predicted to be higher in the Austrian case. (Crepaz 1995; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller
1988; Pelinka 1999; Heinisch 2000)
This leads to the second set of conclusions regarding change and continuity. The
preeminent argument is that German and Austrian systems have been slow to adopt and
implement structural change. (The Economist 2003; Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Crepaz
1994; Kittel 2000; Rose 2000; Streeck 1996; Turner 1998; Vail 2003) It will be herein
argued that the specific institutional, cultural, and structural opportunities of the Austrian
and German social partnerships provide the basis of this structural change or continuity.
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Yet the Europeanization frameworks provided by Hix and Goetz and Risse,
Cowles, and Caporaso may prove to be of limited utility in explaining and understanding
the Europeanization of neo-corporatism in Austria and Germany. The previous
mentioned limitations and weaknesses of the framework including its dominantly top-
down approach, determinism of measuring misfit, and overall sequencing seem to fail to
fully explain and encompass the totality of the Europeanization process in the area of
social partnership. This will be further explored in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
CORPORATISM AND NEO-CORPORATISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Introduction
This chapter has two goals. The first is to introduce, analyze, and assess
corporatism and neo-corporatism as theoretical concepts and empirical political, social,
and economic phenomenon. This will encompass a brief history of corporatism and neo-
corporatism within the field of comparative politics through a survey of its major
developments, scholars, and studies. As will be discussed, corporatism and neo-
corporatism, while somewhat recently adopted as an approach in comparative politics in
relative terms, have had their fair share of controversy. In addition and more importantly,
this chapter will enumerate the major underlying philosophical and political arguments
and assumptions of the theories of corporatism and neo-corporatism. In essence, this
chapter will illustrate through a review of literature and scholarship upon what
fundamental assumptions corporatist and neo-corporatist systems are built and thrive. It
will be herein argued, and more so in chapters six through eight, that the conditions upon
which corporatism and neo-corporatism were founded and operate are potentially
challenged by several economic, social, and political trends, including an ever
Europeanizing political, social, and economic environment.
Corporatism and neo-corporatism are not particularly new concepts or political
phenomena. Quite to the contrary, corporatism predates many other modem ideologies
and regimes such as liberalism or socialism. Yet as a concept and approach within
comparative politics, corporatism and neo-corporatism coherently emerged only within
the last forty years. (Wiarda 1997; Schmitter 1979) By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
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failure to either solve or adequately explain the continuing dilemmas of economic and
political underperformance in the developing world led scholars of comparative politics
to seek alternatives to that of the development approach. The political, economic and
military crises in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, the series of military-authoritarian
takeovers in Latin America, and the continuing poverty and civil strife in Africa
illuminated serious analytical and empirical deficiencies of the development model that
had become the paradigmatic roadmap to democratic peace and neo-liberal prosperity.
(Chalmers 1985; Adams 2004)
First and foremost was the normative link between political development as an
approach and assumed universal inevitability and applicability of pluralism and neo-
liberalism. Underlying the development approach was a fundamental and ethnocentric
belief that developing states should follow in the footsteps of the Anglo-American or
Western experience. (Rostow 1960) This included an inherent faith in neo-liberalism and
pluralism as both a cure of the developing states’ economic and political ills and as a
buttress against the rising tide of Marxist-Leninism. As Samuel Huntington has
suggested, American foreign policy was “handicapped by its happy history” in that there
was a dogmatic and determinist belief that economic development would beget
democratic development and political stability. ( 1968) In such efforts, American foreign
policy sought to engage in state building by promoting both neo-liberal economies and
pluralist political structures.
The widespread failure of the development approach related to more than the
inability of developing states to achieve sustained economic and political development
and democracy, despite an influx of billions of dollars in aid and loans from the United
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States, Western Europe, and international organizations. The development approach also
failed to adequately explain a wide range of phenomena that fell outside of the pluralist
conceptions of state, society, and political process. Scholars, who were disillusioned and
dissatisfied with development’s universalism, ethnocentrism, and failings starting
accreting towards new alternatives such as corporatist, dependency, and world systems
approaches in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (Chalmers 1985; Adams 2004)
Corporatism was attractive to many in comparative politics precisely because it
offered a divergent explanation to many of the historic, economic, and political
assumptions of the pluralist model. (Zeigler 1988; Willimason 1989; Cawson 1986)
However, the historical association or corporatism with authoritarian and fascist regimes,
like that of Mussolini in Italy in the 1920s and 1930s, proved, and often continues to
prove, a major stumbling block to acceptance into the mainstream. (Sarti 1971 ) Despite
the pejorative connotation, corporatism has proven to be a valuable analytical tool in
understanding and explaining a wide range of state-society relations that remained
ignored or under-appreciated by the development approach and its pluralist blinders.
(Chalmers 1985)
While one approach to corporatism emerged primarily out of the disillusionment
with development theory and specific case studies in Latin America, another approach,
arrived at quite independently, arose out of studies of Western Europe. (Schmitter 1971;
Wiarda 1981 ) In numerous Latin American states, the traditional socio-cultural political
arrangements between the Catholic Church, the armed forces, and oligarchic landowners
survived the end of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism and were codified into the
modem regimes of the region. (Wiarda 1981; Schmitter 1971 ) In Europe, corporatism
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had been a popular ideology in many regimes of the interwar era but, in light of the Nazi
and fascist experiences and the subsequent Axis defeat, had been discredited. Once
rivaling both liberalism and Marxism, corporatism was mostly viewed with suspicion due
to its association with corruption, authoritarianism, fascism, and perceived backwardness.
(Adams 2004) These early sources of corporatist ideology will be assessed later in this
chapter.
But several scholars began observing that while Europeans avoided the use of the
term, a number of states were still practicing a form of disguised corporatism. (Beer
1956, 1965; Eckstein 1958; Rokkan 1965; Diamant 1959, 1960; Heisler 1973;
LaPalombara 1964; Lijphart 1969) As Beer posited,
.
. .there remains a system of ‘quasi-corporatism’ which
leaves no important organized interest group without a
channel of influence and a real share in the making of
decisions. The main substance of the system is continual
day-to-day contacts between public bureaucrats in
government departments and private bureaucrats in the
offices of the great pressure groups. (1956)
The tripartite relationships and institutions between business, labor, and the state found in
a number of Western European states exhibited the telltale traits of corporatism despite
using pseudonyms such as concordance, communitarianism, social pact, or social
partnership. (Shonfield 1958, 1966)
Hence, the resurrection of corporatism as a concept and approach flowed from
two distinct directions, Latin America and the developing world with an emphasis on
socio-cultural foundations, and Western Europe where an institutional and political
economy foundations dominated. (Wiarda 1997; Adams 2004) These two independent
currents of corporatism and their respective origins aid in explaining the differences that
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would emerge surrounding the concept and the utilization of corporatism in comparative
politics. And while the controversy surrounding corporatism as both a term and an
approach has never fully subsided, the intensity of the controversy has faded over the past
four decades, allowing one to argue that most elements of the corporatist approach have
been absorbed into mainstream comparative politics. While it can also be argued that
corporatism never attained the broad level of acceptance as a theoretical approach or
methodology of the development model, this argument can be applied to all of the post-
development schools of thought, including dependency theory, new institutionalism,
rational choice, political economy, and others. (Adams 2004) Corporatism became useful
in explaining and analyzing a wide range of political behavior and institutions that other
approaches tended to ignore. (Chalmers 1985) In essence corporatism provided "a new
way of looking at things” as well as “a new set of things to look at”. (Williamson 1989)
Corporatism has therefore made a significant contribution as an enduring alternative
perspective in comparative politics.
Defining Corporatism and Its Types
The term corporatism has been used to describe a variety of ideological, research,
and empirical political phenomenon. (Chalmers 1985; Adams 2002) Because of its broad
usage, corporatism connotes a certain level of ambiguity, though no more so than terms
such as pluralism or democracy. Corporatism is descriptive of a historical approach,
political and social ideology, and empirical institutions of governance. While all these
utilizations of corporatism are interrelated, and will be discussed throughout this chapter,
a short working definition would be helpful. One of the inherent problems in defining
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corporatism is in trying to escape its association with fascist regimes such as that of Italy
under Mussolini. ( Sarti 1971; Field 1938) While escaping this pejorative connotation has
been demanding, it does not diminish the utility of corporatism in explaining and
understanding a range of state-society relations that diverge from pluralist or Marxist
models. (Zeigler 1988;Cawson 1986; Williamson 1989)
Philippe C. Sehmitter’s definition of corporatism, while not the only one, is
amongst the most commonly cited:
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest
representation in which the constituent units are organized
into a limited number of singular compulsory,
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created)
by the state and granted a deliberate representational
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange
for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and
articulation of demands and supports. (1979)
Due in part to its widespread utilization, this definition has also been intensely criticized.
One common critique is the definition’s constrictive focus on authoritarian regimes,
excluding varieties of democratic corporatist regimes and structures. The primary
research on Brazil and Portugal may have heavily influenced Schmitter and limited his
conceptualization of corporatism. (Schmitter 1971, 1975) The definition also cut across
cultural lines and suggested universality, drawing the ire of many in comparative politics
who viewed corporatism as a useful approach in some cases but with less explanatory
power in others. (Chalmers 1985)
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While the Schmitter definition is deliberately complicated, Howard J. Wiarda
suggested a less complex list of three distinguishing characteristics:
1. a strong directing state,
2. restrictions on interest-group freedom and activity, and
3. incorporation of interest groups into and as part of the
state system, responsible both for representing members’
interests in and to the state and for helping the state
administer and carry out policies. (1997)
While these definitions do vary in language and precision, they do share a common
conception of the corporatist relationship between the state and interest groups.
Corporatism, unlike pluralism, organizes societal groups’ relationships to the state as part
of a limited system of interest representation; interest groups are incorporated into the
governance structures and processes of the state. Pluralism is defined by its lack of
regulation in which an infinite number of groups compete with little or no government
direction; interest groups are autonomous from the state. (Zeigler 1988; Wiarda 1997;
Adams 2004)
Another corporatist distinction from pluralism is in the activist role of the central
government. In the pluralist model the state’s role is to “umpire and referee the group
struggle but not try to control it”. (Wiarda 1997) In the corporatist model, the state not
only intermediates between groups but also organizes and recognizes what groups are to
be included in the policymaking process. This does not mean that the state always plays a
direct role in the intermediation process. As will be discussed in chapters four through
seven, the state, after establishing such a system may have little direct role in the process
other than to maintain the infrastructure of corporatism. (Katzenstein 1987) Hence, the
role and function of the state varies significantly amongst the pluralist and corporatist
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models, as does the relationship between political parties and interest groups. (Wiarda
1997; Lehmbruch 1979a)
The conceptualization of corporatism, under its various definitions, has led to a
categorization of corporatist regimes, structures, and systems that is as extensive as those
under the liberal, pluralist, or Marxist banners. Thus corporatism can be found in
developed and developing states and in liberal democracies as well as in authoritarian
regimes. The categorization of corporatist regimes itself seemed like a growing cottage
industry amongst scholars of comparative politics from the 1960s through 1980s.
Modifiers such as social corporatism, state corporatism, liberal corporatism, strong
corporatism, weak corporatism, authoritarian corporatism, new corporatism, meso-
corporatism, micro-corporatism, quasi-corporatism, and neo-corporatism became
common currency of corporatist scholarship. (Katzenstein 1984; Lehmbruch 1979;
Schmitter 1979; Williamson 1985; Cawson 1986; Pike and Stritch 1974)
One important and lasting categorization of corporatist regimes has been the
differentiation between corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes. Schmitter provided such
a distinction between forms of corporatism in his groundbreaking article “Still the
Century of Corporatism?” (Schmitter 1979) State corporatism, or now usually known
merely as corporatism, has come to be specifically applied to the hierarchical,
authoritarian and top-down regimes common to fascist Europe and authoritarian Latin
America. Wiarda suggested that due to their Catholic, neo-feudal, and cultural histories,
these regimes typify a form of “organic-statist” corporatism where the state plays a
dominant and often authoritarian role incorporating traditional domestic interests such as
the Catholic Church, armed forces, and large landowners. (Wiarda 1997) Corporatism
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also emerged in Northern Europe, finding institutionalization in the professional and
guild systems of the Hanseatic League and Italian city-states amongst others. (Berger
2002; Landauer 1983) Neo-corporatism, conversely, is generally applied to the modem
democratic and bottom-up regimes of Europe and the advanced industrial world. In these
systems, the corporate units, usually representing organized labor, business interests, and
farmers, are the more powerful actors and play a far larger role decentralizing power
away from the state. The labeling of neo-corporatist postwar Germany as the “semi-
sovereign state” is an exemplar. (Katzenstein 1987)
Defining the term has not been a particularly easy affair, yet the results do testify
that corporatism does explicitly describe and explain a form of state-interest group
relations that varies from the assumptions and expectations of the dominant pluralist
model. Before further detailing the conditions and assumptions under which corporatism
and neo-corporatism exist, this chapter will briefly explore the philosophical origins and
historical development of corporatism and neo-corporatism.
Origins of Corporatism
While corporatism does describe a particular type of state-society relationships,
the ideological origins of corporatism stem from numerous cultural, political, economic,
theological, societal, and philosophical elements. The principal ideological roots of
corporatism that have been explored in comparative politics derive primarily from
Western sources of philosophical, social, and political thought. (Cawson 1986; Black
1984; Landauer 1983; Elbow 1953; Bowen 1947; Wiarda 1997) It is also important to
note that the Western world and Latin America has been the area where corporatism has
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been more completely exemplified in both practice and theory. However, there has been
and continues to be valuable scholarship exploring the origins of corporatist structures
and regimes in virtually every region of the world. Such research has included studies of
state-society relations in South and East Asia, Islamic and African societies, as well as in
former communist states of Europe and Asia. (Zeigler 1988; Pempel and Tsunekawa
1979; McNamara 1999; Nyang'oro and Shaw 1989; Laothamatas 1991; Bianchi 1989;
Ruble 1998) While this section does primarily focus upon the Western origins, one
should not be limited in viewing corporatism as merely a product of the Western social,
economic, and political experience. The application of the corporatist approach to a
variety of cultures, often those that have a non-individualist or communalist background,
is a testament to its conceptual value and to the diversity of cultures that fall outside of
the pluralist model.
Corporatism, despite its more modern application, can trace its ideological roots
as far as the ancient Greeks, the rise of Christianity, and the Middle Ages. Some authors
have traced the ancient origins to three distinct influences: biblical, Greek and Roman.
(Williamson 1989; Wiarda 1997) The biblical contribution to corporatist thought
primarily derives from St. Paul and Thomas Aquinas, who suggest that society and
politics is an “organic” unit that, like the human body, operates with “all its functional
units integrated, harmonized and performing their proper function.” (Wiarda 1997) The
Greek origins relate most closely to Aristotle's text. The Polities , in which the distinction
between state and society is non-existent. For Aristotle, the state should endeavor to be
“integral, unified and even monolithic” and should be organized along “natural"
functional societal lines. (Wiarda 1997) This organization along occupational and
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functional lines would promote order and harmonization of the state, which is conceived
as an organic whole, rather than a collection of disparate social, economic, and political
actors. The Roman contribution to the ancient origins of corporatism included an early
version of a functional corporatist regime whereby the empire was intermittently
organized under and operated by a series of corporate associations, including military
orders, religious orders, and professional associations. (Black 1984; Wiarda 1997) Within
these ancient sources most of the foundations for modem corporatism can be found. The
ancients shared a view of the state as an organic and unified entity that promotes social
and political order by organizing society into functional and ordered corporate units that
are regulated by the state.
Further development of the ideological origins of corporatism emerged from the
Middle Ages. First was the emergence and predominance of the Roman Catholic Church.
The church itself was organized along functional lines of religious orders, teaching
orders, caregivers, military orders, monastic divisions, cloisters, and other units. The
Roman Catholic Church exemplified the form of top-down, unified, and monolithic
organization promoted by much of corporatist thought. (Wiarda 1997) One notable
feature that distinguishes Catholicism from Protestantism is the very hierarchical and
corporatist organization of church, clergy, and orders.
A second trend was the emergence of artisan and craft guilds, which also
promoted a corporatist vision of social, economic, and political organization. The guilds
functioned as hierarchical, monopolistic, and regulatory associations that had strong
influence upon economic policies of the times, including wages and trade policy. (Black
1984) The Middle Ages were typified by the estate system of medieval feudal
89
relationships between the nobles, church, and commoners. Interspersed within these three
main pillars of society were military orders, guilds, and other functional organizations.
The Roman Catholic Church strongly supported the estate system through which it could
exert tremendous influence in “worldly affairs”. (Landauer 1983) Based on rank, social
order, and function, the estate was influential upon later corporatist thinkers. Complex
and effective corporatist governance was also a hallmark of the trans-Baltic Hanseatic
League as well as the city-states of Italy. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002; Bowen 1947)
Hence corporatism, even in its early history, found variety and utility in a number of
governance settings.
While Rome fell, the Reformation loosened the grip of the Catholic Church, and
the modem state system replaced the feudal order, the ideological origins of corporatism
would remain as recessive elements in the Western philosophy of politics and society.
The French Revolution of 1789 not only signaled the eventual demise of absolutism
across Europe, it simultaneously ended many remaining traditional or medieval
corporatist structures. The promotion of individual rights, or liberalism, in lieu of the top-
down, monopolistic system of corporate privilege swept across Europe in varying
degrees. As the old regimes toppled, so did the remaining ancient and quasi-feudal
conceptions of corporatism. From 1789 to the mid-nineteenth century, the defenders of
corporatism were generally considered reactionary elements, fearing social and political
disintegration, looking to restore the absolutism and central direction of the state. (Elbow
1953, 1966; Bowen 1947) The emergence of socialism, an ideology even more radical
than liberalism, in the mid- and late nineteenth century was itself a great opportunity for
corporatism to provide an alternative to the two other competing ideologies.
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A number of thinkers emerged in the mid- and late nineteenth century minimizing
the focus upon the absolutism of past corporatist thought and seeking a somewhat more
reformed version of corporatism. These primarily but not exclusively Catholic
philosophers and writers such as Durkheim, La Tour du Pin, Rathenau, Spann, and
Manoilescou resurrected corporatism and developed it into a modem political ideology
on par with its contemporaries. (Landauer 1983; Bowen 1947; Berger 2002; Williamson
1989; Wiarda 1997) Rather than being primarily confined to Catholic states such as Italy,
France, and Austria, corporatism also gained traction in Protestant societies afflicted by
the economic, social, and political challenges of industrialization. The emergence of trade
unionism and an industrial working class was not only the hallmark of the growing power
of socialism but also of the emergence of modem corporatism. Corporatist principles
aspiring to harmony between classes, versus the socialist principles of class struggle, and
of national unity gained in popularity as an alternative to either liberalism or socialism.
(Williamson 1989; Wiarda 1997)
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, corporatism emerged as an
important national strategy to address social, economic, and political instability.
Descending from ancient biblical, Greek, and Roman origins, filtered through the feudal
estate and guild systems of the Middle Ages, modem corporatism exploded onto a
European scene ravaged by the socioeconomic challenges of industrialization,
urbanization, and social instability. The popularity of corporatism was due in part to its
provision of an alternative to liberalism, which many viewed as corrosive to political and
social order, and to socialism, which had within its ideological framework an inherent
focus upon class conflict. The Catholic Church was one of the more vigorous proponents
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of the corporatist revival. This was most notable under Pope Leo XIII who issued the
encyclical Renun Novarum in 1891 that recognized labor organizations as legitimate
social institutions within a limited corporatist framework that sought to coordinate labor
and capital for the common good. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002; Wiarda 1997) Beyond
the church, new corporatist thinkers such as Giuseppe Bosca of Italy, Karl von Vogelsang
of Austria, La Tour du Pin in France, and Wilhelm Ketteler in Germany openly cited
ancient and medieval origins of corporatism while concurrently forging a new and
modem version of corporatism to address the social, economic, and political dilemmas of
the industrial age. (Landauer 1983; Elbow 1953; Bowen 1947; Berger 2002) It should be
noted that the corporatist alternative was viewed by most political and social thinkers not
merely as an ideological abstraction, but also as a pragmatic form of national governance
that could be utilized to address ongoing socioeconomic challenges while avoiding the
perceived pitfalls of either liberalism or socialism. (Williamson 1989; Cawson 1986;
Wiarda 1997)
The anti-democratic and anti-liberal tendencies of corporatist thought also
attracted a number of supporters and proponents who viewed corporatism as a viable
solution for the economic, social, and political instability of states in the years leading up
to and following World War I. Rather than promoting social peace with democracy, these
thinkers, such as Gaetano Mosca, Georges Sorel, and Ludwig Glumpowicz, saw
corporatism as a way to limit democracy and forge social order. (Wiarda 1997) Hence,
this era of corporatist thought was already exhibiting the lasting divide between the more
democratic and authoritarian variants of corporatism.
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Nonetheless, both variants of modem corporatism exhibited a critical distinction
from ancient forms of corporatism in its explicit nationalism. Perhaps the defining feature
of modem corporatism is its focus upon the state and its interests, power, prosperity, and
stability. Unlike communism and liberalism that saw the role of the state as either
minimal or intended to wither away, corporatism was an explicitly nationalist ideology
that argued that rested upon the logic of protecting and enhancing the state's power,
especially given their perceived relative weakness, in the global order. (Wiarda 1997;
Cawson 1986, Williamson 1989) Perhaps this is the primary explanation why many
authoritarian and fascist movements, such as those in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, and
numerous Latin American states absorbed corporatism into their philosophies and
manifestos. (Cawson 1986)
The early twentieth century provided more than enough crisis to move
corporatism from an interesting ideological concept to an adopted strategy of governance.
Economically, increasingly costly labor-business disputes and the series of recessions and
depressions and the late nineteenth and early twentieth century peaked in 1929 with the
onset of the Great Depression. Politically, the prolonged conflict of World War I and the
brutality of the Russian Revolution in 1917 brought disillusionment to the utopian ideals
of many of liberal and socialist stripes. These events led many to seek an alternative,
which they found in corporatism. While one might suggest that the ancient and medieval
origins of corporatism necessarily beget the consolidation of modem corporatist regimes
of the twentieth century, this would be an overstatement. Corporatism was often called
upon to address the practical and pragmatic concerns of political elites and their fear of
the excesses of both liberalism and socialism. The ideological origins of corporatist
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thought certainly did provide a particularistic lens by which many modem thinkers and
leaders viewed the relationship between state and society, but without the existence of
economic, military, and political crises, corporatism might have remained primarily an
ideological pursuit rather than a pragmatic one. (Williamson 1989; Wiarda 1997; Adams
2002; Diamant 1960; Landauer 1983; Field 1938)
Corporatism in Practice
The early twentieth century, especially in the interwar era, saw a spectacular
explosion of corporatist regimes and structures throughout Europe and Latin America.
While many of these regimes explicitly called themselves corporatist, almost none, with
perhaps the exceptions of Italy under Mussolini and Portugal under Salazar, adopted a
form of government based solely upon corporate associations. ( Sarti 1971; Field 1938;
Wiarda 1993; Schmitter 1975) Most regimes of this and later eras adopted structures that
operated in a mixed system of corporatist and liberal, statist, or authoritarian forms of
governance. While ideology often tends towards the pure form, like any theory put into
practice there was tremendous variation amongst the cases of states adopting corporatist
regimes.
Corporatism emerged in brief and limited forms in Portugal. Greece, and Spain in
the late 1910s and early 1920s. However, the first corporatist regime of significant length
and application was that of Benito Mussolini in Italy from 1922 to 1939. Mussolini
utilized corporatism to seek greater control over Italy's economy, especially its volatile
unions, and to consolidate his personal authority. (Field 1938; Sarti 1971 ) While
Mussolini's brand of corporatism was primarily a fayade for his authoritarian aspirations.
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it has unfortunately become the most frequently identified example of corporatism. The
Iberian Peninsula was also home to corporatist regimes that duplicated some elements of
the Mussolini model. Portugal under Salazar and Spain under Franco created corporative
units to manage the national economy and delimit political participation. However,
especially in Spam, most efforts were rather thinly veiled efforts to suppress labor unions
and other radical societal groups rather than promoting genuine functional representation.
(Wiarda 1993; Schmitter 1975)
During the interwar era varieties of corporatism could be found in numerous
European regimes including Bulgaria, Poland. Albania, Greece, Lithuania, Estonia,
Latvia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Austria, Ireland, and Romania. (Wiarda 1997; Adams 2004)
Most of these regimes were hybrids of corporatism and some form of statist
authoritarianism or monarchism, though cases such as Ireland also included some liberal
and socialist elements. (Naylor 1993) Vichy France and Nazi Germany also exhibited
elements of corporatism though these were dominantly instrumental, as it was in Italy and
Spain, in promoting dictatorial control rather than functional representation. (James and
Tanner 2002; Paxton 1972; Wiesen 2001)
Latin America also began to widely adopt corporatist regimes, structures, and
processes. Primarily based upon their Catholic, Iberian, and neo-feudal traditions,
numerous authoritarian Latin American states fell into the corporatist category. The
regimes of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Arnolfo Anas in Panama, Alfredo
Stroessner in Paraguay, and Jorge Ubico in Guatemala typified corporatist organizations
based primarily on the three traditional units, the church, military, and oligarchy. (Wiarda
1968; Ropp 2004; Veliz 1980) More populist regimes, such as those of Getiiiio Vargas in
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Brazil, Juan Peron in Argentina, and Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico, included newer and
non-traditional units often representing labor, peasants, indigenous peoples, women, or
other socioeconomic groups. (Bak 1983; Grayson 1998) In some cases corporatism was
found within the structures of authoritarian-military regimes, while in others it was
located within the auspices of civilian political parties or civilian-dominated
governments. (Wiarda 1981; Collier 1979; Pike and Stritch 1974; Malloy 1977)
In Northern European states such as Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands, many corporatist elements were integrated into democratic policymaking
structures. The alliances between industrial labor, agrarian interests, and political parties
helped not only moderate and coordinate their demands and behavior but also provided a
critical mass of support for transition to parliamentary democracy despite conservative
and reactionary objections. The most notable developments were a series of legal reforms
that shifted the conflict between labor and capital, as well as other important socio-
economic interests, from outside to inside state auspices. (Einhom and Logue 2003;
Katzenstein 1980, 1985; Diamant 1960; Andeweg 1993; Lijphart 1969) The process,
while not nearly as comprehensive as in the Southern European cases, was decidedly
coiporatist in forming a formal, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and policymaking relationship
between important social and economic interests and the state. These corporatist reforms
were intended to alleviate the growing costs and disruptions of labor-capital disputes
(such as general strikes) that debilitated national economies without sacrificing other
democratic structures of governance, hence falling more properly into the category of
neo-corporatism. (Einhom and Logue 2003; Diamant 1960) These neo-corporatist
structures promoted and required consensual consultation and bargaining between social
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and economic interests and the state on issues such as wages, pensions, industrial policy,
labor safety, and other social policies. This pattern would develop and expand in the
postwar era, becoming central to numerous European systems of labor-capital-state
relations. (Bischof 1966; Heisler 1973; Katzenstein 1987; Lehmbruch 1982; Lijphart
1969; Wolinetz 2001; Armingeon 1997)
While adoption varied amongst states, national coiporatist and neo-corporatist
structures still shared numerous characteristics distinguishing them from pluralist,
Marxist, or clientelist state-interest group models. The specific development of neo-
corporatist processes and institutions in Austria and Germany will be addressed in
significant detail in chapters four through seven. Nonetheless, corporatism and neo-
corporatism were founded and operated upon several key assumptions regarding the role
and powers of the state and interest groups, as well as the relationship between these
actors. In addition, corporatist scholars suggest that corporatism and neo-corporatism
were more or less likely to occur under certain social, economic, and political
preconditions. (Offe 1984; Katzenstein 1978; Cox 1988; O’Sullivan 1988; Wiarda 1997;
Schmitter 1972; Landauer 1983; Lehmbruch 1982; Lijphart 1984)
The conditions and assumptions that underlie the development and maintenance
of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures is central to this research's emphasis in
explaining and understanding the impact of Europeanization upon such structures in
Germany and Austria. If European integration and multi-level governance has a greater
misfit with corporatist and neo-corporatist structures at the national level, adaptatational
pressures for structural domestic change would result. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso
2001; Hix and Goetz 2000) This might not necessarily result in actual adaptation since
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Europeanization rarely results in isomorphism or "wholesale convergence or divergence”.
(Knill 2001; Hertier 2001; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001) Instead, domestic
structural change will be dependent upon mediating factors found amongst the neo-
corporatist institutions and actors at the national level, which will be explored in chapters
four through seven. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, 2001; Hix and Goetz, 2000)
Nonetheless, the preliminary step in following the Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso model is
determining the "goodness of fit” between European and domestic structures and the
subsequent adaptational pressures that arise from the level of misfit between the two.
While some fit and misfit certainly arises from the particular institutionalization
of neo-corporatism in Germany and Austria, there are fundamental characteristics of
corporatism and neo-corporatism that may exacerbate and magnify the misfit between
integrated European multi-level governance and domestic structures. (Falkner 1997,
2001 ) These foundations of corporatism and neo-corporatism are shared amongst both
states and their social partnerships. And while there are important national variations that
shape the likelihood and manner of domestic structural change, explored in chapter eight,
the commonalities may contribute to misfit between European multi-level governance
and domestic neo-corporatist structures in all cases.
This is not to say that European governance and social partnerships are
completely antithetical to one another. (Schmitter and Grote 1997; Katzenstein 2003) In
fact the EU and its predecessors have partially operated through numerous committees
and institutions, like the Economic and Social Council, European Social Dialogue, and
the Common Agricultural Policy that exhibit strongly neo-corporatist strategies of
decision and policymaking. However, these institutions have been largely marginalized
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or underdeveloped within the EU framework in comparison to other institutions that
operate under non-corporatist means. (Sargent 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1991
)
Additionally, corporatist and neo-corporatist institutions and structures can adapt and
reform and revitalize themselves to better fit the new European environment. These
structures and their institutions and actors are certainly capable of making significant and
lasting alterations to the existing patterns of corporatism or neo-corporatism. Hence,
while the very existence of the neo-corporatist social partnerships in Germany and
Austria may contribute to greater adaptational pressures, the end results are not wholesale
change or dissolution. (Heinisch 2000; Falkner 1997, 2001 ; Falkner and Leiber 2004;
Katzenstein 2003)
Lastly, the existence of misfit between European governance and national
structures of social partnership assumes that there is a coherent or agreed upon
assessment of what encompasses European governance. However, and as will be
discussed in this and later chapters, the European Union exhibits numerous forms of
existing policymaking models, including pluralism, corporatism, and statism, but may
also be a completely new form of governance. (Falkner 2000) This suggests that while
there is certainly some misfit between neo-corporatist patterns at the national level and
policymaking at the European one, the misfit might be far less consistent, stable, or
patterned than one could find between more dominantly corporatist, pluralist, or statist
systems. This would mean that adaptational pressures from Europeanization would also
be less consistent, stable, or patterned, exacerbating difficulties in measuring both misfit
and the impetus for structural change at the domestic levels. This will be more
specifically addressed in the concluding chapter.
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Conditions of Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism
Corporatism and neo-corporatism, as theories and empirical structures of
governance, rest on a number of key assumptions and expectations about the role of the
state, interest groups, state-society relationships, and political culture. These may show
some divergence from state to state and from structure to structure. Yet for the most part,
scholarly analysis and case studies of corporatism and neo-corporatism have suggested
several conditions under which corporatism and neo-corporatism are more likely to
emerge and thrive. The distinctions between corporatism and neo-corporatism will be
delineated when applicable, as there is much scholarship that suggests a divergence
between neo-corporatism and its advanced, industrialized, and democratic path and
corporatism and its tendency towards authoritarianism.
These assumptions and conditions may be critical in assessing the impact of
European integration and multi-level governance upon domestic neo-corporatist
structures not only in the cases focused upon in this research, Germany and Austria, but
in all cases within the European environment. If the assumptions and conditions of neo-
corporatism do indeed misfit with the structures and process of European integration and
multi-level governance, then adaptational pressures will follow. These may or may not
result in domestic change of the neo-corporatist structures; it is dependent upon the
particularistic institutionalization of neo-corporatism in the domestic political system.
Hence, understanding under what conditions neo-corporatism arises, thrives, and survives
is a critical step in this research.
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The Sovereign State
One of the fundamental assumptions of corporatism is the primacy of the
sovereign state. The linkage of corporatism to nationalism is a rather modern incarnation
within corporatist thought. Ancient conceptions of corporatism, w hether stemming from
biblical, Roman, Catholic, or medieval sources did not view the body politic as confined
to the nation-state. (Cawson 1986; Wiarda 1997; Williamson 1989) Since the very
concept of statehood is generally considered a post-Westphalian development, ancient
corporatism was not linked to nationalism in any meaningful way.
However, the new corporatist thinkers and ideology that emerged in the 1
9
lh
and
20th centuries were decidedly nationalist in orientation. This reflects changes in the world
order and its philosophers after Westphalia. The re-founding of corporatist thought was
based upon the solid and positivist conception of a world order of states and national
interests. Corporatism was explicitly sought as a national solution to solve economic,
social, and political turmoil caused by liberalism, socialism, industrialism, radicalism,
and other pressures that were perceived to be dividing and weakening the state. (Cawson
1986; Williamson 1989)
Modem corporatism assumes the state will exert monopolistic and sovereign
power over the economic and social policymaking process. As Williamson argues, the
corporatist state in entrusted to establish and maintain a particular economic and social
order in lieu of the chaotic or divisive liberalism or socialism. (Williamson 1985) The
state must identify national economic or social interests to be sought and achieved by
through state policy. As Winkler suggests, the corporatist state directs the economy
according to four principles: “unity, order, nationalism, and success”. (Winkler 1976,
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103) Others suggest that the distinction between the state and interests in corporatism are
reduced and are “fused” by the incorporation process. (Jessop 1979) The autonomous
agency of the state is a key question. Is the state merely a translator of the domestic
interest group struggle, or does the state have its own specific interests and identity?
While pluralist theory tends towards the former view of the state as a mere referee of
domestic interests, corporatist theory almost always and without exception assumes that
the state is also an actor with its own preferences and agency to shape and sometimes
even contradict domestic interests. (Zeigler 1988; Adams 2004)
Nonetheless, while the debate over the state's autonomy from domestic interests
can certainly be continued, modem corporatist theory and practice does begin with an
assumption of state sovereignty. This includes both external and internal state
sovereignty. Internally, the state must be the highest and unchallenged power over its
population and territory and, externally, the state must identify and defend itself from
encroachment by others. The state must be the monopolistic locus of authority and power
in the realm of economic and social policy if it is to identify and effectively establish and
maintain a particular economic order. As Cawson tautologically posits, “the role of the
state is thus central to the concept of corporatism: the state is the arena in which the
process of corporatist politics takes place.” (Cawson 1986, 36)
Scholarship and case studies of neo-corporatism do not dispute the primacy of
state sovereignty as found in those of corporatism. While there is significant divergence
between the internal role, nature, and power of the state between neo-corporatist and
corporatist regimes, and amongst corporatist scholars, both rely upon assumptions of the
state as sovereign and the ultimate arbiter of economic and social disputes and the
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monopolistic authority over the location of the policymaking process. (Cox 1998;
Cawson 1986; Williamson 1989; Nordlinger 1981; Jessop 1979) Hence both corporatism
and neo-corporatism tend to assume the state is sovereign externally and internally and
that there are national interests that can and will be protected, pursued, and achieved
within the anarchy of the global order. States seek national economic and social interests
through implementation of wage, price, trade, housing, industrial, education, taxation,
transportation, agricultural, foreign, and employment policies. Hence, corporatism and
neo-corporatism rest upon the assumption that the state is the only sovereign vehicle to
security, economic prosperity, and social peace.
However corporatism and neo-corporatism do not vary tremendously in their
conceptions of state sovereignty from most approaches within comparative politics and
state-society relations. Pluralism, clientelism, and even Marxism also tend to assume state
sovereignty, though the Marxist interpretation of state sovereignty is as of a hindrance to
economic and social development. Yet, modem corporatism and neo-corporatism did
develop as strictly national strategies and ideologies to address national economic and
social problems. (Katzenstein 1978, 1985; Grant 1985; Williamson 1989 ) Hence state
sovereignty seems to be of far greater prominence in corporatist and neo-corporatist
thought and practice than in pluralist or other approaches to state-society relations.
Despite the positivist assertions of state sovereignty and Westphalian order by
most corporatist scholars, as well as most approaches of comparative politics, there is
significant room for contention regarding the conception of sovereignty. As Krasner
suggests, sovereignty was never as historically absolute or consistent as has been
suggested by theorists of comparative politics or international relations. (Krasner 2001
)
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In addition, the meaning of sovereignty may have already undergone generational
changes in meaning and applicability from earlier definitions. Aalberts and Schuppert
suggest that the recasting of states in Europe within the EU may require a constructivist
redefining of statehood and sovereignty within the new environment of multi-level
governance. (Aalberts 2004; Schuppert 2006) Corporatism and neo-corporatism, along
with most other approaches to state-society relations, has assumed a very static and
positivist conception of the state and sovereignty. Aalberts, and many others, is positing
that within the new European and global context, redefining what state sovereignty
means may prove not only useful but also necessary. (Aalberts 2004; Schuppert 2006)
Hence while the scholars and practitioners or corporatism and neo-corporatism have
posited the necessity of state sovereignty, those assertions and assumptions may have
been based on rather tenuous foundations of what such sovereignty infers.
Nonetheless, modem corporatism and neo-corporatism have developed as
dominantly national strategies of state-society and political economic organization.
(Pelinka 1999; Cawson 1986) If the conceptions and assumptions of state sovereignty are
changing or state sovereignty is itself being subjugated to pressures, such as those from
globalization or European integration, what are the implications for corporatism and neo-
corporatism? Two relevant questions emerge to address this quandary. First, can national-
level corporatism and neo-corporatism survive an era of European integration and
globalization? And second, can corporatism and neo-corporatism emerge, thrive and
survive in regional, global, or local societies and polities rather than at the national level?
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In addressing the first question, the survival of national structures of corporatism
and neo-corporatism in a changing environment of state sovereignty is obviously difficult
to estimate. However, like most political structures, once created they are often difficult
to abolish. Yet the mere continued existence of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures
is not nearly as important as measuring the actual efficacy, effectiveness, or legitimacy of
such structures in an ever-globalizing and Europeanizing atmosphere. As suggested in
previous chapters, the persistence of corporatism and neo-corporatism may be strongly
dependent upon the scale and manner of institutionalization that varies from state to state.
Hence some corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes may be more responsive and
resilient to challenges to state sovereignty than others. (Crepaz 1995; Siaroff 1999; Ruble
1998; Royo 2002; Falkner 1997) In some forms, corporatism and neo-corporatism may
be able to adapt to a world order in which the absolute conception of state sovereignty
changes or becomes null. While modem corporatism and neo-corporatism have
traditionally been nationalist ideologies in a perceived anarchical global order, the reality
has been one of far less than absolute sovereignty and anarchy. Given the debates
regarding sovereignty and its meaning, one can assume that corporatism and neo-
corporatism have already weathered significant changes in the defining features of
sovereignty from Westphalia to the WTO. Nonetheless, the impact of European
integration and governance is unique and substantially more supranational than other
challenges. The impact of European Monetary Union (EMU) and more pluralist
policymaking environment suggest a certain anti-corporatist element within European
integration and governance. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991)
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This leads to the second question regarding the likelihood of corporatism and neo-
corporatism to persist at the global, regional, or subnational level. Historically, one would
have to suggest that it is certainly possible. Ancient corporatism itself was not based on
nationalism or the nation-state and existed at transnational (Catholic Church), regional
(Roman Empire, Hansatic League), and local levels (Germanic guilds). (Williamson
1989; Wiarda 1997; Black 1984: Landauer 1983) In addition, as Katzenstein argued that
neo-corporatism already exists within a system of divided or semi-sovereignty in which
the state is already limited by the authority and power of organized interests and peak
associations. (Katzenstein 1978, 1987) Hence, while modem corporatism and neo-
corporatism are dominantly nationalist in orientation, there is not necessarily an
underlying structural incompatibility between corporatism and neo-corporatism and local,
regional, or global governance.
But have modem corporatism or neo-corporatism actually emerged at other levels
of governance? There is, at best, a mixed record of such developments. Local corporatism
based on guilds and other functional associations was common in Germanic regions of
Europe stretching back to at least the twelfth century. (Black 1984) But these localities
were for all intents and purposes self-managing units that had some, but limited, political
connectivity with surrounding regions. While clearly not states in the modem sense, these
localities were nominally in economic temis, “sovereign” while the local associations and
guilds were “national” in that they represented the entire economic territory. (Black
1984) The exception here would be the Hanseatic League that created a proto-integrated
transnational network of trading cities with a common guild association system.
However, modem local and subnational governments are far more integrated.
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economically, socially, politically, into regional, national, and global polities and
economies and may not exert the same kind of monopolistic economic and political
control that guilds and associations could during the Middle Ages. Nonetheless, local and
subnational governments may provide the kind of social capital, identity, and solidarity in
which corporatist and neo-corporatist arrangements might thrive. (Nordlinger 1972;
Hernes and Selvik 1981 ) These would likely be limited in scope, authority, and influence
by both the smaller economy of scale, population, and territoriality of the governing
entity. Yet there is some evidence of growing local or regional corporatism in many
political systems including eastern Germany, Spain, and Russia. (Padgett 1999; Ruble
1999; Royo 2002; Pelinka 1999)
Some have suggested federalism and corporatism may be incompatible despite the
existence of corporatist institutions in many federal or devolved states such as Austria,
Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain.
1 (Encamacion 1999; Scharpf 1985) Federal
and confederal systems tend to distribute sovereignty between territorial levels of
government and hence create systems with shared, dual, or decentralized sovereignty that
saps power from the central state to the regions. Corporatism is theorized to operate most
efficiently at the national level with few or no limits on central state authority and
sovereignty. (Pelinka 1999) This is based on both the conception of a national economic
order and national economic interests that could not be effectively achieved if there was
significant variation and decentralized authority amongst subnational governments.
As Encamacion suggests:
1
Spain, as Encamacion argues, is not truly federal. While the constitution does grant some autonomy to the
regions of Spain, it is not explicitly federal. The devolution of authority to Catalonia, Basque Country, and
other regions suggests a system more attune to a devolutionary unitary system like the United Kingdom
rather than a purely federal one.
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...federalist and corporatist arrangements embody
diametrically opposed conceptions of power relations
within the nation state... Federalism stresses de-
centralization of the policy arena along territorial lines.
...By contrast corporatism emphasizes centralization of
the policy arena at the national level with participation at
the bargaining table limited to a few powerful interest
groups that often enjoy monopolistic status in society.
( 1999)
This debate seems to have a rather easy solution; the clear division of reserved and
enumerated powers between central and subnational governments removes just such
concern. Even if corporatist and neo-corporatist structures spanned central and
subnational authority, it remains unclear that this should explicitly make corporatism or
neo-corporatism antithetical to federal arrangements. While it may inhibit absolute
national authority and sovereignty over corporatist and neo-corporatist processes and
institutions, federal corporatist regimes could be arranged to function quite well, just as
they have in the German, Austrian, Swiss, Belgian, Brazilian, Mexican, and Venezuelan
cases to name a few. (Schmidt 2006)
The development of regional or global neo-corporatist structures also has shown
potential both within the European Union as well as within other international
organizations and regimes. Specific and important elements of EU policymaking and
decision-making seem to follow in the neo-corporatist mode. Most notable are the
Economic and Social Committee (ESC), the European Social Dialogue (ESD), European
Works Councils (EWCs), and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and a variety of
professional, economic, and labor associations found under the EU. (Compston and
Greenwood 2001; Gorges 1996; Berger 1981; Visser 2004; Keller and Platzer 2003)
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The results of EU-level neo-corporatist institutions and practices have been mixed
at best. The European Economic and Social Committee is the oldest neo-corporatist body
in the EU, established in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. But it is tremendously limited in
authority and reach. The members are nominated directed by member states rather than
representing specific social partners. The commission is advisory only and can issue
official Opinions that have no binding power to the EU. Further its consultation in the
policymaking process usually comes quite late and limits their ability to influence the
agenda or important structural elements of policy. (Compston 2001
)
In some areas, such as European Works Councils, there is some evidence of
significant expansion and growing importance. (Eberwin, Tholen. and Schuster 2002;
Keller and Platzer 2003) EWCs create institutions for employee involvement in decision-
making at the plant or firm level. As of 2004, it was estimated that there are over 1 ,800
firms currently under EWC directives that covered about 10% of European economic
area employees. (Fitzgerald 2004) The 2004 and 2007 expansions of the EU have
reduced this number significantly. But more importantly, the net impact of EWCs is still
uncertain.
While EWCs have contributed to some increasing collective agreements over
workplace management and improving employer-employee communications,
consultation, and cooperation, it is less clear if this has long-term and EU-wide
implications for social partnership and neo-corporatism at the supranational level. The
fact that many EWCs have developed in states with preexisting affinities for
codetermination or strong union participation, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and
Belgium, suggests one limitation. Secondly, the absence of industry-wide or EU-wide
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collective agreements and bargaining arrangements further limits the implications for
EWCs to propagate broader social partnership at the European level of governance.
(Keller and Platzer 2003)
The European Social Dialogue is clearly more European and supranational in
organization and scope. The ESD began in 1985 under Jacques Delors and includes an
arena for consultation and discussion of proposed European social policy proposals by
the social partners representing European employers' and trade union organizations. The
ESD mimics national strategies of neo-corporatism by providing the ability of the social
partners to conclude binding agreements upon the European Union's Economic and
Social Committee and European Council decisions. This is distinct in the EU as most
other social partnership arrangements are merely advisory or consultative only.
(Compston 2001; Benedictus, et al 2003; Obradovic 2001 ) However, despite these
increased institutional capacities within the EU structure, the will to reach consensus and
agree to common binding agreements on a range of Europe-level policies and programs
has been mixed at best. While achieving some very moderate consensus on a limited
number of low-level or sectoral issues, there has been greater failure to address larger and
more critieal issues due to seemingly intractable divisions between opposing interest
associations as well as important intra-interest schisms that are based on regional,
ideological, economic, social, and political factors. (Obradovic 2001 ) The system has
collapsed on occasion and was in hibernation for several years in the early and mid
1990s. (Compston 2001 ) The ESD has not achieved the level of institutionalization,
centrality, and efficacy as found in national level neo-corporatist policymaking models.
(Benedictus, et al 2003; Mangenot and Polet 2004; Obradovic 2001; Weber 2001)
The creation of peak associations for industry, labor, or agriculture at the
European level has also been rather weak. Industry and employers have been organized
into the Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE) and the European
Federations for Branches of Industry (FEBI). Comparatively, these have been a bit more
successful in both maintaining cohesion and influencing EU policymaking. (Branch and
Greenwood 2001 ) However these have failed to gamer much commitment to the idea of
social partnership. Most members view these institutions almost purely as lobbying
conduits for European industry and business interest rather than as potential social
partners. (Sargent 1985; Greenwood 1997, 2003, 2003a; Branch and Greenwood 2001)
This has been notable in some key sectors such as technology, pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology, and aircraft where there has been more cohesive and successful sectoral
business association representation at the EU level, yet it can be best described as merely
effective lobbying rather than any form of social partnership (McLaughlin and
Greenwood 1995; Greenwood and Ronit 1994; Schmidt, 2006)
Labor has been organized under the umbrella of the European Trade Unions
Congress (ETUC) since 1973. While providing a common voice for all trade unions from
the member states, it lacks the monopolistic authority and role to act as a collective
bargaining actor. The overall decline of organized labor in Europe has weakened the
overall position unions in the policymaking process at all levels. Many national unions
have also remained outside the group, including the French, and there are significant
divisions within ETUC affiliated members over how centralized the organization should
be. This further weakens its representative authority. (Sargent 1985; Greenwood 2003,
2003a; Dolvik and Visser 2001)
Nonetheless, there has been some increasing effectiveness of ETUC through the
expansion of European Works Councils. However, their future role is still often couched
in the perceived potential of a unified European labor organization rather than an existing
one. In essence, organized labor at the European level remains a fairly lonstanding goal
rather than one of tangible existence.
While these European associations and institutions mimic the neo-corporatist
organization of interests and actors at the domestic level, all but CAP have proven to be
weakly supported and lacking effectiveness. (Sargent 1985; Greenwood and Aspinwall
1998; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Greenwood 2003, 2003a; Pelinka 1999) The
institutions that have developed upon corporatist principles or processes tend not to be
very influential in the EU policymaking process. (Sargent 1985; Streeck and Schmitter
1991; Pelinka 1999; Keller and Platzer 2003) The development of Euro-corporatism,
while often heralded, has failed to materialize in most manners. (Sargent 1985; Gorges
1 996; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1 99 1 ) As Hix and Goetz posit, Brussels is
more like Washington in its “richness, complexity, pluralism, and openness of the ‘policy
community' than any other national capital in Europe”. (2000, 8) Even if not truly
pluralist, the EU system of governance is certainly a complex and rich combination of
several forms of policymaking and governance as well as many potential new ones.
(Falkner 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) The EU may be a political system that is
“beyond any traditional typology”. (Pelinka 1999)
The failure of these structures, save CAP which is usually not deemed as a
success under normal conditions due to its large budgetary pressure and perceived
subsidy of inefficiency, suggests that the failure of such structures to thrive relates to
other factors other than its mere regional institutionalization. Of course this does not
mean that these cannot develop into more effective and important institutions in the
future. (Pelinak 1999) As some studies and scholarship has suggested, the neo-corporatist
structures at the EU level are showing some signs of increased efficacy and influence.
(Compston and Greenwood 2001; Berger 2002; Dolvik and Visser 2001; Visser 2004)
The fact that the EU has emulated and invested effort into mimicking state-level neo-
corporatist structures suggests that there is not a formal institutional barrier to or
prohibition of corporatism and neo-corporatism at the European level.
While there has been some institutionalization of functional interest groups
representation in other regional trade blocs such as Mercosur (The Common Market of
South America), the Andean Community, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
and others, these have been primarily weak and purely advisory institutions often for
publicity rather than policymaking. This has also been the fate of similar experiments in
corporatism and neo-corporatism at the global level. A number of international
organizations have created corporatist or neo-corporatist structures to mimic the
functional organization found within national systems. Most notable are several
organizations under the umbrella of the United Nations Organization including the
International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Commission on Dams (WC'D), and
the Global Compact instituted by former Secretary General Kofi Annan. (Ottaway 2001;
Kell 2003; Therien and Pouliot 2006; Tosstorff 2005) Even elements integrated into the
World Trade Organization (WTO). World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
have decidedly corporatist and neo-corporatist elements within their broader frameworks.
(DiMatteo et al 2003)
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This inability to jump to regional and global levels may be explicitly linked to
sovereignty, in that interests and actors in the political system are loyal to and maintain
solidarity with existing political units and their economic and social goals. Hence,
corporatism and neo-corporatism are viable at the national level because interests and
actors who operate within such systems demonstrate regularized allegiance to the state
and its national interests. (Cawson 1986; Cox 1988) While there may always be some
divergence between the state's broad national interests and those specific to its domestic
socio-economic actors, the system nonetheless requires some minimum level of national
solidarity to operate as a legitimate policymaking structure. Hence states’ roles may be to
establish and maintain a particular national economic or social policy, but without some
minimal level of popular legitimacy and affirmation, such systems would lack efficacy,
effectiveness, and longevity. As many scholars suggest, neo-corporatism was itself a
national response to the international environment and is therefore strongly nested in the
national or state-level context. (Streeck 1991 ; Katzenstein 1978, 1985) The corporatist
and neo-corporatist structures created at the European and international levels lack the
kind of legitimacy and primacy that are currently associated with the state and its
perceived monopoly on power, authority, and the people’s loyalty. (Streeck 1991; Streeck
and Schmitter 1991; Pelinka 1999)
How ever, if the state has difficulty in or is incapable of exerting sovereign
authority in economic and social policy areas, identifying and establishing a national
economic interest, or if domestic actors cease to grant the state monopolistic loyalty and
solidarity, state-level corporatism or neo-corporatism, along with the state's legitimacy
altogether, is far less likely to thrive or survive and might engender the creation and
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affirmation of supranational or international corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes. This
would require the creation of identities and civil societies that surpass the nation-state and
coalesce around institutions such as the EU or UN. (Risse 2001; Checkel 2001;
Friedman, Hochstetler, and Clark 2005; Lipschutz 1996) If regional or global civil
societies truly emerge and become powerful forces, perhaps, neo-corporatist and
corporatist structures at the regional and international level might show some signs of
life. However, in a system in which national identity and the state still tend to dominate
the social and economic identities of citizens and most interest groups, this is far less
likely to occur. Hence while national neo-corporatist interest groups have much to gain or
lose at the supranational and transnational levels, their ability to generate and maintain
capabilities at these levels is highly dependent upon a number of factors including, the
solidarity of their membership on supranational or transnational issues, the material
ability to project power at the supranational or transnational level, and the historic
momentum of their institution. Hence some types of interest and social groups, including
multinational business and industry, agriculture, or environmentalists might be more
capable of deploying and exercising at multiple levels than others such as labor or small
business. (Compston and Greenwood 2001; Greenwood 1997, 2003; Pelinka 1999)
While even in Europe there is a trend towards supranational organization of the
economy within the EU, there has also been a commensurate trend of delegating more
authority to subnational governments and actors. In the EU, this trend is called
subsidiarity and is closely linked to the emergent popularity of federalism and devolution
in regime design. (Tiersky 2004; Buclet 2002; Duff 1993; Dinan 1999) Subsidiarity, in
principle, would only transfer the auspices of the state to the European level if necessary.
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But defining necessity and the overlapping competencies of economic, social, and
political authority may make such ideals difficult to enforce. While designed to protect
many traditional roles and powers of the state, it has also created a strong regional or
subnational tendencies within the EU. (Borzel 2001, 2002) Hence, while the traditionally
corporatist and neo-corporatism rested firmly upon the sovereignty and role of states in
the realm of power and interest representation, the existence and operation of multiple
levels of governance in the European Union may provide significant challenge to national
systems. However, as Krasner strongly suggests, even within the framework
globalization and a more powerful European Union, states and sovereign state power are
still critical, if not dominant, forces. (Krasner 2001 ) Additionally, as discussed earlier,
corporatism and federalism are not necessarily antithetical to one another, which will also
be discussed in the later chapters on Germany and Austria. Nonetheless, states are
beginning to share or pool their sovereignty with regional and global organizations and
structures of governance that may create fundamental challenges for all forms of state-
society relations, not just those of the corporatist and neo-corporatist variety. (Pelinka
1 999; Schmidt 2006) Schuppert and Aalberts argue that Europeanization may be blurring
the lines and meanings of statehood, sovereignty, and public and private actors in just
such a way. (Schuppert 2006; Aalberts 2004)
While corporatism and neo-corporatism are conceptualized and have operated as
primarily national strategies and structures under the monopolistic authority of the
sovereign state, if policymaking is to exist within a system of multi-level governance, as
has emerged in the European Union, the question is whether corporatism and neo-
corporatism can survive in or adapt to such a two- or multi-level environment. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the strategies that actors may pursue in a two- or multi-
level game may challenge the corporatist and neo-corporatist assumptions of the
monopolistic authority of the sovereign state to limit and regulate the interest articulation
and intermediation process. (Putnam 1988) Corporatist and neo-corporatist systems are
theoretically and institutionally oriented as closed systems in which the state both limits
and monopolizes the interest intermediation and policymaking processes. In an
environment of multi-level governance where much socio-economic policymaking does
take place at the European level, neo-corporatist systems are increasing facing pressures
on two fronts. First, domestic actors may increasingly seek to go outside the national
policymaking arena to the supranational level to influence and lobby the policymaking
process. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Putnam 1988; Greenwood 2003; Streeck and Schmitter
1991 ) Second, most important social and economic policy decisions must meet some
level of supranational approval or legitimation. (Andersen 1993; Hix and Goetz 2000;
Tiersky 2004) In both cases, the continued monopoly and sovereignty of the state’s
structures of governance seems to be clearly reduced. However, Schmidt argues that the
“compound” nature of the EU policymaking and governance system is actually less
disruptive to other compound polities such as those in the German social partnership
where authority and governance are decentralized to multiple levels and social actors.
(Schmidt 2006) Overall, the perceived “misfit” between neo-corporatism and European
modes of governance is still quite open for debate.
The Strong State
The pluralist model regards the state's role in soeiety as rather minimal. The state
is meant to moderate the competition, bargaining, and confrontation between interest
groups but it not explicitly ascribed with its own goals, interests, or agency in the
intermediation process. Hence pluralism assumes that within a democratic context, the
state should be somewhat weak and dependent upon the input, guidance, and direction
from the pluralist interests of society. (Bentley 1908) Pluralism is in essence built upon
the individual, working with other individuals in interest groups, as the keystone of
society (Zeigler 1988) The governmental process of the pluralist model is one in which
interests compete to influence and dominate the policymaking process and that whether
some groups are well represented, organized, or integrated into the process was not “a
matter of great significance”. (Truman 1951
)
Corporatism, on the contrary, views state-society relations as a far more critical
and complex relationship in which the state takes on additional roles and authority.
Society itself is viewed in a far less individualist, replaced by a more functional group
ideology of the state. (Zeigler 1988) The corporatist state has authority not only to
moderate or referee the interest group struggle but also in participating in the
intermediation itself. (Schmitter 1979; Wiarda 1997) The state plays the directorial and
guiding role in not only mediating the competition amongst interests but also in choosing
which interests are to be represented, how representation will be structured, and limiting
the potential range of activities of the interests in the policymaking and implementation
processes. (Collier and Collier 1979) Hence not only does the state play a much stronger
role in society than in pluralist systems, requiring a greater range and depth of state
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intervention in economic and social spheres, but society itself is conceptualized not in
mere terms of individualism but also in terms of functional groups. (Zeigler 1988;
Cawson 1986; Williamson 1989; Cox 1988)
The recasting of the state as a major actor with its own ambitions, preferences,
and activist role was one of the fundamental accomplishments of corporatist as well as
other non-corporatist scholars of the post-development era. (Huntington 1968; Skocpol
1979; O'Donnell 1986; Stephan 1978; Linz and Stepan 1978) Corporatism has been
relatively successful in the process of bringing the state back into comparative politics.
Corporatism assumes that the relationship between the state and societal groups may be
more or equally important as relationships between the groups themselves. Nonetheless,
there is remarkable divergence amongst cases and scholars regarding the role and power
of the state in corporatist and neo-corporatist systems.
The strong state-weak state debate has been a significant schism amongst scholars
of corporatism and neo-corporatism since its early development in the field of
comparative politics. (Cawson 1986; Williamson 1989; Grant 1985; Cox 1988) The
general debate revolves over the necessity of a strong state model for corporatism to
emerge and survive. The linkages between corporatism and fascism or authoritarianism in
Latin American and Southern Europe were significant evidence that led to such
conclusions. (Field 1 938; Sarti 1971; Malloy 1 977; Wiarda 2004) As mentioned earlier in
this chapter, corporatism does suggest a more powerful and interventionist state than in
pluralist systems. The state is required to have an intervening, intermediating, regulatory,
and directorial role in the policymaking process amongst socio-economic actors. The
bulk of corporatist theory assumes that a strong state is both a necessity for the creation
and maintenance of corporatism in practice. (Offe 1984; Williamson 1985; Cawson 1986;
Grant 1985; Streeck 1991 ) There is also a tendency of weak states, divided by socio-
economic or other schisms, to adopt corporatism as a means to compensate for such
divisions and create a more powerfully institutionalized and legitimated state. (Wiarda
1997)
However, this does not necessarily mean an absolutist state with few societal
limitations. As Williamson illuminates, numerous theorists and proponents of
corporatism held a wide range of opinions regarding the nature and limitations of state
power. While some tended towards absolute state power, many other thinkers assumed
that while vital, central, and necessary, the state's role it was not unlimited.
All theorists saw the state as ultimately having
extensive responsibilities in economic and social
affairs. However, to the majority this was not to
result in unlimited state intervention.
(Williamson 1985)
For most corporatist scholars and theorists, the state would always be a central and
critical actor in the regime but it need not always be authoritarian or fascist. However,
much of corporatist theory was put into practice by just such authoritarian and fascist
regimes due to the shared vision of a strong state and the order that could be created and
maintained under such systems.
Nonetheless, the emergence of corporatist structures in the democratic states of
Europe did suggest a major variation in the conception and institutionalization of
corporatism within a democratic context. Democracy, by definition and empirical
ev idence, rests on a far weaker conception of state power. (Schmitter and Karl 1991 ) The
coexistence of corporatism and democracy required a new typology within the corporatist
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theoretical universe. Hence the distinction between corporatism or in Schmitter’s terms
state corporatism, and neo-corporatism, or social corporatism. (Schmitter 1979;
O'Sullivan 1988; Cox 1988; Lehmbruch 1979)
The distinctions between neo-corporatism and corporatism are most notable
precisely in their regards and assumptions of state power. (Cox 1988; Schmitter 1979;
Lehmbruch 1979; Cawson 1985) Overall, while the role of the corporatist state has often
been authoritarian and strong, neo-corporatist systems exist within democratic contexts
that decentralize power and autonomy away from the central state. Katzenstein noted that
the German case of neo-corporatism provided a “semi-sovereign state" in which state
power was strongly dispersed to the major socio-economic interests of business and
labor. In these system, social and interest groups, such as unions, business associations,
and farmers’ groups, were self-organized but semi- or pararpublic institutions the
performed quasi-regulatory or governmental functions. (Katzenstein 1987; Schmitter and
Grote 1997; Schmidt 2006) Hence, neo-corporatism differed strongly from corporatism
in that is existed within and respected the parallel democratic, constitution, and
decentralized structures of governance. (O'Sullivan 1988) This led many scholars to
suggest that neo-corporatism itself was not a unique or singular typology of state-society
relations but merely a form or extension of pluralism. (Cawson 1986; Zeigler 1 988; von
Beyme 1983, 1993)
However, even neo-corporatism in theory and practice does presuppose a
decidedly more involved and interventionist state than most pluralist systems. The state,
while still constrained by democratic and constitutional structures common to advanced
democracies such as civil liberties, free and open elections, and checks and balances must
also have power to define important limitations upon the interest articulation,
intermediation, and policymaking process that would be absent in pluralist systems.
(Schmitter and Karl 1991; Schmitter 1979; Lehmbruch 1979; Cox 1988; Thomas 1993)
Neo-corporatism, while eschewing the statist authoritarian language of corporatism,
nonetheless often calls upon the state to play an important and critical role in the
bargaining process as well as determining who gets to sit at the bargaining table itself. It
is true that once set. that table may run very effectively with little or no need for constant
or strong state direction, but the state will always need to remain close by and ready to
intervene when neo-corporatist bargaining stumbles or breaks down. (Grant 1985;
Katzenstein 1987; Pelinka 1999)
This division between direct and indirect state action in the interest intermediation
and policymaking process is often quite vague and difficult to discern. (O’Sullivan 1988)
It has also become the premise of a major debate within neo-corporatist scholarship
relating to the dual state, which is at some points and times neo-corporatist and others
seemingly pluralist. O'Sullivan is highly critical of the lack of genuine neo-corporatist
theory that would help alleviate such concerns. ( 1988) However, neo-corporatism
primary exists within democratic contexts that are themselves mixed rather than ideal
types. Systems that have been categorized as strongly pluralist may also exhibit neo-
corporatist elements. Wiarda has suggested just this in regards to the United States and its
“creeping corporatism” as has Lowi in his arguments regarding the “capture” of the state
by the wealthiest and most powerful interests. (Wiarda 1997; Lowi 1979)
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Even given these criticisms of neo-corporatism in theory, in practice these
systems still envision and establish a relatively stronger state than in pluralist systems.
The state is still expected to maintain and regulate the intermediation process as well as
identify which actors should be included. But, beyond these duties, the state may often
take a more minimalist role in the intermediation process. In fact, as in Germany,
Scandinavia, and elsewhere, the actual intermediation between interests may take place
with little or no direct central state action. (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, and Rowthom 1992;
Grant 1985; Schmidt 2006) The systems are often self-maintaining requiring state
intervention only when consensus building becomes too difficult or the intermediation
process results in policies that the state deems antithetical to the overall state economic
and social interest. (Vail 2003)
Additionally, neo-corporatist systems due to their parallel existence with
democratic institutions and structures can be altered, bypassed, and reformed through the
democratic process. Usually this is difficult due to entrenchment of interests and
institutional momentum. Nonetheless, neo-corporatism, unlike corporatism, does exist
within a democratic framework that can, though with difficulty and often torturous
complexity, circumvent and even recast the neo-corporatist institutions and structures.
The Netherlands of the 1980s and perhaps Germany of the 1990s were such cases of
reform. (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Andeweg 2005; Vail 2003; Heinisch 2000)
The corporatist and neo-corporatist state must not only intervene in the
relationship between interests and the state itself but must also be more interventionist in
markets. All corporatist systems are directly concerned with how the state can sustain an
economic and social order with predominantly privately owned property and means of
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production. (Williamson 1989) This is not to say that corporatism is communism, seeking
to create an economic order in which the state monopolizes the economy under its direct
ownership and command. Nonetheless, in most corporatist and neo-corporatist systems,
the state is usually far more interventionist in economic markets than neo-liberal and
pluralist systems. (Collier and Collier 1979; Grant 1985; Williamson 1985; Zeigler 1988;
Cox 1988; Schmitter and Streeck 1991)
However, there is some significant dispute regarding exactly how much market
intervention corporatist and neo-corporatist states require. One classification of neo-
corporatist regimes developed by Katzenstein suggests that neo-corporatism may come in
liberal and social varieties. (Katzenstein 1980, 1984) While some corporatist states like
Austria pursued a strongly interventionist social democratic model, Germany tended to
offer a more mixed “social market” system while others, like Switzerland, Chile, or
Finland pursued far more neo-liberal forms of intervention. (Pelinka 1998; Helander
1982; Lehmbruch 1979; Katzenstein 1979, 1980) The fact that neo-corporatism can
exhibit relatively wide divergence in state economic intervention is seemingly
problematic for neo-corporatist theory in many respects. It suggests that as a political
economic approach it is far less homogenous than one would hope or expect. Yet, as
posited in earlier chapters, neo-corporatism and corporatism exist in many forms in many
types of states. This does not necessarily weaken its usage as a theoretical and descriptive
term; rather it indicates that there is variation of corporatist and neo-corporatist
institutionalization amongst many different types of states, political systems, and political
economies.
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It should be noted that even in liberal neo-corporatist systems, the state is usually
more interventionist than in neo-liberal political economies. While liberal neo-corporatist
systems like Switzerland utilize many market-based processes, the neo-corporatist
elements still act as limitations and barriers to more fully developed and unencumbered
neo-liberalism or pluralism. (Armingeon 1997; Kriesi 1982; Steiner 1974; Steiner 1996;
Katzenstein 1984, 1985) Hence, while neo-corporatism may come in both liberal and
social varieties, even liberal neo-corporatism does expect the state to play a stronger and
more limiting role upon both interests and markets than found in most pluralist and neo-
liberal regimes.
The reliance upon a stronger state by both corporatist and neo-corporatist systems
may be fundamentally challenged by several trends both within Europe and the global
order. As more and more policymaking takes place in Brussels than in national capitals,
the ideal of the strong state may be mitigated if, as many suggest, the policymaking
process in the European Union seems far more pluralist, or mixed, than corporatist. (Hix
and Goetz 2001; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2000; Falkner and
Leiber 2004; Schmidt 2006)
However, as noted earlier, it is difficult to assess if the EU constitutes a case of
dominantly pluralist governance. If it were, pressure to conform to EU standards or
modes of policymaking may cause greater misfit to and adaptational pressure upon
systems that are strongly neo-corporatist. This would not necessarily lead to structural
domestic reform of existing political, social, and economic institutions and processes, but
it would be a minimally necessary condition. (Hix and Goetz 2001 ; Risse, Cowles, and
Caporaso 2001; Knill 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003) However, there is also the possibility
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that the process of European integration itself helps bolster state and neo-corporatist
power in many ways by requiring its participation in the creation and administration of
EU policy and law. (Falkner 2000; Heinisch 2000; Schmidt 2006)
There is also a growing strain of neo-liberalism present in both the European and
national political systems seeking to reduce the role and scope of the state in market and
social policy. (Pierson 1994, 2001; Schwartz 2006) While the expected massive
reductions of the welfare state and social spending have yet to materialize, the
liberalization of employment policies, the reform of pension, healthcare, retirement, and
unemployment benefits, and the privatization of national firms and utilities suggest a
serious push to weaken the state's influence in social and economic realms. (Taylor-
Gooby 2001, 2004) Further, in an ever-globalizing world, the ability of states to achieve
or even create a macroeconomic policy is diminished. As international trade begins to
take on a greater share of states’ GNP, as monetary policy becomes more
internationalized, and as capital and currencies become more mobile, governments are
losing their traditional methods of economic influence and control. (Graham 1996;
Lipschutz 2005; Friedman 1999, 2006; Pelinka 1999) The inability of the state to fulfill
this primary role undermines some corporatist and neo-corporatist assumptions of the
role and power of the state.
The forces of neo-liberalism, while still a minority voice in Europe, are amplified
by similar calls on the global level. Globalization's trend toward freer markets and
smaller government intervention reinforce the pressures to reduce the role of the state in
social and economic policy upon which corporatism and neo-corporatism rest. The
predominance of neo-liberalism has pressed for shrinkage of the welfare state.
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privatization of formerly state-run industries and services, and a general trend towards
smaller government on a global scale. (Wolf 2004; Friedman 1999; Bhagwati 2004) As
the state’s role in welfare policy, macroeconomic policy, and the public sector contracts,
the capacity of the state to manage neo-corporatist arrangements may also be
simultaneously diminished. This may be perceived as not only a threat to corporatism but
to state sovereignty as well.
Interestingly, many have noted that integration itself may be a solution for the
challenges of globalization to many European states. European states may find safe
harbor from the vagaries of globalization within the European Union and its greater
economy of scale and capacity to deflect many of the challenges to the European welfare
state and way of life. (Gordon 2004; Verdier and Breen 2001; Hennis 2001; Adams 2007)
Of course, for neo-liberals the use of the EU as a barrier to free trade is antithetical to
their free trade orientations. (Wolf 1 994) The corporatist and neo-corporatist state relies
upon important political, macroeconomic, and social levers to both regulate and
intermediate the interest group struggle as well as to ensure its ability to defend national
economic and social interests, whatever they may be. Hence, while the strong state has
been amongst the foundations of corporatist and neo-corporatist thought and practice, the
pressures of neo-liberalism and globalization conspire against the maintenance of the
interventionist state. Nonetheless, neo-corporatist systems could be put in a difficult
position between globalization and Europeanization. While globalization may be viewed
as a larger threat to the economic tenets of neo-corporatism, European integration may
similarly undermine or alter other important political and economic powers of the state
that have been hallmarks of neo-corporatist governance. (Schuppert 2006)
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Incorporation of Interests and Limitations on Interest Articulation
Corporatist and neo-corporatist goals of regulating interest groups and their
participation in the policymaking process primarily necessitate the assumptions of the
strong and sovereign state. The dominant feature that distinguishes corporatist and neo-
corporatist regimes from pluralist ones is the incorporation of interest groups into the
policymaking process. Hence, the ability to organize, incorporate and limit interest
groups and their relationship to the state and policymaking process are fundamental
assumptions of corporatism and neo-corporatism. (Collier and Collier 1979; Schmitter
1979; Schmitter and Grote 1997)
The underlying rationale for such incorporation varies tremendously amongst
scholars and theories of corporatism and neo-corporatism, as well as amongst empirical
cases in practice. Some scholars and theorists argue that corporatism and neo-corporatism
stem primarily from cultural, historical, and philosophical roots that support a vision of
polities as functionally segmented and organized. (Zeigler 1988) As Wiarda suggests,
corporatism, especially in the cases of Latin America and Iberia stem from “organic-
statist” and “Thomistic” social, political, philosophical, and cultural roots of these
dominantly Catholic societies. (Wiarda 1997; Wiarda and Mott 2001 ) Even in non-
Catholic societies, there may be important social, cultural, and historical bases for
adopting corporatist or neo-corporatist regimes that reflect the underlying beliefs
regarding the roles of and relationship between the state and social groups. (Cawson
1986; Zeigler 1988) Historical traditions and practices may also be influential, such as the
importance of guilds and other functional organizations in many Germanic societies.
(Landauer 1983; Black 1984; Bowen 1947; Williamson 1989)
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But corporatism may also have developed as a product not merely of cultural,
social, and historical influence but as one of institutional and political choice. C'orporatist
and neo-corporatist regimes may be designed and implemented to organize and
intermediate interests by political systems, elites, and other actors to achieve
particularistic national social, economic, and political goals. (Katzenstein 1984; Schmitter
1979; Lehmbruch 1979) The incorporation and limitation of interests may be
institutionalized to solve long-standing or seemingly intractable social conflicts that
hinder the state's political, social, and economic development. Corporatism and neo-
corporatism may be adopted as a rational solution to the deficits of pluralism, neo-
liberalism, and other state-society and political economic regimes.
Corporatism and neo-corporatism have emerged from two distinct views of
corporatist development. The first stems from cultural, historical, philosophical, and
social forces; the second stems from more immediate institutional and rational political
challenges. (Chalmers 1985; Wiarda 1997; Adams 2001, 2004) This dichotomy is not
nearly as absolute as one might imagine. While scholars such as Wiarda fall generally
into the first camp, they generally do recognize that institutional design and choice is
important in considering the constructing corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes.
(Wiarda 1997) Scholars that often fall into the second camp, such as Schmitter and
Katzenstein, also recognize that cultural, historical, and social conditions may provide
some “elective affinity” towards corporatism and neo-corporatism in many regimes.
(Schmitter 1979; Katzenstein 1985)
Despite these divergences, corporatist and neo-corporatist theory and practice
generally assumes that the state plays an important role in identifying and incorporating
major interests into the policymaking institutions and process. The state usually places
some limits on the absolute freedoms and liberties of interests and actors. (Williamson
1985, 1989) The state cannot be regularly challenged by majoritanan or particularistic
actor demands. It must coerce or persuade social and economic actors to limit their
actions to those that are compatible with the goals of the economic and social order.
(Collier and Collier 1979; Williamson 1985)
The extent to and methods by which the state intervenes and incorporates interests
varies tremendously amongst corporatist regimes. The most notable distinction is
between the authoritarian and statist corporatism found in regimes of Southern Europe
and Latin America and the democratic and social neo-corporatism found primarily in
Western Europe. (Adams 2004) This variation exists both in the teleological goals of the
state as well as the methods by which interests interact with the state.
In authoritarian corporatist systems, the state’s goal is usually to constrain or
subjugate social interests that have traditionally hindered the state's authority and
legitimacy while simultaneously institutionalizing the power and authority of interests
that supported a more dictatorial regime. This was most notable in Italy under Mussolini,
Spain under Franco, and Mexico under the long domination of the Revolutionary
Institutional Party (PRI) which all used corporatist organization to either subjugate or buy
off social actors that had been previously challenged the state while simultaneously
reinforcing the power of loyal institutions and actors. (Field 1938; Wiarda 1993; Grayson
1998) Franco’s Spain used incorporation to bring Spain's unions and labor organizations
under control while also using corporatism to enhance and reinforce the power and role
of the military. (Wiarda 1993) Nonetheless, the goals of corporatist incorporation were to
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solidify and centralize authority and power in the hands of the authoritarian elites of the
state at the expense of other social interests and groups. Hence, this was a “top-down”
process of institutionalizing corporatism with explicitly authoritarian goals. (Field 1938;
Wiarda 1997)
The process of incorporation amongst the authoritarian regimes was also most
notable in that it was often done through significant coercion or threat of violence. There
was little choice amongst the actors and groups incorporated under the state
policymaking umbrella. Again, the primary examples are fascist or authoritarian Southern
European and Latin American regimes that used violence, the threat of violence, bribery,
electoral alchemy, media suppression, exile, political detention, and economic
punishment as methods of ensuring limited challenge to state authority and power. (Field
1938; Stepan 1973; Collier and Collier 1979) Hence, many of these regimes used
corporatism and the corporatist ideology as the tools to build a stronger and more
authoritarian state, rather than functional organization as a goal in and of itself. In
addition, this further solidified the power and authority of institutions such as the
military, church, large landowners, and others at the expense of other social interests.
(Wiarda 1997) In essence, corporatism paradoxically used inclusion and incorporation to
create greater exclusion and disenfranchisement.
In neo-corporatist systems, the state’s goals and methods diverge significant from
authoritarian corporatist systems. Neo-corporatist regimes, while also attempting to limit
and incorporate social interests under the auspices of the state's policymaking process,
are far more “bottom-up" affairs that operate within and parallel to existent democratic
institutions and processes. The state’s goals are not to dominate or otherwise suppress
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interest groups so much as it is attempting to reign in the vagaries of the policymaking
and interest representation process to achieve social partnership, social peace, and
consensus. (Lijphart 1975, 1999; Scholten 1987; Lehmbruch 1982) In addition, the
methods by which the state coerces and incorporates interests are fundamentally limited
by the legal and social constraints of democracy and a democratic polity. Hence the neo-
eorporatist state does not, and has no intention of using the types of coercive violence and
powers that authoritarian corporatist regimes traditionally employ. Nonetheless, even
within neo-corporatist systems there can be tremendous distinctions in the role of the
state in the policymaking and economic governance arenas. (Katzenstein 1987; Heinisch
2000 )
This relates to a point mentioned earlier in this chapter regarding the
consideration of neo-corporatism as merely an extension of pluralism within the
democratic context. (Cawson 1986) Williamson posits that the institutions of neo-
corporatism are not liberal democratic and pluralist in nature. This is not meant to infer
that corporatism and democracy are incompatible. Actors and institutions may be
democratically selected and accountable, yet, and perhaps more clearly, the point that
Williamson is trying to make in that the specific neo-corporatist policymaking process
and its results are not reliant upon pluralist and majoritarian institutions and processes.
(Williamson 1985) As Lijphart suggests, the majoritarian or pluralist model of democracy
is “exclusive, competitive, and adversarial” whereas neo-corporatist and other consensual
political models are characterized by an essential “inclusiveness, bargaining, and
compromise” (Lijphart 1999, 2) Hence, democracies may empower policymaking
processes and decisions to relatively un-pluralist and non-majoritarian institutions or
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structures such as those common to neo-corporatism. (Lehmbruch 1979) This is not
particularly uncommon, most judicial systems are insulated from majoritanan and
popular will through anti-democratic structures such as non-elective, life appointments.
Hence, neo-corporatism and representative democracy can co-exist and are not exclusive
or antithetical to one another.
Even with these important variations amongst the goals and methods of
corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes, both systems utilize a similar structure of
mandatory and monopolistic functional representative organizations to take an
intermediary role between the state and the societal actors. These organizations are
compulsory and provide formal and inviolable linkages between societal actors and the
state. They act as the primary pathways for societal interests to lobby and negotiate with
the state and other actors while simultaneously providing conduits for the state to ensure
regulatory compliance and nominal solidarity. (Williamson 1985) The corporatist model
generally assumes a formal or legal system of relationships between the state and societal
groups. This differs significantly from the pluralist model, which assumes an informal
and segregated relationship between the state and interest groups. As Lijphart suggests,
“pluralism... means a multiplicity of interest groups that exert pressure on the government
in an uncoordinated and competitive manner.” (Lijphart 1999,16) This also varies from
the Marxist model, which assumes that the state mirrors the existing relationship between
classes within the society; or the totalitarian variant, which assumes the state attempts to
totally control all interest group activity. (Adams 2001
)
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However, corporatist and, especially, neo-corporatist systems may exhibit high
levels of informal and extra-governmental relationships between important social actors.
Some argue that they work optimally and with greater flexibility given the reduced
formality. (Heinisch 2000; Pelinka 1999) The state must not formally be included in all
negotiations, compromises, and bargaining. Corporatist and neo-corporatist systems, once
established, might be rather self-sustaining without the need for omnipresent state
intervention. (Katzenstein 1987; Lijphart 1975; Armingeon 1997; Scholten 1987)
However, the state is almost always a vigilant watchdog of corporatist and neo-
corporatist structures and processes so as to ensure all actors abide by the
institutionalized conventions and are working towards desirable national economic,
social, and political goals.
Nonetheless, corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes rest upon the assumption
that social and economic interests can be organized and incorporated into the state's
policymaking process. (Pelinka 1999; Schmitter and Grote 1997) This organizational and
incorporation effort works best if there are a small number of easily identifiable
functional interests. Lijphart argues:
Concertation is facilitated if there are relatively few,
large, and strong interest groups in each of the main
functional sectors - labor, employers, farmers -
and/or there is a strong peak association in each of the
sectors that coordinates the preferences and desired
strategies for each sector. ( 1 999, 1 6)
Katzenstein considers the centralization and concentration of interest groups to be one of
the primary characteristics of democratic corporatism. ( 1985) This characteristic tends to
hold constant across both corporatist and neo-corporatist systems in both philosophical
and practical terms. Philosophically, in accordance with much of corporatist theory.
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society is envisioned as unified and that interests represent particular parts or organs of
the body politic. (Cawson 1986; Landauer 1983; Williamson 1985; Schmitter and Grote
1997) Even as manifested in modem corporatist thought, the state is meant to embody
and encompass the national social, economic, and political locus of identity and
authority. (Williamson 1989; Cawson 1986) Practically, the ability to organize and
incorporate interests into the state policymaking process is streamlined and simplified by
the existence of a small number of identifiable, functional interest groups. (Lijphart 1999;
Katzenstein 1985; Pehnka 1999)
The organization and incorporation of interests is therefore dependent upon the
social and economic organization of the state into readily identifiable sectors, interests,
and actors. But if these distinctions and divisions are difficult to discern and
operationalize, the ideals of corporatist and neo-corporatist functional organization
become less salient and fare more problematic in institutionalization. There are a number
of trends that challenge coiporatist functional organization and incorporation in the
modem European context. First, the Europeanization and globalization of business,
capital, financial, and other economic interests creates a transnational dilemma in
delineating national business interests from foreign ones.
These transnational and European business interests may be less likely to share or
possess either the normative or socio-cultural predisposition towards corporatist and neo-
corporatist structures than predominantly domestic-oriented business interests. This is a
product not just of corporate operations and trade that force firms to compete in
continental and global markets tending towards isomorphism, but also that firms have
become transnational in ownership, financing, capitalization, and stakeholding, all which
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undermine a nationally-based corporatist or neo-corporatist operating principle. (Kurzer
2001 ) National corporatism and neo-corporatism must face the prospects diminishing
leverage against increasingly European and global firms, once thought to be national.
Consider the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler to form Daimler-Chrysler; is this a
German, American, or transnational corporation? Can the German government
effectively coerce and persuade Daimler to abide by German neo-corporatist structures of
state-society relationships and policymaking when the firm’s owners, operations, and
stakeholders are increasingly spread across six continents? Can Daimler continue to
voluntary limit its own influence and options in the German policymaking process given
both changes to its ownership and interests, as well as to the Europeanization of the
policymaking process itself? (Adams 2001
)
National firms themselves have also become increasingly divided over issues such
as European integration, globalization, and protectionism. While some national firms
have adopted more European, global, and free-trade orientations, other firms may reject
these processes and wish to retain higher levels of state-sponsored economic
protectionism and market intervention. (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Schmidt 2006;
Cowles 2001 ) In addition, large modem firms often operate in many sectors
simultaneously, including industrial, manufacturing, finance, insurance, and sen ices
making functional categorization difficult if not impossible. (Graham 1996) The
Europeanization and globalization of the economic order has made the identification and
incorporation of business interests under a single common corporatist or neo-corporatist
banner problematic.
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It is not just firms that have changed and challenged existing neo-corporatist
orders in Europe. Changes and decline in labor unions have also begun to erode many of
the foundations of the corporatist and neo-corporatist order in many European states.
Another important foundation of neo-corporatism was the assumption that such structures
would be ideal at addressing and alleviating the longstanding social question and conflict
between capital and working classes in many European states. (Wallerstein, Golden, and
Lange 1997; Diamant 1958, 1960; Shanahan 1954; Lijphart 1968, 1992; Armingeon
1997; Einhom and Logue 2004; Williamson 1985) This is challenged by socioeconomic
changes in Europe, including the decline of trade unions and emergence of a post-
industrial economy. (Visser 2002; Esping-Andersen 1993, 1996; Pelinka 1999)
As Europe has become less industrial, the importance of the social question has
certainly been transformed if not marginalized. The post-Fordist era has seen a
remarkable decline in union membership and industrial employment, the building blocks
of the neo-corporatist order. (Pontusson 1995; Visser 2002) Further, the neo-corporatist
relationship was also clearly based upon a class relationship between capital and labor.
(Williamson 1989) However, as union wages in industry and manufacturing have risen,
the average industrial union member in Western Europe is more likely to be middle
income than lower income. (OECD) Lower income workers are found primarily in
serv ice industries lacking levels of unionization common to industrial and manufacturing
sector employment. (Lucifora, McKnight, and Salverda 2005) In areas where
unionization is increasing, these tend to be white-collar and professional sectors of the
European economy rather than lower wage service segments. (Crouch 1986)
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If the neo-corporatist and corporatist state is going to effectively intermediate
interests and their participation in the policymaking process, incorporated units are
required to be unitary functional actors representing important socio-economic sectors
and reflecting critical socio-economic schisms. Neo-corporatism was most often adopted
to address the longstanding social question and political schisms that often ripped
European states between left-oriented labor and right-oriented capital. (Williamson 1989;
Panitch 1979) But if peak associations and other functional organizations cannot maintain
discipline and effectively represent and organize their functional sectors, the corporatist
and neo-corporatist structures may lose efficacy and effectiveness. If the incorporated
interests no longer reflect critical and outstanding social and economic cleavages,
existing corporatist and neo-corporatist structures may also lack salience and legitimacy.
(Pelinka 1999)
Political Stability
Another fundamental characteristic of corporatist and neo-corporatist systems is
political stability. Corporatism and neo-corporatism are effective almost exclusively
when the political system exhibits a strongly predictable and stable balance and
consensus between major socio-economic and political actors. Katzenstein and others
suggest that neo-corporatism and political stability are mutually contingent. (Katzenstein
1984, 1985; Scholten 1987) Corporatist and neo-corporatist structures require guarantees
of access and monopolistic representative authority to interests in exchange for the state’s
limitations upon their activities, demands, and roles in the policymaking process.
(Katzenstein 1985; Collier and Collier 1979) Hence, changes in fortunes from election to
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election between parties are not meant to significantly alter or disrupt the processes and
institutions of representation, intermediation, and policymaking established in corporatist
and neo-corporatist structures. This requires relatively stable political systems that
mitigate frequent and radical changes in political leadership and reduce the potential
impacts that majoritarian or radical electoral swings might otherwise produce. Hence, the
adoption of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures requires a level of political stability
and consensus that is often absent from pluralist and majoritarian systems of governance.
(Katzenstein 1984, 1985, 1987) This stability is usually derived from both constitutional
and legal institutionalization of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures as well as
through preexisting agreements and arrangements amongst the major political parties,
political leadership, and socio-economic elites. (Collier and Collier 1979; Katzenstein
1985; Nordlinger 1972; Lijphart 1984)
Political stability is necessary for several reasons. First, if socio-economic
interests are expected to agree to some level of state-mandated limitation upon or
regulation of their interest articulation activities and participation in the policymaking
process, those interests must usually be guaranteed certain inalienable and inviolable
rights to monopolistic access and representation within the corporatist or neo-corporatist
policymaking structures. Second, the policy process within such corporatist and neo-
corporatist structures must not be easily dismissed, ignored, or bypassed by other political
institutions. If the corporatist and neo-corporatist structures and their outputs were simply
ignored or altered by bureaucratic, parliamentary, or judicial actors, the efficacy and
legitimacy of such structures would be minimized and actors would regularly seek to act
outside the institutions created. (Katzenstein 1987; Lehmbruch 1982; Thomas 1993)
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Political stability is usually accompanied by strong consensus amongst not only
the socio-economic interests to abide by the corporatist and neo-corporatist rules of the
game, but also by political parties. Even when parties retain a large governing majority,
the corporatist and neo-corporatist structures must eontinue to operate beyond the
transitory rise and fall of electoral politics. (Katzenstein 1985; Scholten 1987; Li jphart
1984, 1999; Daalder 1987) Hence, neo-corporatist and corporatist systems often thrive in
systems in which a strong consensus regarding the institutionalization and insulation of
these structures is agreed upon by all major political parties and actors. As Katzenstein
suggest, neo-corporatism usually coincides with “the absence of a winner-take-all
mentality.” (Katzenstein 1985, 157)
Victory or defeat on any given issues does not lead to an
escalating spiral of conflict because a continuous sequence
of political bargains makes all actors aware that victory today
can easily turn into defeat tomorrow. The predictability of the
process enhances the flexibility of the actors.
(Katzenstein 1985,33)
States that see radical shifts between politically and ideologically divergent
parties are less likely to maintain stable corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes since
policymaking preferences and processes of governance are often regarded as spoils by the
victorious political parties taking office. If parliaments, cabinets, and executives begin
regularly bypassing or ignoring the corporatist and neo-corporatist structures of
governance, or treating them as extensions of their majoritarian mandates, the future
viability of such regimes is certainly curtailed. (Gobeyn 1993; Rose 2000; Crepaz 1994;
Vail 2003) Coiporatist and neo-corporatist regimes can only properly function when the
socio-economic interests are incorporated under the state and insulated in a relatively de-
politicized. at least in terms of majoritarianism and electoral implications, arena.
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Otherwise, the willingness of interests to enter into and abide by neo-corporatist and
corporatist arrangements would be fleeting at best since they could rationally recognize
that given changes in electoral fortunes they could either dominate the policymaking
process or be locked out entirely. Actors enter corporatist and neo-corporatist
arrangements precisely to mitigate the potential swings in electoral politics that might
bring a feast-or-famine cycle to their participation in the policymaking process.
(Katzenstein 1985; Lijphart 1999) The American system might suggest just such a
counter-example in which labor and business interests are far more susceptible to the
electoral vagaries and fortunes of the Republican and Democratic parties whose control
of Congress and the White House will strongly determine their ability to influence and
actively shape the policymaking process.
Political stability may be fundamentally challenged by European integration in
several meaningful ways. First, the process of European integration itself has split
political parties, and even factions within political parties, across Europeanist and Euro-
skeptical lines. (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Schmidt 2006) Second, traditional
alliances between leftist parties and labor, and rightist parties and business have been
increasingly weakened by issues of European integration. (Ignazi 2003; Marks and
Steenbergen 2004; Miiller 2000; Muller 1996) Third, the rise of post-material parties and
schisms within existing dominant parties has uncovered a growing decline of consensus
regarding neo-corporatist structures and processes. (Inglehart 1977; Luther and Miiller
1 992; Conradt 2001 ) Fourth, the rise of European levels of governance, representation,
legislation, and governance creates a far more complex, and less stable, political
environment that makes consensus far more difficult to achieve. (Schmidt 2006; Dyson
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2003) Fifth, there is some evidence that the process of integration has raised the
importance and powers of governmental actors such as parliaments and executives in the
policymaking and governance process. This would accrete governance authority and
power away from the social partners who have traditionally been responsible for many
such duties. (Vail 2003; Falkner 1994) In combination, these changes suggest a far less
stable and predictable political order upon which corporatism and neo-corporatism, it is
argued, seems to necessarily rest. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985, 1987)
Cultural and Institutional Solidarity
One of the fundamental debates in corporatist and neo-corporatist theory has been
the role of political culture in explaining the rise and implementation of corporatist and
neo-corporatist regimes. Focusing upon the common religious, cultural, historical,
colonial, and societal features of the Iberian and Latin American states, Wiarda analyzed
the “unique tradition” of corporatist organization amongst the regimes of this region. This
was clearly state corporatism, “top-down and authoritarian,” “state-centric,” and derived
from the Thomistic, Catholic, and Iberic-Latin American tradition. (Wiarda 1981, 1997)
Crucial to Wiarda's early conception was the notion of corporatism imbedded within the
socio-cultural tradition of Iberia and Latin America.
In Northern Europe, the ideological and cultural affinity towards corporatist and
neo-corporatist governance emerged from long-standing traditions and practices passed
down from the Medieval ages of guilds and Catholic orders. (Black 1984; Landauer
1983; Offe 1984; Schmidt 2006) As Katzenstein suggests one of the critical
characteristics of neo-corporatism is an "ideology of social partnership” rather than one
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of conflict. This does not mean the termination of political contestation, rather that the
major socio-economic and political actors share “vaguely held but firmly shared notions
of public good” (Katzenstein 1984, 27) This does not even suggest that political
contestation will not be bitter and fervent, but does imply a consensual style which
Austrian Chancellor Kriesky called “a loveless marriage that works” (Katzenstein 1984,
26) This argument regarding the sociological and cultural bases of corporatism and neo-
corporatism is not without critics and controversy, most notably that found in the work of
Philippe C. Schmitter.
Schmitter’s definition, cited earlier in this chapter, focused on the institutional
basis of corporatist arrangements. Rather than looking at the socio-cultural basis of
corporatism, Schmitter identified the causes of corporatism as residing within political
and economic variables including the growth of central planning, the need for peaceful
labor-capital relations, and the necessity of bureaucratic implementation of state
economic and social policy. Rather than stemming from culture, Schmitter suggested an
“elective affinity” towards corporatism in some states, especially those of Latin America.
(Schmitter 1972) As Katzenstein and others suggest, most corporatist and neo-corporatist
regimes are adopted as solutions to intractable social conflicts that require new forms of
consensual governance inclusive of once bitterly divided adversaries. (Katzenstein 1984,
1985; Nordlinger 1972) In Northern Europe, these truces, including Norway's Basic
Agreement of 1935, the Dutch Corporatist Charter of 1938, the Belgian Solidarity Pact of
1934, the Swiss Peace Agreement of 1937, and the Danish Kanslergade Compromise of
1933, were adopted to address the long-standing social question and conflicts of
industrialized Europe. (Katzenstein 1985; Einhom and Logue 2004; Armingeon 1997;
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Lijphart 1968; Visser and Hemerjick 1997) In Southern Europe and Latin America, the
corporatist regimes of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Peru were
imposed or implemented after long periods of civil or social insurrection, economic
recessions and crises, or political factionalism and instability. (Sarti 1971; Field 1938;
Grayson 1998; Schmitter 1971, 1975; Wiarda 1993; Stepan 1973, 1978; Kline 1993) In
both corporatist and neo-corporatist systems, these structures seem to have been
politically expedient or necessary solutions to address particular crises of their eras and
not necessarily products of socio-cultural determinism.
However, as the scholarship regularly illustrates, the institutional and socio-
cultural arguments regarding corporatism and neo-corporatism are not necessarily
exclusive or incompatible. Most cases suggest that both socio-cultural and political
institutional factors important to the adoption and implementation of corporatist and neo-
corporatist regimes. (Katzenstein 1984. 1985, 1987; Wiarda 1997; Schmitter 1971;
Lijphart 1968) The existence of corporatism and neo-corporatism is likely a combination
of both long-standing socio-cultural bases that have affinity towards corporatist and neo-
corporatist governance structures and more immediate and short-term political and
institutional opportunities and circumstances that made the adoption and implementation
of such structures seem useful in achieving particularistic political, social, and economic
solutions to long-standing conflicts.
Regardless, there does appear to be some nominal level of cultural or political
solidarity and consensus that must exist for corporatist and neo-corporatist systems to
emerge and thrive. The lack of significant cooperation, consensus, and social agreement
regarding such forms of governance would seem to quickly limit the efficacy, legitimacy.
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and effectiveness of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures to properly function and
succeed at achieving their particularistic social, economic, and political goals. Obviously,
the methods of organization and the openness of the system differ tremendously between
and amongst corporatist and neo-corporatist systems. Nonetheless, cases of both
corporatism and neo-corporatism do usually share a common underlying philosophical,
historical, cultural, or sociological basis for the creation, institutionalization, and
maintenance of such regimes.
This does not suggest that the underlying cultural and social foundations are
sufficient to maintain corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes. Changes do occur to
societies, economies, and polities that may alter the preferences of actors within the
system and drive them to discount or prefer particular political options. Corporatism and
neo-corporatism likely emerged from just such circumstances, and changes in the
substance and balance between socio-cultural preference and immediate social,
economic, and political conditions would likely change the value that societies may place
upon corporatist and neo-corporatist structures. Hence, while some societies might have a
socio-cultural affinity towards corporatist or neo-corporatist regimes, the social,
economic, and political circumstances and opportunities of a given era may discount the
likelihood of adopting and implementing such systems. Mexico may provide just such an
example in that while Mexican society may still reflect many of the overt and underlying
practices and social structures that promote corporatist organization, the association of
corporatism with seventy years of PRI-led authoritarianism have led many towards more
pluralist structures and preferences of governance since the democratization era of the
1990s. (Grayson 1998) The converse is also possible, in which societies that have
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traditionally lacked much in the way of corporatist ideology and practice, do adopt
corporatist or neo-corporatist modes of governance due to the perception of applicability
to specific social, economic, and political dilemmas. This might be most notable in the
New Deal era of the United States w here due to the extreme economic, social, and
political consequences of the Great Depression, many neo-corporatist elements made
their way into administrative and legislative policy programs such as the WPA and
Wagner Act.
While socio-cultural variables may not explain all cases of corporatism and neo-
corporatism, the institutional argument also fails in a similar regard. First, there are
virtually unlimited numbers of cases in which corporatist and neo-corporatist system
might have been effective and useful in addressing long-standing social and economic
conflicts but lacked the underlying socio-cultural bases of consensus and solidarity that
seem to have been necessary to adopt, implement, and maintain such systems. These
could potentially include Tsarist and Revolutionary Russia, postwar France, Yugoslavia,
post-Apartheid South Africa, and post-independence Malaysia and India. Second,
institutionalized cases of corporatism and neo-corporatism without underlying socio-
cultural bases have generally failed to thrive and achieve desired social, economic, and
political results. Such instances can be found in failed programs and policy structures in
many modem political systems such as the United States, Australia, France, Indonesia,
Egypt, Nigeria, and many other developing states. (Bianchi 1989; Nyang'oro 1989)
Hence corporatism and neo-corporatism rely upon two sets of important variables,
socio-cultural and institutional, that in combination seem to explain when and how
corporatist and neo-corporatist policymaking solutions and regimes are more likely to
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emerge, be adopted and implemented, thrive, and ultimately survive. The balance
between the two variables may show tremendous variation, but the absence of one or the
either seems likely to reduce the efficacy, necessity, quality, and longevity of both
corporatist and neo-corporatist structures of governance.
It is in this manner that corporatism and neo-corporatism may be threatened by
developments in the global social, economic, and political context. Neo-corporatism
specifically rests upon the willingness of organized interests to negotiate, compromise,
and bargain, and hence concede some ground, to reach agreements. (Compston 1998)
The underlying institutional necessity for such structures of governance would be
reduced if corporatist and neo-corporatist structures were designed to “win the last war”.
In the context of Europe, neo-corporatism may have become a victim of its own
successes. In many ways, the future of neo-corporatism in Germany, Austria, and other
European states resembled similar debates about the future of NATO. While many claim
that NATO was an effective and instrumental tool in fighting and winning the Cold War,
many now suggest that the alliance is no longer suitable in addressing the post-Cold War
world and its new threats and environments. Similarly, neo-corporatism may have
overstayed its welcome precisely because it provided a long era of social peace,
economic growth, prosperity, and political stability.
But in an ever global and European environment, many view neo-corporatist
structures as hindrances, rather than assets, to effective interest articulation,
intermediation, and policymaking processes. (Crepaz 1995; Gobeyn 1993; Gerlich 1992;
The Economist 2003 ) The cultural solidarity underlying neo-corporatist consensus may
still exist as a philosophical, ideological, and socio-cultural ideal but with diminished
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perceptions of its political necessity and efficacy to address current dilemmas of
European integration and globalization it is less likely to survive. (Pelinka 1999; Streeck
and Schmitter 1991
)
Conclusion: The Fit of Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism to Europeanization
Corporatism and neo-corporatism in theory and practice rely upon several critical
assumptions and arguments regarding the nature of the state, sovereignty, interest
organization, solidarity, and political culture. European integration is one of several
forces that may be eroding the foundations of neo-corporatism. (Streeck 1991; Streeck
and Schmitter 1991; Pelinka 1999) Along with globalization, post-materialism, post-
industrialism, structural socio-economic change, and domestic political transformations
the foundations of modem neo-corporatism seem under assault. European integration
may be influential precisely because it has impacts upon almost all of the underlying
theoretical and empirical underpinnings of neo-corporatism and social partnership.
(Pelinka 1999; Falknerand Leiber 2004)
First, in terms of state sovereignty, while many argue that globalization is also a
threat to the Westphalian order of the international system, the European Union is far
more institutionalized in terms of hierarchical power and authority over member states.
The EU itself provides a system of multi-level governance that presents many critical
challenges to neo-corporatist systems that had previously assumed to be operating within
the context of the monopolistic authority of the sovereign state. Second, in terms of state
power, European integration along with globalization is pressuring for some reductions in
the state and its authority over socio-economic policymaking that were once the
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hallmarks of neo-corporatist governance, though in some ways Europeanization may also
increase the influence and primacy of the state in policymaking in areas of administration
of new EU-level policies and programs. (Knill 2001; Pelinka 1999; Schuppert 2006)
Third, European integration has created schisms amongst existing national actors
regarding the process, scope, and pace of integration itself Europeanization is a new area
of political contestation that may not necessarily be well absorbed by existing
policymaking patterns. (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Schmidt 2006) This has been
exacerbated by both global and socio-economic developments that have altered the
politics of associability and class in neo-corporatist systems, making functional and
coherent organization of interests extraordinarily difficult. However, if systems can adapt
to these new issues and environments, the long-term implications might be mitigated.
Fourth, European integration, along with globalization and post-industrialism,
have shifted political conflicts away from the traditional left-center-right, labor-capital
pattern upon which neo-corporatism was predicated in the first half of the Twentieth
Century. (Hix and Goetz 2000) New political parties, new cleavages, and new divisive
issues have made the existing neo-corporatist institutions and structures seem
anachronistic and have eroded the necessary political stability upon which the systems
were built. And finally, the cultural and political consensus regarding the adoption,
institutionalization, and maintenance of neo-corporatist systems may be declining due to
both the success of the existing institutions to address and solve the social, economic, and
political problems of the past fifty years and the inapplicability of these solutions to the
new European and global social, economic, and political environments states must now
face.
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European integration is potentially at the core of all five challenges to corporatism
and neo-corporatism in theory and practice. While the European Union and its treaties
and institutions are not explicitly or intentionally antithetical to neo-corporatist structures
and processes, there is not an overwhelming fit either. (Pelinka 1999; Streeck and
Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991; Falkner 2001; Falkner and Leiber 2004) Many argue that
existing neo-corporatist regimes and structures do seem to be designed to address social,
economic, and political dilemmas of the 19 th and 20th Centuries rather than the 21 s '.
(Crepaz 1995; Gobeyn 1993; Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991 ) This is not to
say that there has been isomorphic response to these pressures amongst neo-corporatist
structures in European states. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and Leiber 2004) Quite to the
contrary, the responses of states and their neo-corporatist institutions, processes, and
actors, has illustrated a wide variety of reforms, reorganizations, retrenchments, or
resignation.
Importantly, it is quite difficult to assess the level of misfit between the European
and neo-corporatist patterns of policymaking precisely because there is no single uniform
or even dominant model of European policymaking. (Falkner 2000; Pelinka 1999;
Sehuppert 2006; Schmidt 2006) While some have suggested a significantly more pluralist
orientation of the policymaking process in Brussels, the complexity of the system defies
simple categorization. As many scholars have suggested, the EU exhibits pluralist, statist,
and corporatist tendencies in its policymaking patterns as well as entirely new forms of
governance. The EU can perhaps best be described as a hybrid. Detailed studies of the
EU model suggest a diversity of public-private interactions within the policymaking
process that shift and alternate depending upon numerous factors including the presence
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of preexisting lobbies or policy communities, issue networks between the supranational
and national levels, the level of competence transferred to the supranational level, and
specific sectoral issues. (Falkner 2000; Pelinka 1999; Schuppert 2006)
Schmidt argues that fit and misfit are primary dependent upon the overarching
structure of domestic political systems. Strongly simple and unitary patterns of
policymaking and governance, such as the United Kingdom and France, fail to
correspond with the complex, dispersed modes of governance at the EU level while states
with compatible patterns of compound and decentralized governance, such as in Germany
or Italy, are more likely to have better fit. She explicitly points to the devolved model of
social partnership and neo-corporatism in Germany as much more accommodative and
adaptive to Europeanization than other unitary or concentrated policymaking systems.
(Schmidt 2006) This suggests that the level of misfit between the EU and neo-corporatist
patterns of policymaking and governance may be far less than Streeck and Schmitter
imagined. (Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991)
In essence, the EU policymaking system seems far less pluralist than many
suggest and that the fragmented and segmented European model may allow considerable
space for neo-corporatism and other national forms of governance patterns to continue to
function with only minimal changed. In some cases EU standards and directives may
actually promote a neo-corporatist implementation such as in the Working Time
Directives inclusion of a provision that requires that “member states may, after consulting
employers and labor, in accordance with the traditions and practices of each member
state, decide not to grant equal minimum pay to posted workers during the first month of
their stay abroad”. (Falkner 2000) Hence, while there has been much consternation and
supposition over the impact of Europeanization and integration on neo-corporatist
patterns of policymaking, the actual level of misfit seems rather inconsistent and
irregular. The neo-corporatist systems of governance at the state level and the EU
policymaking and governance process at the supranational level are not identical and
have significant variation. Nonetheless, it is difficult to assert or quantify that there is an
absolute misfit between the neo-corporatism at the national level and EU modes of
policymaking and governance.
In addition, any misfit that does exist between traditional corporatism and neo-
corporatism and European integration must not necessarily continue unabated. The
process of Europeanization is just that, a process, and does not necessarily have a
particular endpoint of convergence or isomorphism. The future of the EU and its modes
of governance are still unwritten. Two potential futures could alter existing levels of
misfit, whatever that might be. First, European integration may become less antithetical
towards national structures of neo-corporatist social, economic, and political governance.
(Pelinka 1999) Europeanization is an ongoing and still-debated process that does not
necessarily end with a permanent system of multi-level governance in which states cede
significant levels of sovereignty, authority, and state power. (Schuppert 2006) In fact,
there is some evidence that the efforts of European integration even through today have
not been nearly so detrimental to state sovereignty, authority, and capacity as have been
argued generally. Additionally, as Aalberts and Schuppert argue, Europeanization is
changing the meaning and nature of sovereignty and statehood themselves. (Aalberts
2004; Schuppert 2006) Second, new transnational, national, subnational, or multi-level
forms of neo-corporatism could arise and become influential and lasting structures of
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governance within the European framework. Again, the contestation over the scope, pace,
and content of integration is far from complete and beyond debate.
While the current systems and assumptions of neo-corporatism seem less than
fully compatible with the processes and structures of European governance, neo-
corporatist structures could adapt and reconfigure so as to remain both as influential and
effective structures of governance within Europe. (Pelinka 1999) Falkner and Hemisch
suggests just this scenario as Austria has made a number of reforms that, while certainly
reducing the influence and role of social partnership in policymaking and governance,
nonetheless maintained significant continuity in their neo-corporatist structural
characteristics and processes as well. (Falkner 2001; Heimsch 2000)
In all, while European integration and neo-corporatism do certainly share a
number of conflicting assumptions, conceptions, and structures, it would be inaccurate to
suggest that they are absolutely antithetical or hostile to one another. The misfit between
neo-corporatism and Europeanization may be emergent but not necessarily decisive.
Nonetheless, in the context of the theories of Europeanization, even modest misfit
between neo-corporatism and European integration certainly increases adaptational
pressures upon neo-corporatist states to adjust to the new European environment.
(Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000; Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2001;
Dyson 2005; Falkner and Leiber 2004)
However, the concept of misfit seems less than complete and of utility under these
circumstances precisely because of the overwhelming variations of neo-corporatism
between member states and even within member states. As will be explored in detail in
later chapters, the differential institutionalization of the social partnership in Germany
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and Austria is critically important to understanding the role of Europeanization in
prompting continuity or change within the domestic sphere. The response of neo-
corporatist systems and states to the challenges of Europeanization is dependent upon the
specific institutional characteristics of national neo-corporatist structures and patterns.
These specific institutional and mediating factors are the primary determinant of if and
how states might transform or reform their domestic structures of governance. (Cowles,
Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Falkner and Leiber 2004) However, it does not seem clear that
measuring or identifying misfit as a necessary condition of change is useful or viable.
As Hertier and Knill argue, assessing misfit appears to be an unnecessary and
potentially incorrect theoretical assumption. Domestic change or continuity may occur in
cases of fit as well as misfit, and may be purely dependent upon the specific institutional
and political constellations arranged at the domestic, sectoral, or policy level. (Hertier
and Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006) Hence, whether neo-corporatism fit or misfits with
European modes of governance may be less important that the particularistic political,
economic, and institutional conditions, actors, and structures taking place in the
Europeanization process. While neo-corporatism and corporatism have some similarities
to and differences with European modes of governance, it is necessary to explore the
empirical cases to understand and explain the impact of adaptational pressures upon
change and continuity.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PARADIGMATIC CASE OF SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP IN AUSTRIA
Introduction to the Cases
As stated in the introductory chapters, while there is significant debate over the
level of “misfit” between European governance and neo-corporatism, the mere existence
of fit or misfit does not explain the likelihood or the variation of convergence or
divergence of national structures from the European model. (Falkner 2001 ) Hence while
the misfit between the social partnership and European governance may or may not exist,
explaining how particular states respond to adaptational pressure and Europeanization is
still found within the institutional characteristics of the social partnership structures in
each state. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Schmidt 2006) In other words, European
integration and governance may cause either domestic structural change or continuity
depending upon the particular institutionalization of the social partnership at the national
level. Therefore, it will require a case study of comparative analysis to explain particular
structural changes or continuity amongst the Austrian and German social partnerships.
Because the Europeanization literature focuses upon the “neither wholesale
convergence nor continuing divergence of national policy structures, institutions, and
other patterned relationships” from European modes of integration and governance, the
analysis of when, why, how, and to what extent domestic change or continuity occurs is
central. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Schmidt 2006; Borzel and Risse
2003) As has been explained in earlier chapters of this research, national institutional
characteristics do matter and result in “domestic adaptation" to European integration and
governance “with national colors”. These variations encompass formal and informal
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institutions as well as the norms and conventions within which such structures survive
and thrive. As noted in chapter three, there is extraordinary variation in the
institutionalization amongst neo-corporatist regimes. The social partnerships of Austria
and Germany are not exceptions and are comprised of a variety of formal and informal
structures. (Heinisch 2000) Hence to explain when and how European integration and
governance is more likely to cause domestic structural change or continuity, a
comparative analysis of the social partnerships in both states is necessary.
While this will be used to provide historical, economic, political, and cultural
contexts for the cases, it will also be instrumental in providing institutional analysis so as
try and fit the cases into the theoretical frameworks of Europeanization of Risse, Cowles,
and Caporaso and Hix and Goetz. According to Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, responses
to adaptational pressures of European governance and integration are dependent upon the
presence or absence of five specific mediating factors at the national level: multiple veto
points, facilitating formal institutions, organizational and policymaking cultures,
differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and
Caporaso 2001, 2) According to Hix and Goetz, domestic structural change is more likely
when domestic actors, institutions, or processes have increased opportunities at the
European level in three areas: new exit pathways, new veto powers, and gaining
informational advantage. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 13) Hence these next four chapters, while
providing an institutional and comparative analysis of the social partnerships, will also
address the presence and absence of these criteria that will then be assessed within the
Europeanization framework in chapter eight.
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Introduction to the Austrian Case
Austria has long been considered one of the strongest examples of corporatism,
even having been labeled as the paradigm or prototype case. (Lijphart and Crepaz 1995;
Crepaz 1995; Lehmbruch 1982; Gerlich. Grande, and Mtiller 1988; Encamacion 1999;
Kittel 2000; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998) To be precise, Austria is perhaps the
preeminent model corporatism within a democratic framework, or neo-corporatism,
rather than as an example of an authoritarian mode of corporatism. While Austria had
existed under an authoritarian version of corporatism during the interwar era, postwar
Austrian corporatism is, with little debate, clearly a form of democratic corporatism.
Neo-corporatist institutions and processes in Austria are generally known as
Sozialpartnerschaft
,
or social partnership, as they are also known in Germany, Ireland,
and other states. But perhaps in no other state is the social partnership so politically
entrenched. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Schmitter 1982; Gerlich, Grande, and Miiller 1988;
Pelinka 1998; Kittel 2000) Austria has been ranked amongst the strongest in both
qualitative and quantitative studies (see table 1 below) of interest group corporatism.
(Katzenstein 1984; Gerlich, Grande, and Miiller 1988; Siaroff 1999; Hicks and
Kenworthy 1998) As one Austrian saying goes, the social partnership “need not be
explained to an Austrian and simply cannot be explained to a foreigner”. (Gerlich 1 992;
Talos 1996; Pelinka and Bischof 1996)
In contrast to the pluralist systems of the United States or Canada, Austria and its
social partnership is dominated by relatively centralized, highly concentrated, and quasi-
monopolistic interest associations that are integrated into political decision-making
structure. They are not merely pressure groups. (Talos 1996; Katzenstein 1984; Talos and
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Kittel 1996; Crepaz 1995; Lehmbruch 1982) This has lead many to criticize the Austrian
partnership and its close concertation between the major interest groups and the state for
resulting in a nepotistic and clientelistic patronage system that rewards those on the
inside but excludes those groups and interests not incorporated. (Crepaz 1995; Markovits
1996; Marin 1985) This is not an uncommon charge against most neo-corporatist systems
in both practice and theory. (Ottaway 2001; Zeigler 1988)
Norway 0.44 Costa Rica 2.50
Sweden 0.50 Botswana 2.60
Austria 0.62 Australia 2.66
Denmark 1.00 Barbados 2.80
Switzerland 1.00 France 2.84
Israel 1.12 Ireland 2.94
Netherlands 1.19 New Zealand 3.00
Belgium 1.25 Portugal 3.00
Japan 1.25 Italy 3.12
Finland 1.31 Spain 3.25
Germany 1.38 Bahamas 3.30
Luxembourg 1.38 Jamaica 3.30
Mauritius 1.60 Malta 3.30
Venezuela 1.90 Trinidad 3.30
Papua New Guinea 2.10 United States 3.31
Iceland 2.25 United Kingdom 3.38
India 2.30 Greece 3.50
Colombia 2.50 Canada 3.56
9
Table 1: Index of Interest Group Pluralism in 36 Democracies"
But even amongst other neo-corporatist systems and social partnerships, Austria
has often stood out as a penultimate case. The levels of concentration, centralization, and
institutionalization of the Austrian social partnership are what tend to differentiate
Austria from other “more normal” or moderate neo-corporatist regimes in Europe such as
Germany or the Netherlands. (Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka 1998; Crepaz 1995; Kunkel and
2
Siaroff uses over twenty variables to create this scale including labor-business centralization, labor-capital
conflict, political consensus, wage-setting arrangements, direct interest participation in the policymaking
process, and formal institutions of corporatism. (Siaroff, 1999)
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Pontusson 1998) Austrian corporatism has three main features: a close interconnection
between parties and economic associations, dense and obligatory interest associations,
and a comprehensive structure of co-decision-making powers at the national level.
(Pelinka 1998) In all three features, the Austrian model ranks above most other
comparable neo-corporatist states or regimes. (Lehmbruch 1982; Pelinka 1998; Kittel
2000; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998; Mann 1987)
In addition, the Austrian model of social partnership, because of its “ultra-
stability” and miraculous economic success from 1950s through 1970s, was regarded as
something unique and worthy of study and emulation. (Gerhch, Grande, and Muller
1988) Austro-corporatism became a password to describe the Austrian model of
“cooperation between business and labor under the auspices of benign government” that
provided “the best of all worlds” including “democracy and welfare, capitalism and union
power, economic growth and full employment but without significant inflation”.
(Pelinka 1998, 2) The Austrian social partnership, especially from the 1970s, garnered
significant scholarly and policy attention for its emblematic and highly successful
practice of neo-corporatism. (Lehmbruch 1979; Katzenstein 1984; Markovits 1996;
Pelinka 1998)
Historical and Social Preconditions for the Austrian Social Partnership
Austrian neo-corporatism and social partnership are not merely political or
bureaucratic institutions without underlying historical or philosophical bases. Scholarship
rarely omits the social and cultural ideals of social partnership in Austria as well as its
specific historical and political development. Talos and Kittel, echoing Lehmbruch and
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others, argues that propagating and maintaining corporatist political institutions is
“largely dependent on historical preconditions”. (Talos and Kittel 1996; Lehmbruch
1979) The preconditions for modem Austrian neo-corporatism can be found not only at
the end of World War II but in important political, social, economic, and bureaucratic
developments and policies of the 19 lh century if not earlier. (Katzenstein 1984; Luther
and Muller 1992; Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996) A number of institutional
developments to mitigate and mediate social and economic conflicts in the 19 Ul century
established the proto-foundations for the modem Austrian social partnership including
the creation of the chambers system. (Katzenstein 1984; Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel
1996; Kittel 2000) Nonetheless, cooperation and consensus between interests and the
government was quite limited in content and temporality until the interwar era of the
1920s and was not fully institutionalized and made permanent until after World War II.
(Katzenstein 1984; Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996)
In terms of social and cultural preferences there is a strong pattern of concordance
often ascribed to the Austrian political system and its political culture. (Gerlich 1996;
Markovits 1 996) But Austria’s political culture has been one of significant change from
the 1
9
,h
to the 20 th centuries as the state and society evolved from a powerful multi-
national and multi-ethnic empire into a smaller, more homogeneous state. (Pelinka 1998)
Despite these changes, there have been long-term influences from Catholic doctrine, the
Lager or pillars of society, and the Stcmdestaat or medieval guild-state corporatist model,
upon which one could link pre- and postwar eras in Austrian society and political culture
(Diamant 1960; Luther and Muller 1992; Crepaz 1995; Markovits 1996; Talos and Kittel
1996)
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However, the divergence from prewar to postwar Austrian political culture is
quite striking. Staunch ideological divisions typified prewar Austria. There was deep
fragmentation between the three Lager
,
camps or pillars, of Austrian society, Catholic-
Conservatives, Socialists, and Pan-German Nationalists. (Diamant 1959, 1960; Luther
and Muller 1992; Crepaz 1995; Pelinka 1998a) This contributed to the weakness and
eventual failure of the First Republic that led to an authoritarian regime from 1934 to
1938, the Anschluss with Nazi Germany in 1938, and the catastrophe of World War II.
(Pelinka 1998a) Lager identities were usually more important to individuals than a
national Austrian identity that had little historical or cultural meaning or adhesion.
(Brucktnuller 1998) Postwar Austria, because of the costs of its previous divisions,
became far more likely to seek and employ consensual or cooperative political processes
than in prior eras. As Pulzer suggests, this differed from the First Republic in that while
the ideological camps still existed, “their teeth were drawn” (Pulzer 1998) In essence,
while Austria remained ideologically divided along Lager lines, these eventually became
secondary to a common Austrian identity in the Second Republic. This was especially
true amongst the socialist and Catholic-conservative elites who sought recovery and
reconciliation. (Pelinka 1998a; Bruckmtiller 1998)
The social partnership would seem to be more prevalent in societies where one
might find regularized and effective subordination of individuals and associations to
those at the national level, high recognition of the importance of negotiation and
compromise, and important informal or discrete elite interactions to address common
national problems. (Gerlich 1996) In societies where systematic compartmentahzation
and distinction between social, economic, or political groups is strong, corporatism and
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neo-corporatism might be more likely. The Lager mentalities and their subsequent
divisions between labor, capital, and agriculture, while secondary to an Austrian identity,
nonetheless may positively contribute to the kind of neo-corporatist institutions and
structures found in the social partnership. In addition, these subcultures were relatively
"'closed” and highly organized and disciplined. This fragmentation and mtra-Lager
stability continued for decades after 1945. (Pelinka 1998a) These political cultural traits,
and others that may help explain the Austrian affinity towards corporatism, have been
found in vast reserve in studies of the Austrian polity over many decades. (Lehmbruch
1967; Steiner 1972; Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Pelinka and Plasser 1989; Fitzmaurice 1990;
Luther and Muller 1992; Markovits 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a; Bruckmuller 1998)
Hence, the Austrian system is one that possesses a number of social, political, and
historical preconditions upon which the social partnership could be predicated.
This is not to say that the existence or absence of particular historical, social, or
cultural characteristics will necessarily result in neo-corporatism or other regimes. There
is a genetic trace of neo-corporatism in almost every European state despite tremendous
variation in political cultures, development, and social characteristics. (Markovits 1996)
However, as Katzenstein, Schmitter, and others strongly suggest, that given specific
political and economic opportunities, cultural and historical affinities towards neo-
corporatism may certainly bear fruit. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Schmitter 1979)
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Austria’s social partnership, while perhaps rooted in its political culture and
history, thrives as a product of critical postwar political, economic, and social
developments. In other words, the actors, groups, and parties of postwar Austria may
have discovered that neo-corporatist cooperation would result in higher payoffs than
continuing patterns of conflict. (Katzenstein 1984; Luther and Muller 1992; Talos and
Kittel 1996; Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996)
Corporatism in the Empires & First Republic
The rudiments of the Austrian social partnership were established in the 19 lh
century. Early interest organizations began amongst employers and large industrial firms
in the mid 19 lh century. These were mostly local and entirely voluntary, but they did
begin to slowly coalesce into larger units by the late nineteenth century. (Tomandl and
Fuerboeck 1986) This unification of business interests was not without catalyst. In 1867,
the ban on workers' organizations was lifted and in 1870 strikes ceased to be illegal.
These reforms were primarily inspired by the new 1867 Austrian constitution in which
conservatives were forced to compromise with liberals on a range of issues. (Fitzmaurice
1990; Pelinka and Plasser 1989; Katzenstein 1984) Employers and large industrial firms
had a common interest in securing government favor and limiting the power of labor. The
first large national forum of employers’ interests was housed in a new forum, the
Chambers of Commerce, which was created by statutory law in the 1860s. The
Chambers became generally recognized by both the state and labor as the primary
representatives of industry and employers by the late 19 th century The authority to
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designate delegates to reserved seats of the Austrian Parliament enhanced their power.'
(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) In essence, there were numerous tangible incentives for
employers and industry to organize and cooperate.
Early Austrian labor unions developed in similar fashion, starting out as mostly
voluntary and local units and merging into ever-larger ones by the end of the 1
9
th
century.
National labor unions became the dominant form of worker organization by the early 20 th
century but were split primarily along ideological lines. There were three major labor
umbrellas encompassing Socialist. Christian Democratic, and pan-German Nationalist
political and economic manifestos competing fiercely and sometimes violently for
support in the working classes. (Diamant 1960; Katzenstein 1984; Tomandl and
Fuerboeck 1986) This division weakened labor’s overall leverage with both the state and
employers.
Hence, the early interest association system in Austria within the Austrian and
Austro-Hungarian Empires was decidedly lopsided and not particularly based on a model
of consensus and national solidarity. Austrian employers and industrial interests were
better organized, unified, financed, and legally integrated into the state than other
interests. The ideological divisions amongst labor proved a significant barrier to creating
a significant counterweight to the Chambers of Commerce. The fact that the working
class had not yet obtained suffrage rights, which came in 1907, further exacerbated the
gap between labor and industrial interests. (Katzenstein 1984; Tomandl and Fuerboeck
1986; Luther and Muller 1992) It is also clear that neither labor nor business primarily
Delegates that represented and were selected by specific functional, professional, or social groups was
increasingly common in the new constitutional parliamentary systems of 19"’ century Europe. Even today,
there are semblances of this system in the Irish Senate where occupational, professional, and social groups
elect delegates to the assembly.
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viewed the policy-making process as primarily based on cooperation. This was a conflict-
oriented, winner-take-all system in which business and industrial interests regularly
trumped labor. Nonetheless, increasing labor organization and demands were
transforming the system.
The collapse of the monarchy at the end of World War I and the establishment of
the First Republic finally provided some balance between capital and labor interest
associations and power. While the business associations and Chambers of Commerce
survived the transformation, the major alteration came with the creation of the Chambers
of Labor and Agriculture in all nine provinces of the newly federalized Austrian state and
the enfranchisement of the working class with the new 1920 constitution. This allowed
direct and formal participation of labor and farmers at the Lander level as well as
indirectly at national level through representation in the Social Democratic, nationalist
workers’, and farmers' parties in Parliament. However, there were no formally organized
chambers for labor or agriculture at the federal level similar to the Chambers of
Commerce. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 15; Pelinka 1998) In addition, labor remained
strongly divided amongst Christian Conservative, Socialist, and Nationalist factions that
rarely exhibited a unified position even on basic issues common to all three ideological
sects. (Diamant 1960; Katzenstein 1984)
While a growing balance of power between labor and business interests was a
characteristic of the First Republic, this was far from a true social partnership. Both
commerce and labor saw the institutions as merely conduits of their pursuit of political
and economic aims rather than for true consensus building. There was a lack of
centralized bargaining at the national or even sector level and relations between capital
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and labor were as best hostile, and at worst prone to disruption and occasional violence.
The very failure of the First Republic was due in no small part to the instability and
conflict between the left and right, between labor and business, between Social
Democrats and Christian Democrats, and exacerbation by the Great Depression.
Nonetheless, the first attempts to create direct intermediation between labor and
the business in Austria also emerged. Several industrial commissions (held in 1918 and
1919), a parity commission ( 1921 ), and industrial and economic conferences (held in
1919 and 1930) were typical of early cooperative efforts. These were primarily ad hoc or
temporary, almost always voluntary and non-compulsory, and lacked binding resolutions.
Nonetheless, some of the first semblances of coordination were developed to address
postwar recovery and reconstruction efforts, wages, prices, inflation, and collective
bargaining which would become the eventual backbone of the post-World War II social
partnership. (Kindley 1996)
The First Republic was beset by innumerable problems. Its initial attempt to fuse
with Germany in 1918 and 1919 was opposed by the victorious allies of World War I.
The remaining “stump” of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, now the Republic of Austria
was facing high unemployment, demobilized soldiers, and serious food and fuel
shortages. The economy was also hurt by the remarkable loss of industrial and
agricultural territories and markets as the old empire was dismembered by the numerous
postwar treaties. Even after the economy stabilized by the mid- 1920s, Austrian
democracy was besieged by an increasingly polarized political scene. (Diamant 1959.
1960; Fitzmaurice 1990) The Great Depression and its resulting economic turmoil
prov ided the catalyst for further weakening of the democratic institutions of the First
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Republic. Much like in Weimar Germany, votes and support began flowing to the more
radical parties and leaders of the far left and right. (Pelinka and Plasser 1989) The 1930
elections installed essentially a Christian Social authoritarian government that
immediately installed a corporatist state, based on Mussolini's Italian fascist model.
(Pelinka 1998, 1 1 ) By March 1933, Chancellor Englebert Dollfuss engineered the
collapse of parliamentary democracy, “liquidated” the First Republic, and instituted a
period of “Austrofascism”. (Diamant 1960; Staudinger 1991; Fitzmaurice 1990; Pelinka
1998)
The collapse of the First Republic resulted in the institutionalization of a far more
authoritarian corporatist system, initially under the governments of Engelbert Dollfuss
(1933-1934) and Kurt Schuschnigg (1934-1938) With Parliament eliminated and
opposition political parties banned and their leaders imprisoned, Austria, under the
domination of the Christian Socials led by Dollfuss, was to be restructured on a pattern of
an “authoritarian Catholic state” of “medieval corporatism”, or Standestaat based
strongly on the 1891 Papal encyclicals of the Rerum Novarum and the Quadragesimo
Anno of 1931. (Diamant 1959; 1960; Landauer 1983; Black 1984; Staudinger 1991;
Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Pelinka 1998; Weinzierl 1998; Katzenstein 1984) These
were supported by advocates of corporatism, including Karl Vogelsang and Ottmar
Spann who were the Austrian intellectual vanguards for the fascist-authoritarian
ideology. (Fandauer 1983; Markovitz 1996) The failures of liberal constitutions after
1848 and more laissez faire economics after the 1860s further solidified distrust of the
liberal order by the early 20 th century. (Luther and Muller 1992)
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Under Austrofascism, the three competing trade union groups were replaced with
a single trade organization under the state's domination. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986,
15) Hence while Austria was now a functioning corporatist regime, this was under less
than democratic conditions. The interest associations, labor, business, farmers, and
others, were reformed as Biinde
,
public corporations that participated directly in the
Bundeswirtschaftsrat
.
This was merely a consultative body to legitimate and support
government policy and had no independent decision-making authority. (Talos and Kittle
1996)
But Dollfuss and the Christian Socials were also fighting a new and growing bloc
in Austria, the National Socialists. The Austrian Nazis, allied with Hitler and the German
National Socialists organized a putsch in July 1934 and assassinated Dollfuss. The putsch
was eventually put down, leaving Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg as Chancellor and leader of the
Vaterlandisches Front, or Fatherland Front, political organization, (Fitzmaurice 1990;
Konrad 1991 ) However, under continuing internal and external pressures, the Austrians
eventually accepted the Anschluss with Germany in March 1938. (Fitzmaurice 1990;
Konrad 1991; Pelinka 1998) After the Nazi invasion and Anschluss in 1938, Austria was
governed under the pseudo-corporatist regime of Nazi Germany that utilized some
semblance of functional corporatist organization, but was merely a formalized method of
control over workers, business, farmers, and other socio-economic groups similar to the
fayade of functional corporatism used under fascist regimes such as Benito Mussolini's
Italy after 1922 or Francisco Franco’s Spain after 1939. (Fitzmaurice 1990; Segar and
Warren 1991; Luther and Muller 1992)
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The failure of the First Republic, the authoritarian experiences under Dollfuss and
Schuschnigg, the Anschluss, Nazi occupation, and embarrassment of wartime defeat and
postwar occupation brought the costs of social conflict, division, and economic failures
into harsh focus for the Austrian polity and its assorted socio-economic interests. The
failures of the 1
9
th
and early 20th centuries to maintain the empire, achieve economic
growth, manage social peace, increase political stability, and even remain sovereign
created a mass of political, economic, and social will for change in Austria by 1945. For
the first time in history the potential for a consensus in Austria existed while the “winner
takes all philosophy so important in the First Republic never made a comeback in the
Second”. (Pulzer 1998; Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka 1998; Kindley 1996) The political
necessity for the social partnership as a way of rebuilding the Austrian economy and
unifying Austrian society was overwhelming. Hence, Austro-corporatism was a method
to replace class war with class cooperation. (Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Kindley 1996;
Seidel 1996) The rise of the social partnership in Austria, while a primary product of dire
postwar conditions, was nonetheless also a product of the experiences and failures of
Austrian dating well back into the previous century. (Pelinka 1998; Fitzmaurice 1990;
Famleitner and Schmidt 1982; Katzenstein 1984; Markovits 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996;
Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988)
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The Social Partnership in the Second Republic ( 1940s- 1980s)
The Postwar Development of the Social Partnership
While Austria's prewar and wartime experiences provided the historical and
political preconditions for the neo-corporatism, the primary criteria for developing and
stabilizing the social partnership emerged after 1945. After having negotiated and secured
a reestablishment of an independent Austrian state under the auspices of the occupation
by the United States, Soviet Union, France, and United Kingdom, there were still
considerable doubts regarding the economic and political viability of Austria. (Pelinka
1998; Knight 1998) Austria learned from its bitter experience of the interwar and war
years, institutionalizing pragmatic methods of addressing the economic, social, and
political problems that divided and weakened the state from the 19 lh century through the
First Republic. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Katzenstein 1984; Kindley 1996; Gerlich,
Grande, and Muller 1988) Nonetheless, success for the Austrian state was far from self-
evident. (Knight 1998; Talos and Kittel 1996)
Surviving trade union leaders decided not to reestablish the three rival trade
organizations that existed prior to 1 934 but instead created a single labor organization,
the Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (OGB), or Austrian Trade Union Federation.
The OGB formed during the occupation period before the formal reestablishment of an
independent Austrian state and intended to cut across ideological and religious lines.
(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Kindley 1996) This was also a decidedly more
compromise and cooperation-oriented labor organization than had existed before the war.
Labor leaders seemed more willing to compromise and bargain with business in formal
and institutionalized patterns. Postwar Chancellor and SPO leader, Karl Renner,
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admonished labor that “not struggle, but organization” had become the “watchword”.
(Kindley 1996; Seidel 1996) The Chambers of Labor, which had been abolished in lieu of
state-controlled corporatist institutions during the Dollfuss regime, were also resurrected
in the nine provinces and, for the first time, given juridical identity and rights at the
federal level. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996; Katzenstein 1984)
Amongst employers and business interests, the Chambers of Business had
survived the Nazi era and continued to operate after the end of fighting in 1945. The
group was purged of National Socialists during the occupation by the Four Powers and
also expanded its range of activities and duties to include monopolistic representation of
all matters of industrial relations. They also began forming a number of new voluntary
associations to represent specific business sectors or interests, the most notable being the
Vereinigung Osterreichischer Industrieller (VOI), or Association of Austrian
Industrialists. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Katzenstein 1984) Importantly, employers
and industries were also more willing to negotiate and compromise than in the prewar
era. Julius Raab, longtime leader and member of the OVP and a representative of
employers’ interest in the Chambers of Business expressed a “clear creed” that business
“must exercise self-restraint” with labor and negotiate and compromise rather than
confront them. (Pelinka 1998; Talosand Kittel 1996; Kindley 1996; Seidel 1996)
This was even more urgent given the occupied status of the Austrian state and the
garrisons of allied troops, including the Soviet. By seeking compromise with labor, the
employers and business associations were aiming to preclude radical socialist swings that
would be supported by the Soviets in their occupation zone. ( Bischof, Pelinka, and
Steininger 1995)
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In agriculture and forestry, there was no creation of a national or federal interest
association to represent or unify farmers and other agrarian or timer interests. Under a
rather arcane element of the 1920 Constitution, the creation of a single such entity at the
federal level was forbidden. However, at the provincial level. Chambers of Agriculture
were organized to represent agricultural and forestry interests and acted in concert to
provide de facto federal organization of agricultural interests. Later, these would be
unified in the Presidents' Conference of Austrian Agricultural Chambers that would be
given similar legal and procedural rights as the Chambers of Business and Labor.
(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and Kittel 1996)
Almost immediately after the cessation of hostilities and the repartition of Austria
from Germany, several wage-price and social benefit agreements were negotiated
between the four major interests associations (the OGB, and the Chambers of Labor,
Business, and Agriculture) and the Austrian state with an explicit hope of encouraging
rapid postwar economic recovery. While negotiations did include both the OGB and the
Federal Chamber of Labor, many workers did not fully support the measures leading to a
series of serious strikes in the fall of 1950. (Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996) However,
the strikes illustrated how a lack of cohesive solidarity within interest associations and
broader socio-economic discord could harm the entire Austrian economy. More intense
and institutionalized concert amongst interests was the unintended result. (Kindley 1996)
The first permanent institutionalization of the social partnership came in the
inflation crisis of 1947 when an informal joint economic commission was agreed upon.
(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and Kittel 1996; Heinisch 2000) The commission
created a framework of five price and wage pacts between 1 947 and 1 95 1 , as well as the
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Currency Act of 1947, that was agreed upon by all four major interest associations. The
success of the commission and navigation out of the inflation crisis, led the government
to a proposal to turn the commission into an official directorate of the state in which the
government would participate alongside the four peak associations. While the
Constitutional High Court rejected this proposal, it did create further impetus to formally
institutionalize the social partnership. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996; Kindley 1996;
Heinisch 2000)
Despite the occasional strikes, lockouts, and other disputes, the ad hoc and
informal cooperation and coordination of the late 1940s and early 1950s successfully
navigated large-scale economic recovery in Austria. (Fitzmaurice 1990; Gerlich 1992;
Pulzer 1998; Kindley 1996) The “Great Strike” of 1950, organized by the Communists
was aimed at the social partnership as much as it was aimed at higher wages and lower
prices. The Communist labor organizers and the Communist Party (KPO) were
attempting to undermine the new neo-corporatist partnership between conservative
business and socialist labor which excluded them and their more revolutionary ideology.
The failure of this general strike to encompass socialist and conservative workers and
unions, or to gain popular traction, was in part to strong anti-communist rhetoric by both
the left and right. The results were quite more conclusive in that it ended the power of the
communists in labor and the KPO in Austrian party politics permanently. (Pelinka 1998;
Talos and Kittel 1996; Kindley 1996)
However, the economic success that ensued magnified differences between
interest associations over a range of budgetary, economic, social, and employment
policies. (Talos 1996) On issues such as inflation, international competitiveness, and
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scare labor supplies there was often little common currency between labor and business
interests. Here, the state and the governing coalition partners, the Osterreichische
Volkspartei (OVP), or Austrian People's Party, and the Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs
(SPO), or Socialist Party of Austria, were critical in providing the structure to extend the
cooperative arrangements between interest associations to the state policymaking level.
(Talos 1996; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and Kittel 1996) The growing divide
between economic interest associations threatened not only to lead to greater conflict
between business and labor, but also threatened to break the grand coalition partnership
between the two parties leading to overall political instability at the federal level. Hence,
there was a strong governmental and bureaucratic interest in institutionalizing the social
partnership. While the interest associations would still need to be the primary actors in
achieving a permanent structure for cooperation and consensus, the state and political
parties became strong supporters and organizers of such efforts. (Pelinka 1998; Talos
1996; Kindley 1996)
In 1957, the Council of Ministers established the Paritdtische Kommission, or
Joint (or Parity) Commission, for Wages and Prices. The effort to create the commission
was a bipartisan one between Johann Boehm, President of the OGB, and Julius Raab. the
Federal Chancellor and de facto representative of the Chambers of Commerce. (Tomandl
and Fuerboeck 1996; Pelinka 1998; Kindley 1996) While initially intended as a
temporary instrument to moderate and limit labor and business demands the commission
became a permanent fixture and the primary vehicle in institutionalizing the social
partnership in Austria. Initial opposition and dispute was quickly addressed by an
expansion of the commission’s competencies and the inclusion of more interest
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association influence over decision-making. (Kindley 1996) But its greatest support
mechanism was the perceived necessity of the commission to maintain macroeconomic
success. The economic boom slowed by the mid 1950s, and while informal and ad hoc
coordination had been up to the tasks of the late 1940s and early 1950s, greater
permanent institutionalization was demanded from all the actors involved. Elites in labor,
agriculture, business, and government generally favored greater institutionalization, even
if the specifics of the structures were to be quite fiercely debated and negotiated.
As Kindley suggests, there were both ideological and pragmatic economic
rationale for expanding and institutionalizing the neo-corporatist arrangements. This
increased the likelihood of successfully launching the Joint Commission with support
from all the involved players. (Kindley 1996) The process was also strongly supported by
the state and major parties as a way of institutionalizing and structuring the collective
bargaining and intermediation process under once roof. This simplified and reduced the
complexity of the system and allowed the state a single-entry point with the social
partners.
This is not to say that the Joint Commission was the only, or even the best policy
to pursue. Kindley suggests that the tripartite formula was, perhaps, a “second-best”
alternative. (Kindley 1996, 75) Nonetheless, the establishment of the Joint Commission
was a seminal event in the development of the social partnership in postwar Austria.
The early 1960s saw further expansion with support by both political parties, the
OVP and SPO, as well as by all three federal chambers and the OGB. (Talos 1996, 1 10;
Talos and Kittel 1996) The creation of the Advisory Council on Economic and Social
Questions within the Joint Commission in 1963 subjected a much wider range of
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economic policies to critical analysis by the social partnership associations and
institutions. (Katzenstein 1984; Heinisch 2000) As Alfred Klose suggested, the Council
was tasked to make “politics less political” and increase both scientific and academic
input into the process. (Pelinka 1998; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996; Fitzmaurice 1990)
This particular expansion allowed the social partners to expand their influence over
matters as diverse as transportation, the environment, education, and other policy matters.
(Heinisch 2000)
Talos argues that the Austrian social partnership developed with far more
continuity and stability than either the Dutch or German models. (Talos 1996, 1 10) The
1 960s witnessed the social partnership exceeding its original aegis in prices and wages
and creating institutions and structures to address various aspects of national economic
policy including labor markets, fiscal and monetary policy, and investment policies.
(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1998)
Estimates cite that social partners regularly interacted with at least 90 governmental
committees and over 220 advisory councils or subcommittees. (Heinisch 2000) This has
been called a “spillover” of neo-corporatist policy into broader economic and social
issues beyond the scope of the original institutions. (Lehmbruch 1979; Katzenstein 1984)
Surviving periods of one-party rule as well as that of changing economic, social,
and political environments of the 1970s and early 1980s, the social partnership, through
the Joint Commission and its various committees and subcommittees became a powerful
and lasting institution of Austrian economic and social policymaking. (Gerlich. Grande,
and Muller 1988; Fitzmaurice 1990; Gerlich 1992; Talos 1996, 1 10; Talos and Kittel
1 996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a) The results were not only a stable and growing economy
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throughout the period but also a remarkably low level of labor-business conflict. In
addition, major legislative acts such as the Work Constitution Act (regulating
codetermination and collective bargaining), the Employment Act, and Employment of
Foreigners Act were passed largely because the major inter-association conflicts had
already been resolved outside of parliament in both the federal chambers and Joint
Commission on Wages and Prices. (Talos 1996, 1 10) The social partnership became
engrained as one of the most vital and successful structures of the Austrian policymaking
system. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988)
Organizing Austrian Interests
In legal terms, interest associations are organized quite freely and voluntarily
under very “liberal and permissive” statutes of the Austrian constitution. (Tomandl and
Fuerboeck 1986, 13; Pelinka 1998) There are a large number of unions, business
associations, non-governmental bodies, civic associations, and clubs organized around a
virtually unlimited number of issue areas including economic, trade, the environment,
health, sports, and beyond. In this way, Austria does not seem unlike more pluralistic
systems of interest representation such as those in the United States, Canada, or Australia.
But interest associations also exist at a statutory level. These statutory organizations,
known as chambers, are formal intra-govemmental institutions that possess legal
monopolies over the right of representation and articulation of interests in key areas of
the federal policymaking process. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996; Markovits 1996;
Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988) Membership in the chambers is obligatory for all
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those whose economic interests the chamber was established to represent. (Markovits
1996; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and Kittel 1996; Crepaz 1995)
Furthermore, unlike private and voluntary associations, no qualified member can
be excluded or expelled from their chamber. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 13) Hence,
the state did exercise some important controls over the composition of the chamber as
well as requiring some internal decisions to be endorsed by public bureaucratic or
parliamentary oversight. In levying of dues and spending there are defined legal statutes
that place certain limits on the chambers as well. Nonetheless, direct state intervention in
the chambers' internal organization and proceedings had been quite rare until the 1990s.
(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Viebrock 2004) Elections of officers and internal
organization of committees had been primarily autonomous of the state for most of the
postwar period, though since the 1990s, the state has been more likely to exert and extend
oversight to ensure democratic and transparent standards. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;
Talos and Kittel 1996; Viebrock 2004)
Labor, both white and blue-collar, are organized into two interest associations: the
Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (OGB), or Austrian Trade Union Federation, and
the Federal Chamber of Labor. The OGB had historically represented more than 60% of
all blue and white-collar workers in Austria providing it sizable leverage and power to
negotiate with both the state and business. (Talos 1996, 105; Katzenstein 1984, 36;
Gerlich 1992; Heinisch 2000) Membership density was bulwarked by labor laws that
protected closed shops, made union membership in both the OGB and Federal Chamber
of Labor compulsory, and applied the laws deeply into medium and some small
businesses. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) However, its share of representation in the
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Austrian workforce has gradually declined, and is now well under 50% of all workers.
(Pelinka 1998; IMF 2007) Nonetheless, the OGB, while technically not a federal
chamber, was granted defacto status at the chamber level through law as well as
convention. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos 1996; Pelinka 1998) This was due in
part to the remarkable level of centralization of the OGB, long considered amongst the
most centralized trade union federations in the world. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;
Katzenstein 1984) Under the OGB charter, the fourteen constituent unions that make up
the federation (such as specific unions for metal workers, food industry workers,
construction workers, railroad workers) had very limited independent identities and weak
autonomy. (Talos and Kittel 1996) The power over dues and spending were concentrated
into the hands of the national federation. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 18) The member
unions did have important powers in recruitment and negotiating collective agreements,
but these must always have been approved by, and potentially vetoed by, the national
federation. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Katzenstein 1984)
This differes tremenosuly from the more decentralized system in Germany
discussed in the next chapter. There are no unions, other than the civil service unions,
outside of the OGB. (Pelinka 1998) Since the 1990s, there has been a gradual
decentralization of the OGB and labor significantly increasing the autonomy and power
of the local works councils, member unions, and other sub-federal labor organizations.
(Viebrock 2004) Nonetheless, for most of the postwar era, the OGB was a highly
centralized and very powerful labor organization.
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There is also the official chamber association for workers, the Chamber of Labor,
or Bundeskammerfur Arbeiter und Angestellte or as it is usually known by its shorthand
Arbeiterkammer (AK), which is mandatory for all workers, excepting civil servants, at
the provincial level. The unions for civil servants are independent of the OGB and their
chamber negotiates directly with the state. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and
Kittel 1996) The provincial chambers are linked to the federal chamber through the
Austrian Chambers of Labor Conference. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 20) Hence the
Federal Chamber of Labor has a near absolute representative monopoly of Austrian blue
and white-collar workers. The Chamber of Labor at the federal level has tended to view
itself as the intellectual and scientific backbone of the labor and union movement in
Austria. The Chamber publishes books and compiles data, consults on labor issues, and
acts as a representative voice of all labor voices in Austrian society. (Tomandl and
Fuerboeck 1986, 20) The Chamber has legal and statutory authority in the Joint
Commission and must legally be consulted by parliament over proposed legislation
unlike the OGB which has been granted such status through convention only. (Tomandl
and Fuerboeck 1986; Pelinka 1998)
Combined, the OGB and Chamber of Labor have a close and often overlapping
relationship. They have developed a task-sharing arrangement both within the Joint
Commission as well as in other areas of labor relations and organization. Nonetheless, the
OGB has tended to act as the “senior partner” to the Chamber of Labor. The OGB tends
to fill most of the important positions in the Joint Commission and is often dominant in
terms of propagating and defining labor interests. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;
Katzenstein 1984) While there is sometimes competition between the two organizations.
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for the most part they have been quite effective as a dyadic partnership in the articulation
and representation of broad and specific labor interests at the federal policymaking level.
(Pelinka 1998)
Business interests are organized into the Vereinigung Osterreichischer
Industrieller (VOI), or Association of Austrian Industrialists, and the Federal Chambers
of Economics, Wirtschaftskammer Osterreichs (WKO), formerly known until the 1990s
as the Bundeswirtschaftskammer (BWK), the Chambers of Business (or alternately know
as Commerce or Employers. The VOI is a purely voluntary organization of Austrian
firms and employers and has been historically dominated by Austria's largest firms and
industries. (Heimsch 2000)
The statutory national chamber, the Federal Chambers of Business, includes all
firms, approximately 300,000, as well as self-employed businesspersons with the
exception of agriculture and forestry as well as specific professions such as physicians,
lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, architects, or accountants who are organized into their
own particular professional chambers. (WKO 2007) These small professional chambers
have different and more limited roles than the major chambers, usually confined to very
specific areas of legislation dealing with professional qualifications, standards, licensing,
and practices. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos 1996; Pelinka 1998) The Chambers
of Business is complex in bureaucratic organization, perhaps even unnecessarily
cumbersome. (Heimsch 2000; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) While amongst workers,
the voluntary OGB dominates the compulsory Chambers of Labor, this has historically
been reversed amongst employers. The Chambers of Business had tended to dominate
and eclipse the voluntary business associations such as VOI during most of the postwar
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era. (Katzenstein 1984; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) The Chamber, unlike the VOI, has
also been dominated by smaller and midsized firms. (Heinisch 2000) The federal
chamber is actually comprised of nine chambers at the Lander level each maintaining its
own legal identity. (Talos and Kittel 1996) These chambers, as well as the federal
chamber, are subdivided into six sections based upon their area of enterprise; commerce,
crafts and industry, transport, tourism, finance, banking and insurance. (Tomandl and
Fuerboeck 1986; Pelinka 1998) All businesses whose activity falls under one of these
sections must be enrolled as a member of the chamber and the subordinate section. Each
section is also subdivided into numerous groups known as Fachgruppen which represents
the interests of a particular branch or field. Flowever, at the federal level, the sections are
divided into combinations, or Fachverbaende, not groups. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck
1986)
This complex organization was adopted for historical and institutional reasons.
First, Austrian firms had been traditionally decentralized by autonomous guild regimes.
Secondly, there was a pragmatic attempt to create a system of “checks and balances” at
both the provincial and federal levels after World War II so that the exclusive interests of
the members could be mediated and coordinated. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) This
has made the Federal Chambers of Business far less autonomous from its provincial,
sector, and group organizations than is found in the OGB and Chambers of Labor.
Nonetheless, the WKO and the OGB have been the leading institutions of the social
partnership and Joint Commission since the 1940s, far exceeding the influence of the
other chambers. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996)
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Farmers and agricultural interests are organized into the Presidential Conference
of the Austrian Chambers of Agriculture or Prasidentenkonferenz der
Landwirtschaftskammern Osterreichs (LWK). Nearly all self-employed farmers are
members of the Chamber of Agriculture. The chambers are also organized at the Lander
level much like commerce and labor. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos 1996; Talos
and Kittel 1996; Pelinka 1998)
While the chambers are organized at the provincial level of Austria’s nine Lander,
or states or provinces, they primarily operate as national organizations at the federal level
in Vienna. The exception is agriculture in which the provincial chambers are in a slightly
more powerful position within the national structure than in either labor or business.
(Talos and Kittel 1996) The chambers are legally guaranteed financial resources by
means of compulsory membership dues. Hence, the Austrian system provided one of
concentrated, well-financed, and dominantly monopolistic peak associations, known as
Dachverbande
,
at the federal chamber level. The federal chambers are also granted
important legal rights to control the personnel and financial resources of their members
and make decisions that are binding for them. These rights are supported by the Austrian
state in a number of ways including subsidizing of the interest associations and the
sanction or punishment of non-conforming members. (Lehmbruch 1982; Katzenstein
1984; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and Kittel 1996; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller
1988; Crepaz 1995; Viebrock 2004)
Nonetheless, the system was predicated on, and worked best with, voluntary
cooperation and coordination amongst the social partners. Nonetheless, it would be
inaccurate to argue that there was little internal dissent or conflict within the peak
183
associations. As Katzenstein suggests, “the image of order and symmetry... is somewhat
misleading” since political conflicts within the organization have been quite intense.
(Katzenstein 1984, 27) But the settling and compromise of these disputes inside the
interest associations and outside of the public realm was precisely one of the perceived
benefits of the social partnership's policymaking process. The peak associations, having
reached consensus within their membership, were then able to bargain and act with the
full support of their compulsory membership, thereby decreasing conformity costs and
increasing the speed and flexibility of the deliberations amongst the peak associations at
the national level. (Lehmbruch 1979, 1982; Katzenstein 1984; Gerlich 1992; Talos and
Kittel 1996; Crepaz 1995; Heinisch 2000)
The Structure and Operation of the Social Partnership
The Austrian social partnership, despite its perceived centralism and
concentration has been a rather complex network of formal and informal structures
amongst the interest associations, the federal government, bureaucracy, and parliament.
(Gerlich 1992) The social partnership was institutionalized on several levels. Figure 2
illustrates the complexity and tiers of the Austrian social partnership as well as the typical
decision-making procedures. While the central institution is the Joint Commission for
Wages and Prices, it sits atop a structure that interwove important interest associations.
(Talos 1996; Markovits 1996)
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The Structure of the Joint Commission on Wages and Prices
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Figure 2: The Structure of the Joint Commission (Talos, 1996)
The General Assembly of the Commission is chaired by the Federal Chancellor
and included, until reforms of the 1990s, the ministers of Agriculture, Labor and Social
Affairs, and Economic Affairs, and the presidents of the four peak associations;
Chambers of Labor, Business, Agriculture, and the OGB. In addition at least one or two
vice presidents of the peak associations, as well as secretary-generals and other staff
usually take part in deliberations and consultations bringing the number to between 25
and 30 members. From 1966, the only voting members were the four peak association
presidents. Votes are secret and require unanimity for action, reflecting parity and the
demand for consensus within the social partnership. (Crepaz 1995; Talos 1996; Tomandl
and Fuerbock 1986)
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Importantly, the decisions of the Joint Commission are not legally binding and are
merely advisory and governmental or parliamentary adherence to its findings is strictly
voluntary. Prior to the 1980s, examples of government or parliament action in spite of, or
in opposition to a contradictory decision by the commission were quite rare and the Joint
Commission acted with a de facto veto. (Gerlich 1992; Talos 1996, Pelinka 1998;
Tomandl and Fuerbock 1986) This was due to the social partners’ strong ties and
influence within the major political parties and the legislative process. But as will be
illustrated in a later chapter, these links have weakened and the willingness of
government or parliament to ignore the Joint Commission has steadily increased.
However, even while legally only an advisory institution in which the government
may wish to voluntarily cooperate, there are areas where the economic interest groups
have traditionally exerted more power than in others. This is especially true in the areas
of wages, inflation, monetary policy, agricultural subsidies, and a range of social welfare
provision. (Katzenstein 1984, Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Pelinka 1998) Social
security provision is most notable in that the association members of the Joint
Commission have historically been the primary institutions of decision-making regarding
health, old age, and accident insurance. (Pelinka 1998) While this has also declined since
the 1990s, it still remains an important part of the social partnership’s importance and
authority. (Viebrock 2004)
The structure of the General Assembly of the Joint Commission of Wages and
Prices is clearly intended to grant parity to the interests of commerce and labor. (Pelinka
1998, 92; Markovits 1996) As Katzenstein notes “the system of social and economic
partnership reflects and shapes a policy process built around an equilibrium of power”.
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(Katzenstein 1982, 153) The ability for each to veto or block any decision was central to
the social partnership’s intent to inextricably tie the major interests to wider responsibility
in the Austrian state. (Pelinka 1998, 1998a) This joint governance structure also reflects
and addresses the typical and historic political and economic divisions between the left
and right in Austria and between the major political parties, the OVP and SPO. (Crepaz
1994, 1995; Heinisch 2000) The structure seems to have clearly conceptualized to
provide roughly equal weight to both the left (the SPO, OGB, and Federal Chambers of
Labor) and the right (the OVP, VOl, and Federal Chambers of Business and Agriculture).
The strong linkages between the parties and interest associations are explored later in this
section.
Below the level of the General Assembly are the prepatory, preliminary, and
informal meetings and conferences undertaken by the chiefs, officers, and staffs of the
particular interest associations prior to General Assembly meetings. While the formal
vote and debate of policy takes place in the General Assembly much of the “heavy
lifting” of negotiation, compromise, and debate usually took place well before such
events. Most details, issues, concerns, obstacles and questions were well addressed if not
solved before the issues were put forth in front of the Chancellor and ministers at the
General Assembly level. This also included the cabinet ministers and staff, the
Chancellor, members of parliament, and the federal bureaucracy. Hence, the system,
while possessing a strong institutional structure has also been run with an extraordinary
amount of informal and unofficial legwork. (Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996; Kittel
2000 )
Much of the fundamental and important work of the Joint Commission on Wages
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and Prices has been accomplished through the preliminary decision-making of the
subcommittee and advisory council level. (Talos and Kittel 1996; Kittel 2000) Here,
interest associations and other parties research, debate, negotiate, write, re-write, and
amend potential policy initiatives for the General Assembly as well as track and comment
on pending legislation in parliament and parliamentary committees. This parallel system
created a “shadow parliamentary committee” system that exerted influence on bills still
being considered by parliamentary committees. Hence, the influence of the Joint
Commission and the interest associations was not only within the specific institutional
framework but was also in its ability to exert its joint power in other areas or government
or parliamentary interest that have not been explicitly placed under the commission's
aegis. (Talos and Kittel 1996; Pelinka 1998; Kittel 2000)
This does not mean that the peak associations were connected or involved in
every political decision or policy area. Quite to the contrary, there were many areas such
as education, justice, arts, science, and research where peak association interest was, and
continues to be, minimal or inconsistent. However, given the wide range of economic,
social, and political interests that the peak associations encompassed, they regularly
commented on draft bills in such diverse issues as criminal justice, primary and higher
education, and science. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel
1 996) There is a legal right granted to the chambers to comment on any draft bill in the
Austrian parliament and its committees. The underlying legal and philosophical
foundations of this practice have been central to the social partnership. Such practices
offered “the best chance of reaching compromise on controversial issues and securing
consent”. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 6) Given this and the strong linkages between
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the interest associations and the political parties and cabinet ministers, interest
associations have had a number of strong formal and legal, as well as informal and
conventional, conduits to decidedly impact the Austrian policy and decision-making
process. Austria perhaps exhibited its corporatist credentials most strongly in this
manner. The interest associations have been so centrally ensconced that it allowed them
expanded latitude into policy areas beyond the intended locus of neo-corporatist
arrangement that is found far less frequently in other neo-corporatist systems. (Heimsch
2000 )
The social partnership has also been well entrenched in the constitutional and
legal systems of Austria as well as in the Austrian population's general tendencies
towards negotiation, bargaining, and compromise in lieu of contlict. As Tomandl and
Fuerboeck argue, there has been a “fundamental Austrian attitude of trying to settle
conflicts by bargaining rather than by formal struggle” that helped explain and underpin
the social partnership's widespread success and acceptance. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck
1986, 1 1 ) The Austrian constitution and legal system had been relatively flexible and
rather amenable to granting strong leeway to social partners to enact policy. (Gerlich,
Grande, and Muller 1988: Pelinka 1998; Marin 1987; Heimsch 2000) Hence the legal
system, as well as the general political climate of postwar Austria, tended towards
decisions, agreements, and settlements that emerge from consensual or arbitrated
proceedings. This varies from the more codified German model, which discussed in the
next chapter, highly formalizes and defines the social partnership in strict legal terms. In
many ways Austrian social partnership is unique to its lack of rigid juridification or
Verrechtlichung that is seen in the German or Dutch models. (Mann 1987)
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In addition to the formal and informal structures and processes of the Joint
Commission, there also existed a constant and often informal dialogue and exchange of
ideas, opinions, and preferences between and amongst the peak associations, the
government, the state bureaucracy, the legislature, provincial governments, political
parties, and other social, economic, and political actors. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;
Katzenstein 1984; Crepaz 1995; Kittel 2000) Much work and negotiation between the
partners and parties was performed in confidential, if not secret, negotiations and in
“gentleman’s agreements”. (Crepaz 1994, Viebrock 2004; Heimsch 2000) While the
framework of the Joint Commission provided a legal and formal locus, the social
partnership regularly occurred beyond the committees and commission structures. While
Tomandl and Fuerboeck argue that this provided a purely “voluntary and informal”
relationship, the influence and stability of the Joint Commission would suggest a far more
formal, institutionalized, and structured relationship. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) The
voluntary, informal, continuous, predictable, and regularized patterns of political
bargaining became a structure of the Austrian policymaking and political system that
shaped the interests, behaviors, and expectations of its actors as well as the content of
policy. (Katzenstein 1984) As Heinisch suggests, the Austrian system was built upon a
process that implied high-trust relations in bargaining and negotiation that required as
less explicit and less rigid legal enforcement mechanism. (Heimsch 2000)
In other words, the social partnership of Austria was rather self-sustaining without
the need for strict state regulation or intervention. Much like what will be found in the
German system of semi-sovereignty, the Austrian state was not required to perpetuate the
system on a regular basis as the social partners were capable of doing so with little direct
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government intervention. (Katzensetin 1987) Nonetheless, interests usually must also
have had some guarantee of voice, veto, or authority to deter majoritarian efforts and
continued to find value in participating in the social partnership itself. (Katzenstein 1984;
Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988) Hence, it is perhaps best to
view the Austrian social partnership as one that was strongly institutionalized in both
formal-legal and informal-conventional manners.
While some suggest that the interest associations are primarily informally and
voluntarily organized, this seems to omit the coercive structural power of the formal and
institutional elements of the social partnership that make variance or non-conformity
expensive or unsuccessful in political and economic terms. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck
1986; Heimsch 2000; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Crepaz 1995) In many ways,
this parallels elements of Europeanization scholarship that seeks to understand how
European governance can condition or constraint the actions and structures of member
states even without explicitly or formally requiring reform or change. The social
partnership did provoke significant criticism from many given the more conservative and
elitist orientation of the partnership. (Katzenstein 1984; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;
Fitzmaurice 1990; Markovits 1996; Pelinka 1998; Viebrock 2004) As Markovits
suggests, it entailed a “clear preference for stability and discipline to the direct detriment
of democratic change and participation”. (Markovits 1996, 18; Crepaz 1995; Viebrock
2004) Nonetheless, strong and lasting public and elite support for the institutions and
ideals of social partnership reinforced and empowered the neo-corporatist structures and
processes of the social partnership in Austria. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Gerlich
1989; Pelinka 1998; Markowits 1996)
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Linking Social Partners and Political Parties
The concert of interests of the federal chambers and OGB was reinforced by a
very close relationship between the peak associations and Austrian political parties. The
Second Republic was long dominated by two major political parties: the Osterreichische
Volkspartei (OVP), or Austrian People's Party, and the Sozialdemokratische Partei
Osterreichs (SPO), or Social Democratic Party of Austria. 4 Both parties have had
extensive institutional links to the large economic interest associations. This was
highlighted by the fact that individuals often concurrently hold positions in both. In 1973,
5 1 .4% of the deputies to the Austrian Parliament were also representatives of interest
associations. (Talos 1996, 108; Katzenstein 1984; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988) The
interest associations had historically possessed plurality factions within the major parties’
congresses, organizations, membership, and leadership.
The links fell in line with the typical postwar left-right political spectrum with the
SPO, OGB, and Federal Chamber of Labor strongly allied, while the OVP had
traditionally found allegiance with the VOI and the Business Chamber. (Fitzmaurice
1990; Crepaz 1994) In agriculture, the OVP absorbed large numbers of fanners from the
Agrarian League, or Landbund (LB), following World War II and had been traditionally
allied with the Chambers of Agriculture. (Muller 1996) The OVP itself has been
internally organized around functional leagues, or Biinde
,
including the Osterreichischer
Bauernbund {OBB), or Austrian Fanners' League, the Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsbund
(OWB), or Asutrian Business League, and the Osterreichischer Arbeiter- und
Angestelltenbund ( OAAB), or Austria Workers’ and Employees’ League. These leagues
operate at all levels of the party (local. Lander, federal) and were the primary institutions
4 The SPO was known as the Socialist Party of Austria, Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs
,
until 1991
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for recruiting and mobilizing specific functional party members. The Farmers’ and
Business’ Leagues were amongst the strongest actors within the OVP structure and
decision-making process during much of the postwar era. While the SPO had a similar
internal structure, it operated quite differently and has been far more centralized in terms
of authority and organization. (Muller 1996; Pelinka 1998)
The close ties between the interest associations and the parties often moderated
the political parties' behavior vis-a-vis one another. As reflections of the major interest
associations, the parties became extensions of the interests' commitments to greater
consensus-driven and cooperative policymaking. That Austria has endured long periods
of grand coalition government (see table below) between the SPO and OVP since 1945,
with the historic exclusion of the FPO, illustrated the prominence the symbols of
consensus found in both the social partnership and peak associations that encompassed a
large share of the parties’ memberships. (Gerlich 1992; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller
1988; Fitzmaurice 1996; Pelinka 1998; Luther 1998; Markovits 1996; Floward 2000)
The party system itself developed in a structured and limited manner after 1945
that coincided strongly with the lager and interest association cleavages of Austrian
society. (Luther and Muller 1992; Crepaz 1994) The allies initially legitimized only three
political parties in the post-Nazi era, the SPO, the OVP, and the Kommunistische Partei
Osterreiches (KPO), or Austrian Communist Party. (Weinzierl 1998; Luther 1998;
Pelinka 1998) The KPO quickly lost legitimacy and support due to the Soviet occupation
of Eastern Austria and ceased to be a functioning and important party by the early 1950s.
In 1949, the allies established the Verband dev Unabhdngigen (VdU), or League of
Independents, to represent former Nazis and nationalists. The allies viewed the creation
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of such a party, while seemingly antithetical to postwar de-Nazification, as a necessity so
to include these remaining in the democratic process and marginalize their demands as
well as a way to keep tabs on their members. (Pelinka 1998) The VdU would change its
name to FPO in 1956. In essence, by 1949, the three major Lager
,
Catholic-
Conservatives, Socialists, and Nationalists, had been formally institutionalized into
representative political parties. The linkages and agreements between the parties and the
major interest associations, the SPO with OGB and the Chambers of Labor, the OVP with
the VOI, Chambers of Commerce, and fanner’s Landbund (LB) helped create a tightly
wound political universe. (Luther and Muller 1992; Pulzer 1995; Pelinka 1998;
Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Crepaz 1994)
Years Chancellor Maioritv Partv/Coalition
1945-1947 Renner SPO-OVP-KPO
1945-1947 Figl OVP-SPO-KPO
1947-1953 Figl OVP-SPO
1953-1961 Raab OVP-SPO
1961-1964 Gorbach OVP-SPO
1964-1966 Klaus OVP-SPO
1966-1970 Klaus OVP
1970-1983 Kriesky SPO
1983-1986 Sinowatz SPO-FPO
1987-1987 Vranitzky SPO-FPO
1987-1997 Vranitzky SPO-OVP
1997-2000 Klima SPO-OVP
2000-2007 Schtissel OVP-FPO
2007-Present Gusenbauer SPO-OVP
Table 2; Governments in Austria since 1945
The SPO and OVP ruled either together in grand coalition or by themselves from
1947 to 1983, from 1987 to 2000, and once again from January 2007 (see table above).
They established an extraordinary model of sharing power known as proporz, a fonn of
consociationalism in which, much like neo-corporatism, the major parties would seek and
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institutionalize consensus and consultation in decision- and policymaking. (Lehmbruch
1974, 1979, 1979a; Marin 1987; Lane and Errson 1997; Luther and Muller 1992; Rose
2000; Saltiel 2000) Lijphart identifies four essential characteristics of consociational
democracy: grand coalition, mutual veto or concurrent majority rule, proportionality in
political representation, and highly autonomous political associations. (Lijphart 1975,
1984, 1997) Austria's proporz system between the SPO and OVP, and their affiliated
interest associations, functioned along these lines. Proporz existed concurrently and in
adjunct to the social partnership creating a nexus of party-interest-govemment
relationships. (Lehmbruch 1974, 1982; Luther and Muller 1992; Pulzer 1995; Pelinka
1998, 1998a; Luther 1998) This was a tightly linked system comprising both neo-
corporatism and consociationalism built around an institutionalized and structured system
of codetermined and consensual policy and decision-making. As Marin suggests, not only
was Austria the paradigmatic case of neo-corporatism, but it was also the “crow n jewel”
of consociationalism and proporz party systems. (1987)
The stability of the social partnership was commensurate with stability in political
parties and parliamentary elections. Elections seldom produced major or radical changes
in the respective strengths of the major political parties. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;
Katzenstein 1984) As Katzenstein suggested, political stability was a requirement of the
social partnership, guaranteeing a predictable and reliable arena for consensual decision-
making. (Katzenstein 1984) But the social partnership, as Austria demonstrated, may also
provide further reinforcement of such stability. There was an almost cyclical pattern of
reinforcement between the social partnership, its interest associations, and the proporz of
the major parties. In the Austrian case, it seems clear that the growth and development of
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the social partnership went hand in hand with the development of a stable two-party
system predicated upon a consociational proporz relationship between the OVP and SPO
and the exclusion of the FPO and other smaller parties. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller
1988; Luther and Muller 1992; Gerlich 1992; Pulzer 1995; Saltiel 2000; Howard 2001;
Crepaz 1994, 1995) The lines quickly became so entangled and overlapping that it
became nearly impossible to discern the divisions between the interest associations, the
institutions of the social partnership, the political parties, parliament, and government.
During periods of one-party government, OVP majority from 1966-1970 and SPO
majority from 1970-1983, the system could not rely upon proporz between political
parties to balance the system. In such periods, the social partnership regularly played the
critical balancing role between the interests of the left and right. (Pelinka 1998) The case
of proposed codetermination laws in 1973 is one such example and is discussed later in
this section. (Pelinka 1998, 1998a)
Talos and others argue that this concentrated and centralized organizational
structure between parties and the interest associations was a necessary prerequisite for the
social partnership and neo-corporatism. Only through concentration and centralization
were the heterogeneous interests forced to integrate and diffuse intra-organizational
conflicts by encouraging, and sometimes forcing cooperation between the interest
associations, parties, and government. (Talos 1996; Katzenstein 1984, 1985) However,
others suggest that this was quite antithetical to democracy and that the electoral and
policymaking marketplace was “rigged” by the elites of the parties, interests, and
government. (Rose 2000; Crepaz 1994, 1995; Viebrock 2004)
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With state sponsorship and monopolistic legitimacy, the peak associations were
able to minimize defection and maintain the cohesion and loyalty of their membership.
The linkages to political parties facilitated replication of the structures and processes of
the social partnership into the representation and legislation arenas of political parties and
parliament. This also simultaneously provided an additional political arena in which
compromise and negotiation could occur. This further entrenched and empowered the
interest associations at the federal, as well as state and local, levels in the Austrian
political system.
The Austrian system certainly ranked as one of the most concentrated varieties of
social partnership with so much authority placed in the hands of a relatively small
number of centralized peak associations, externally support and legitimized by the
Austrian state, with tight membership and political linkages to the two dominant political
parties. (Lehmbruch 1982; Gerlich 1992; Luther and Muller 1992; Pulzer 1995; Talos
1996; Fitzmaurice 1990, 1996; Pelinka 1989; Crepaz 1995) The Austrian neo-corporatist
state and party state were in complementary synchronization for much of the Second
Republic. (Lehmbruch 1982; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Markovits 1996) Whether this was
antithetical to democracy and efficiency will be discussed in latter sections.
Social Democracy & the Social Partnership
Katzenstein utilized the term "social corporatism” to describe and categorize
Austrian social partnership from other more “liberal” or mixed systems of neo-
corporatism. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Markovits 1996) This was primarily based on a
more interventionist and protectionist role of the state in the economy through total or
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partial ownership of industries and a more extensive welfare state. The Austrian state
had. with the passages of the Nationalization Acts of 1946 and 1947, held and increased
ownership over a large number of enterprises for much of the postwar period. These
included industries that were often publicly-owned in other states, such utilities and
public transportation, but also included an extensive range of other sectors including
communications, steel, coal, banking, salt, tobacco, and insurance. (Seidel 1982; Talos
1996; Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Markovits 1996) Historically, approximately 20% of the
total working population and approximately 25% of industrial production had been in
public-sector industries and services. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Fitzmaurice 1990)
These firms were managed through the state-organized Austrian Industrial
Administration Company (OIAG) which, at its peak, accounted for at least one-third of
the GNP. (Lens 1985)
While public ownership of communications and heavy industry, were among the
most visible signs of the strongly interventionist Austrian state, state ownership of
commercial banking was amongst the most critical areas. The holdings of the major
Austrian banks gave the state vast leverage, if not fiat ownership, over many private-
sector manufacturing, consumer, and sendee firms. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;
Katzenstein 1984; Markovits 1996) The large public sector provided a framework for
fusing and simplifying the relationship between the state and national economic interests.
It also provided leverage to the Social Democrats and labor, through the state control and
regulation, over major industries, both public and private. (Katzenstein 1984; Talos 1996;
Marchant 2001 ) This was especially true in employment in which Austria maintained a
full-employment policy for many decades. (Lens 1985)
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In exchange for this high level of state regulation and control, industrial and
commercial interests were provided guarantees included insulation from work stoppages,
a say in the costs of their contributions to the provision of the welfare, and high levels of
subsidy and other protectionism to safeguard Austrian firms competitiveness. This
protectionism found in Austria, more than many other neo-corporatist systems, was
partially due to the state’s very large national sector but also due to private industry's
domestic orientation and demand for heavy subsidy. Hence, voices for free trade were not
particularly strong even among the business elite until the late 1970s and 1980s.
(Katzenstein 1984;Talos 1996)
In addition, the central bank was used as a political tool by the state and
institutions of the social partnership to achieve desired economic or social goals. Lijphart
cites a number of indexes that ranked the independence of Austria’s Central Bank as
amongst the lowest in the world. (Lijphart 1999) The OGB itself was a major shareholder
in the Austrian Nationalbank providing labor deep penetration into the Austrian monetary
institutions and policies. (Katzenstein 1984) Private capital in Austria was quite weak and
strongly regulated from 1945 until the 1990s. It was also often oriented towards labor, the
state, or publicly-owned industries. Private capital became increasingly rare by the 1960s
and in some cases hardly private at all. The Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtshaft AG
(BAWAG) was established in 1922 under the name Arbeiterbank, or Workers' Bank, by
the Austrian state to provide credit the lower classes. It would eventually become fully
owned by the OGB during the 1960s.
5
The bank was closed from 1934-1947. BAWAG is most notable for its ties to the US firm Refco which
involved bad loans in excess of 425million Euros necessitating a government bail out in 2005. The bank
was purchased in 2006 by Cerberus Capital Management, the same firm that began the purchase of
Chrysler from Daimler in 2007
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The welfare state has also been more extensive in Austria than other cases of
“liberal’' neo-corporatism such as Switzerland, Germany, or the Netherlands. Austria’s
preference of equality over efficiency resulted in a more “social” neo-corporatist.
(Katzenstein 1984; Markovits 1996; Marchant 2001) Public expenditures were high as
the state provided an exhaustive “cradle to grave” security blanket through high levels of
public intervention and social provision. By the 1970s Austria's public spending
substantially surpassed the norm amongst other OECD states. By the 1970s this meant
significant budget deficits which were financed through surplus revenues saved from the
previous decades of growth, as well as through short and medium-term borrowing. This
large social welfare system was a generous built-in cushion or stabilizer for the Austrian
economy and its workers but with potentially long-term costs. Public debt rose
considerably through the late 1970s and into the 1980s and impacted Austria's credit
status by the 1990s. (Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka 1998) This was often cited as one of the
fundamental weaknesses of the Austro-corporatist political economy of the postwar era
and a contributor to Austria’s overall economic decline.
Solidarity and Social Partnership
Solidarity to the social partnership has been a critical factor in the support and
survival of the Austrian social partnership. As Katzenstein notes, “social corporatism in
Austria mobilizes and maintains a strong political consensus around a strategy of national
adaptation to and a public compensation for economic change”. (Katzenstein 1984)
Postwar Austrian social partnership differed significantly from interwar and 19
lh
centuries models of corporatism precisely because major interests abandoned their most
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conflict-oriented and incompatible goals within a highly democratic framework. The
postwar period saw a remarkable reconfiguration and limitation on interest association
demands. The OGB abandoned many of its most radical demands and strategies and
developed a much more cooperative and consensual perspective that sought not only to
improve the conditions of workers but also recognized their responsibility towards social
and economic development, and the economy as a whole. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller
1988; Talos 1996; Kindley 1996; Seidel 1996; Kittel 2000)
Business also moderated their demands and accepted that while they had a duty to
represent their specific commercial interests that they also had duties in “maintaining a
responsible attitude towards the whole economy” which often required “immediate
interests of individual economic groups to be subordinated to general economic goals”.
The Chamber of Business must look beyond its short-term members' interests and
“attempt to balance interests... for the sake of the whole economy”. (Talos 1996, 107;
Seidel 1996; Kittel 2000) Katzenstein labels this “an ideology of social partnership
expressed at the national level”. (1984, 27) Hence interest associations are not tasked to
defend their vested interests at all costs, but explicitly sought, in the postwar
environment, more accommodative or cooperative strategies and goals for the betterment
of state and society.
This did not, nor does it mean that conflict and dissent ended. On the contrary,
interest associations in the federal chambers often struggled to find ground upon which to
compromise. Former Chancellor Bruno Knesky once characterized the social partnership
as “a loveless marriage that works”. (Katzenstein 1984. 26) Nonetheless, the overall
results of the Austrian model were characterized by widespread consensus, especially
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among elites, on a number of fundamental social and economic objectives including
economic growth, wages, stable currencies, and international competitiveness. (Talos
1996; Kindley 1996) In such a system, conflicts were limited by being "framed within
vaguely held, but firmly shared notions of the public good”. (Katzenstein 1984, 27;
Kindley 1996) The environment of consensus and its subsequent economic and political
success in the postwar era engendered further public and elite support for the system.
(Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988)
A poll of federal chamber members in 1990 found that more than half preferred to
have economic and social decisions determined through the state-business-labor
association negotiation. Only 3% supported extreme and active dissent practices such as
strikes or lockouts. (Talos 1996, 107) While strikes and lockouts do occur, they are quite
rare and usually a last resort. Hence “class struggle at the negotiating table” has been far
more preferable in the Austrian system than conflict-oriented strategies to address social,
economic, and political divisions. (Pelinka 1998; Kindley 1996; Gerlich, Grande, and
Muller 1988)
The 1970s saw the emergence of greater and greater divergence between the
interest associations and even within the associations themselves on a number of policy
issues. Growing inflation, associated primarily with spikes in energy and oil prices,
decreasing industrial competitiveness, higher unemployment, and revenue shortfalls
strained the social partnership. A number of proposed economic reforms were quashed
due to lack of consensus while others were initiated on the floor of parliament itself,
entirely bypassing the federal chambers and the Joint Commission. This limited the
ability for all the major interests to negotiate or maneuver towards consensus. A prime
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example was the increased corporate tax burden passed in 1977 despite heavy business
disapproval. (Seidel 1996)
However, the social partnership was still effective in a number of areas through
the 1970s and 1980s including the regulation of agricultural commodities, the Sickness
Benefits Act of 1977, and the Amendment to the Works Constitution Bargaining Act of
1986. (Talos 1996, 111) Even with the more right-wing Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs
(FPO), or Freedom Party of Austria, becoming a governing coalition partner from 1983
until 1986, the stability of the social partnership between the government and interest
associations remained mostly unchanged. (Talos 1996) A 1987 poll found that 63% of
Austrians were proud of the social partnership. (Bruckmuller 1996) A 1981 poll indicated
that, when asked to choose between the social partnership and parliament, a majority
would opt for the former. (Pelinka 1998a) An OECD assessment from the same year
noted, “Austrians are in fundamental agreement about the need to settle conflicts and
wield power in a spirit of moderation and cooperation”. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986,
1 3; Kindley 1996)
Results of Social Partnership ( 1940s- 1980s)
The postwar Austrian economy achieved very high levels of success in almost all
measures by the early 1980s. There is significant evidence that even amongst other
affluent European states, in terms of macroeconomic performance, Austria
“outperformed its neighbors and trading partners by substantial margins”. (Arndt 1982;
Katzenstein 1984) Austria ranked, and continues to rank, amongst the wealthiest
countries of the world in terms of per capita GDP, currency stability (until adopting the
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Euro in 2000), low unemployment, social welfare provision, and environmental quality.
(Lauber 1996; Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka 1998) Austria also developed a highly stable
political system that had reached a very comfortable level ofproporz between the major
parties and interests. Austrian politics had become predictable and perhaps even a little
boring due to the high levels of concordance. (Kramer 1996; Pelinka 1998) While only
part of this can be accredited to the social partnership, the continuity and stability of the
social partnership, in both economic and political terms, contributed to conditions that
markedly increased the economic and political gains of the Austrian state. (Lauber 1992,
1996; Katzenstein 1984; Arndt 1982; Pelinka 1998; Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Gerlich,
Grande, and Muller 1988)
Economically, growth in Austria had been amongst the highest in the world while
unemployment and inflation were amongst the lowest. By managing to spread wage and
benefit increases over long periods of time, the threats of inflation and international
competitiveness were minimized. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Lauber 1992, 1996)
This is especially true in light of Austria's “small state” status and the difficulties it faced
in surviving and competing in the postwar economic and political environment.
(Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Lauber 1992, 1996) Overall, Austria became a prosperous and
advanced industrial state and the social partnership surely played a role. Lauber argues
that the two necessary preconditions for this Keynesian period of high Austrian economic
growth and stability (sometimes known as Austro-Keynesiamsm) were a large public
sector and the close cooperation of major interest groups, or the social partnership.
(Lauber 1992, 1992a; 1996; Seidel 1982; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Markowits
1996) Many of the most important commitments made by the Austrian state during this
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period could not have been accomplished without the social partnership. These include
the commitment to a hard currency and anti-inflationary policies and de-politicization of
prices and incomes policy. (Lauber 1992a, 1996; Talos 1996, 1 14; Arndt 1982; Seidel
1996) The incremental and gradual increases in wages, pensions, and other labor
demands allowed Austria to manage low inflation and high economic growth in the
postwar period until the late 1970s. (Arndt 1982; Katzenstein 1984; Tomandl and
Fuerboeck 1986)
The Austrian social partnership was also quite successful in mitigating inter-
interest association conflicts, manufacturing consent for consensually supported
legislation, and contributing to economic growth and political stability. Tomandl and
Fuerboeck posit “the social partnership has brought internal stability in party politics and
virtually complete freedom from strikes and lockouts”. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986,
vii) The long periods of grand coalition between the OVP and SPO, as well as the
incredibly low rate of labor unrest solidifies this point. Even during periods of one-party
rule, under the OVP from 1 966- 1 970 and under the SPO from 1 970- 1 983, parties and
interests were checked from pursuing radical policy shifts by the institutions and
structures of consensual decision-making. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Fitzmaurice 1990;
Talos 1996) A good example was the 1973 Labor Relations Act that would have
introduced rules of codetermination not unlike that of Germany after 1966. The SPO had
a parliamentary majority and could have passed the act in spite of a veto in the Joint
Commission by the Chambers of Commerce and vehement OVP opposition in
parliament The OGB and SPO compromised with the employers and OVP and passed a
law that established a much weaker version of codetermination than labor preferred.
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(Aztmuller 1984; Pelinka 1998a) In addition, strikes, lockouts, and other economic
disruptions were held almost completely in check. Labor conflict was nearly the lowest in
the world, averaging only two lost days of work due to strikes for every thousand
workers.'
1
(Talos 1996, 1 15; Lauber 1996, 128; Fitzmaurice 1990, 148)
Of course the social partnership was not responsible for every major achievement
of the Austrian postwar economy, it was more influential in a number of key policy areas
but less so in others. Nonetheless, as Talos argues, the Austrian social partnership's
primacy in three policy areas is clear. These included prices and wages, currency and
inflation, and social welfare and labor markets. (Talos 1996) As noted, the core of
Austrian neo-corporatism had been the Joint Commission on Wages and Prices. Hence it
should of little surprise that this has been one of the most notable areas of concerted and
consensual policymaking. But even here the results were generally been mixed. While the
Joint Commission was extensively influential over wages, it was historically less
powerful in regulating prices, especially since the 1970s. Since the 1970s more prices
have become exempt from the commission’s control While the commission, at its peak,
once regulated approximately 70% of manufacturer (wholesale) prices and nearly 60% of
consumer (retail) prices, by the late 1970s that had dropped to less than 50% of wholesale
and 20% of consumer prices. (Arndt 1982; Talos 1996) Further, price policy became far
less salient due to low inflation and fixed exchange rates between Austria and its major
trade partners, such as Germany, through the late 1970s and 1980s. (Talos 1996;
Katzenstein 1984)
6
This was amongst the lowest in the world, well ahead of 1 1 in Japan, 35 in West Germany, 162 in the
United States, 191 in Sweden, and 719 in Greece.
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In areas of wages, the Joint Commission’s important Subcommittee on Wages
exerted strong influence by approving collective bargaining of wages in different sectors.
The subcommittee, with representatives of all of the four interest associations, created a
filter that had effectively subjected the wage demands of unions to preliminary
examination of both extent and timing increasing the chances of orchestrating a new
wage policy that would be a product of the social partnership solidarity and beneficial to
the national economy as a whole. (Lauber 1996; Katzenstein 1984; Haberler 1982) Hence
wage demands of specific labor unions would automatically be subject to the commission
that was likely to consider the broader national economic impacts of wage demands upon
inflation, unemployment, and international competitiveness.
The consequences of the system included a strengthening of the leadership of the
peak associations at the federal level at the expense of the lower levels of the labor
organizations. It also provided a more stable business climate in terms of wages and costs
that tended towards gradual or incremental increase. This stability and insulation against
radically increasing business costs increased employment by minimizing business fears
over the costs of new hiring. It also helped check inflation by keeping wage increases
small and incremental. (Seidel 1982, 1996; Katzenstein 1984) Austrian boasted one of the
smallest inflation rates in the world between 1953 and 1981. (Seidel 1982)
In macroeconomic policy, the results were also mixed depending upon the issue
or policy area. Cooperation was most common and successful in areas of agricultural
commodity markets, state subsidy of exports, and tax credit policy . Most notable was the
consensus on a policy of “hard currency” that pegged the Austrian Schilling to the
German Mark. (Katzenstein 1984; Arndt 1982; Seidel 1996; Heimsch 2000) This
7
Austria ranked fifth behind Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the United States in this period
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stabilized trade with Germany, Austria's largest trading partner, and kept inflation low.
As Talos notes, this illustrates one important aspect of the social partnership, its salience
on a continuous basis. The Austrian social partnership was not used for just crises or
economic emergencies it was a consistent and regularized pattern of consensus and
coordination among the interest associations and state. (Talos 1996; Katzenstein 1984)
The system was also typified by “big bargains" or “package deals" in which income and
wage policies supported by the OGB, Chambers of Labor, and SPO would be negotiated
against revenue, hard currency, or competitiveness policies supported by the VOI, the
Chambers of Business, and OVP. The results usually struck a successful balance, as was
the intent of the system in the first place. (Talos 1996; Katzenstein 1984, 1985)
The third area of extensive social partnership influence was in the area of the
welfare state and labor market policies. While many of these agreements were the
products of fierce conflict over labor market protections, expansion of social security,
pensions, retirement, and healthcare, they were primarily achieved through the structures
and institutions of the social partnership that required consensual policy and decision-
making by the interest associations. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Talos 1996; Seidel 1996)
The most notable features of the Austrian social partnership that distinguished it
from other neo-corporatist systems was in its high level of direct state intervention in
both the economy and in the welfare state. Hence, Austria's social partnership was
labeled as a social variant of neo-corporatism versus more liberal versions that existed in
Switzerland. Germany, or the Netherlands. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985) The Austrian social
partnership, according the Katzenstein, was centered on labor and trade unions. Their
prominence was “secured through political penetration of key institutions in Austrian
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society; nationalized industries, banks, media, the SPO. the Nationalbank,
codetermination, as well as Parliament”. (Katzenstein 1984, 37) But labor had also
penetrated the political parties of the right as both the OVP and FPO both had sizable
union and labor presences that could not be entirely ignored. (Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka
1998)
The development of an expansive and generous welfare state was due to several
characteristics of the Austrian social partnership and economic development. As the
Austrian economy boomed in the 1950s and 1960s, increasing social benefits were
demanded by Austrian labor. While the social partnership did spread these over time and
in incremental fashion, by the 1970s the benefits were amongst the highest and most
generous in the OECD. (Lens 1985; Katzenstein 1984) This was in part due to generally
high levels of economic growth but also by the beginning of thirteen years of
uninterrupted SPO majority government from 1970 to 1983. The party was strongly
linked to and dependent upon the OGB and labor and increased counter-cyclical
spending, increased social outlays, and enhanced worker benefits despite declining
economic growth. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Gerlich. Grande, and Muller 1988; Seidel
1996) By the 1980s, all Austrian workers were entitled to free medical care, relatively
high pension payments, higher than average family allowances, and a generous
unemployment package of up to four-fifths of the previous salary for at least one year,
and up to as many as five, from the time of termination. (Lens 1985)
The Austrian system did generate a significant number of detractors and potential
deficits. First the system was a closed or locked system that had not undergone any
significant additions, reforms, or reappraisals since the early 1 960s. The peak
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associations and their leadership served as guardians and gatekeepers of a system that had
some its initial foundations set in the 1
9
th
and early 20 lh centuries. In the Austrian case,
many argued that the system reproduced and magnified a number of preexisting
inequalities such as those based on gender, region, and class. (Talos 1996; Pelinka 1998)
For many the social partnership represented the schisms and issues of the 19 th and early
20 th centuries and was ill-equipped to deal with much else. The class struggle, social
questions, and traditional left-right division upon which the social partnership was based,
made the Austrian policymaking process an exclusive club of anachronism. While these
features made the social partnership successful in the 1950s and 1960s, they would
become millstones around the neck of Austria in the future. (Crepaz 1994, 1995)
The system was also dominated by small numbers of elites from the peak
associations and dominant political parties. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Howard 2000) The
connections between the peak associations and parties may have led to serious conflicts
of interest antithetical to rank and file members of either party or the peak associations.
The levels of formal and informal cooperation and coordination required close working
relationships between the top tiers of the state, interest associations, and political parties
and helped create an exclusive and often secretive iron triangle of political and
policymaking power. (Crepaz 1995; Viebrock 2004) This has been accused of creating a
system that operated on the principles of secrecy and groupthink and rarely envisaged
non-conforming solutions to Austrian problems. (Unger 1999) The close relationships,
while predicated upon larger national goals and advantages, have been accused of being
both far too exclusive and lacking in both transparency and accountability. The system
was also said to maintain far too many democratic and legitimacy deficits, including
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informality, nepotism, elitism, and secrecy, to properly function in a modem, democratic
system. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Crepaz 1995; Viebrock 2004) Many also point to
the undemocratic nature of obligatory membership that also creates privilege and
insulation for top officials who are then not easily held accountable by their members.
(Crepaz 1994, 1995; Rose 2000; Pelinka 1998)
Another significant deficit of the system may have been the creation of a
comparatively weaker Austrian business sector. Major industries and banks were
nationalized and the remaining private capital and industry was essentially small or mid-
sized firms that were not particularly European or global in scale. Unlike neighboring
Switzerland and its liberal corporatist model, or even Germany where nationalization was
highly limited and large firms saw the global economy as a primary target, Austrian firms
emerged from the 1970s as global underperformers and less prepared for competition on
European or international scales. (Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996; Gerlich, Grande, and
Muller 1988; Katzenstein 1984)
Many also criticized the social partnership and the policymaking process for its
diminishment of Austrian federalism and the general weakness of the Lander. The
division of powers between the central state and Austria's nine provinces or Lander had
been decidedly lopsided for most of the Second Republic. (Pelinka 1999)
Constitutionally, while labor relations and social insurance fall within the enumerated
powers of the central government, public assistance, healthcare, and other welfare
policies were reserved to the provinces. This has caused occasional problems in
policymaking within the Joint Commission and parliament in Vienna since many of the
bargains or compromises made within the social partnership would have nominally
required Lander governments’ approval. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) However, the
federal government and peak associations had been successful in gaining subordination
of the provinces and provincial chambers in a dominant number of cases during the
postwar era. (Pelinka 1998, 1999; Pelinka and Bischof 1996; Tomandl and Fuerboeck
1986)
Unlike Germany and Switzerland, labor relations and social insurance are
exclusively within the purview of the central government rather than the federal states.
While these areas are primarily the bailiwick of the central government in both Germany
and Switzerland, the actual operation is far more decentralized between the central and
Lander and cantonal governments. However, the Austrian states do have a greater role in
public assistance and healthcare provision which often overlap into areas of federal
jurisdiction over social insurance and labor relations, thereby making the system far less
centralized than perhaps intended. (Tomnandl and Fuerboeck 1986) Nonetheless, the
Austrian federal states have been far more subservient to Vienna than their German and
Swiss counterparts are to Berlin and Bern. This coincides with many scholarly arguments
that have found federalism and neo-corporatism antithetical to one another. (Lehmbruch
1982; Encarnacion 1999; Scharpf 1985; Pelinka 1999)
Yet Austria's social partnership would have to have been deemed widely
successful on almost all fronts. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, “social stability and
political normalcy in Austria contrast with instability and crisis elsewhere". (Katzenstein
1984) While the economy had slowed, it appeared to have weathered far better than other
advanced industrial states. Politically, the system remained quite stable and saw none of
the major swings in parties and politics in other European states undergoing similar
challenges. The social partnership was given much credit for this overall success.
Escaping “Europe's misery”, interest groups, parties, and the other elements of the social
partnership remained stable and absent of the “advanced decomposition” in so many
other industrial states.
As Katzenstein posits, Austria was able to avoid many of the crises of the 1970s
precisely because of its adaptive social partnership which was able to quickly react and
reform in textiles, steel, finance, insurance, and other industries. (Katzenstein 1984) The
system seemed to continue to exhibit flexibility, adaptability, and empirical success in
navigating the small Austrian state to economic prosperity and political stability while
striking a precarious balance between conflict and cooperation. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985)
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CHAPTER 5
THE GERMAN SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP IN MODELL DEUTSCHLAND
Introduction
Germany is often considered one of the strong models of neo-corporatism
amongst modem cases. The postwar German economic policymaking process has been
characterized by the strong participation and relationships between major peak
associations of trade unions, agriculture, and business associations and the state typical of
neo-corporatism in both theory and practice. (Katzenstein 1987, Wessels 2000; Streeck
and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004) Yet the German system of state-interest groups relations is
also often said to possess strongly pluralist and decentralized elements that suggest a far
more mixed model of interest group and state interaction especially in comparison to that
of the strongly corporatist Austrian case studied in the previous chapter. (Fuchs and Koch
1991; von Beyme 1993; Schmidt 2006)
Whereas the Austrian case is often considered one of strong macro-corporatism
with a highly centralized, powerful, and national system of interest intermediation and
decision-making, the German case is often considered one of weaker sectoral or macro-
corporatism due to its more circumscribed and informal institutionalization. (Casey and
Gold 2000) In many ways, Germany does seem less neo-corporatist because it lacks the
type of permanent, compulsory, and overarching chamber system that is found in Austria.
This has led many to suggest that the form of neo-corporatism in Germany is one with far
less centralized macro-corporatism but with significantly more meso-corporatism in
which tripartite or sometimes only bipartite neo-corporatist interest intermediation takes
place in a more diffused and decentralized manner. (Cawson 1986; Allen 1990; Casey
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and Gold 2000) Katzenstein suggests that the German model exhibits unique
characteristics of both “Anglo-Saxon liberalism” and “continental statism and
corporatism”. (Katzenstein 1987)
However, despite the perceived lack of a lasting and formal institutionalization of
neo-corporatism in a centralized institution at the national level, Germany is often still
ranked amongst the most neo-corporatist modem political regimes (see the chart at the
beginning of the previous chapter). Even if falling short of the paradigmatic Austrian
model and its highly centralized and compulsory chambers system, the postwar German
policymaking process has often been dominated by both formal and informal structures
of social partnership. Hence, while Germany may seem a weaker version of neo-
corporatism to the Austria model, in broader terms, the German case has still been among
the more neo-corporatist of the postwar era.
The distinctions in structure and pattern between the German and Austria social
partnership are quite notable and important to this research project. This chapter will not
only discuss the development and institutionalization of the social partnership in
Germany in the postwar era, but will also compare the German version to that of the
strong Austrian case discussed in the previous chapter. These distinctions are critical
given the emphasis upon domestic institutional features found in the Europeanization
model utilized in this research. Despite some important overarching similarities, the
development, institutionalization, and structure of social partnership has been quite
diverse between the German and Austrian models of postwar neo-corporatist
policymaking. (Heinisch 2000)
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Historical and Social Preconditions for the Gennan Social Partnership
As suggested in earlier chapters of this research, many scholars believe that neo-
corporatism is more likely to develop in states with certain preconditions that create an
affinity for consensus-based and inclusive models and structures of policymaking. These
include a political culture that supports and prefers an inclusive negotiation and
bargaining process, well-organized and powerful associations of important socio-
economic interests, and a w illingness of elites to create and sustain the type of bargaining
and negotiation process found at the core of the social partnership. (Wessels 2000) It may
also include historical, social, economic, and political developments that drive political
actors towards accommodative structures due to the failure of previous forms or models
of policymaking. Postwar Germany, much like Austria, possessed a number of fertile
preconditions that made neo-corporatism and the social partnership a preferable model of
decision- and policy-making in the new Federal Republic.
The dream of social harmony and national community had long haunted Germany
as it was divided by political, religious, and ideological boundaries. The lack of a
coherent or unified national identity or polity was a product of successive historical
developments spanning from the death of Charlemange to the Reformation and
subsequent Thirty Years' War to Napoleonic conquest. (Katzenstein 1987) Interestingly,
early German economic and professional governance was often far more centralized and
unified than the political institutions of these earlier eras. Early professional and guild
organizations such as those of the Hanseatic League were examples. These interest
groups also provided a conduit for participation in otherwise absolutist and authoritarian
political systems of the early German states, (von Beyme 1993: Schmidt 2006)
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Membership in such groups entitled one to a certain social status and rights that were
absent in the undemocratic environments of the early German states. (Landauer 1983)
Hence, there has been a long-standing corporatist traditional or affinity within German
societies and polities predating the emergence of a modem German state or society.
Even as the notion of a unified German state began to emerge, many of its
strongest advocates were also proponents of corporatist methods of social and political
organization. Notably, German Romanticism strongly rejected many of the atomistic and
individualist tendencies liberalism and preferred the Stand
,
the corporate group, as the
best unit of social organization. This ideal was found among German conservatives and
monarchists such as Friedrich Schlegel ( 1772-1829) but also with nationalist and
reformist political thinkers such as Adam Muller and Joseph Gorres who were admirable
of the modem nationalism of the French Revolution despite its anti-corporatist biases.
(Landauer 1983; Berger 2002)
By the mid and late 19 lh century, with the challenges of liberalism and socialism
facing Europe, many notable advocates of modem corporatism, including its more
authoritarian and fascist variants, emerged from the German intelligentsia. These
included Othmar Spann, the intellectual architect of the Austrian corporatist state of the
1920s but also included democratically oriented thinkers who saw elected parliaments as
the optimal locus for vocational and corporatist representation. Heinrich Ahrens and
Robert von Mold both advocated forms of parliamentary and bicameral representation
with chambers organized along functional and vocational delegations. Karl Christian
Planck went further suggesting that functional and social structures and representation
should be instituted at local, provincial and national levels in a regime that fused federal
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and corporatist ideals. Karl Levitas suggested that the only path to social peace for the
troubled German states of the mid and late 19 th century was one where the state was
comprised of corporative bodies representing all classes and divisions of society. (Bowen
1947; Landauer 1983)
Hence Germany has had a long social and political affinity for corporatist
institutions and policy-making structures. (Berger 2002) It spanned the political spectrum
of right to left and crossed religious lines. Among Catholic German thinkers, there was a
strong ideological affinity for corporatism. The estates system had been one that was
congenial to maintaining church power and authority in “worldly affairs” while it
simultaneously reflected the Church’s wish to maintain a semblance of social order after
the disorganizing pressures of the reformation, Napoleon, and industrial revolution. The
most prominent Catholic German advocates of modem political corporatism included the
Bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm von Ketteler, Franz Hitze, and Constantin Frantz. Frantz
advocated a far more decentralized model with strong constitutional and even federal
limitations upon central government. There were also notable Protestant and leftist
German supporters of corporatism such as Jakob Marschak and Karl Polanyi. Even
German communists in the late 1
9
th
and early 20 th centuries used particularly corporatist
terminology and concepts, with a strong emphasis on structure and functional
organization, as part of their revolutionary rhetoric. (Bowen 1947; Landauer 1983;
Berger 2002)
Much like Austria, with its multiethnic empire and strong divisions between left
and right, Germany lacked the kind of national solidarity and unity found in other
European states in the 19 lh and early 20 lh century. It was divided ideologically, socially.
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religiously, politically, and economically. Corporatism was an attractive national strategy
for many as it potentially provided a bridge of these divides and constructed the
semblance of cohesion and unification. It also had historical and social roots stretching
back to the guild and estates system, finding affinity with Protestants and Catholics alike.
Despite the failed efforts of Imperial and Nazi Germany to bind Germans together
through military and authoritarian organization, postwar Germany seemed to possess
critical historical and social preconditions that would make modem democratic neo-
corporatism a viable solution to the ideological and socio-economic divisions of a
rebuilding German state.
Nonetheless, it may be difficult to estimate the long-term implications of German
social and political thought on corporatism into the modern era. This assumes that there
has been little change in the German economy, society, and polity since the Middle Ages
or even 1 9"' century, and would be quite off the mark. (Bowen 1947) Yet there is
significant evidence that while political culture, along with the economic, social, and
political environments of the German state and peoples have dramatically changed, there
are a number of consistent and lasting norms, beliefs, and cultural preferences that have
transcended the tides of history. (Berger 2002; Schmidt 2006) These affinities for
vocational, functional, or corporatist organizations and decision-making processes
certainly helped shape the range of institutional and policy options by the postwar
German state and its political actors.
However, as noted in the previous chapters, these affinities might only come to
fruition given particularistic economic, social, and political conditions at the time of
institutional and structural transformations. The postwar German model of social
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partnership provides some evidence that this confluence of cultural affinity and political
opportunity, or even necessity, was present at the foundation of the Federal Republic.
(Allen 1990) While the postwar social partnership may owe some of its ideological and
nonnative affinity to a long and vibrant history of corporatist thought and experience, it
also must be viewed as a product of the specific political, economic, social, and
institutional atmosphere of the postwar era.
Corporatism in the Early German States & Empire
A variety of associational groups representing occupations and economic interests
can trace be traced to the system of corporate guilds and estates system, the Standestaat
or corporate state, which provided quasi-govemmental functions for long-standing
professional and aristocratic groups dating back to the Middle Ages. (Bowens 1947;
Landauer 1983; Black 1984; von Beyme 1993; Conradt 2001; Berger 2002) The
Hanseatic League was perhaps the most notable example. Comprised of guilds, traders,
and merchants in a few northern German cities and states, the organization blossomed
into an expansive mercantile association throughout the Baltic basin and eastern North
Sea. (Braunthal. 1965) It became broadly influential in a number of areas of economic
governance including the performance of regulatory functions such as licensing,
apprenticeship, taxes, and professional standards. Many of these roles and structures can
still be found amongst modem German interest associations. (Conradt 2001)
At the time, these organizations served practical economic functions as well as
social and political ones. While the German states lacked both unity and democracy, the
professional and guild orders often transcended religious and political frontiers while
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simultaneously providing policymaking authority to the membership over important
issues of trade, apprenticeship, taxation, professional standards, and other matters of
economic governance. In essence, the guild system helped create a parallel form of
governance that gave power to many who would otherwise been excluded from both
political and social advancement. (Bowen 1947; Landauer 1983; Katzenstein 1987)
In many of the German states, especially in the post-Napoleonic era after 1815,
new demands for representation and political rights were often met through the creation
of the first large professional and industrial associations. The primary impetus for the
rebirth of political corporatism in Germany was industrialization and the growing social
conflict and labor unrest. In 1819, the Commercial and Industrial Union, a
manufacturers' and merchants' association was founded in the central and southern states
while in 1829 an industrial association for the Kingdom of Saxony was founded. The
first major industrial concerns such as Krupp and Borsig were also founded between the
1 820s and 1 830s, adding to the growing demand for collective representation of
industrial and commercial interests within and amongst German states. (Braunthal 1965;
Bowen 1947)
In 1848, Karl Mario helped create the Hamburg Congress of the North German
Handicraft Workers. It established a coqmratist assembly, beginning in 1849, that was
comprised of social and vocational estates. The goal of this “Handicraftsmen’s
Parliament” was to draft resolutions and suggested laws for the German constitutional
assembly and subsequent parliaments. (Shuchman 1957) These types of institutions
became far more common throughout Germany, though they were common almost
exclusively to the local or provincial level. Given the continuing political decentralization
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of the German states this is not surprising. Yet, such institutions also began to be asserted
at national levels, especially after German unification in the 1870s. The spontaneous
explosion of new and large vocational interest groups including trade associations,
chambers of commerce, vocational congresses, and local trade unions created a greater
urgency to find pathways to preserve order and social peace creating a link between the
nascent syndicalist movements and corporatism. Many policymakers and political
thinkers viewed corporatist structures and processes as possible prescriptions. (Landauer
1983; Berger 2002)
The mid 19 lh century was also a period of significant growth and interest in
models of codetermination that would give workers’ guaranteed levels of participation or
representation in the management of their factory or firm. There is some controversy over
the linkages between codetermination and corporatism. Some suggest that
codetermination is primarily a feature of social democracy or outright socialism rather
than of corporatism. (Pejovich 1982) However, communists, as w ell as socialists, leftists,
and other Marxists assess codetermination quite skeptically, claiming it offers little true
economic democracy. (Leaman 1988; Spiro 1958) Further, many states that have strong
social democratic credentials, such as the Netherlands, lack the models of
codetermination seen in the German state. On the other hand Austria is also strongly neo-
corporatist and has low levels of codetermination. Nonetheless, in the German context
there seems to be some correlation or connection between the two as the first propositions
of codetermination developed concurrently with those of corporatism in the early and mid
I9
lh
centuries amongst German thinkers, labor leaders, and regional guilds and heavy
industries. (Bowen 1947; Landauer 1983; Berger 2002)
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In 1 848, the first German parliament meeting in Frankfurt introduced legislation
known as the Reichgewerbeordnung that would create works councils at the plant level in
large German industries. While the legislation was never enacted, it did begin a trend of
voluntary and local experimentation with codetermination in Germany. In 1850, an
association of printers in Eilenberg created the first functional works councils that
required employees to be consulted in matters of general importance to the firms.
(Pejovich 1982) These types of arrangements spread to other sectors and throughout the
German state over the next few decades. Nonetheless, they remained voluntary,
consultative, and generally local or provincial in scale until the 1890s. In 1891, the
German state enacted the Law for the Protection of Labor requiring factories with more
than twenty workers to establish workers committees. Again, these were merely
consultative councils with no institutional authority to actually stop or change firm
behavior. By 1906, about 10% of German firms were operating with such committees.
(Shuchman, 1957) Individual German states passed additional and often further reaching
codetermination laws into the early 20th century including Bavaria in 1900 and Prussia in
1905.
In Prussia, the Junkers
,
the landed aristocratic heirs of the Teutonic order,
historically controlled economic and political resources. Thq Junkers utilized a mix of
feudalism and paternalism to govern the Prussian state that solidified after 1700.
Significant coordination between the Junkers and the growing Prussian state was a
necessity as it industrialized and competed for regional power in Europe. After
marginalizing the many of the liberal gains following the revolutions of 1 848, Prussia
reverted to a fonn of industrialization, militarization, and growth based strongly on its
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traditional feudal and elitist order. Under the leadership of Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck, himself a Junker of more non-conformist and modest heritage, from 1862 the
Prussian state began a process of expansion under a modem authoritarian model. The
close ties between the governing elite and Junkers continued, but under Bismarck the
state took a more directing role so as to enhance industrialization and military
capabilities. (Hancock 1989) This continued after the creation of the unified German
Reich in 1871. Social historians have argued that it was the political alliance between
industrialists of the West and landed Junkers of the East that helped finally unify
Germany into Empire in the 1860s and 1870s. (Katzenstein 1987) This was also an era of
the first formal peak associations for industry in Germany. Bismarck created the Prussian
Economic Council that functionally included the major industrial, agricultural,
aristocratic, professional, and even worker interests. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002) This
tended to under-represent workers and was dominated by the Junkers and Western
industrialists for the most pail, yet did possess much of the corporatist orientation
common to German political and philosophical preconditions. This coordination between
“iron and rye” would be the basis for elite domination and governance in the new
German state. (Katzenstein 1987)
The accelerated economic grow th during the eras of absolutism, especially under
the empire from 1871, offered the prospect of unity by the state through embracing and
organizing interest groups. Between 1876 and 1880 there was a “feverish outburst of
organizational activity” in the coal, textile, and iron industries. (Braunthal 1965) With
economic growth came social contlict that in turn provided the impetus for the
development of large, powerful, and national economic interest associations for both
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labor and capital. (Katzenstein 1987; von Beyme 1993) Notable was the Central
Association of German Industrialists or Centralverban Deutscher Industrieller (CDI) that
was formed in 1 876 as a way to exert greater pressure upon the state on a number of
trade-related issues. By 1900 there were well over 500 national and regional industry
associations with over 1,200 affiliates spanning the state. (Braunthal 1965; Berger 2002)
The CDI was the forerunner to the modem peak association of German industry.
It was organized for the primary purpose of exerting greater influence over key
governmental positions and promoting a variety of trade and commercial policies.
(Braunthal 1965) While the CDI was the preeminent of such organizations, with a full
lobbying program including paid representatives, electoral program, and legislative
liaisons, most other interests lacked both the financial and organizational wherewithal to
act at this level. These groups, representing smaller trades, agriculture, or other interests,
were often internally decentralized or divided. The success of the CDI in getting a
number of protective legislative acts through the Reichstag with the support of
Chancellor Bismarck by the late 1870s led many other industrial and commercial
interests to organize along similar lines. These included the rival League of
Industrialists, which gained the support of the Association of Saxonian Industrialists,
formed in 1895. (Braunthal 1965)
In fact, the lack of coherent and compulsory peak associations and the very
competitive lobbying atmosphere of the Reichstag led Bismarck to attempt to
institutionalize the interest representation process. The fierce rivalries between competing
industrial associations began to hinder effective policymaking as disputes percolated into
bureaucratic and governmental ranks. During the 1880s and through the 1890s, Bismarck
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proposed the creation of a national Economic Council, or Volkswirtschaftsrat
,
based on
vocational and functional representation and modeled on the institution he helped formed
in Prussia in the 1860s. (Landauer 1983)
Nonetheless, neither Bismarck nor Imperial Germany, were particularly
committed to strong corporatism at the national level. The corporatist institutions and
structures created in Prussia and then in the Empire from the 1870s until World War I
were politically weak and tended to be dominated by the elites of the Prussian and
Imperial order. The Economic Council had only advisory powers and was never fully
implemented at the national level. It also tended to under-represent, or exclude, workers
and was far more oligarchic than modem neo-corporatist systems. (Landauer 1983) If
there was an ideological or empirical basis for corporatism during the Imperial era it was
one in which a formal, legal, and juridical system of corporatism was subordinated to
absolutism and state power. (Katzenstein 1987) The Empire may have toyed with some
forms of corporatism, but it was difficult to know if Bismarck was serious about using
corporatism as a guiding principle of governance or whether he merely used it as a tactic
to frighten some and placate others. (Landauer 1983)
The increase in underlying tensions in the German political system would
eventually cost Bismarck his position and lead to the end of the Second Reich with the
conclusion of the First World War. The industrialization of Germany had the
consequence of a relatively quick industrial stratification of society. Urban and industrial
workers were influenced by a range of ideologies, from communism and socialism to
strident pan-German nationalism. (Hancock 1989; Katzenstein 1987) A series of laws
were passed to both organize and control interests and the interest group system. One
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such law was the Zwangsinnun Gen enacted in 1 897 that created compulsory professional
and artisan organizations. (Landauer 1983) Other efforts included those forcing fanners,
workers, teachers, and others into state-organized, and often state-dominated, peak
associations. Hence Imperial Gennan interests were organized on a far more
authoritarian, and perhaps statist-corporatist, manner more common to Latin America or
future regimes of Spain, Italy, or Dolfuss-era Austria than modem social or democratic
neo-corporatism. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002) But the absence of labor and the general
weakness of the representative authority and legitimacy of the other associations
prevented any creation of a functional corporatist regime.
Prior to World War I, industrial associations did begin to coordinate along
functional and sectoral lines. The major industrial associations were reordered while two
new employers' associations were created to handle labor relations. These two
employers’ associations eventually merged into the League of German Employers
Associations or Vereinigung tier Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande (VDA) and replaced
the GDI. Nonetheless, attempts to bridge the gap between competing industrial
associations failed until the onset of war in 1914. (Braunthal 1965; Landauer 1983) Labor
was even less coordinated and centralized. While there had been a concerted effort to
amalgamate and condense craft and trade unions into a more concentrated labor
institution, these mostly fell short. The German labor movement was split over a schism
between a bloc of thirty-nine artisan-small craft guilds and large industrial unions for
textile, metal, mining, and construction workers. (Markovits 1986)
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During World War I, there was an obvious need for greater state organization and
coordination of the economy within all the belligerents, and Germany was no exception.
But the German case was notable for its level and methods of centralization through the
Kriegsgesellschafen, the War Committee for German Industry, formed it 1914 and the
Council of German Industry that was organized in 1916. These were amalgamative
corporations of private firms and industries equipped with coercive quasi-regulatory
powers, endorsed and backed by governmental decree, to manage scare industrial and
agricultural resources needed to conduct the war. Functionaries of business and
employers’ associations including the VDA, League of Industrialists, and Chemical
Association staffed these institutions. (Braunthal 1965) They were assigned based on
their expertise in particular commodities or services. There were innumerable problems
with this system as it was dominated by large business and industrial interests, was not
consumer or worker friendly, often tended towards corruption and nepotism, lacked
professional administrative and bureaucratic oversight from the German state, and were
hugely unpopular in the public’s opinion. Nonetheless, this form of industrial self-
governance and powerful national peak association did lead many to imagine similar
institutionalized solutions for the postwar German future. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002)
The empire ended with the end of World War I and the abdication of Kaiser
Wilhelm II in November 1918. The abdication threw Germany into a period of political
turmoil and contestation over the future of the German state. Conservatives as well as
many moderates were stunned by both the military loss and abdication and scrambled to
maintain semblances of authority. Liberals, with much moderate support, launched
efforts to move the state away from its conservative and traditional order towards one of
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modem parliamentary democracy. Communists and socialists saw the collapse as an
opportunity for revolution and the establishment of a Soviet-style communist state. The
Social Democrats, along with support from centrists and moderate conservatives, were
able to act first and seized power, hastily declaring a Republic only two days after the
abdication. (Hancock, 1989) These changes were then enshrined in the new
constitutional, written and adopted in the city of Weimar, establishing the new German
state as a parliamentary republic.
Corporatism in the Weimar Republic & Nazi Germany
In the Weimar Republic, the Social Democrats attempted to weaken or dissolve
many pillars of the old regime including the army and feudal order in lieu of a system of
civilian parliamentary democracy. However, many conservative and imperial interests
remained well entrenched in the military, judiciary, and bureaucracy. (Henig 1998; Lee
1998) Nonetheless there was some important reshaping of relationships between interests
and the state. Many of the quasi-corporatist institutions and structures from the Imperial
period were dismantled, including the Kriegsgesellschafen. (Landauer 1983; Hancock
1989) The coordination between industries that existed during the war did not lead to
effective concentration after the end of fighting as both business interests and labor
unions quickly returned to their competitive and antagonistic relationships amongst
themselves. (Braunthal 1965)
With the dissolution of the wartime economic and planning associations and
councils, there were increasing demands from both within and outside the government to
create and structure the German state’s industrial and socio-economic interest group
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system. This was deemed necessary due to the costs and complexity in addressing
reconstruction, economic planning, industrial-labor relations, and the building of more
democratic procedures and institutions. A number of schemes were developed between
1918 and 1919 to create a more corporatist and functional organization of policymaking
and the interest group system.
One of the earliest was by Walter Rathenau, president ofAllgemeine
Elektrizitatsgesellschaft (AEG), one of the two biggest electrical firms in Germany and
one of the primary organizers of the German wartime economy in the
Kriegsgesellschafen. He suggested that the German economy’s division into functional
states or Fachstaaten was problematic given the lack of expertise and bureaucracy at the
national level to ensure that these “states within the state” were actually pursuing policies
that did not serve goals contradictory to those of the nation as a whole. His plan was to
create a Fachparlament , or Vocational Parliament, that would be administered by a
specific government ministry with oversight of each functional group. The
Fachparlament would negotiate conflicts or overlapping jurisdictional problems between
Fachstaaten. (Fandauer 1983; Berger 2002) This was an overly complicated and probably
unworkable scheme, yet was important in motivating more practical neo-corporatist
solutions to postwar organizational and institutional reforms.
Rudolf Wissell, Social Democratic Minister of Economics, and his colleague
Wichard von Mollendorf, who was himself a coworker of Rathenau in the wartime
Kriegsgesellschafen
,
introduced a more streamlined plan. They suggested that all
industries should form obligatory organizations that would be directed by business,
worker, and consumer representatives tasked to ensure that the industries were acting for
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the common good. Planwirtschaft or Planned Economy, had elements of both neo-
corporatist consensual decision-making as well as codetermination that would be enacted
more universally following World War II. The obligatory organizations would be under
the competence of a central council, the Reichwirtschaftsrat
,
that would determine which
issues would be left up to the sectoral organizations and which should be reserved at the
council level. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002) The underlying emphasis of the plan was the
interdependence of industries upon one another and the imposition of a moral, national
obligation to look beyond their narrow self-interests, falling well within the neo-
corporatist framework and ideology.
The SPD and other parties of the Weimar Republic rejected much of the Wissell-
Mollendorff scheme but did in fact institutionalize some key elements. The
Reichwirtschaftsrat was created to provide functional representation for German
industries and economic actors. However, it was a significantly weaker and diluted
version of the original proposal. Trade and economic organizations could propose
appointments to the body but they had to be approved and formally appointed by the
Economics Minister effectively giving the government veto powers. It also lacked formal
regional organization and substructure severely limiting its reach into German industry
and society that still had strong provincial and regional identities and divisions. It was
purely advisory and was subordinate to the Ministry of Economics and parliament. In
practice, most economic and social representatives spent their efforts on lobbying
administrators and legislators rather than working with one another to achieve consensus.
One of the lasting problems of the Weimar era w as the lack of advanced policy expertise
in economic matters amongst the politicians and higher bureaucrats. (Lee 1998; Berger
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2002) This led the state to adopt and follow many less practical overarching fiscal,
monetary, industrial, and commercial policies in lieu of those linked to patronage from
party supporters. One can argue that the primary impact of the Reichwirtschaftsrat was to
create an institutionalized lobbying system that had little emphasis on common public or
national goals. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002)
The Weimar state also created the Kohlwenwirtschaftsverband.
,
a compulsory
cartel of all coal and lignite firms that would be supervised by a public authority, the
Reichskohlenrat
,
comprised of officials from both industry and workers. While initially
meant to be self-managing, it led to a strong collusion between the firms, workers, and
the Ministry of Economics that was required to approve all price increases in the
commodities. The combined interest of the industries and workers to increase prices, to
maximize profits and wages, required the state to become more deeply involved in
moderating price and wage demands from both industry and miners. (Landauer 1983)
This seems to have fallen strongly into a corporatist model of interest intermediation and
consensual policymaking, yet it was never expanded beyond the coal industry. The
proposals for a concurrent steel cartel, the Eisenwirtschaftsbund
,
never got out of the
planning stages due to strong industry opposition. (Landauer 1983) Interestingly, it seems
a much like an early example of what would later become the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) that would become the basis of integration in postwar Europe.
These efforts, while limited in scope, applicability, and effectiveness, nonetheless
did create a more centralized and streamlined pattern of state-interest group relations.
(Berger 2002) Lobbying in parliament and access to many ministries was limited to
nationally organized and approved interest groups. This accentuated the need for
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hierarchical centralization and the concentration of actors into formal and quasi-legal
peak associations that would be resurrected after World War II. (Conradt 2001 ) The
Wissel-Mdllendorff plan bridged conservative and leftist ideologies as well as spanning
the gap between feudal tendencies and modem socialist sympathies. (Landauer 1983) Yet
there was very little sympathy and unity amongst most German interests.
Labor unions were highly divided along political and ideological lines. The
primary divisions within labor were amongst socialist, communist, liberal, and Catholic-
Conservative sects. (Berger 2002) They vied with one another for support and members,
fragmenting the labor movement not unlike that of the Austrian First Republic. (Conradt
2001) The largest unions were the social democratic General German Trade Union
Federation (ADGB), the Christian conservative German Trade Union Federation (DGB),
and the smaller and more white-collar Union Ring. The ADGB tended to represent blue-
collar workers while the DGB was split between both blue and white-collar Catholics and
conservatives. (Markovits 1986)
However, labor was also divided along sectoral lines, creating a highly
decentralized and uncoordinated labor movement. Many radical, communist, and
nationalist labor movements regularly refused to accept the legitimacy of the republic
entirely (Hancock 1989) Only a handful of unions and labor organizers, usually from the
far right of the SPD or strong adherents to guild socialism, found a corporatist model
appealing. Most labor organizers, socialists, communists, and even those affiliated with
the more mainstream SPD favored greater nationalization over corporatism and its
creation of cartels. Increased worker rights, wages, and representation in the economy
were their primary goals and many felt that corporatist institutions were likely to insulate
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industries and employers from their more significant demands. (Landauer 1983) Despite
the decentralization and division amongst labor, major gains were made during the post-
World War I era in terms of social democracy and codetermination.
The most important were the institutional and legal development of guaranteed
rights of collective bargaining, works councils, and codetermination or Mitbestimmung.
Many of these were developed or enacted during the immediate postwar period as
industrialists, fearful of outright revolution, agreed to significant accords with labor that
recognized the rights of unions to organize and collectively bargain. These became
legally binding with the passage of the Collective Bargaining Law of 1918. Importantly,
under the law the state assumed a right to intervene in the collective bargaining process
through mandatory arbitration. (Bosch 2004) Further, under the Weimar Constitution, the
right to create and organize labor associations was enshrined. This was followed by the
creation of a special system of labor courts, the Recihsarbeitsgerichte
,
tasked to
adjudicate labor-business disputes. The Works Council Law of 1920 created a system of
institutionalized works councils at the firm, regional, and national levels, granting
workers a right to consultation over both shop floor and firm-level decisions in areas of
innovation, hiring and layoffs, expansion, and changes in procedure. (Markovits 1986;
Berger 2002)
Business interests were initially divided and weakened after the war as well
Many key industries that had been important in the defense and military build up prior to
the war had lost their allies in Berlin with the transition to the republic. The
marginalization of the Junkers and eastern agricultural interests w as also magnified by
the repatriation of large chunks of previously Prussian territory to Poland and
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Czechoslovakia. The once dominant alliance of “iron and rye” had been dissolved.
(Hancock 1989; Landauer 1983) With the SPD in power, business interests had been
forced to make several concessions. While few “enlightened” industrial interests wished
greater channels of communication and consensual decision-making with workers at this
time, a series of worker safety and codetermination laws were enacted including the
creation of shop stewards. Betriebsrdte
,
and the elections of worker committees in a
number of industrial enterprises. (Landauer 1983)
Nonetheless, industrial organizations did eventually manage a level of unity that
escaped them during the Imperial era. In February 1919 the National Association of
German Industry or Reichverband der Deutschen Industrie (RD1) was formed in Berlin.
The RD1 was a “super-association” of 26 trade groups encompassing over 400 national
associations and cartels, 58 regional associations, 70 local associations, 70 chambers of
industry and commerce, and over one thousand individual members and firms. The RDI,
as well as the VDA had strong ties to the conservative German National People's Party
(DNVP) or the center-conservative German People's Party (DVP). (Braunthal, 1965)
While the transformation to republic and new forms of governance and policies had
briefly shaken German industry, they were able to quickly rebound and reestablish
themselves as a powerful force at the national level by the mid 1920s. (Berger 2002)
Despite the process of democratization, the Weimar Republic developed a rather
closed system of interest representation and participation at the national level. The only
interests that tended to effectively operate and be recognized were those that were
strongly dependent upon or tied to the primary governing political parties. Due to their
larger electoral strength and consistent inclusion in coalition government, the center-
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leftist SPD and center-conservative German Peoples' Party monopolized the policy- and
decision-making process and subordinated interests to their party structures. (Hancock
1 989) The exclusion of such a large percentage of interests and parties, especially the
communists, independent socialists, pan-German nationalists, and others, was one of the
fundamental and lasting problems of the Weimar Republic and contributed to its deficit
of legitimacy amongst many German elites, interests, and citizens. (Landauer 1983)
The effectiveness of SPD-affiliated unions and the conservative/centrist-affiliated
employers and industrial associations, the RD1 and VDA, was a testament to the tight
policymaking process and growing social partnership of the Weimar Republic. However,
this centralism between the social democrats and conservatives alarmed many socialists
who felt the SPD should be dedicated to preventing or excluding capitalist influence in
the policymaking process. The RDI attempted to lower its profile in the policymaking
process to provide greater cover to both the SPD and its conservative allies, nonetheless
there was a growing perception amongst the more socialist left that business interests
were over-represented and extensively integrated in the halls of government. (Braunthal
1965)
Even after economic and monetary stabilization by the late 1920s, the republic
lacked cohesion, legitimacy, and popular support. The Great Depression from 1929
onward magnified this beyond repair. Interests, elites, and masses quickly polarized
towards more socialist-communist tendencies to the left and nationalist and fascist
strategies to the right. The rise of the National Socialist German Workers Party
(NSDAP), or Nazi Party, and its eventual overthrow of parliamentary republic ensued.
The Nazis were able to gain strength through a coalition of frightened middle-class
236
farmers and urbanites who felt left out of the mainstream parties, German industrialists
who feared the rising communist threat from inside and outside Germany, and Pan-
German nationalists from all classes, including labor. (Hancock 1989) Nonetheless, many
German industrialists and the RDI were opposed to Nazism and actively worked against
it in the 1930s. However, a segment of the RDI eventually broke away by 1931 to support
the National Socialist movement. (Braunthal 1965) Amongst labor, support was garnered
through significant socialist elements in the party that favored nationalization and other
policy prescriptions not entirely unlike those in revolutionary Russia. The republic had
failed to solve many of the longstanding social, economic, and political questions that
had haunted Germany into the 19' 1 ' century, and exacerbated by the Great Depression,
Weimar democracy took much of the blame.
The rise of Nazism in Germany was linked to a resurgent literature favoring a
more nationalist, statist, and authoritarian regime. The perceived failure of Weimar and
liberal democracy, led many back to the conservative roots of the corporatist ideology in
both Catholicism and the Standestaat. Both proposed alternatives to parliamentary
democracy that focused upon order, hierarchy, and the unifying state. The 1920s and
1930s saw an explosion of numerous writers and thinkers, with a plurality being German,
arguing the merits of a state corporatism. (Landauer 1983)
The writings of Othmar Spann would become highly influential in developing the
Austrian corporatist state of the 1920s but also influenced many Germans who would
become the architects of the Nazi regime. Spann's work, Der waive Staat or The True
State
,
argued that a democratic state was not a true state. (Landauer 1983) Among
Catholics, the Quadragesimo Anno issued by Pope Pius XI in 1922 to mark anniversary
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of Leo XIII ’s Rerum Novarum resurrected a corporatist approach to seeking social peace
through the “well-ordering” of the social body that leant itself, implicitly, to fascism.
(Landauer 1983; Wiarda 1997) In fact, many of the Catholics, small shopkeepers, and
other interests that backed the National Socialists, expected the creation of a corporate
state once the republic was abolished, as many were strong advocates of restoring
economic corporatism via resurrection of the guild system. Some industrial interests felt
that the National Socialists offered a strong model to limit worker demands and also
increase government expenditure on armaments and all forms of capital goods. Many
workers were drawn to the pan-German rhetoric of National Socialism but also sought a
stronger order in which the state would mediate and mitigate the power of industrial
interests. (Landauer 1983)
Under Nazi rule from 1933, almost all advocates of corporatism were
disappointed by the results. Almost all discussion of creating a corporate state
disappeared soon after the National Socialists took power. German interest groups were
harshly suppressed and reorganized to serve the Third Reich. This consolidation included
the dissolution of almost all private interest associations in lieu of a national
Gleichschaltung or coordination under Nazi direction and command. Workers and labor
leaders who had been absorbed by the more socialist rhetoric of the party were also
disappointed as most of the socialist workers’ elements were marginalized from the party
by the mid 1930s. All trade unions were disbanded along with industrial and private
capital associations. The central state would organize these into extended arms of the
Reich itself. (Hancock 1989) In one fell swoop Hitler had abolished almost all the
vestiges ofJunker feudal aristocracy, Weimar democracy, and social disunity.
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The Nazis created many compulsory organizations that, on the surface, appeared
to be modeled upon corporatism. (Berger 2002) The Association of Farmers, handicraft
chambers, industrial sector cartels, and Labor Front all resembled functional corporatism.
All were endowed with official public and quasi-regulatory functions but none possessed
any meaningful autonomy from the state and Nazi Party. Only industry was left
somewhat in tact during the early years of Nazi rule. The National Socialists were less
aggressive in dissecting the powerful German industrial associations for several reasons.
First, the Nazis received some important financial support from some firms and
industrialists in its rise to power. Secondly they required the industries to be complied in
the militarization process about to be undertaken by the state. While business and
industry were initially left to their own devices, the Nazi state eventually restricted more
and more of their independence. The associations, including the RDI and VDA, were
infiltrated by Nazi party members and were often used as levers of control and
propaganda rather than functional representation in a consensual decision-making regime.
Hence corporatism was merely a “cloak” for dictatorship under the Nazi regime much the
same as in Mussolini’s Italy. (Braunthal 1965; Landauer 1983) Not long after, the RDI
and VDA were merged into a single organization that then succumbed to Nazi dissolution
by late 1933. (Braunthal 1965)
Under Nazi control, industry and business associations were tightly structured
into the Organization of Trade and Economy, an overarching and authoritarian institution
directly controlled by the Minister of Economic Affairs and the National Economic
Chamber. The organization was territorially organized and broken down by functional
role. Industry was concentrated into one of seven nationwide functional groups, the
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Reichsgruppe Industrie. (Braunthal 1965) All preexisting labor unions were abolished by
the Nazi regime in 1933. Workers and their institutions were reorganized in the German
Labor Front (DAF) that was not a trade union in any conventional sense given its
infiltration and direct control by the state and Nazi Party. The most important labor
leaders were either jailed or fled into exile until the war’s end. Intriguingly, the shared
exile experience of socialist, conservative, and other labor leaders helped bring about the
blueprints for the eventual unification and reorganization of German labor. (Markovits
1986; Hancock 1989)
The end of the war meant significant change for interest groups and the political
system as a whole. The de-Nazification of all government, institutional, and
organizational structures included the decentralization of the economic system and
elimination of “cartels, syndicates, trusts, and other monopolistic arrangements”.
(Hancock 1989; Berger 2002) This process of destruction was balanced by the urgent
need to reconstruct and revive German civil society through political parties, trade
unions, and other voluntary associations. Hence, the immediate postwar development of
Austria and Germany did diverge in the perceived degree of compulsion. While
compulsory chambers were permitted by the occupying four powers in postwar Austria,
that tended to emphasize its status as a victim of Nazi aggression. German totalitarianism
was blamed for the war, resulting in a greater demand for decentralization. This also
meant that interest organizations, once again independent of the state, would become
central features of the postwar German political system, much like they had been in
centuries prior to German unification in the 1870s. (von Beyme 1993; Katzenstein 1987)
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The Social Partnership of the Postwar Federal Republic
Developing the German Model
Neo-corporatist developments in the Federal Republic, while based on social and
historical antecedents, were primarily a product of postwar structural and political
change. The institutional and operational characteristics of the postwar model constitute a
distinct form of democratic corporatism, or neo-corporatism, versus earlier German
examples of proto-corporatism of the middle ages or authoritarian corporatism during the
Second or Third Reich. Germany’s turbulent past tempered its citizens' and leaders’
responses to economic, social, and political dilemmas of the postwar period, not unlike
that in Austria. (Hancock 1989) The principle social, economic, and political divisions
that had been the culprit in Germany's instability from the 19
lh
century through Weimar
were not to be repeated. The utter destruction of the Second World War allowed the
surviving elites and citizens an opportunity to achieve the kinds of cohesion and stability
absent from previous German regimes. (Hancock 1989; Nicholls 1994)
The defeat and occupation of Germany transformed German domestic policy and
political institutions. After the period of Nazi rule, the authoritarian, traditional, and state-
dominated decision-making model that was the backbone of previous forms of German
governance became unacceptable to both the new German state and the victorious allied
occupiers. The demand for greater transparency, participation, and liberalism overrode
and attempts to foster intense nationalism or statism in the postwar political environment.
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Hence the role of the German state would be considerably circumscribed in
comparison to what was permitted in the Austrian model. The organizational structure of
the Federal Republic would diffuse power and policymaking across the institutions of the
political system and civil society and create a “semi-sovereign state”. (Katzenstein 1987;
Schmidt 2006)
The intricate web of relations amongst the political actors and institutions of the
Federal Republic resulted in low state autonomy as power was diffused. The new German
state’s role was diminished by the importance of political structures and norms diffused
throughout the political system and society. (Katzenstein 1987) This also weakened the
traditional links between interests and political parties that were prevalent in the prewar
regimes. This distinguishes Germany from Austria where the connections between parties
and interests were strongly reestablished through a system of neo-corporatism and
consociational proporz. (Conradt 2001
)
The formal disintegration between parties and interests was accompanied by
significant increases in cooperation and consensus between the major interests and parties
over a wide range of economic and social policy goals. To maintain political order and to
obtain prosperity and social peace, German elites, in both the parties and interest
associations, were more likely to act in concert to defend common and fundamental
principles of solidarity in the new postwar environment. (Hancock 1989; Vail 2003)
There was also an important structural simplification of the German political and
policymaking process. The reduction in viable political parties, through marginalization
of radical parties of the left and right, and the concentration of interests into national peak
associations was one way that postwar Germany, much like Austria, distinguished itself
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from other states, and its own past. Hence while the postwar German and Austria
partnerships did vary in their institutions and levels of concentration and centralization,
they did share a common solidarity towards consensus building and co-deterministic
forms of policy and decision-making amongst the primary interests and the state. This is
one of the more notable similarities in the postwar developments of the Austrian and
German political systems and political economies.
The postwar social partnership was one inspired by historical and social
preconditions but made possible by the economic, political, and social necessities of
reconstruction of the state, economy, polity, and society. (Allen 1990; Berger 2002)
These factors constituted the basic prerequisites and critical consent that resulted in
democratic corporatism in the Federal Republic. Yet, deliberate action, intent, and choice
made by the important political actors were primary in achieving postwar social
partnership. Without significant cooperation, compromise, and recognition by the interest
associations, political parties, and other major social groups, neo-corporatism would not
have necessarily developed in Federal Republic.
Organizing German Interests
During the occupation period, the reconstruction of autonomously organized
interest groups was to go hand in hand with the creation of new decision-making and
administrative structures of the state. The formation of peak associations of unified trade
unions, industry and employers’ organizations, and agricultural groups was viewed as a
necessity for practical economic policymaking to aid in reconstruction but also as a
manner of reconstructing a postwar German civil society. (Hancock 1 989) The new
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interest group system developed into one with a high degree of sector concentration and
high membership density, (von Beyme 1993) Germany developed a robust civil society
of interest group activity with nearly four voluntary associations for every thousand
citizens. Germans are more likely to use interest groups as a means of influencing
government than citizens in the United States or United Kingdom. But the style and
methods of interest group politics has been what has made the system a vital part of the
policymaking process. (Conradt 2001)
While most interest groups are apolitical, civic, or local, there are a number of
politically important national interest associations that represent the primary socio-
economic cleavages in German society. (Dalton 1989) Many of these chambers retain
significant quasi-govemmental regulatory functions including licensing, training,
apprenticeship, and standards that restrict the legal practice of the profession or activity.
(Hancock 1989; Conradt 2001 ) They also controlled recruitment and membership that
can translate into economic as well as political power. Most were hierarchically
organized from the local to federal levels and had considerable autonomy in dealing with
the state or one another. This made the members fairly dependent upon and subordinated
to the groups' leaderships especially at the national level where the elite structure
becomes the locus of representation, negotiating, bargaining, and policymaking. (Conradt
2001; Katzenstein 1987)
While some had labeled the postwar German political system as dominantly
pluralist, the system of peak associations seemed to suggest a more incorporative pattern
of concurrent pluralism and neo-corporatism, (von Beyme 1993) As Braunthal suggested
as early as 1965, well before much of the corporatist literature emerged in comparative
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politics, calling the peak associations of the German federal republic “lobbies” was far
too limiting given their wider and more direct roles in regulatory governance and
policymaking. (Braunthal 1965)
The most notable distinction between Austrian and German interest group
systems has been the level of compulsory membership. The Austrian chamber system
relies upon three compulsory membership organizations, the Chambers of Labor,
Commerce, and Agriculture, with representative monopolies in articulating interests and
bargaining at the federal level. The other Austrian organizations, the OGB and VOI,
while not compulsory had demonstrated unrivalled centralization and monopolistic
tendencies as well. The German system is far less compulsory as obligatory membership
was deemed unacceptable, and generally illegal, after the experiences of pre-1945 forced
membership, (von Beyme 1993) The only compulsory organizations tend to be the
chambers for professional occupations such as lawyers, doctors, and architects. The
remainder, including unions and business associations, are primarily voluntary unlike the
Austrian chambers that possess compulsory membership requirements. Hence the peak
associations in Germany tend to be national spokesmen for management, labor, and
agricultural interests, but lack the formal authority of compulsory membership and
centralized control found in Austria, (von Beyme 1993; Heinisch 2000)
Despite important limitations placed by the allied powers and efforts to
decentralize the policymaking and interest group system. Germany did develop a rather
concentrated and dense interest group structure. (Berger 2002) This was in part due to the
consequences of “social leveling” by the war, but also the liquidation of the remaining
great Prussian estates in the East, (von Beyme 1993) Hence, the war actually contributed
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to a greater centralization of interest groups by eliminating some of the most excessive
social and class divisions as well as removing or marginalizing key ideological identities,
notably pan-German nationalism and communism, that had otherwise kept interests
divided during the Weimar and earlier eras. Regional identity had also become less
persistent given the migration within Germany due to the conduct of the war as well as
the relocation of refugees from neighboring states.
Industry and Employers' Associations
During the immediate postwar period, many of the preexisting employers’ and
business organizations were dissolved due to their association with and incorporation
under the Nazi regime. As a whole, employers and industry were strongly discredited by
the Allies and many Germans for complicity in the rise and maintenance of the Nazi
regime. (Braunthal 1965; Wiesen 2001 ) Increasing numbers of strikes and movements
towards more powerful labor organizations forced businesses into a “defensive response”
of reorganization. (Braunthal 1965) Between 1945 and 1949, a number of groups,
committees, and associations began to emerge at local and regional levels in the
occupation zones. There was tremendous variation from zone to zone depending upon the
political and economic affinities of the occupying powers. (Berger 2002) Attempts to
form a national association for industry failed in 1946 precisely because of the variations
amongst the occupation zone authorities and the general allied mistrust of national
industrial organization and the specific motives of the organizers. (Braunthal 1965;
Wiesen 2001
)
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But by 1949, as labor had been reestablished as a national confederation under the
DGB, employers' and business interests were permitted, with significant limitations and
assurances by the occupying powers, to soon organize into three peak associations; The
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) or Federation of German Industry, the
Bundesvereinigung Dentscher A rbeitgeberverhdnde (BDA) or Federation of German
Employer Associations, and the Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag ( DIHT) or German
Industrial and Trade Conference (or Diet). (Hancock 1989; Braunthal 1965; Heimsch
2000 )
The DIHT has significant heritage and organizational history reflecting both
medieval merchant associations as well as contemporary lines. The DIHT had initially
been organized in 1861 but was dissolved in 1933. From 1956, membership was
compulsory, a rare exception for German peak associations, for all enterprises under its
charter that is dominated by artisans, crafts, and specialty manufacturing. It is primarily
organized at the local and regional levels and while an interest and lobbying group, spent
the bulk of its resources on fostering vocational training programs and fulfilling advisory
roles. (Braunthal 1965) The group was never particularly engaged in the policymaking
process to the extent of the BDI or BDA and has diminished in membership, importance,
and viability as the German economy moved away from smaller artisan and craft
manufacturing towards large scale industrial production. Nonetheless, the DIHT continue
to exist today pursuing a very modest role in lobbying, policymaking, and interest
representation process.
The primary purpose of the BDA has been to serve as the coordinating institution
for employers’ in labor and social policies. While the BDA does not engage in direct
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collective bargaining with labor, it has traditionally set recommended wage and benefit
policies for its constituent members, the employers’ associations representing specific
national sectors such as banking, industry, insurance, transportation, and agriculture. The
BDA has been influential in areas of social and labor law and social security provision.
BDA has tended to be dominated by large industries and employers’ due to their larger
financial contributions to the association and domination of the important administrative
and executive positions. The BDA consisted of forty-six national associations and 384
local units, (von Beyme 1993) While the BDA is generally representative of conservative
business interests, it has also operated on the basis of accepting a large and powerful
trade unions movement including codetermination. (Braunthal 1965) Hence, the
organization has tended to be rather less bombastic and radical in its relations and
demands from both the state and labor throughout the postwar era. (Streeck and Hassel
2004)
The BD1 tends to be the most dominant and broadly influential business
organization compared to DIHT and BDA. (Hancock 1989; von Beyme 1993; Conradt
2001 ) The BDI and BDA were operationally and ideologically close from the 1940s
through 1980s, with overlapping and shared leadership and membership. The two even
shared a common president during the 1970s. There was even a proposal to merge the
two organizations in 1963. (Braunthal 1965) Nonetheless, each organization has tended
to have its own functional competencies and specialization, (von Beyme 1993; Braunthal
1965) As will be discussed later in this chapter, these are distinct organizations that, like
most institutions, often clung to their own autonomy and institutional identities, resulting
in a more competitive and divisive relationship since the 1 980s.
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The BD1 is broadly influential on a range of national and international economic
policy issues and is the most effective and influential voice of business interests in
Germany. By 1965 it represented over 100.000 employers. It has often been argued that
postwar Germany had returned to a system in which the “economic plutocrats’', broadly
represented by the BDI, were once again in a dominant political position. (Braunthal
1965) There has often been the charge that even when the SPD has been in office that
they are quite receptive and accommodating of business interests. (Hancock 1989)
Today, the BDI is a federation of thirty-nine individual industrial associations
encompassing more than 90.000 firms and has significant financial resources. (Hancock
1989; Conradt 2001 ) Most BDI activity is in direct, small-group consultations with
governmental, parliamentary, and bureaucratic officials. They have a significant research
wing that has helped it compile useful and timely data, improving their access to and
success in the decision-making process. (Conradt 2001 ) The BDI is further subdivided
and organized into functional interest sections such as manufacturing, construction,
banking and insurance, or agriculture. (Hancock 1989)
Throughout most of the postwar era, the BDI and BDA remained closely
connected and dominated by the largest industrial concerns in Germany, especially those
of the Ruhr region. This caused many significant long-term problems for both institutions
in satisfying geographical, sectoral, and size divisions amongst the membership.
(Braunthal 1965; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Nonetheless, from the 1940s until 1980s the
BDI and BDA provided a significantly centralized and powerful institutional presence for
industry and employers’ at the federal level.
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Labor and Trade Unions
During the occupation of Germany, especially in the west, there was a strong
movement to separate the unions from the political parties and to create a single
encompassing federative union. This was done for both political and pragmatic economic
rebuilding purposes. The de-linking or parties and unions was part of the de-Nazification
process but was also engineered to weaken the communists in the western occupation
zones. On a pragmatic basis, it was also easier to push the basic reconstruction-era
economic policies objectives of wages, prices, inflation, and working conditions through
a simplified tripartite state-business-labor arrangement. This was also supported by a
number of labor leaders who, after surviving the war, recognizing the strategic weakness
of labor during the Weimar era and wished to centralize the voice of labor which
concurrently required de-aligning labor with the parties. (Markovits 1986; Conradt 2001)
Hence the unification of German labor was essentially a postwar, occupation-imposed
necessity that coincided with remaining labor leaders wish to centralize and strengthen
labor at a national level, much like that found in Austria. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991;
Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Strong and unified labor was a hallmark of the postwar economic and political
reconstruction of Germany. From the outset, the DGB and its member unions were better
organized than previous eras of German labor organization and were also committed to
the pragmatic goals of consensual policymaking with industry and the state from the
1940s through 1970s. Compared to unions to in the Anglo-American model. German
unions have been much more embedded in both society and the policymaking process for
most of the postwar era. (Thelen 1991; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) Yet
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institutionally, German labor is far weaker and diffusely organized than that in Austria.
There is nothing even vaguely comparable to the compulsory' Austrian Chamber of Labor
in Germany. (Heinisch 2000: Markovits 1996) The largest labor organization is the
German Trade Union Federation, Deutscher Gewerkschaftbund (DGB), was formed after
World War II is the umbrella organizing German trades unions. Importantly, the DGB
needed to overcome the historical legacy of ideological and religious divisions amongst
labor. Membership on the governing board of the DGB was consociationally and
proportionally divided between Catholics and Protestants during its early development.
Marxists were also represented in the earliest stages, but as they declined so did their
influence and membership in the DGB leadership. (Markovits 1986; Hancock 1989;
Thelen 1991
)
The DGB was, by the late 1950s, comprised of seventeen separate unions with a
combined membership of almost nine million. The largest member union was, and
continues to be, the Metalworkers Union, IG Metalb which had historically accounted for
about one-third of the total DGB membership. (Heinisch 2000; Conradt 2001 ) The DGB
has been historically dominated by industrial unions and workers that made up well over
60% of the total membership during the bulk of the postwar era while w hite-collar and
public employees constitutes around 30% over the same timeframe (Hancock 1989;
Thelen 1991 ) However, even some smaller unions have exerted significant influence
inside the DGB and German labor movement. IG Dnick und Papier, the printers' union,
while amongst the smallest of the trade unions, had consistently “punched above its
weight" due to its prestige and tradition as the oldest of the German trade unions.
(Markovits 1986)
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Despite the perception of strong collective organization under the confederative
umbrella of the DGB, there have been important and difficult divisions between and
amongst the numerous trade unions. While the DGB and German labor movement were
dominated by the largest industrial unions such as IG Metall for much of the postwar era,
this leadership was neither absolute nor unchallenged. (Heinisch 2000) Amongst
industrial unions, the chemical workers’ union, IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik
,
and the
construction workers’ union, IG Bau-Steine-Erden (IG Ban), often butted heads with IG
Metall on a range of issues and collective bargaining agendas. (Markovits 1986; Thelen
1991 ) There were additional divisions between the larger industrial and smaller public
sector and service unions such as those representing postal workers, food processors,
commercial and banking employees, and railway workers. Another important division
was between unions representing growing or declining sectors of the economy. After the
war, while industrial production and many services boomed, others, notably in the
artisans, crafts, and printing industry declined rapidly in the face of mechanization,
European and global economic integration, and the changing economic, social, and
technological environment. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991)
Hence viewing German labor as monolithic and fully centralized has been a
somewhat common myth of the postwar era. The DGB it itself excluded from collective
bargaining which is done by the member unions at the sector, and increasingly, firm or
regional level (Casey and Gold 2000; Heinisch 2000; Markovits 1996) Under the
Collective Bargaining Act of 1949, the primary rules of collective bargaining were
established. First, unlike the Weimar Republic, the state withdrew its interventionist role
and right to arbitrate collective bargaining codifying only unions and employers’
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associations could conclude such agreements. (Bosch 2004) The collective bargaining
process would become institutionalized at the industry-wide and regional levels. The
results of the bargaining process between the sectoral union and industry would become a
“pilot region” which would then become the basis for national sector-level collective
bargaining agreements. This has been known as the "convoy principle”. (Markovits 1986;
Heimsch 2000) Usually the sectoral unions would select prosperous regions in Southern
or Western Germany as such test cases so as to extract higher industry contributions
which could the be replicated nationally. (Bemdt 2000) Again, IG Melall was often the
dominant and leading union in this process, tending to play the pivotal role. (Thelen
1991; Heinisch 2000)
The DGB has also been excluded from almost all other essential aspects of union
activities, including membership, recruitment, and finances, unlike the OGB in Austria
that has historically dominated the member unions and the most important membership,
financial, and political duties, as well as maintaining a veto power in all collective
bargaining. (Markovits 1996; Heinisch 2000) Despite these weaknesses, especially
compared to Austrian labor, the DGB and German labor in general had maintained very
high levels of density though it is most useful to conceptualize the DGB as merely the
umbrella over a relatively effective and concentrated number of sectoral trade unions
such as IG Metall, IG Ban
,
and IG Druck und Papier. (Markovits 1986)
The DGB initially had a strong Marxist tone, reflecting the views of the new
organization leadership comprised mostly of former socialist leaders. Yet the
organization moved to the center-left rather promptly. The major emphasis of labor
actions soon fell on shorter working hours, higher wages, and codetermination.
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(Markovits 1986) The DGB abandoned most Marxist elements from their program, such
as widespread nationalization, by 1963. (Conradt 2001; Heinisch 2000) This decline in
labor’s more radical demands signified an important step in developing the postwar
German social partnership. A radical Marxist labor program is almost by definition
incapable of finding consensus and common ground with business interests and the state.
This hardly means that conflict and divisiveness between labor and capital diminished,
but rather reflected a significant acceptance of the new rules of German economic
policymaking that focused on consensus and solidarity rather than on conflict and
revolution.
There are unions that fall outside of the DGB umbrella. In 1950 and 1951,
angered by the unequal balance of power in the DGB between industrial blue-collar and
white-collar unionism, two new white-collar unions broke away from the DGB and were
established. The German White-Collar Employees' Union or Deutsche
Angestelltengewerkschat (DAG) consists of only salaried employees and historically
represented about 20% of all white-collar workers in the Federal Republic, though that
number was near 35% in the early 1950s. The second was the German Civil Servants’
Federation or Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB) that represents public sector civil servant
workers. The DBB operates quite divergently than most other German labor groups in
that the ability to collectively bargain and strike is prohibited under German law. The
DBB tended to act purely as a lobby or pressure group more than a formal labor union.
(Markovits 1986; Dalton 1989; Heinisch 2000)
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Additionally, a number of Christian trade unions emerged in the 1950s, mostly
supported through initial institutional and financial assistance of conservatives, the
remnants of the far right, and a few within the CDU/CSU. The German Christian Trade
Union Federation emerged in 1959 with the merger of two smaller right wing and
conservative labor groups. Yet support by the Adenauer-led CDU diminished into the
1960s and the federation, while maintaining a few pockets of influence at the local or
regional levels, had all but disappeared from the national labor movement by the mid-
1960s. (Markovits 1986) Organized labor had become decidedly allied with the SPD by
the late 1950s and would remain so for the foreseeable future.
While the DGB emerged as the primary representative of organized labor in the
German political system in the postwar period, this position was neither as overarching
nor monolithic as was found in the Austrian system with the compulsory Chamber of
Labor and the highly empowered and centralized authority of the OGB. (Heinisch 2000)
The DGB was characterized by a lack of central authority in areas of collective
bargaining and more often a reflection of the underlying power and conflicts within its
sectoral member unions than an autonomous and powerful actor at the national stage for
both the labor movement and relations with business interests and the state. (Bosch 2004)
Compared to more decentralized and weakly coordinated labor union systems such as
those found in France or the United States, the German model seems quite concentrated.
Another potential decentralizing condition of German labor has been the system
of works councils enacted through codetermination laws. While codetermination suggests
a greater role for the unions at the firm or plant level, in operation the works councils
system have sometimes demonstrated a significant centrifugal power to sectoral and
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national union solidarity and strength. (Streeck 1982) Hence, unions in Germany are a
system of parts ranging from the confederation and sectoral unions at the national level to
their provincial and local offices, and then to the works council level at the firm and plant
levels. (Thelen 1991; Bosch 2004) In many ways the semi-sovereignty of the German
federal republic is somewhat paralleled in the geographic, sectoral, and firm-level
decentralization of German labor.
The success of German labor, and the economy as a whole, in the postwar period
helped overshadow important internal and organizational conflicts within the DGB and
the German labor movement. Hence while there has often been an assumption that the
postwar economic miracle and social democratic gains such as an expansive welfare state
and advanced codetermination were due to the unified and centralized system of German
labor unions, this does tend to gloss over critical schisms that did exist and could
potentially contribute to, in the long term, an increasingly divided German labor
movement.
Agricultural & Professional Interests
Agricultural interests have been concentrated into the Green Front, an umbrella
association of three agrarian organizations encompassing the overwhelming majority of
German farmers. The three organizations are the Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV) or
German Fanner's League, the Verband der Landwirtschaftskammer or Association of
Agricultural Chambers, and the Raiffeisenverband or Cooperative Association that
specializes in agriculture-related banking, mortgaging, and retailing activities.
Agriculture, perhaps due to its small size and well-coordinated membership, is amongst
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the most politically integrated and centralized of the German interest associations.
(Conradt 2001; von Beyme 1993; Hancock 1989)
Additionally, there are the smaller professional peak associations including the
Federation of Free Professionals or Bundesverband derfreien Berufe that act as an
umbrella organization of sixty-seven national associations representing doctors, lawyers,
dentists, engineers, and architects. Unlike most other German peak associations, these do
tend to be compulsory due to their powerful role in establishing and controlling
professional membership, standards, and training. (Hancock 1989) Otherwise, these
organizations play a very small role in the policymaking and political process.
Hence, the German system of peak associations seems rather similar to those
found in other neo-corporatist regimes or social partnerships such as in Austria, Ireland,
or the Netherlands. Yet the German model was generally “looser” than the Austrian in
terms of compulsory membership and centralization. Despite the lack of compulsory
membership and formal centralization, the postwar peak associations maintained a high
level of member density and membership numbers. For much of the postwar era, the
BDA included over 80% of all organized businesses while reaching nearly 90% within
the BD1. (Braunthal 1965; Katzenstein 1987; Conradt 2001) The Green Front included
over 77% of all farmers as early by 1965 and increased membership density to nearly
90% by the 1990s. (von Beyme 1993; Conradt 2001 ) Even with the DGB only between
35-44% of the work force, far below the OGB and Federal Chamber in Austria, it has
much higher union density than in many other advanced industrial states. This is
especially notable given the open shop laws of German employment that prohibit
compulsory union membership for workers, (von Beyme 1993; Heinisch 2000)
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The Development of the German Social Partnership ( 1940s- 1980s)
While the Austrian and German models have often been lumped together under
the neo-corporatist banner, the differential institutionalization, processes, and structures
between the two have meaningful political and developmental consequences. (Heinisch
2000) The postwar German social partnership developed a number of unique
characteristics that distinguish it from its Austrian neighbor. The German model relied
less upon formal institutions such as the Austrian Joint Commission for Wages and Prices
or Commission for Social and Economic Questions and instead relied upon a well-
developed codification of laws to regulate labor-capital relations and the highly informal
bipartite negotiations and bargaining between labor and business associations to find
consensual policy recommendations for the German state. (Heinisch 2000; Katzenstein
1987)
The legal codification of social partnership has been quite remarkable in the
German model, distinguishing it from its Austrian counterpart. This has been called the
juridification of the social partnership as many elements of labor-business relationships,
including works councils, codetermination, collective bargaining, rights to strikes and
lockouts are highly delimited and regulated under German law. (Heinish 2000; Thelen
1991; Markovits 1986; Katzenstein 1987; Schmidt 2006) Notable are the series of Works
Constitution and Collective Bargaining Acts that have been codified, regularly amended,
and expanded since 1949. This is quite different from the Austrian model that lacks the
levels of significant legal codification found in Germany and relies more upon the
negotiation and bargaining process within the legally provided frameworks of institutions
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like the Joint Commission. Many have argued that this institutional difference has had
tremendous influence in limiting the range of policy options within the German system
while it has allowed greater flexibility within the Austrian model. (Heinisch 2000) Hence
there is a strongly legalistic element to the mode of governance in the German model.
(Schmidt 2006)
In terms of formal institutions, unlike Austria, there have few formal or
compulsory national institutions of social partnership. The institutions that have been
created at the national level have tended to be temporary in nature and are usually
convened by the state only when the social partners have been unable or unwilling to
reach compromises and consensus amongst themselves. (Vail 2003; Heinisch 2000) In
times of normal operation and economic growth, the German state was able to minimize
its own role in the governance of the economy and leave the process in the hands of the
social partners. On issues such as the labor market, wages, employment, unemployment
and health insurance, the postwar German model primarily operated without significant
or disruptive government intervention between the social partners and their suggested
policy prescriptions and consensual adjustments. The role of the state was circumscribed
by the “parapublic” and quasi-regulatory roles of the social partners resulting in the semi-
sovereign state. (Vail 2003; Katzenstein 1987)
In the immediate postwar occupation era, the DGB and affiliated unions, while
committed to social democracy and greater economic power for workers were willing to
compromise with the BDA, BDI and other industrial and employer interests. One of the
primary goals of the DGB became the creation and extension of codetermination rights of
workers in their firms. Codetermination, extending participatory rights of workers in
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management decisions, was itself a compromise between unions and industry. While
labor had often rhetorically suggested that nationalization of key industries was a primary
goal of the DGB and other unions, this was mostly set aside as long as industry was
willing to grant and extend codetermination rights. (Hancock 1989; Thelen 1991
)
In 1946, works councils, known as Betriebsrate
,
that were formed by employee
elections, were established at the firm level. The following year, British occupation zone
officials, prompted by the unions, endorsed a form of parity codetermination or
Mitbestimmung between workers and firms in the iron and coal industries. This provided
for equal representation of labor and shareholders on company supervisory boards. This
experiment in the British Zone was expanded to all coal, iron, and steel industries in the
Federal Republic in 1951. In 1952, the German parliament enacted a weaker version,
giving only one-third of the seats to workers in all remaining industrial firms. (Hancock
1989; Thelen 1991; Markovits 1986)
Extension of codetermination rights became the primary and overarching goal of
the DGB from this point forward. While not fully satisfied with the more diluted version
of codetermination passed in 1952, it was still hailed as a victory by labor. Yet it was not
a total loss for business. The BD1. BDA, and sectoral industry associations were able to
sidestep existing and future calls for full nationalization in the compromise. In addition,
the BDI and BDA secured significant labor peace for the next few decades by creating a
system that made workers share the responsibility and burden of production, investment,
and personnel decisions at the firm level. This created a far more stable labor situation
with greater worker loyalty, efficiency, and commitment to firm-wide goals of
profitability. The law also limited the rights of workers to strikes and walkouts and of
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employers to lock out. (Bosch 2004; Heinisch 2000; Markovits 1986) Hence, there was
compromise and bargaining on both sides. Given the strong economic growth rates and
low unemployment, labor-capital stability benefited all involved.
These acts, while done with little direct state intervention, were strongly
influenced by the state and the Adenauer CDU/CSU-FDP-DP coalition government. The
state’s overriding interests was to maintain social peace, economic growth, and political
stability above all else. Adenauer and his cabinet gently pushed the BDI, BDA, industrial
and employers' groups, and firms to accept the 195 1 codetermination laws and the 1952
compromise extensions as instruments of national stability and growth. Adenauer and his
Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, were especially keen to not let labor conflict slow
the phenomenal growth of the nascent German economic miracle. While Erhard
ideologically opposed codetermination, Adenauer, the more politically astute of the two,
saw the value and gains to be made from a compromise. The benefits were a permanent
tabling of nationalization talks by the DGB and affiliated unions and a more cooperative
and consensual policymaking process between the peak associations with only minimal
guidance from the Chancellor or Minister of Economics. This created the conditions
whereby energies were expended on bargaining sessions rather than external disruptions
such as strikes or lockouts. (Nicholls 1994)
The primary underlying concept of the Adenauer period was one based upon an
“acceptance of certain common rules for conflict mediation” rather than a formal
institutionalization of social partnership that was found in the Austrian Joint Commission
model, (von Beyme 1993) The state would play a much smaller “semi-sovereign” role
than in Austria with less institutional and formal edification of social partnership.
261
(Katzenstein 1987) While never securing the same level of labor-capital peace as found
in Austria in the postwar era, Germany nonetheless mostly avoided the more radical
labor-capital relations found in many other postwar European states such as France or
Italy. Some scholars go as far to suggest that German democratic consolidation and
political stability would have been less likely or successful if it were not for a strong and
well-organized labor movement. (Markovits 1986)
From the 1950s through mid-1960s, the Adenauer government was able to
successfully navigate an economic miracle with only broad policy direction by
safeguarding labor-capital coordination and consensus building on wages, prices,
inflation, social benefits, and trade. (Vail 2003) Hence the state's role was primarily to
ensure that the infrastructure of social partnership continued to allow the social partners
to compromise and negotiate the specific policy remedies and changes. (Katzenstein
1987; Vail 2003) Adenauer’s eventual demise was less about economics than about
foreign and military policy controversies and his declining influence inside the
CDU/CSU. (Conradt 2001; Hancock 1989) The promotion of Ludwig Erhard to
Chancellor could have signaled an important move towards more neo-liberal and free-
market policies at the expense of social democracy, the DGB. and German labor. But his
lackluster leadership, the continuing internal fights within the CDU/CSU, and his overall
weakness moderated such moves. The rise of the right-wing NPD in provincial and local
elections in 1965 and 1966 and the defection of the FDP pushed the CDU/CSU to remove
him and reluctantly join the SPD-CDU/CSU grand coalition in November 1966.
(Hancock 1989; Allen 1990)
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The grand coalition was the first period the SPD participation in government since
the establishment of the Federal Republic. The existence of grand coalition, which unlike
in Austria was quite rare at the federal level in Germany, led to the institutionalization of
the most formal and highly centralized institution of neo-corporatism in postwar
Germany. Facing the first significant economic recession since the war and growing
inability for the social partners to find solutions, the SPD-CDU/CSU coalition, under
heavy pressure and leadership from the pro-labor SPD, established Concerted Action or
Konzertierte Aktion through the 1967 Law for Promoting Stability and Growth in the
Economy. (Hancock 1989) Concerted Action was the German equivalent of the Austrian
Joint Commission for Wages and Prices and was designed to facilitate consensus
building, policymaking and implementation on issues of economic stability and growth.
The economic downturn that had begun in 1 965 had led to both the grand coalition, with
large SPD electoral gains in 1966, and Concerted Action in 1967, as the state and citizens
demanded quick and consensual action to stabilize the economy. The creation of
Concerted Action alone was a result of significant compromise between the SPD and
CDU/CSU as part of the grand coalition contract. The Minister of Economics, Karl
Schiller of the SPD, became the ideological and operational head of the Concerted Action
program. (Hancock 1989; Allen 1990; von Beyme 1993; Conradt 2001
)
Concerted Action was a series of regularized and institutionalized conferences
that brought together high-level government, business, and labor representatives to
discuss general macroeconomic trends and potential policy prescriptions to reverse the
recent recession. (Conradt 2001; Hancock 1989; Streeck and Hassel 2004) The
participants included officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council of
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Economic Experts, the Bundesbank
,
as well as equal numbers of representatives of the
business and employers’ associations and the DGB and German labor. Concerted Action
was broadly supported by both labor and business which both openly declared their
willingness to act in concert to promote economic stabilization. (Hancock 1989) While
labor was far more dedicated to the institutionalization and centralization of social
partnership at the national level, business and employers' reception was somewhat more
lukewarm. Nonetheless, given the economic conditions and the growing influence of
labor through the preliminary inclusion of the SPD in government, business and
employers’ were happy to have a seat and were willing to make some compromises.
(Hancock 1989; Conradt 2001
)
Concerted Action held six sessions in 1967 covering a wide range of topics
including income and structural policy as well as broad macroeconomic goals. In 1968,
the four sessions were expanded to encompass new issues such as macroeconomic
projections, social policy, and wage developments. In 1969, the agenda for the three
sessions also included price stability and revaluation of the Deutschmark. (Hancock
1 989) While meeting less regularly every year, they tended to cover more economic and
policy ground. More of the agenda was being replicated and continued between sessions
between the social partners without direct state moderation. Hence while the sessions
were becoming more intermittent and irregular, the sparse formal meetings were
supported by significant informal and regularized patterns of interaction, discussion,
consensus, and intermediation between the social partners outside of direct state
compliance. (Hancock 1989)
264
The primary accomplishments of Concerted Action between 1967 and 1969 were
significant compromises by both labor and business to promote the state’s overarching
goals of increased growth stability. Union officials agreed to limit wage rate increases for
1967-68 to 6.5%. By the end of 1968, the unemployment rate had declined and general
economic growth rebounded by 1969. (Hancock 1989) By late 1969, Concerted Action
began to show a number of significant cracks in its solidarity and civility. The electoral
season in began in September and increased the public and rhetorical bickering between
the SPD and CDU/CSU dragging labor and business into the fray. After the elections, as
the SPD emerged victorious and began nearly thirteen years of leadership with the
CDU/CSU in opposition, labor demands immediately increased while business interests
became less willing to exercise price restraints and concede wage increases. (Hancock
1989) The absence of the CDU/CSU in government certainly changed both German
industry’s and labor’s adherence and commitment to Concerted Action.
With a social democratic-led coalition government, the DGB, German labor, and
the left began pressing for greater demands. As corporate profits increased during the
economic upturn between 1969 and 1970, labor demanded “catch-up” wage increases for
the reduced demands between 1967 and 1968. The number of wildcat and official strikes
also increased. Under SPD leadership of Concerted Action wages hiked 12.6% in 1970
followed by a 13.6% increase in 1971. This contributed to a 5.3% increase in the inflation
rate in 1971 well up from the average rate of 3.2% throughout the 1960s. Despite the
growing disagreements and tensions, the SPD continued Concerted Action sessions into
1970 and 1971. The major agenda items remained centered on methods of lifting sluggish
economic growth, wages, prices, fiscal and monetary policy, and foreign economic
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relations. The social partners continually recommitted themselves to supporting the
government's efforts and promised to seek and find compromise on most important
issues in that pursuit, yet many felt that the true commitment to compromise and
consensus of social partnership through Concerted Action had already passed. (Hancock
1989)
Concerted Action began to wobble in 1972 as the Minister of Economics and
defended of the program, Karl Schiller, resigned. The sessions became less frequent and
more irregular from that point. A number of sessions held from 1973 until 1975 and
included discussion of the oil crises and potential restrictions on wages demands to limit
inflationary pressures from the shock. The wage negotiations of 1974-75 were a model of
restraint on both sides and did reduce inflationary pressures considerably. (Hancock
1989) Germany maintained one of the lowest inflation rates in the industrialized world in
the period. (Katzenstein 1987 ) Yet by 1976, labor had become increasingly critical of the
Concerted Action process given the parliamentary power of the SPD and the perception
that the wage restraints had primarily benefited firms’ profits margins rather than having
merely reduced inflationary pressures. Additionally, the DGB. affiliated unions, and the
left felt, as they often have during the postwar era, that business was over-represented in
the sessions, federal ministries, and councils. (Hancock 1989; Braunthal 1965; Conradt
2001) Hence, while the SPD leadership seemed content to continue Concerted Action, the
DGB. German labor, and the left were demanding a significantly more partisan and pro-
labor tilt to economic policy in the Federal Republic.
1975 and 1976 were critical years for Concerted Action and German labor
During the run-up to the October 1976 elections, the SPD had responded to increased
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German labor pressure for more serious social democratic reforms and initiatives. The
long-standing issue of extending codetermination was foremost on the labor wish list. A
bill to provide equal representation between workers and shareholders on supervisory
boards of joint stock companies employing 2000 workers or more was submitted to
parliament in December 1975. The law would not have meant full parity between capital
and labor since a number of rules left shareholders in dominant positions in most firms.
Nonetheless it was an important demonstration by the SPD to re-secure the DGB and
German labor electoral support by reaffirming its social democratic and labor credentials.
The act was passed in March 1976 and the SPD prevailed in the elections with
overwhelming labor and leftist support. (Hancock 1989; Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991
)
Of course the BDI, BDA, and other employers' and business interests were
fundamentally opposed to the extension of codetermination. In 1977, a group of nine
industrial firms and thirty employers' associations challenged the constitutionality of the
new law before the Federal Constitutional Court. They argued that that the law
undermined shareholder rights, stymied effective management, violated rights to primate
property, and was “incompatible with the basic constitutional principles and guidelines
governing the legal order and nature of the economy and labor relations”. (Hancock
1989) While the court would eventually uphold the law in a 1979 ruling, the damage to
the social partnership and Concerted Action had been done.
Following the issuance of the legal challenge, DGB leader, Heinz Oskar Vetter
illustrated his unhappiness with business' appeal to the courts by boycotting the
scheduled Concerted Action meeting in July 1977. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt attempted
to lure labor back to the table later in 1977, but by that point neither labor nor business
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felt compelled to return. The resuscitation of the German economy and electoral victories
of the SPD lowered the commitment of all parties, political parties and social partners
alike, to the program. Using the codetermination law fight as a “convenient excuse” to
cease participation in Concerted Action, both labor and business withdrew from the
arrangement that had already become so acrimonious over the past few years as to
prohibit any kind of successful compromise anyway. (Hancock 1989; Heinisch 2000)
While Concerted Action was dissolved after one decade, the impact has been
quite contentious amongst scholars. It does seem clear that Konzertierte Aktion never
attained the level of institutionalization, authority, and influence that the Joint Partnership
or Commission on Social and Economic Questions did in Austria. Concerted Action's
results were more limited in consequence, more circumscribed in scope, and more
redacted in time to that found in the permanent institutions of the Austrian social
partnership. Some even suggest that the overall impact was negligible as it did little
actual work and influenced policy even less while being primarily a vehicle for media
attention, ceremony, or merely symbolic significance. (Markovits 1996; Allen 1990;
Heinisch 2000; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
The collapse of Concerted Action did not reduce the need for significant
economic reform however. By the late 1970s, with an additional oil shock, growing
inflation, and growing unemployment, the Schmidt government was desperate to enact
significant fiscal, employment, revenue, and monetary reforms. Hence while the formal
and institutional Concerted Action program dissolved, necessary functional equivalents
emerged. (Hancock 1989)
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The most notable were a series of “bungalow” discussions at the Chancellor's
residence in Bonn after the DGB boycott of Concerted Action began in 1977. These
would continue through the end of his tenure in 1982 and included intense negotiations
and bargaining between the peak associations were undertaken through the initiative and
coordination of federal officials. The discussions were to inform the social partners of
proposed government economic policy and to encourage cooperation through mutual
price and wage restraint. After 1980, the talks also included significant efforts to address
the increasing rate of unemployment. (Hancock 1989)
While certainly lacking the formal institutionalization of Concerted Action, these
discussions sought to maintain both the spirit and intent of social partnership in a less
formal and high-tension environment. In fact, it was rare for labor and business to
negotiate directly, rather the government and the Chancellor tended to bilaterally filter
and intermediate more actively than under Concerted Action. This diverged significantly
from the Adenauer era where the government's direct role was rather small and the social
partners shouldered the bulk of the negotiation and compromise process. This increased
the role of the state in intermediating between the interests and forced it to assume a
much larger and sovereign role in the policymaking process, a large departure from
previous eras. (Katzenstein 1987; Vail 2003)
The results of Bungalow Action were mixed. Unions and business were able to
find compromise on wage hikes and price restraint in 1979 and 1980, lowering inflation
at a better rate than in other major OECD states. (Hancock 1989) But the talks were never
able to restore the previous levels of growth and lower unemployment, though those may
have been out of the control of any social partnership or government given broader
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regional and global economic changes. As Hancock suggests, the changing international,
structural, and attitudinal conditions of the German economy and society were perhaps
too much for any system to solve simultaneously. (Hancock 1989)
More importantly however, Schmidt was unable to find compromise on a formal
reestablishment of Concerted Action or any similar institutionalization of social
partnership amongst the peak associations. Hence, German neo-corporatism would
continue without a major formal institutionalization for the foreseeable future. This also
meant a significant shifting of even more authority to the Chancellor and government in
organizing and utilizing the social partnership to achieve consensus. While Germany had
already developed into a form of Chancellor Democracy in which many of the primary
legislative, foreign, and domestic policy initiatives rested with the Chancellor, in areas of
wages, employment, and social insurance the social partnership had been the traditional
locus of postwar authority. Economic policymaking was now becoming more
inextricably linked to individual Chancellors and governments and their programmatic
ability to seek and manufacture consent amongst the major interests. This varies
tremendously from the semi-sovereign model of low state interference and authority
initially developed under Adenauer and from the Austrian model where the Joint
Commission regularly trumped both Chancellors and parliament in initiating important
economic and social policy decisions.
Hence by the 1 980s, the social partnership in Austria, despite being more
institutionalized within the government, was actually far more autonomous from the
government and generally more influential in shaping economic policy. (Heinisch 2000)
The German system, while modeled on the need for only minor government roles to
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ensure the infrastructure and conditions of consensual policymaking between the social
partners, had begun to show significant variance from its original structure. (Vail 2003)
Under the new Chancellor, Helmut Kohl of the C'DU, from 1982 to 1998, the
government continued the trend of increasingly irrelevant social partnership. While the
Kohl DU-FDP coalition government officially pursued a strategy to gain consent and
consensus from social partners on major economic and social reforms, they were far more
willing to bypass such processes and enact legislation without the consent of the interests,
especially labor. (Allen 1990; Wessels 2000; Vail 2003; Gobeyn 1993)
While the return of the CDU/CSU to leadership was a major change for German
politics, it did not always result in immediate or radical departures in the government’s
economic policies or policymaking process. Many foreign observers expected large-scale
liberalizing reform in short order, however, most changes were changes in degrees. This
was surprising given the conservative ideological rhetoric of the Kohl government.
(Katzenstein 1987) As some suggest, the conservative coalition found itself a “prisoner of
the hegemony” of the more social democratic policies entrenched from the late 1960s
onward. (Heclo and Madsen 1987; Katzenstein 1987) Generally, the Kohl government
moved to reduce budget deficits by reducing public expenditures on social and welfare
programs, a slight liberalization of the labor market, and moderate reductions in taxes.
All were aimed at increasing private investment, maintaining a tighter monetary and
fiscal policy, and improving employment. (Conradt 2001
)
But these changes, no matter how nuanced, did matter to German labor which saw
a tilt towards business as a threat to hard fought social democratic gains. A series of
strikes instigated by the unions in 1 983 were intended to warn the government to avoid
271
too drastic of a swing away from plans to reduce unemployment and shorten the
workweek. Escalating labor-capital disputes included a seven-week walkout by
metalworkers and printers in early 1984. The dispute ended when workers and industry
eventually compromised over a 38.5-hour workweek. (Thelen 1991; Streeck and Hassel
2004) This negotiation and compromise between unions and industry was accomplished
with strong pressure by the Kohl government. Kohl and his cabinet, while generally pro-
business and certainly less inclined towards social partnership than past SPD-led
governments, nonetheless continued many earlier practices of informal consultation and
intermediation with leaders of labor and business groups. (Gobeyn 1993; Hancock 1989;
Allen 1990) The need for social peace and to mitigate costly and lasting labor-capital
disputes often required the Kohl government to intermediate peak association relations
not much unlike that found in previous eras. While Kohl and his government certainly
used the social partnership less frequently and with less vigor than previous
administrations, tripartite and neo-corporatist structures continued to play an important
role in the German economy especially in wages and collective bargaining. But even here
the state was now required to take a more activist role to prevent a widening of labor
disputes that threatened overall economic and social stability. In essence, the system of
social partnership that once operated with a minimum of government intervention and
direction now required a much stronger state presence and intermediary role between the
social partners both in the policymaking and collective bargaining processes. (Gobeyn
1993; Vail 2003)
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The development of the social partnership in Germany from the 1940s to 1980s
certainly followed a less consistent path than in neighboring Austria. The German social
partnership developed with less formal institutionalization eventually became far more
dependent upon the government than the Austrian case. During CDU/CSU-led coalition
government under Adenauer, the social partnership operated effectively as an informal
but primary policymaking structure between the social partners. The role of the state was
more circumscribed and was primarily concerned with maintaining the infrastructure and
general policy directions of social partnership rather than its specific content.
Only when the system began to fail to develop consensus and deliver cooperative
policy did the state begin to intervene more regularly. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel
2004) The institutionalization of the German social partnership at the national level
within Concerted Action actually illustrated the growing weakness of the social
partnership to act without significant government intervention. While the SPD and
Schmidt were clearly more dedicated to and placed greater emphasis on social
partnership, its institutionalization within Concerted Action was hardly exemplary. The
limited successes and eventual failures of Concerted Action mid 1970s required the
Schmidt government to take a far more direct, unilateral, and intermediating role to
squeeze consent from the social partners on important reforms and policies. By the time
of Kohl’s ascendancy to Chancellor, the social partnership was already failing to provide
the types and levels of governance it has it the past. (Gobeyn 1993; Streeck and Hassel
2004; Vail 2003) This was exacerbated by Kohl's low affinity for social partnership and
perceived willingness to ignore or bypass the social partners, especially labor. (Gobeyn
1993)
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By the 1980s, the social partnership had experienced serious structural decline as
the Chancellor, government, and parliament began taking on a greater role in the
policymaking process in the stead of social partnership. (Vail 2003; Gobeyn 1993) This
was far from the developments of social partnership in its neighbor to the south, Austria,
where, while facing a number of challenges was not facing the type of wholesale
structural dissolution than was beginning to commence in the 1980s. The Austrian Joint
Commission and chambers systems, while facing its own problems and lessening
influence, was nonetheless more structurally sound and maintained much higher efficacy
levels Hence, by the 1980s, while the social partnership maintained some important
policymaking duties and influence, its profile was certainly diminished far below what it
had achieved in the 1950s through early 1970s.
The Structures and Institutions of Social Partnership ( 1940s- 1980s)
The German social partnership, as noted in the previous section, lacked the type
of permanent and formal structure and institutionalization as found in the Austrian model
for the bulk of the postwar era. While Concerted Action was somewhat institutionally
comparable to the Austrian Joint Commission, it is clear that it was not as well
entrenched, empowered, or lasting as its Austrian counterpart. (Casey and Gold 2000;
Heinisch 2000) The German postwar model has been, in comparison to Austria, most
notable for its lack of formal institutions. But institutions are not the only elements of
structure, and the structure of German social partnership was far more developed than its
formal institutions.
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The absence of a Joint Commission- like institution in Germany has led many to
suggest that it had been weakly neo-corporatist.In comparison to Austria perhaps this
assessment holds up well. On the contrary however, the German social partnership was
quite influential from the 1940s through 1980s through numerous legal, formal, and
informal policymaking conduits. These included numerous formal and informal
mechanisms including the parliamentary committee system, the legal system, ad hoc and
advisory councils, informal negotiation and bargaining, and through the social learning of
key actors. (Katzenstein 1987)
In the parliamentary settings of the national and provincial governments, the peak
associations were always deeply involved in the evaluation all proposed legislation that
related in any way to business, labor, or agriculture. These were not one-off evaluations
but were ongoing and engaged processes that extended throughout the policymaking
process from ministerial drafting, parliamentary debate, and administrative
implementation. The social partners were notable for their exertion of power in
parliamentary committee work through the direct role of elected members but also the
consultation process that allows them influence over the design and drafting of
legislation. (Braunthal 1965; Thelen 1991; Markovits 1986) The consulting of the interest
associations was done as a matter of administrative procedure. This is a reflection of both
the lasting impact of social partnership on the policymaking process as well as the
pragmatic need for expertise in drafting and implementing policy in a cooperative
manner. (Conradt 2001
)
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However, the ability of the German soeial partnership to influence the
government through parties, parliament, and government has likely been more
circumscribed than in the Austrian case. Even during periods of single party domination,
such as the SPD in the 1970s and the CDU in 1980s, the social partnership's abilities to
shape the cabinet, influence ministers, and directly influence policymaking were limited
in comparison to the tight and centralized Austrian case, (von Beyme 1993) This was due
to the lack of grand coalition as well as the inclusion of the FDP for much of the postwar
governing period. (Heinisch 2000) Relations between the small federal bureaucracy and
interest associations are also primarily informal and lack the compact and strongly linked
characteristics of the Austrian system. Given the division of federal powers, the social
partners were actually quite often more interactive with Lander governments and
bureaucracies on a regular basis than those at the national level.
One of the ma jor distinctions from the Austrian case was the relative dearth of
state-owned or subsidized industries. While the German state did eventually become a
partial shareholder in some larger national firms like Volkswagen, the tendency was
away from direct state ownership of assets from the private sector. (Markovits 1986;
Conradt 2001; Heinisch 2000) This is not to say that the state lacked a strong role in
regulating or shaping the private sector. In fact, much like Austria, the provincial German
banking system was a conduit used by the state to strongly delegate its power to the
sector and firm levels. Nonetheless, in overall terms, the German state took a far less
direct role in managing important sectors of the economy. Whereas the Austria state
became a major shareholder or owner in heavy industry, banking, insurance, airlines.
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utilities, and service sectors, German nationalization was more limited to public sector
service such as transportation, telecommunications, and utilities.
As noted earlier, social partnership regularly empowered the social partners with
quasi-regulatory authority and roles. The German postwar model exhibited many such
cases including the Federal Employment Office or Bundesanstaltfur Arbeit (BA) that
was tasked to link jobseekers and open positions amongst employers. The BA
administered training and job placement funded through a combination of federal
revenues and, primarily, through social contributions from the social partners. The
regional and local offices were operated jointly by both labor unions and employers'
associations and were amongst the most notable quasi-govemmental roles of the social
partnership in postwar Germany. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Another related
area was vocational training where the social partners effectively operated a
governmental-funded and created program via the autonomous and collective efforts of
peak associations. Importantly, these examples also meant a more circumscribed state
role in labor market policies and outcomes. (Katzenstein 1987)
Unions also achieved important roles in the administration of the social security
system and other social insurance programs at both the federal and provincial levels.
(Katzenstein 1987; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Employers’ and business interests similarly
adopted duties including regulations over industrial policy and regulation. As Streeck and
Hassel suggest, the “high art of government in West Germany was to turn social
organizations with guaranteed autonomy and independent power into agents of publicly
licensed self-government”. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) These fit very well into the
conceptualization of the federal republic as a semi-sovereign state. (Katzenstein 1987)
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One notable difference with Austria was the role of the central bank. In Germany,
the Bundesbank
,
the central bank of the Federal Republic remained highly independent
from the government and influence of social partners. In Austria, the state and social
partners frequently used the central bank to shape and direct macroeconomic trends
though what was called Austro-Keynesianism. However, in Germany, except for a brief
period in the early 1970s, the central bank was independent and generally biased against
inflation and used its power to apolitically regulate monetary values and maintain a stable
investment profile. (Hancock 1989; Conradt 2001; Katzenstein 1987) This highly
moderated not only inflationary pressures but also wage and price demands from unions
as well as industry. Almost all the major parties and interests tended to be rather
conservative in their approach to using the central bank, including the SPD by
“studiously avoided policy measures that might undermine fiscal stability or unleash
rampant inflation” (Hancock 1989; Allen 1990; Thelen 1991; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)
The only exception to the norm was during the era of Concerted Action when the German
state did adopt a more Keynesian model of intervention that required greater instrumental
use of the central bank. (Casey and Gold 2000) But this was short-lived and was halted as
the German economy showed signs of recovery by 1972. (Allen 1990) While the
Austrian central bank was less independent, it should be remembered that by pegging the
schilling, the Austrians were able to achieve somewhat similarly low inflation despite a
more aggressive fiscal and monetary policy.
While the central bank remained a strong pillar of independence, and hence a
strong barrier to egregious demands by the social partners, the system of municipal and
state-owned banks and savings institutions was a useful conduit for state and social
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partner intervention in the economy. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) These Landesbanken
often allowed the state and Lander governments to funnel low-interest or good term
loans, basically subsidized financing, to German industries and business. (Allen 1990;
Schmidt 2006) Hence while the German state avoided direct intervention in firms and the
marketplace, such indirect methods were common to the German system in the postwar
era. (Thelen 1991 ) These allowed the social partners, the state, unions and business and
employers’ organizations, opportunities to influence the economy and economic
decision-making at the firm or sector level. (Allen 1990; Jeffery and Paterson 2004) The
conservative stability of central banking as a way to control inflation was common to
both the Austrian and German models. Of course the Austrians had a slight advantage of
being able to peg their currency to the Deutsch-Mark as an anti-inflationary benchmark.
Germany as a major world economy and a regularly traded currency, especially after the
withdrawal of the United States from its role in maintaining the gold standard of the
Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, had much tougher choices to make in terms of
interest rates and often stepped on the toes of labor which was normally seeking wage
increases.
In constitutional and legal terms, the social partnership is also well
institutionalized through strongly constituted labor and codetermination laws. Germany
has a remarkable level and variety of labor and industrial relations policies codified into
law. This process, known as juridification or Verrechtlichung
,
is one of the most
distinguishing patterns of German labor and social partnership. (Markovits 1986; Thelen
1991; Heimsch 2000; Bosch 2004) The most important legal foundations for organized
labor in the social partnership are found in the guaranteed rights of collective bargaining.
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works councils, and codetermination or Mitbestimmung. Many of these began to be
developed and enacted during the immediate post-World War I and Weimar eras, and
were discussed earlier in this chapter. After the end of World War II, these rights were
reestablished in a number of important legislative acts as well as the Basic Law, the
constitution of the Federal Republic.
Much of the impetus for the laws came from developments in the British
occupation zone between 1945 and 1949, in which the British were quite supportive of
the creation of stronger links between labor and industry. This stemmed from a distrust of
many industrial interests that the British felt had been too strongly affiliated with the Nazi
regime but also fit a longstanding pattern, dating to before World War I, in trying to limit
German industrial and economic might vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. Hence German
labor demands for greater co-determination coincided with overall British occupational
goals of checking or regulating the unfettered renewal of German heavy industry and
manufacturing. The developments in the British zone were expanded to the trizonal level
by the late 1940s and then to the whole republic after 1949. (Braunthal 1965; Markovits
1986)
The Basic Law provides much of the foundation for the institutionalization of the
social partnership through subsequent legislation. The most notable are the
Codetermination Acts of 195 1 and 1976, the Works Constitution Acts of 1952 and 1972,
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement Act of 1949. (Bosch 2004) In 1954, the
government also created the Federal Labor Court and defining a specific adjudication and
appeal process for labor-capital related disputes. In combination, these acts resurrected
most of the legal developments of the Weimar period while also providing significantly
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improved institutional and legal protections of labor. (Markovits 1986) However, as
noted earlier, these laws also prohibit and limit social partners from some actions,
including strikes, lockouts and other disruptions only when meeting strict legal
conditions. The legal system can therefore be said to both institutionalize social partners
and partnership and limit its potential range of actions simultaneously. (Heinisch 2000;
Bosch 2004)
Unlike Austria, where the constitutional court and legal system tended to play a
smaller and less integral role, the German Constitutional Court has been a far more strict
and powerful force in moderating the social partnership. It and the labor courts have
regularly handed down decisions that were antithetical to consensually made policy of the
social partners and government throughout the postwar era. (Thelen 1991; Kitschelt and
Streeck 2004) The special labor courts themselves are often accused of being quite
conservative in their rulings and interpretation of existing code. (Katzenstein 1987;
Heinisch 2000) This has limited some policymaking avenues within the social
partnership, far more than occurs in the Austrian case. The ability and increased
willingness of the constitutional and labor courts to effectively veto certain moves,
reforms, and policies changes the calculations of the partners, government, and
negotiation process. This has extended to areas of taxation, social insurance, labor
markets, and vocational education, all areas integral to the social partnership. (Kitschelt
and Streeck 2004)
In addition, there is no constitutional right to social partnership and inclusion of
peak associations in the governance of the German political system. Unlike in Austria
where the social partners have both de facto and de jure rights to inclusion in the
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policymaking and governance process, the German model is based almost entirely upon
conventional law and norms rather than strict constitutional protections. (Markovits 1986;
Heinisch 2000)
However, the added benefit of the strong legal and constitutional limitations upon
the social partners, especially on extensive protection of rights to private property,
freedom of organization, and non-compulsory memberships, has reduced more militant
objectives of both business and, more importantly, labor. (Thelen 1991 ) On the other
hand, compared to the Austrian model, the codification and juridification of the social
partners primary areas of interaction also limited their abilities to bargain and reach
compromise without regularly exceeding their legal mandates or coming into violation of
preexisting code. (Heinisch 2000)
Another factor in the operation of the social partnership has the strong federal
nature of the German republic. The system of cooperative federalism strongly divides
jurisdiction in many areas but requires close cooperation, consultation, and joint action in
others. For instance some issues such as monetary policy, railroads, and air transport are
under exclusive national jurisdiction. Yet, there are many matters requiring concurrent
legislation at both the national and provincial levels including those relevant to the social
partnership including laws of association, public welfare, industrial and banking issues,
labor laws, and healthcare. (Vail 2003) The Lander also exercise jurisdiction in policy
areas not specifically enumerated to the central government including public education.
(Conradt 2001
)
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Importantly, the Lander governments also have a strong say in enumerated federal
policy areas due to their direct representation and delegations to the upper house of
parliament, the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat has authority over 50 to 70% of legislation
passed by the lower house. (Conradt 2001; Jeffrey 2003) Hence, unlike the Austrian
model with its weaker federal structure and lessened provincial power in the decision and
policymaking process, the German state is far more federal in its decentralization of
authority and empowerment of the Lander.
While, as discussed in chapter three, there is some dispute over the compatibility
of federalism and corporatism it should be noted that the German model has tended to
weaken such arguments. The German social partnership existed and was institutionalized
at several levels of governance within the federal republic. While at the national level,
industry-wide collective bargaining and national peak associations of labor, business, and
agriculture have been integrated into the policymaking process there is significant
evidence of concurrent provincial and local neo-corporatism between the Lander
governments and the provincial representatives of business, labor, and agriculture as well.
Given the level of involvement of the Lander in the federal policymaking process as well
as the significant sovereignty over intra-provincial affairs, including social insurance,
labor, industrial, and vocational education policy this should not be surprising.
Importantly the Lander were also quite influential through the use of regional and
provincial banks to fund and regulate regional industry and labor politics. This meso-
corporatism at the provincial level was rather unique to the German model. (Allen 1990;
Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)
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However, the federal and Lander governments have not always been effective at
delimiting their own competencies. The Basic Law provides a system of considerable
cooperative federalism that requires significant cooperation, consultation, and
compromise between the federal and Lander level governments. (Jeffrey 2003) Hence
policymaking in many areas of social partnership does require additional steps to ensure
Lander support and consent over major social and economic policies that will require
approval of the Bundesrat
,
the upper house of the German parliament controlled by the
Lander governments. (Vail 2003) This differs significant from the weaker federal system
in Austria that has tended to see the Lander defer to the central government on almost all
issues, minus social security, of social and economic policymaking.
While limited in many ways by the courts and federalism of the German political
system, participation in panels, committees, commissions, and special councils has been a
primary conduit for the social partners to exert influence in the policymaking process.
Parliamentary committees. Chancellor, and Lander governments have regularly
appointed peak association representatives to relevant advisory commissions and
councils. Guidelines and expert suggestions for reforms of wages, prices, economic
growth, inflation, and other social and economic policies are often addressed by such
committees and commissions and often operate on a consensus building process amongst
the tn- or multipartite attendees. Despite the formal disbandment of Concerted Action in
the late 1970s, the social partners retained important seats and roles in innumerable
commissions and council consensual ly advising the government on important social and
economic policy matters.
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While some neo-corporatist arrangements have been through national level social
partnership institutions, like Concerted Action, these have varied on the basis of
governmental or social partner support. During times of economic prosperity and growth,
the social partnership between German labor, industry, employers’, agriculture and the
state operated more informally, silently, but effectively to negotiate, compromise, and
find consensus in areas of economic governance, wages, prices, employment, and
subsidy. (Streeck 1984) Only in times of crisis and contestation, did the social partnership
increases its formal profile in the policymaking process such as it did during Concerted
Action. Hence while the Austrian model of social partnership was one of rather consistent
and regularized patterns of institutionalization and gradually expanding authority, the
German model has exhibited greater institutional inconsistency. When times are good,
the social partners seemed more than capable of achieving consensus and cooperation
with limited state intervention. (Katzenstein 1987; Streeck 1997; Vail 2003; von Beyme
1996) However, in times of decline and crisis, and when the social partners have been
unable or unwilling to compromise and negotiate, the state’s role in the partnership
increased as it did during Concerted Action and, after its failure, the Bungalow meetings
of the Schmidt government. (Streeck 1997; Vail 2003)
Overall, the structure of the German social partnership is quite complex. While
lacking many of the formal institutional qualities found in Austria, the German model is
still deeply entrenched in numerous other informal, legal, advisory, and conventional
structures inside the policymaking system. (Katzenstein 1987) As in Austria, the
structures of socials partnership are also found in the linkages of the social partners to the
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political parties and citizens through political culture and solidarity and will be discussed
below.
Linking Social Partners, Political Parties, and Parliament
While most of the major interest associations have members in parliament and
sitting in the major political parties, the penetration and mutual dependence is
significantly less pronounced than in Austria. The professional occupational chambers
have close to fifty members of Parliament mostly in the CDU/CSU and FDP delegations.
Further, it has been estimated that nearly one-third of the parliament’s members represent
their occupations. (Miiller-Rommel 1989; Conradt 2001 ) The numbers tend to be in
professional and occupational associations that include doctors, lawyers, engineers,
professors, architects, and other professional organizations rather than larger labor or
business associations. Hence while the German parliament appears to have significant
penetration by interest associations it often stems from an extraordinarily narrow range of
professional and occupational interests. The Austrian case was one of penetration by the
large and national compulsory chambers or the powerful OGB and VOI associations.
Interest Group/Associations CDU/CSU SPD
Professional Organizations 26% 1 9%
Employers’ Organization 13% 12%
Religious, Scientific, Political 23% 20%
Unions, Workers' Association 8% 24%
Social Organizations 11% 13%
(Hancock, 1989)
Table 3: Interest Group Affiliation of Deputies in the Major Parties ( 1989)
The impact of peak associations in the parliamentary process has been mixed in
comparison to that of the Austrian case. The constitution, especially article 38, suggests
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that the government, ministers, and parliament should be “independent” from outside
influences. This would seem, in theory, to limit direct intervention of the peak
associations in the policymaking process. Yet the electoral and organizational linkages
between parties and interests allow significant penetration of the legislative process by
the peak associations often resulting in consensually developed and mutually agreed upon
policy outcomes, (von Beyme 1993) This is especially true in the parliamentary
committee and pre-plenary process where interests, through their parliamentary
delegates, often shape the eventual acts that become law.
In four specific committees. Agriculture (67%), Labor (63%), Economics (48%),
and Family and Health (67%), penetration by interest groups was well above the whole
parliamentary average. (Miiller-Rommel, 1988) Nonetheless, much of this penetration is
by the professional chambers, doctors, academics, and lawyers, while labor and business
influence is slightly less pronounced. The exception is agriculture and its strong
penetration of the relevant parliamentary committees with little organized opposition.
(von Beyme 1993)
German parties are prohibited from running candidates for union offices and
intervening in intra-union affairs. This would seem to weaken the link between the party
and interest group, especially between the SPD and labor. As was illustrated in the
Austrian case, a number of officials concurrently served in party and labor association
positions. In reality, however, the prohibition is bit more technical than universal.
Approximately 35-40% of SPD parliamentarians have strong ties to the labor movement
and the maintenance of dual membership is quite common. (Thelen 1991; Markovits
1986; Conradt 2001)
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Historically the ties between the SPD and German labor have been quite strong
and concentrated. There has been significant interpenetration between the party and
organized labor. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991) Yet the relationship between the DGB
and SPD lacks the level of intimacy, interpenetration, and mutual dependency that differs
from the case of the SPO and OGB in Austria. This is primarily reflected by the overall
decentralization and weakness of the DGB vis-a-vis its constituent sectoral unions. At
times, it has seemed clear that labor has been frustrated with the slow pace of the SPD in
initiating pro-labor reform programs and institutionalizing stronger elements of social
democracy. (Conradt 2001
)
Many on the far left and in the labor movement also accuse the SPD of a far too
accommodating relationship with business and the BDI and BDA. (Braunthal 1965;
Turner 1998) This frustration often leads the DGB to reaffirm its official non-partisan
and independent posture, implicitly threatening the SPD with the withdrawal of its
support and also to appeal to a wider audience in terms of membership and public
credibility. (Turner 1998; Thelen 1991; Markovits 1986; Conradt 2001)
But the primary weakness between the DGB and SPD lies in its lack of central,
overarching, and compulsory membership. There is nothing similar to the compulsory
Austrian Federal Chamber of Labor that includes all workers and even compared to the
more comparable OGB, the DGB lacks both the density and centralized organizational
dominance over the national labor movement of its Austrian counterpart Because the
DGB often struggles to find a collective and consensual position amongst its constituent
member unions, the DGB is ultimately weakened within the eyes of the SPD. While the
Austrian Social Democrats (SPO) can rely upon and deal with rather monolithic and
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monopolistic labor organizations in the Federal Chamber of Labor and the OGB, the SPD
often must negotiate and bargain with multiple unions as well as the confederation,
complicating the relationship and leading to inter-union division within the party leaders
and members itself. Hence, divisions within labor are reflected and sometimes magnified
within the SPD. (Markovits 1986; Heimsch 2000)
This has occurred on numerous occasions. Examples include the split between the
metalworkers' union and chemical workers’ union over social insurance and labor market
changes during the Kohl and Schroder governments as well as schism between smaller
and larger unions over issues of pensions, healthcare, and European integration.
(Heimsch 2000; Streeck and Hassel 2004) The decentralization of German labor and the
divisions within the DGB and labor movement itself tend to be replicated within the
membership, parliamentary caucuses, provincial and local officials, and national
leadership of the SPD. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991 ) Hence the links between labor and
the SPD are more convoluted and less predictable than those found between Social
Democrats and Austrian labor. In comparison, the DGB relationship to the SPD has been
generally strong but with moderate criticism and occasional division. This suggests that
the relationship is less strong than the one between unions and Labour Party in the United
Kingdom, and well below that of the links between the OGB and SPO in Austria, but far
stronger than the one between the AFL-CIO and the Democratic Party in the United
States. (Conradt 2001
)
The employers’ and business associations have tended to enjoy close relations
with the CDU/C'SU and gam advantage during periods of their government. (Braunthal
1965; Conradt 2001) This differs from the Austrian case where even during periods of
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OVP rule (which itself was limited by long-term grand coalition and thirteen years of
SPO rule in the 1970s and 1980s) there was little significant change from the more social
democratic and neo-corporatist policies and structures. Even during periods of SPD rule
in Germany, it has been argued that the BD1 and BDA have found little difficulty in
getting proposals approved by government. (Conradt 2001
)
The Green Front representing agricultural interests is perhaps the most well
represented interest, based on proportionality, amongst the German political parties.
About fifty parliamentary deputies, dominantly from the CDU/CSU, form a relatively
powerful caucus within the legislature and have dominated the agriculture committee for
decades. (Conradt 2001 ) Additionally, farming interests have done well under both
CDU/CSU and SPD led governments. Farmers in Germany enjoy very high subsidies
from both national and European levels and have been successful at securing German
protection, within the EU decision-making structure, of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). This has made German agriculture perhaps the least competitive but most
protected of any major European state, quite an achievement given the competition.
The SPD was excluded from power until the 1966 grand coalition that lasted until
only 1969 While leading as the senior partner with the Free Democrats from 1969 until
1982, they were again out of power from 1982 until 1997. Another grand coalition was
reestablished after the 2005 elections and continues today, but Germany has had far less
experience with grand coalition and has not developed the type of extensive proporz
system that existed in Austrian for the majority of the postwar era. The first period of
grand coalition was itself less motivated by a will or wish for co-determinant decision-
making and more for the weakened position of the parties vis-a-vis a resurgence of the
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right-wing NPD and problematic relations with the FDP in the mid to late 1960s.
(Hancock 1989) In essence, there has been less demand for and experience with grand
coalition in Germany than in Austria, at least until the last election. Intriguingly, many
German voters felt that the grand coalition after the 2005 election was a necessary step
for German reform which needed consensus from both left and right, an almost Austrian
ideal for consociational politics.
The political parties have also been weaker in terms of membership and loyalty
compared to Austria. In 1996, the SPD only had 900,000 official members in a county of
80 million. The SPO of Austria had nearly 700,000 members in a country of only 7.5
million. (Conradt 2001 ) Also unlike Austria, labor has weak penetration of the right wing
parties of Germany. While labor has some institutional and organizational membership
power inside both the OVP and FPO in Austria, labor is far weaker in internally
influencing the FDP or CDU/CSU. There is a small labor wing of the CDU, the Christian
Democratic Workers or Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA) operating
exclusively in the Rhine-Ruhr regions of Germany. 8 (Conradt 2001
)
An additional element that weakens the relationship between social partners and
parties has been the continual role of third parties in government coalition since the
establishment of the Federal Republic. From 1952 until 1966, the CDU/CSU was limited
in their policy programs and legislative agendas by the inclusion of the more libertarian
FDP. Even more limiting was the coalition between the SPD and FDP from 1969 until
R
This author encountered representatives of the CDA at a CDU political rally in Bonn in July 2002. The
primary goal seemed to be to attract voters away from the SPD by offering a chamber within the CDU
party organization specific to union and labor concerns. The CDA was giving away combination cigarette
hghters/bottle openers while the CDU kiosks were primarily handing out pens and pamphlets. It is unclear
if this was a strategy to attract more blue-collar oriented-workers who apparently may smoke and drink
more while the typical middle and upper class supporters of the CDU have more time for reading and
writing.
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1982 that tremendously limited the ability of the SPD, as Willy Brandt nearly found out
in 1972 as he only nearly survived a vote of no confidence, to overwhelmingly fulfill the
wishes of the labor movement and left during its tenure. (Heimsch 2000) While the FDP
has since been joined by the Greens in the king-making role ofjunior coalition partners,
the overall result, unlike Austria which was dominated by either grand coalition or one
party governance for a number of years in the postwar era, has been a multiparty system
requiring coalition building with the smaller third parties so as to govern. This has limited
the ability of the major parties to fully press for and enact specific interests' agendas
without endangering their governing coalition. In addition, this has often caused
dissatisfaction amongst the major interest associations with their respective party partners
and the perceived lack of hoped reforms. (Thelen 1991 ; Heinisch 2000; Conradt 2001)
Nonetheless, the domination by the CDU/CSU and SPD since the establishment
of the Federal Republic allowed a partial neutralization of both more radical socialist and
neo-liberal parties and reinforced their relationship with the social partners for most of
the postwar era. (Kitschelt and Streeck, 2004) The near two-party system also locked the
peak associations of labor and industry into a rather uncompetitive relationship with the
SPD and CDU/CSU significantly moderating their demands and mitigating extreme
policy options by both sides. (Katzenstein 1987; Nicholls 1994; Turner 1997; Vail 2003)
Social Democracy and Social Partnership
German social democracy's relative weakness compared to Austria's also
informed the postwar arrangement of their respective corporatism (Heinisch 2000) This
meant that the kind of Austro-Keynesianism that became the model of the postwar, social
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democratic, neo-corporatist, social partnership in Austria was usually beyond the reach of
the German left and SPD. (Markovits 1996; Seidel 1996) Germany, especially under
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, who
himself would become Chancellor in the mid 1960s, eschewed the use of Keynesian
fiscal measures to promote growth, maintain full employment, and enact monetary
policy. The central government tended to rely upon the regulation of the market by using
the central bank, Bundesbank
,
to control the supply of money and inflation via interest
rates. (Heinisch 2000; Conradt 2001
)
The sudden drop in growth rates and increase in unemployment in the mid 1960s
prompted an electoral swing and the eventual grand coalition between SPD and the
CDU/CSU in 1966. This swung the state towards a far more economically interventionist
agenda and the Concerted Action program adopted in 1967, discussed earlier in this
chapter. The new policy direction, articulated under the 1967 Law on Stability and
Growth, included more a Keynesian counter-cyclical program of increased public
expenditures on infrastructure and housing and increased employment. (Streeck and
Hassel 2004; Hancock 1989) By 1968, these had stabilized the short-term economic
slump, stimulated new growth, and temporarily reversed unemployment trends. This
would continue into the 1970s as the grand coalition ended and the SPD governed with
the junior partner FDP as from 1969 until 1982.
After the return of the CDU/CSU to the Chancellorship under Helmut Kohl in
1982, Germany began gradually reducing the more Keynesian programs of the SPD era
Hence a significant difference between Austria and Germany was the role of social
democracy and Keynesian macroeconomic planning. While dominant throughout the
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postwar period in Austria under all governments and coalitions, Germany experienced a
far less interventionist and more intermittent history of statism. The statist market
domination in Austria was mostly absent in the German case until the late 1960s. And
even then there was far less direct and deep economic intervention of the state in
Germany in terms of nationalization, state-domination of private capital, or other
protectionist or dirigiste practices. (Markovits 1996) Hence the linkages between
Keynesianism, statism, and social democracy that were fundamental to the Austrian
model of social partnership were either significantly weaker or absent in the German
model. (Heinisch 2000)
As noted earlier, German labor was far less centralized organized than in the
Austrian case model. There was also significant sympathy for business and industry in
the middle class and even amongst parties of the center and left such as the FDP and
SPD (Conradt 2001 ) Hence compared to Austria, social democracy and the pursuit of a
“social market economy” in Germany, while generally agreed upon, has been far more
limited in scope and scale in practice. (Casey and Gold 2000) Nonetheless, while
Germany may have ranked below Austria in measurements of both neo-corporatism and
social democracy, clearly Germany was strongly guided by both ideals compared to the
entire community of postwar industrialized democracies. Many key social democratic
goals including an advanced welfare state, significant labor market protections, worker
representation at the firm level through codetermination, and extensive social insurance
were gained by German workers in the postwar era. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991
)
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Codetermination laws were amongst the more social democratic policies to be
institutionalized in the Federal Republic, initially introduced into legislation in 1951
under the CDU government of Konrad Adenauer. The laws are designed to grant parity
or near-parity to representatives of workers’ interests on the supervisory boards of larger
industrial firms. The intent was to give labor an active voice in corporate management
and decision-making but it was also a method of increasing worker loyalty to the largest
firms. This would hopefully create a “p°slt 've attitude toward cooperation" with business
interests as well as to lessen the likelihood of employee discontent and radical labor
demands. (Hancock 1989; Katzenstein 1987) Hence co-determination was a compromise
that had potential benefits for both labor and business. However, attempts to expand
codetermination, either increasing power or increasing the applicable number of firms,
have often run into staunch opposition by German industry and business interests. The
most notable was the 1976 and 1977 challenges to a new codetermination bill that
business felt was too restrictive of private ownership rights. (Hancock 1989; Conradt
2001 )
During the period of SPD leadership from 1969 to 1982, there were important
attempts to expand social democracy including the expansion of codetermination laws
and Vermogensbildung, a redistribution of capital through compulsory profit sharing.
Both were strongly opposed by employers’ and business interests. The codetermination
and works constitution acts were expanded in 1972 and 1976 to include stronger worker
representation on firm boards and the inclusion of a greater number of medium and
smaller enterprises. The proposed program for profit sharing was adamantly opposed by
industry and the CDU/CSU as well as the SPD's coalition partner, the FDP. This
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coalition of opposition eventually killed the proposal and led to the eventual replacement
of Chancellor Brandt with Schmidt in 1974. (Nitsch and Hams 1974; Braunthal 1977)
Upon their return to power in 1982, the C'DU/CSU under the Kohl government initiated
more market-friendly reforms that encouraged private sector investment and cut social
program spending. These were obviously welcomed by employers' and industry that had
endured thirteen years of SPD governance. (Conradt 2001; Vail 2003) The BDI and BDA
were temporarily effective at stopping demands for shorter working hours including a
thirty-five hour workweek plan similar to that enacted in France. While successful, it has
also been partly responsible for increased labor-business conflict since the 1970s.
(Conradt 2001)
Unlike Austria, the German model of social partnership seems to have had a more
fluctuating institutionalization dependent upon particular governments and partisanship.
The social partnership was certainly more influential and empowered with greater
structural and institutional authority at the national level under Social Democratic or
grand coalition eras of government than under Christian Democratic ones. Many have
suggested that there is a strong linkage between social democracy and social partnership,
some going as far to suggest that the social partnership is the highest form of social
democratic policymaking. (Jessop 1979; Wessels 2000) In Austria, with long periods of
social democratic participation, alone or in grand coalition, the social partnership
remained a powerful, vital, and well- institutionalized model of decision-making. In
Germany, with long periods of conservative government with more marginalized
institutions and processes of social partnership, there does seem to be some evidence to
suggest such a correlation
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Only during periods of grand coalition or SPD-ied government, such as during the
period of Concerted Action from the late 1960s into the early 1970s, has the German
social partnership been institutionalized at a level like that found in Austria. Yet the mere
presence of the SPD in government does not explain the entire postwar era of German
social partnership. The Social Democrats were excluded from power from 1949 until
1966 and again from 1982 until 1998. The C'DU governments of Erhard and Kohl did not
emphasize national and centralized forms of social partnership. Yet the German
policymaking process was still strongly neo-corporatist is many key areas including
wages, the labor market, healthcare, vocational training, pensions, and unemployment
compensation. Under Adenauer, the social partners were able to effectively self-govem
over most of these policy areas with only incremental or general guidance from the
German state. While Erhard was more ideologically opposed to social partnership due to
his affinities for neo-liberalism. Kohl would have likely have continued the earlier
patterns of neo-corporatist governance if the social partners had been more
accommodative to one another in implementing reforms in times of economic decline.
Nonetheless, after Adenauer the pattern tends to support the argument that the SPD
favored greater institutionalization of the social partnership through peak associations at
the national level than the CDU/CSU preferred. (Wessels 2000; Conradt 2001
)
Solidarity and Social Partnership
While the postwar German and Austrian social partnerships did vary in their level
of concentration and centralization, they did share a common solidarity towards
consensus building and co-deterministic forms of policy and decision-making between
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the primary interests and government. Like Austria, the more radical politics and parties
that punctuated pre-war and 19 lh century German political landscape were mostly
marginalized. (Nicholls 1994) The atmosphere was one of necessary consensus building
amongst the major political and economic actors to achieve postwar economic and
political reconstruction.
Popular support for anti-system, regional, and other splinter parties fell
dramatically after the war and the rise of centrist parties like the CDU/CSU and SPD
illustrated a significant break from the past. (Hancock 1989; Vail 2003) The civic culture
that emerged after the war favored consensus building, unity, solidarity, democracy,
efficiency, and dependability, all hallmark preconditions for the building of neo-
corporatist institutions and processes. (Hancock 1989; C'onradt 2001; Nicholls 1994)
Uniquely, the new German political culture and its tendency towards neo-corporatism
lacked a strong nationalist rationale common in most other states.
While there was certainly an ideal of unifying the society and polity for
reconstruction of the German economy and state, the elites were not able to use an
explicitly nationalist argument for social partnership as was often the case in previous
eras and other states. The specific context provided by National Socialism and the war
made fostering intense nationalism implausible and dangerous. (Katzenstein 1987)
Hence, the new Federal Republic and its social partnership were not based on an
explicitly nationalist identity or ideal, rather there was the use of a more subtle and
inclusive identity to bind the actors and interests together towards achieving consensually
developed economic and social decisions. The norms of consensus, inclusion, and
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solidarity to the ideals of social partnership became important features of the German
political and social culture of the postwar era. (Schrim 2002; Nicholls 1994)
However, Germany in 1945 was still a society divided along class, regional,
religious, and social lines. Levels of income, education, and other social criteria
differentiated a strong working class-middle class-upper class division in German
society. These strongly fell in line with the new postwar political parties. The SPD came
to encompass the lower and middle class trades and unions as well as the political left.
The CDU tended to dominate amongst conservatives of both the middle and upper class,
while Conservative Catholics of all classes were drawn to both it and its sister party in
dominantly-Catholic Bavaria, the C'SU. The FDP, as a smaller classically liberal party,
tended to attract many from the wealthiest portion of German society as well as other
more libertarian-minded entrepreneurs and upper middle class Germans. (Dalton 1989;
Conradt 2001 ) Communists, nationalists, and other radicals, while represented by parties
such as the KPD and NPD were rather quickly marginalized and lacked much legitimacy
in the postwar German environment. Hence, the very fragmented party system of Weimar
Germany had been reduced and simplified significantly, not unlike that which occurred in
neighboring Austria between the First and Second Republics.
This helped simplified the relationship between interest groups and parties. (Vail
2003; Katzenstein 1987) German labor had few options other than to work with the SPD,
even when it was less than ideal. Business interests also had little option but to align to
the CDU/CSU. (Conradt 2001 ) Hence German interest group and party politics were
significantly streamlined and concentrated, while still within a democratic framework, in
a way that provided a semblance of order and stability that was lacking during Weimar.
299
In this way Austria and Germany shared a common concentration and simplification of
state-party-interest group relations. The strong ties between the peak associations and
major parties helped solidify democratic institutions and political stability much like that
in neighboring Austria. (Markovits 1986) Hence the social partnership also played an
important institutional option for the Federal Republic in solving some of the nagging
problems of the Weimar era that led down a path towards national destruction.
This was typified by the conscious efforts of the parties and interests to sustain
pragmatic and effective cooperation and consultation on major political and economic
policies. Alternation between parties and coalition in Germany led to incremental policy
changes. (Katzenstein 1987; von Beyme 1985; Vail 2003) Even when conservatives were
victorious and held majority, albeit in coalition with the FDP, in parliament, they rarely
reversed major social democratic programs like codetermination and avoided breaking
too sharply from the past. They were far more likely to favor incremental reform and
liberalization. (Katzenstein 1987; Hancock 1989; Vail 2003) Likewise, even when the
SPD came to power in 1969, while it pursued and adopted some pet projects of German
labor and the left, in other areas it was quite reserved in its pursuit of significant policy
changes. Chancellor Schmidt was especially careful to try and include business and
employers’ interests into the policymaking process through both Concerted Action and
his own Bungalow accords. (Hancock 1989)
This was in part due to the influence of ideals of “social market capitalism” upon
the CDU/CSU comparable to other European center right and conservative parties. The
CDU/CSU tended to pursue a more pro-business and anti-Keynesian agenda but
tempered its and business demands by favoring a more expansive and generous welfare
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state and more inclusive model of social partnership governance. Hence while the
CDU/CSU cannot be said to be social democratic, its maintenance of existing class
structure and affinity for free enterprise was more “enlightened”. (Katzenstein 1987;
Schrim 2002) These ideals helped limit the more ordo-liberal demands by their frequent
coalition partner, the FDP, as well as some business and employer interests. Hence,
despite long periods of conservative rule, which were absent in the Austrian case
altogether until the 1980s, Germany's CDU/CSU pursued a far more socially moderated
version of capitalism. The distrust of neo-liberalism was and remains quite strong
amongst the bulk of German, both conservative and leftists. (Katzenstein 1987; Hancock
1989; Bemdt 2000; Heinisch 2000)
The SPD was also moderated by a far less conflict-oriented strategy with
business. By gaining strong codetermination rights early in the development of the
Federal Republic, this moderated both the demands and levels of conflict between labor
and capital on a wide range of issues. Germany’s economic miracle also meant a strong
co-dependent relationship between German firm profitability and worker employment,
wages, and benefits. The more decentralized German labor movement and the weaker
confederation of the DGB allowed the SPD more “wiggle room” in working with
business, the CDU/CSU, and other interests. Of course, the SPD was also excluded from
power until 1966, significantly limiting the direct role of either labor or the party in
decision-making. (Markovits 1986)
There were swings in policy during several periods. During SPD leadership in the
1970s and CDU/CSU leadership in the 1980s and 1990s, there was less consensus-based
policymaking and more majoritariamsm. Nonetheless, the policy swings were usually
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lacking radical policy reversals or impositions. The SPD did not massively upend the
dominantly anti-Keynesian model, though they certainly tinkered with it more than
previous CDU governments, and the CDU/CSU did not upend the existing
codetermination laws and welfare state. (Katzenstein 1987; Streeck 1997; Schrim 2002)
So unlike Austria, which was dominated by grand coalitions for much of the postwar era,
Germany experienced more single-party dominance that often resulted in a
marginalization of social partnership in lieu of more pluralist and parliamentary
policymaking dominance. But both parties showed significant restraint and avoided
large-scale policy change. (Katzenstein 1987; Vail 2003; von Beyme 1985)
The critical role of the social partners cannot be underestimated. The neo-
corporatist system relied upon these peak associations defining their interests to take
account not only their constituency of membership but also that of the public interest.
Strong and well-organized interests helped stabilize and institutional democracy in the
Federal Republic not just a system of social partnership. (Markovits 1986; Katzenstein
1987) With interests working consensually towards similar goals of national economic
and social importance, such as reconstruction, high growth, or full employment, the
social organizations can enable the semi-sovereign state to remain outside of labor-capital
disputes which will be solved via bargaining and compromise. This requires the interests
not only to sacrifice some demands to the “common weal” of social peace and national
prosperity but also demands that those costs be borne internally by their membership
hence linking all to the solidarity of the system. (Schrim 2002; Streeck and Hassel 2004;
Nicholls 1994; Katzenstein 1987)
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This was not merely an ideological pursuit however, unions, business, and the
state all gained from the tripartite relationship through simplification of demands,
regularization of the negotiation and bargaining process, and ensuring tangible material
benefits to the partners. (Katzenstein 1987; Schirm 2002) Solidarity to the German
model, social partnership, the necessity of German economic growth, democracy, and
political stability all worked to help the major interests, parties, and actors narrow their
demands and work with one another towards consensus.
European Integration
One of the fundamental differences between the Austrian and German models of
social partnership in the postwar era concerns European integration. Austria, due to its
neutrality, Soviet veto of membership, and internal political division to direct
membership in the mtegrationist institutions of what would eventually become the
European Union, remained formally outside until 1995. (Heinisch 2000) Conversely,
Germany was a founding member of the integration movement in Europe and has been
deeply enmeshed in the integration process since the 1950s.
German membership in the European Coal and Steel Community and the
European Economic Community was predicated upon the necessity of German
reconstruction in both political and economic terms. France wanted to tie Germany’s
hand in areas that were most closely linked to war fighting capacities and Germany
wanted to illustrate that it was could be a trusted member of the Western European
fraternity of liberal democracies. (Tiersky 2004) European integration became a pathway
towards normalization of Germany’s postwar relationship with its Western European
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neighbors and was never purely an economie strategy or one based exclusively on growth
and trade development. Given both the SPD and CDU/CSU aversions to traditional neo-
liberalism, the objective of free movement of goods and services and the integration of
European economies was fundamentally based on strategic political criteria rather than
limited economic rationale. (Conradt 2001; Katzenstein 1987) Nonetheless, integration
did hold out significant hopes of material benefit and increased trade as well, so it was
not merely a symbolic pursuit either.
Hence European integration must be understood as a relatively permanent goal
and orientation of German foreign policy in the postwar era. After 1949, European
cooperation and integration became “ingrained, even assumed” amongst all the important
political actors in Germany, including the social partners and major parties. (Jeffrey and
Paterson 2004; Heinisch 2000) From the 1950s through 1980s, this solidarity over
European integration remained dominant amongst all social partners and successive
German governments from Adenauer onward. (Padgett, Paterson, and Smith 2003;
Schmidt 2006) The social partners, while certainly involved in the negotiations,
bargaining, and domestic political considerations of membership and integration efforts
nonetheless were in rather strong solidarity with, or deference to the German
governments’ overarching goals, especially under Konrad Adenauer, to pursue
integration as the primary goals of postwar German foreign policy. The demands of
reconstruction, in economic and political terms, were able to lead most interests to
compromise, negotiate, and moderate their own demands. (Jeffery and Paterson 2004)
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The case of the BDI falls well into this pattern. The BDI was dominantly
supportive of Adenauer’s programs of European integration from the 1950s onward. The
strong dependence of the BDI on the CDU was part of this rationale but it also rested
upon a general deference and solidarity to grander German foreign policy goals of
reestablishment in the postwar environment. Some industrialists opposed integration into
the ECSC in 1951 as well as the EEC in 1957. The BDI was influential in helping shape
German foreign economic policymaking on several elements of both the ECSC and EEC
treaties yet not decisively so. In many cases, the BDI and Adenauer government differed
strongly on the content of the treaties and the consequences of integration to German
firms and markets. Nonetheless, the overall pattern was one where the BDI supported,
sometimes perfunctorily and sometimes energetically, the broad objectives and policies
of European integration developed by the Chancellor. When such policies were deemed a
threat to the BDI, it used its influence to attempt change in government positions, yet was
not always successful even during C'DU-led periods of government. (Braunthal 1965)
Union involvement in European integration was more circumscribed. As the SPD
was marginalized from government until 1966, the CDU was able to effectively control
the integration process with little input from social democrats. However, in typical
German consensual format, Adenauer and later Chancellors regularly sought and
obtained consent on major treaties and extensions of European integration. Labor had
been invited and involved in many of the early talks regarding the ECSC and EEC.
Labor's primary concerns were to increases wages, benefits, and codetermination rights
of workers in firms. (Markovits 1986) There was high uncertainty regarding the impact of
integration upon these goals, however, for most of the postwar era German labor found
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little evidence of negative consequences from European integration given the economic
miracle. The state was able to sooth such fear through regular and incremental increases
in employee security, wages, social insurance, and increasing codetermination rights
from the 1950s through 1970s. Hence once the material concerns of unions over the costs
of integration were addressed and offset by the state or employers, much of German labor
became deferential and moderately staunch supporters of the integration process from the
1950s onward. (Markovits and Otto 1992) There were some internal ideological disputes
within German labor over the implications of European integration on workers solidarity
and social democratic bases. The more leftist and activist labor leaders and unions feared
that European integration might be assisting in the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism
and an increasingly unjust economic pattern across the continent. (Markovits 1986;
Markovits and Otto 1992) However, amongst these labor leaders and unions, expansion
of international labor relationships with unions in other EEC member states helped
assuage some of these fears. The German state was also able to address these concerns by
pushing for the inclusion of elements of social democracy and social partnership at the
European level, and to give a voice to labor in Brussels. (Sargent 1985)
Hence labor was effectively co-opted or marginalized in the European integration
debates in Germany by the continuing benefits of economic growth and increases in
wages, social insurance, and codetermination as well as through the effective
subordination of labor demands to larger national strategies towards European integration
arranged by Adenauer and latter Chancellors through the 1980s. (Katzenstein 1987;
Thelen 1991 ) When German interests were required to make sacrifices to demands of
European integration and governance, the state usually stepped in to help subsidize.
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reimburse, or offset specific losses. This was replicated for almost all the major peak
actors including agriculture, labor, and industry where state-level subsidy or other
tangible relief was provided in exchange for consent and support of European integration
efforts. (Katzenstein 1987; Conradt 2001
)
In essence, unlike the Austrian case, EU membership and a generally unwavering
support for greater integration efforts were never primary divisions of German interests
from the 1950s through 1980s. The social partners recognized that no government, from
Adenauer through Kohl, would tolerate significant deviation from the pro-European
German position without significant punishment and sanction. There was also a
pragmatic economic acceptance, strongly repeated by government, that both unions and
business would greatly benefit from increased intra-European trade and that European
integration would benefit the large, highly industry- and manufacturing-based export-
oriented German economy more than its smaller European counterparts. (Braunthal 1965;
Jeffery and Paterson 2004)
The end results of the immediate thirty years of postwar integration seemed to
support this very argument. Germany’s economic miracle outpaced that of its other large
European neighbors while simultaneously allowing the normalization of German
relations within a broader European context. Germany's surprising ability to weather the
early storms of the 1970s, including high inflation, oil shocks, de-industrialization, and
social change, reaffirmed to both unions and industry that Germany had indeed navigated
the postwar economic and political reconstruction process better than most and emerged
prosperous, stable, and an accepted ally. (Katzenstein 1987)
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Results of Social Partnership 1940s- 1980s
The German social partnership strongly conformed to the system of divided
authority, multiple veto points, disposition towards compromise, and political stability
that encompassed the German postwar model of governance. The equilibrium and
consistency of the model were considered virtues and worthy of study and emulation.
(Markovits 1986; Vail 2003; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) This tight arrangement between
the state, unions, and business, while below the level of institutionalization and
centralization found in Austria, was nonetheless one of the more neo-corporatist models
of economic policymaking and interest intermediation of the era. Despite significant
variations from the paradigmatic Austrian model of social partnership, postwar German
politics exhibited generally similar structures and patterns of bi-, tri-, or multipartite
negotiations between peak associations and the state. One significant variation from the
Austrian mode has been the lack of lasting and formal institutions of social partnership.
While the Austrian model was permanently enshrined in the Joint Commission on Wages
and Prices in 1957 and the Commission for Economic and Social Questions in 1963,
Germany's experiments with such formal organizations were quite limited. (Heinisch
2000) While Germany did utilize the Concerted Action, the peak of social partnership in
the postwar era, program briefly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it has neither the
support nor longevity found in corresponding Austrian institutions. (Hancock 1989;
Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Another important variation was the lack of centralized and overarching
compulsory authority in the peak associations. While the peak associations like the DGB,
BD1, and BDA are often responsible for providing national voice for interests through
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publicity campaigns, research and publication, and occasional legal actions, they have
had far less of a formal and direct role in the collective bargaining, wage negotiation, and
tripartite system of interest intermediation than their member organizations such as
individual trade unions and sectoral industry associations. (Heimsch 2000; Markovits
1986) The primary counterexample is in agriculture where the Green Front has been quite
monopolistic, and successful, in the unified representation of members and their vested
interests.
Nonetheless, German interests emerged as relatively powerful and unified actors
in the policymaking system. Amongst employers and businesses, sectoral business and
industry associations were tied to the national umbrella organizations of the BDI and
BDA which helped provide a valuable nexus of information gathering and dissemination,
cooperation and coordination, innovation, and collective representation at the national
and provincial levels of the policymaking processes. According to the BDI, by 1960
almost 98% of all industrialists were included in the umbrella organization. (Braunthal
1965) This remained above 90% well into the 1980s. (Dalton 1989) Unions, while less
centralized than in Austria, remained strongly linked under the DGB umbrella and its
large, national, and powerful sectoral member unions. Labor was well entrenched and
organized from the firm level, through works councils and co-determination, to the
national level including extensive legal codification of labor and employment standards.
(Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Heinisch 2000; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)
Wage bargaining, while not quite as legally or formally centralized as in Austria,
was organized at the sector or industry-wide level. (Casey and Gold 2000; Bosch 2000)
Yet, in practice, collective bargaining in Germany from the 1940s through 1970s
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exhibited a level of centralization nearly equal to that of Austria. While the state was
barred from a statutory wages policy and arbitrating the collective bargaining process, the
system of social partnership provided a framework for unions and employers’ to arrive at
wage settlements, with relative freedom from government intervention, respecting the
needs of high growth, low inflation, and stable employment. (Markovits 1986; Vail 2003;
Streck and Hassel 2004; Bosch 2004)
Initial negotiations would generally be at a regional and sectoral level between
sectoral unions and employers’ or industry associations. (Casey and Gold 2000; Bosch
2004) For most of the postwar period, IG Metall tended to exert “wage leadership” and
would use these regional and sectoral agreements to benchmark not only all other
agreements in the specific national sector of metalwork but would also be the standard for
most of the other smaller unions collective agreements in all sectors and industries.
Hence, while the collective bargaining system was technically decentralized to the
specific sectoral unions, in practice the leadership of IG Metall and other larger industrial
unions and their industry and employers’ counterparts set de facto national benchmarks
for all collective bargaining agreements across the German economy. (Markovits 1986;
Thelen 1991 ; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Bosch 2004) This system of Tarifautonomie or
wage autonomy worked without the need of intensive or regular state intervention further
supporting the concept of the semi-sovereign state. (Katzenstein 1987; Vail 2003)
This tended to concentrate power over collective bargaining and wages in the
national levels of the trade unions and regional and national employers' associations.
While some modification of collective bargaining agreements could be concluded at the
firm or plant level, these could only be improvements upon the industry-wide agreements
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not reductions. Hence, while works councils were a notable feature of the postwar
development of German labor-management relations, they were traditionally quite
limited in their autonomy and authority. In most cases works councils primary areas of
competence were in very limited firm and plant specific areas of labor-management
relations.
However, the trend, since the 1960s especially, has been a gradual growing
independence of works councils. (Bosch 2004) Nonetheless, their ability to strike and
vary from industry-wide collective agreements and their national trade union organization
was rather limited for most of the postwar era. Firms that left industry or employers'
association would be legally required to operate under the existing agreements until new
agreements could be concluded. In addition, the state could legally bind collective
agreements if they covered at least fifty percent of the workers in the sector and if
approved by committee representing the employers' federations and unions agreed.
Hence, the legal system had a strong ability to compel firms to remain in the existing
employers’ associations and to abide by industry-wide agreements. (Bosch 2004) Overall,
this system was quite centralizing and empowering for the trade unions and employers’
and industry associations.
Amongst the most notable accomplishments of the postwar era of social
partnership had been the extension of codetermination laws allowing worker
representation and input into the decision-making process of firms and plants. (Markovits
1986; Thelen 1991; Parkes 1997; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Katzenstein 1987) Despite
being strongly social democratic and union-inspired, these were accepted by industry and
the state during the postwar era for practical and national goals of achieving social peace
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and addressing the needs of a reconstructing German economy and polity. In return, labor
shelved many of its more radical and Marxist ideals, rhetoric, and leaders and decidedly
committed itself to the social partnership and the processes of compromise and
negotiation with both the state and capital. (Markovits 1986; Hancock 1989; Thelen
1991)
The end result was a generally successful and prosperous system for both workers
and industry as was evidenced by examples including German automotive and other
heavy industries. (Streeck 1984; Markovits 1986; Parkes 1997)
Another area that came under strong influence by the social partners was in
vocational training. This brought unions and employers, as well as the national, state, and
local governments, into a mutually supportive system to provide vocational training for
those coming through the German education system. (Casey and Gold 2000) This
relationship, known as a ‘dual system” provided a system of employer-provided
apprenticeship to students while simultaneously attending public trade schools. The long-
term nature of employment in German firms and membership in German unions, and the
public demand and provision of education, created an obvious area of neo-corporatist
policy and cooperation. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Vail 2003; Kitschelt and Streeck
2004)
The economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s set Germany apart from many
other large European states such as Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. (Katzenstein
1987; Parkes 1997) Much like Austria, but on a much larger scale, the German economy
was rebuilt and German society became affluent and comfortable. During the 1950s,
West German growth was at a rate of 6.5% ofGDP per year, exceeding that of France
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and Italy, as well as the United States. The rate fell to 4.4% during the 1960s, falling a bit
below the French rate of growth but still above the United Kingdom and United States in
the same period. Growth fell to 2.6% in the 1970s below France and the United States. It
was only 1 .8% through the mid 1980s, a bit higher than France, the United Kingdom, and
Sweden, but below that of the US. (OECD 1988; Hancock 1989) Hence, in economic
terms, the German model seemed to be doing quite well in all relative standards far into
the 1970s and even into the early 1980s.
Even during the oil crises of the 1970s, Germany delivered lower inflation, lower
unemployment, and marginally better growth rates that most other Western industrial
democracies. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Parkes 1997) In terms of low inflation, low
unemployment, and low labor conflict, Germany had comparable numbers to that in
Austria and the Netherlands. (Hancock 1989; Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991) Much like
Austria, the ability of Germany to survive the oil and inflationary shocks in the early
1970s brought about increased scholarly and policy interest in Modell Deutschland.
(Markovits 1986; Katzenstein 1987; Casey and Gold 2000) It was argued that German
institutional arrangements succeeded because they lowered transaction costs between
labor, capital, and the state while producing competitive and quality goods and controlled
inflation despite rising labor and administrative costs. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)
Comparatively, Germany was striking for its lack of new and bold policy
initiatives and the continuation of previous policy. (Katzenstein 1987; Hancock 1989)
Many argued that new policies could only be carried out with some minimum level of
consent from the relevant social partners and that those that lacked such credentials
would usually fail in the legislative process without major dilution or bargaining between
the partners. (Katzenstein 1987; Smith 1992) The political stability that emerged with a
weighted two-party system between the SPD and C’DU/CSU was a far cry from previous
eras of German party politics. (Hancock 1989; von Beyme 1985) The social partnership
helped support such a system and perhaps even helped stabilize democracy during the
postwar Federal Republic. (Markovits 1986) While ties between the parties and peak
associations were slightly less institutionalized than what was seen in the Austrian case,
the linkages were significant in providing predictable and stable party politics and
policymaking. The German system clearly never achieved the level ofproporz found in
the Austrian system. Yet the German model possessed significant levels of political
continuity and stability while experiencing few extreme electoral and parliamentary
shocks. (Katzenstein 1987) The peak associations’ roles in and linkages to the SPD and
CDU/CSU certainly contributed to this stability even if it fell short of the level of
interest-party integration and stabilization found in Austria. (Markovits 1986; Katzenstein
1987)
The German social partnership did perhaps tend to be more restricted than the
Austrian model in terms of policy areas. As discussed in the last chapter, through the
institutionalization of the social partnership in the Austrian Joint Commission and
Committee on Social and Economic Questions, the Austrian social partners began to
significantly expand the aegis and competencies of the partnership into peripheral and
tertiary areas of economic and social policy including education, the environment,
women's rights, transportation, and beyond the limited scope of wages, social insurance,
and labor-capital relations. As indicated below in Figure 3, Hancock argued that the neo-
corporatist structures between the state, labor, and business were usually restricted to a
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narrow subset of issue areas unlike Austria where the social partnership was regularly
extended throughout the postwar era. In area A, labor and management tended to
negotiate without state oversight on topics such as wages, working hours, and other
“bread-and-butter” issues. In areas B & C, there tended to be bilateral talks between the
state and either labor or business in a regularized lobbying format common to pluralist
systems. True neo-corporatism, in its trilateral form, only occurred in area D that
reflected the overlapping of state, business, and labor interests and activity. Hancock
further suggests that this only occurred during the formation of grad coalition
government. (Hancock 1989)
Democratic Corporatism in Practice
FIGURE 6.r
PATTERNS OF POLICY LINKAGES
notes: Area A = management-labor consultations and negotiations; area B = government-
management consultations; area C = government-labor consultations; and area D = government-
management-labor consultations.
Figure 3: Hancock's Patterns of Policy Linkages (1989)
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However, Hancock may be underestimating the structural impact of the social
partnership on all areas, A, B, C, and D. The underlying social, cultural, political, and
economic conditions of social partnership drove actors towards consensus and bargaining
on a wide range of issues no matter their location in the policy universe. Area A issues,
mostly related to collective bargaining and codetermination, while generally being
pursued without strong and direct government interference were not exclusively so. (Vail
2003; Markovits 1986) During Concerted Action as well as the subsequent informal talks
arranged by the Schmidt government, the state regularly intermediated in many of these
areas when the social partners were unable to reach compromise. In addition, during
tough collective bargaining negotiations with national implications. Chancellors from
Adenauer to Kohl regularly became indirectly or directly engaged in marshalling the
collective bargaining process along and helping persuade actors to compromise and
bargain. In addition, the judiciary had strong oversight over labor-capital relations due to
the juridification of labor law from the 1950s.
In areas B and C, while direct lobbying did regularly take place especially during
times of one party dominance, such as the C'DU/CSU from 1949 to 1966 and 1982 to
1998, and the SPD from 1969 to 1982, there were concurrent with efforts by the state to
obtain broad social partner consent on issues rather than to merely legislate from the
majority. As was demonstrated by the policy actions of the Adenauer, Schmidt, and to a
lesser extent. Kohl governments, there was a general hope that the state could either
encourage the social partners to negotiate and compromise amongst themselves without
direct state intervention or they would go out of their way to obtain wider consent from
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the opposition before enacting important legislation. (Vail 2003) This mitigated large
policy shifts and continued to uphold the principles of the semi-sovereign state.
(Katzenstein 1987; Streeck 1997)
Some areas of policymaking don't fit very well into the Hancock pattern model at
all. International trade, globalization, European integration, and other issues of foreign
policy, with significant economic and social consequences seem to lack a space in the
chart yet were notable for their levels of consensus and stability throughout the postwar
era. (Katzenstein 1985, 1987, 1989) Further, the ability to disaggregate these policy areas
from one another is easier said that done. As Wilensky and Turner suggest, neo-
corporatism in Germany, as well as Austria, was typified by significant interdependence
on a range of economic and social issues including industrial policy, labor markets,
wages, trade, vocational education and training, pensions, and social insurance which
spanned a considerable political and policy spectrum. (Wilensky and Turner 1987) In
addition, despite only one period of grand coalition from 1966 to 1969, the social
partnership was a regularized pattern of policy and decision-making throughout the
postwar era.
While it seems clear that the system was neither as extensive in policy
competency nor formally institutionalized as in Austria, the compelling structural
pressures to conform to and abide by consensual policymaking strategies and to bargain,
even when not an absolute necessity, tended to win out over majoritarian and
particularistic interest wishes. The structural power of the social partnership encouraged a
negotiated approach even when direct and institutionalized negotiation was absent
(Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Wessels 2000) This would be the social learning that the
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actors developed from the 1940s onward. The interests, parties, and actors expected
consensus and altered their own behavior and activities to conform to the norms of the
German policymaking process. This was neither absolute nor entirely static, yet peak
associations tended to alter their own behavior and expectations on a range of economic
and social policy areas given the need for consensus and the higher likelihood of veto or
blockage if they failed to take account of the other social partners. (Streeck and Hassel
2004; Katzenstein 1987)
Nonetheless, Hancock is correct is estimating that the German social partnership
lacked the breadth of competence found in the Austrian system. The Austrian social
partnership, though the Joint Commission and other structures, continually expanded its
range of interests, activities, and influence into policy areas not found under its initial
aegis. The German model of social partnership between the state, trade unions, and
business was clearly more limited in scope and competencies. It is clear that the German
social partnership tended to remain focused on a core set of policy issues including
wages, pensions, healthcare, unemployment insurance, vocational training, and labor
markets. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Heimsch 2000)
It was in these areas that the social partnership, under Concerted Action as well as
in the more informal structures before and after, was quite powerful in these policy areas
while there was far less evidence of tripartite arrangements’ influence beyond these
policy areas. Unlike in Austria, where the Joint Commission and Committee on Social
and Economic Questions regularly expanded the areas of influence into prices, education,
the environment, and other areas, the primary German social partnership was more
restricted.
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The German soeial partnership also was far more reliant upon a “rigid legal
framework" than the Austrian model. While Austria's social partnership was more fully
institutionalized, it nonetheless operated with far more flexibility between the social
partners at the national level. The juridification of German labor law and labor-business
relations actually may have contributed to a less flexible system. (Heinisch 2000) This is
further enhanced by the decentralization of worker-employer relations to the firm and
plant level through codetermination that is far more developed in German than in Austria.
(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Bosch 2004) This has actually weakened links between
workers and the sectoral unions in favor of alliances with their own firm.
Codetermination and the sector-based collective bargaining model, with the dominant
role of large industrial unions like IG Metall, impeded the establishment of a powerful
unitary labor actor, such as the DGB, that could have provided both flexibility and
leadership in negotiating and bargaining with industry and the state. (Heinisch 2000)
Of note is the important role of the executive in sustaining the social partnership.
Under Article 65 of the German Constitution, the Chancellor is granted important
independent authority over the “general policy guidelines” of the German state. (Padgett,
Paterson, and Smith 2003; Conradt 2001 ) However, since the creation of the Federal
Republic under Adenauer, the Chancellor has become more central to the policy- and
decision-making process within the German political system, (von Beyme 1993; Goetz
2003) This is derived from as many extra-constitutional sources as constitutional ones,
but nonetheless this has placed the Chancellor in the center of the German political
system where parties, interests, the media, and parliament converge. While the social
partnership regularly operated with little need of oversight or direct state intervention.
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there was a pattern of regularized executive activity in influencing and shaping the social
partners in both collective bargaining and the policymaking process. Chancellors
Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl, occasionally intervened in the negotiation and
bargaining process when the social partners seemed less likely or unwilling to reach a
compromise. This certainly increased under SPD government in the late 1960s and early
1 970s with the creation of Concerted Action but also continued with the Schmidt
government after it dissolved in 1977. (Hancock 1989)
The Schmidt and Kohl governments became exemplars of the growing direct role
of the state in intermediating and shaping the social partnership and social partners as
they failed to reach compromise in the 1980s and 1990s. This broke strongly from the
long tradition of limited state interference in the negotiations and bargaining between
social partners dating back to the establishment of the federal republic. Further, Schmidt
and Kohl began to more regularly institute larger reforms and changes despite higher
levels of dissent from social partners. (Streck and Hassel 2004; Streeck 1997; Vail 2003;
Gobeyn 1993)
It should also be noted that because of some of the perceived limitations and
inconsistency of social partnership, in scope and institutionalization, Germany did exhibit
more characteristics of a mixed system of interest representation that the more purely
corporatist model found in Austria. The interest group system often exhibited more
pluralist elements depending upon the political and economic circumstances, the policy
area, the strength and makeup of the political coalition, and the preferences of the present
government and executive. (Fuchs and Koch 1991; von Beyme 1993)
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There have been significant criticisms of the postwar German model of social
partnership, and these would grow stronger from the 1970s onward. These included the
disenfranchisement and unhappiness of the far left and right in a policymaking process
that often excluded too many interests that fell outside the typical tripartite arrangements.
(Streek 1997) Many on the left and in German labor often felt that industry and
employers were over-represented in patterns of governance, were too insulated by both
the CDU/CSU and SPD, and that the social partnership tended to reinforce this inequality
and exclusion. (Braunthal 1965; Hancock 1989; Thelen 1991; Conradt 2001)
Simultaneously, neo-liberal firms and interests berated the CDU/CSU for its adherence to
the social market version of capitalism and the strong welfare state. (Streeck and Hassel
2004; Schnm 2002)
The most fundamental critiques came from the wings of German society
including radical socialists, terrorist movements, the Greens, the far right, libertarians,
and feminist organizations who for varying reasons felt excluded or ideologically
opposed to the system. Many from the socialist left, such as Claus Offe, Jurgen Habermas
and numerous radicals from the neo-Marxist left, argued that the system of social
partnership did little but maintain a status quo of inequality amongst classes and
perpetuated an industrial order that was illegitimate. (Hancock 1989; Offe 1984) Feminist
and Green organizations felt excluded from important policymaking processes as well,
though both issues were eventually co-opted to some extent into the system by the birth
and inclusion of the Green Party and significant legislation and political party changes
that brought more feminist issues into the policy process. (Hancock 1989; Parkes 1997)
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A major limitation of the social partnership, compared to that of Austria, has also
been the strong role and authority of the Lander in the policymaking process as well.
While both Austria and Germany are federal regimes, the German state has a far more
powerful federal system in which the provinces play a significant role. Constitutionally,
the Lander were reserved important economic powers vis-a-vis the central government in
a number of critical areas including social and welfare policy, industrial relations, and
labor relations. (Markovits 1986; Vail 2003; Jeffrey 2003) The states also have a direct
parliamentary role through the Bundesrat
,
the upper house, in approving or vetoing major
domestic legislation. (Conradt 2001; Parkes 1997; Katzenstein 1987; Dalton 1989)
Attempts in the 1980s to formally re-institutionalize the social partnership since
the collapse of Concerted Action in 1977 failed under both Schmidt and Kohl
governments. The efforts of the DGB to establish an Economic and Social Council,
similar to that found in the Netherlands, during the mid-1970s were blocked not only by
business interests but also by new post-material interest associations, such as
environmentalists and feminists, which felt excluded from the proposed council and its
tripartite labor-business-govemment structure. (Markovits 1986) There was also strong
disapproval from parliament and legal scholars that argued the plan would weaken the
democratic and representative constitutional order of the Basic Law. (von Beyme 1993)
Even the periods where there was more formal structure to the social partnership,
such as during the era of Concerted Action, the impact has been muted. Many suggest
that the effects and meanings of Concerted Action itself have been “overrated” and
perhaps “conveyed a harmony of interests that never existed", (von Beyme 1993; Streeck
and Hassel 2004) Others suggest that it was merely used as a public relations gambit to
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create an illusion of social partnership in lieu of concrete consensual policymaking
structures. (Hancock 1989) Notable evidence was that work stoppages caused by both
labor and business action actually increased two-fold during the period rather than
declined during the six years of Concerted Action. Of course, as von Beyme suggests, the
conflicts could have been more intense if the system was not used at all. (von Beyme
1993)
Compared to Austria, the German model was not nearly as expansive and
influential into tertiary issues of economic and social policy. In this way, Germany
exhibited a more mixed model of concurrent neo-corporatism and pluralism. In some
policy areas and under certain economic and political conditions, the social partnership
might be dominant while in other times and on other issues the German system tended to
work along more pluralist political lines. It also depended upon the specific political and
economic conditions or “mood” of the German government, (von Beyme 1993)
Importantly, the postwar social partnership was, for the most part, strongly representative
of the model of semi-sovereignty that provided a more circumscribed and secondary role
to the state vis-a-vis the social partners in a number of important areas of economic
governance including wages, collective bargaining, social insurance, codetermination,
vocational training, and labor market policies. (Katzenstein 1987) Strong peak
associations representing labor, business, and agriculture were able to negotiate and
bargain amongst themselves, and sometimes with the government, to achieve a
remarkable record of economic growth, prosperity, social peace, and political stability.
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Yet by the late 1970s and 1980s social, economic, and political challenges were
threatening the very fabric of the German model as consensus and compromise became
more difficult to manufacture and the roles of the social partners and state began to alter
the once dominant model of consensual economic and social governance that had made
Germany so successful and envied.
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CHAPTER 6
THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP IN AUSTRIA SINCE THE 1980S
Introduction
The Austrian model of development and social partnership came into what has
generally been regarded as “crisis” by the mid and late 1980s as economic growth
flattened, regional and global economic pressures increased, and the domestic political
environment was transformed. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1998; Kramer
1996; Talos 1996; Karlhofer 1996; Pulzer 1995; Unger 1999; Kittel 2000; Viebrock
2004) Austria was forced to make difficult choices, or difficult choices were thrust upon
them, regarding its economic and political model so as to survive in a more global and
European atmosphere.
According to Katzenstein and others scholars, the social partnership and its neo-
corporatist structures should have been ideal in addressing these challenges. The social
partnership had navigated Austria through the precarious postwar reconstruction and
crisis-ridden 1970s adeptly. Flexibility and adaptation were often identified as the most
critical and positive benefits of the social partnership. (Katzenstein 1984) As Heinisch
suggests, the centralized Austrian social partnership was able to “help translate, absorb,
and distribute economic and social pressures created by international economic
transformations”. (Heinisch 2000)
However, by the 1980s, rather than being viewed as a solution to economic and
social dilemmas in Austria, the social partnership and neo-corporatism would be
identified by many as one of the problems of the Austrian system as it created barriers to
efficient economic policymaking. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1999) Talos argued such a
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change did not “necessarily portend an end to corporatism in Austria” but did signify a
tangible requirement for change “in the erstwhile form of interest group politics”. (Talos
1996, 104)
Hence the 1980s and 1990s were a tumultuous era for the Austrian social
partnership. This section will assess why the social partnership's fortunes were so altered
in the passing of a mere decade. The once revered system transited from domestic and
international adoration to a “burden to modernization” in relatively short order. (Holl,
Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) It has generally been argued that the social partnership
emerged in the 2 1
'' l
century far weaker and less salient in Austrian policymaking than it
had only two decades prior. Nonetheless, despite all the “disorganizing pressures” that
the Austrian social partnership has experienced, there has also been significant continuity
of many “elements of interest intermediation, concertation, and conflict resolution”.
(Kittel 2000) Heinisch even argues that the social partnership surprisingly underwent a
“skillful adaptation of organized decentralization” ending with a strengthened
repositioning of neo-corporatism in Austria. (Heinisch 2000) In any case, the Austrian
social partnership has undergone a remarkable transformation, with evidence of both
change and continuity, from the 1980s into the early 2f century.
Economic Transformations and Challenues
The most notable change in Austria during this period was a widespread and
lasting slowdown of the Austrian economy by the 1980s. While Austria did not escape
the recessions of the early 1970s, they were certainly milder than those found in the
United States, United Kingdom, and most other advanced industrial states. (Haberler
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1982; Katzenstein 1984, 1985) Growth between 1971 and 1981 was 4.3% compared to
the OECD average of 3.2% while cost of living and inflation rates were only 6.1%
compared to 9.7%. Unemployment was 2%, the lowest of the OECD during the period.
(Lens 1985) Hence, Austria weathered the earliest recessional storms of the 1970s quite
well. Yet by the 1980s, the impacts of economic recession were more strongly felt and
had important concussive effects. Economic growth rates declined below European
averages, deindustrialization lead to higher unemployment (though still only 4% by
1 984), high wages and taxes drove industry and manufacturing overseas, and budget
deficits soared. (Arndt 1982; Haberler 1982; Lens 1985; Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996)
Between 1984 and 1987, economic growth slowed to 1.8% of GDP. (Heinisch 2000)
Increases in the provision of social welfare benefits had also strained the budget and
economic competitiveness while inflation and prices were rising to problematic levels.
These stories were common throughout Western Europe and other advanced industrial
states in the 1970s and 1980s, and Austria was no exception. As Pelinka argues, this
began to diminish Austria’s “charm” and “special status” as it illustrated that its prized
Austro-Keynesianism and Austro-corporatism were no longer immune from the vagaries
of the global economy. (Pelinka 1998, 1998a, 1999) The economic downturns and
structural transformation provided some of the first important challenges to the postwar
social partnership since it was precisely these kinds of international economic
fluctuations that the flexible and consensual decision-making process was designed to
address. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Gerlich, Grande, and Mill ler 1988; Gerlich 1992;
Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1999)
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The 1970s through 1990s were a period of important restructuring of the Austrian
economy. Austria transformed into a primarily service-based economy from one
dominated by heavy industry. By 1990 over 60% of its economy was in the service sector
as white-collar employment expanded. Blue-collar employment continued to shrink as
Austria emerged as a post-industrial economy. (Crepaz 1995) Its accession to the EU in
1995, continuing de-industrialization, privatization, and other economic reforms were
painful for many in Austria. Austria also experienced a massive fall in exports, a rapid
decline in industrial production, and a series of failures of large enterprises. The most
affected sectors were steel, iron, chemical, paper, and textile production, where state-
owned heavy industry saw losses of several billion Schillings. (Dimbacher 1993) The
decline of the German economy, Austria's largest trading partner, from the late- 1990s
onward also exacerbated unemployment and low GDP growth. (OECD 2007; Thomsen
and Hadjimichael 2007) This increased the demand for greater economic reform but
commensurately increased the scale and number of conflicts between economic interests.
The Austrian economy had rebounded and stabilized by 2006. Budget deficits had
shrunk, unemployment was reduced, and GDP growth exceeded 3% in 2006. Yet Austria
still faces significant challenges in areas of deregulation of the service sector, enhancing
competition, and labor market participation. (Thomsen and Hadjimichael 2007) Hence,
while Austria has emerged from the turbulence of the 1980s-2000s in relative good order,
the need to remain adaptable and flexible in the European and global marketplace is as
large, if not larger, than in the past. Crepaz argues that neo-corporatism is, by definition,
incapable of adapting to the transition from an industrial to post-industrial society.
(Crepaz 1995) However, Crepaz would probably be more accurate to state that traditional
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tripartite social partnerships have difficulty in adapting to such transitions. (Pelinka 1999)
There is no reason why post-materialist social partnerships and neo-corporatism could
not potentially arise in the future in Austria or other states. (Wiarda 1997; Adams 2002)
Nonetheless, the route that brought Austria to its current economic and political
environment has had enormous implications for the social partnership and its future.
(Pelinka 1999)
Liberalization, Privatization, and Challenges to Social Democracy
One of the significant reforms that Austria has pursued since the 1980s has been
privatization of formerly state-owned or controlled industries. (Kittel 2000; Pelinka 1999)
This was accomplished for both economic and political rationale. Politically, the OVP
returned to the government with the renewal of the grand coalition in 1987 and was able
to represent a more pro-business agenda after a long absence during the SPO-dominated
1 970s and 1 980s. Yet the left and right, and labor and business, also recognized the need
to reform the economic policies and models of the state as the world and European
economies had placed even greater pressure on Austrian competitiveness. (Crepaz 1994)
Even those critical of privatization felt Austria faced few other options in the ever-
globalizaing and Europeanizing economy of the 1980s and 1990s. (Pelinka 1999) Many
of the anti-cyclical, Austro-Keynesiamsm, and other macroeconomic strategies used by
Austria from the 1940s to the 1970s to sustain economic growth, maintain a strong state
role in the economy, reign in inflation, manage exchange rates, keep unemployment low,
provide generous welfare benefits, subsidize domestic industry and farming, and increase
exports had become ineffective and dysfunctional in a transformed world economy.
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Change may not have been preferred but was deemed necessary. (Kramer 1996; Arndt
1982; Seidel 1982, 1996; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Marchant 2001; Kittel 2000)
The new global and European economic environments also significantly
restrained many of these macroeconomic tools of the Austrian state. (Fitzmaurice 1990
151) As Kramer and others suggest, from the 1950s until the 1980s small states like
Austria were potentially able to be free riders in the increasing global trade environment.
Austria could be protectionist, but by being small enough, was able to avoid drawing too
much attention to its policies from large trading states and partners like Germany, Italy,
the United Kingdom, or the United States. (Kramer 1998; Riklin 1991; Frei 1977;
Katzenstein 1985) The recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, the reform and reinvigoration
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in the Uruguay Rounds from
1986, the end of the Cold War, and the increasing pace and importance of European
integration ended this “clever trick” and exposed Austria to the wider forces of the global
and regional economies. (Pulzer 1998) Even as a long standing member of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), Austria and the other smaller members of the group
were able to maintain fairly unequal protectionist economic policies.
Significant privatization and reduction of the public sector has been
commensurate with Austria's integration into the European and world economies. The
need for privatization, liberalization, and reform to bring Austria in line with GATT, the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and EU standards of trade and openness has
fundamentally changed the power and role of the social partnership in regulating Austrian
business and industry. (Crepaz 1994; Marchant 2001; Pelinka 1999) The 1980s and
1 990s saw a process of deregulation and privatization of most major state-owned or
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controlled firms. This has been primarily done in an incremental manner that continues to
present day. (Kittel 2000; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998; The Economist 2003) Many argue
that the difficult process of structural reform was hampered by not only the scale of
nationalization into banking, finance, insurance, as well as heavy industry, but also by the
social partners' unwillingness to quickly and radically reform. (Crepaz 1994, 1995) This
is not to say that gradual reform is less preferable to radical reform. Rather, there has
been significant criticism that Austria has gone too slowly and incrementally impeding its
own economic integration and growth by unnecessarily dragging out the process. Again,
this would diminish the argument that the social partnership and neo-corporatism provide
timely, adaptable, and flexible decision-making to the small Austrian state and enhance
its ability to navigate the international economy. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Pulzer 1995,
1998; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Gerlich 1992; Crepaz 1994, 1995)
Nonetheless, reform did gradually occur in both privatization and penetration by
foreign capital into the Austrian economy. The first major act of privatization was the
passage of a 1985 law to reduce the holdings of the Austrian state holding company,
OIAG (Osterreichische Industrieholdings-Aktiengesellschaft). The privatization of oil,
steel, banking, tobacco, salt, and other industries, while mostly accomplished, continues
to be fiercely debated by the major parties, interests, and other actors. (Lauber 1992;
Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996; Kittel 2000) Nonetheless, even amongst labor and the left
there was resignation to the necessity of privatization to remain even remotely
competitive in the European and global economies. (Pelinka 1999; Unger 1999)
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Banking and finance was perhaps the most hotly contested sector of the economy.
Given the strong role of the state in both public and private capital and finance markets
this should not seem surprising. It was also one of the primary conduits in which labor
could regulate or coerce the private sector throughout the postwar era. (Katzenstein 1984;
Talos 1996)
The privatization process was itself an example of the decline of the social
partnership’s efficacy. The privatization efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s
illustrated a number of trends that bode poorly for the social partnership in Austria. This
privatization period was punctuated by OGB attempts to maintain a mixed economy
while the OVP and WKO advocated thorough privatization. The OGB’s influence in the
SPO had declined, weakened by overall decline in heavy industrial employment and
weakening party identity and loyalty. Hence the OGB was unable and did not “intervene
decisively in this policy-making process”. (Kittel 2000) The dissolution of the SPO-FPO
coalition with the 1987 elections, and the subsequent creation of a SPO-OVP grand
coalition created the conditions for major reform. The SPO realized that it could not, and
need not maintain strictly protectionist and anti-liberal stances in this altered economic
and political landscape.
Nonetheless, the early privatization efforts of the late 1980s, while restructuring
many major industries, still attempted to maintain state ownership of a blocking minority
of shares and to try and keep the firms organized into large conglomerates. Hence, while
privatization in the late 1980s was eventually instituted, it was far from thorough.
Nonetheless, while it might reflect compromise between the SPO and OVP, it was not a
decision reached with the explicit support of unions and the OGB This was primarily due
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to the fact that while labor and the left were not thrilled with the prospects and
consequences of wider privatization and liberalization of the Austrian economy, they
lacked any viable alternatives. Hence, while the privatization process mostly bypassed
the Joint Commission and social partnership, in reality the process was initiated due to
the implicit acquiescence of the much weaker SPO and OGB. (Pelinka 1999) A second
round of privatizations in the 1990s followed the increased risk of Austria losing its
triple-A credit status in the international financial markets. This found the OGB even
more isolated from the policy and decision-making process as well as from its former
political party partner, the SPO. As Kittel suggests, from 1986 onwards, while
compromise took place it was primarily between the coalition parties of the SPO and
OVP rather than through the formal and informal structures of the social partnership.
Labor had very little input and became marginalized from the process. (Kittel 2000) The
1993 OIAG law firmly placed Austria on the road to privatization in even its smaller
sectoral holdings. (Kittel 2000)
Almost one-third of all privatized firms ended up in foreign hands, the majority
German. (Heinisch 2000) This has increased criticism of the privatization process as un-
Austrian. A recent example was the sale of Voest-Alpine, a steel group, in which the
Austrian government owned about one-third of the shares. The proposed sale of the
remaining shares to a Canadian firm sparked political controversy in 2003. The
provincial government of Upper Austria, the FPO, OGB and others had serious concerns
not only over privatization but also about the sale to a foreign owner. The eventual
agreement was to accept a lower price for the shares from a domestic investment group, a
uniquely Austrian decision. ( The Economist 2003a)
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Austria is now committed to privatization under European auspices as well its
own domestic attempts to improve the competitiveness of the Austrian economy. Hence
it has to address both domestic concerns and politics and European rules and oversight in
regards to such privatizations. (Pelinka 1998) The inflow of foreign capital and
increasing foreign ownership of Austrian firms has been, and continues to be one of the
largest consequences of the liberalization reforms. While the postwar period had strongly
linked public and private industry and finance to the state and the influence of the social
partnership, privatization has resulted in a major internationalization of the control of
Austria's major industries, banks, and other firms. Nearly 20% of all Austrian industry is
now owned by German firms and perhaps as many as 40% of all Austrian firms are now
partly or fully foreign owned. (Pelinka 1998; Marchant 2001; U.S Department of
Commerce 2007) Austria can no longer be called a case of “capitalism without capital or
capitalists” and many of these capitalists are non-Austrian as well. (Pelinka 1998; Lens
1985; Heinisch 2000) This means that a growing number of employers and firms fall
outside of Austrian ownership and reduce the ability of the state to directly influence
firms’ decision-making. However, the state still maintains an above-average number of
partial or minority ownerships in a number of utilities, firms, and industries. With the
renewal of the grand coalition and re-inclusion of the SPO in government, new plans for
privatization have slowed as well (U.S. Department of Commerce 2007) Hence, while
Austria has seen major changes, it is not in the extensive and radical Thatcher model of
privatization seen in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s.
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There have also been significant changes to labor markets and their regulation that
have increased non-union employment and reduced the overall influence of the OGB to
organize and participate in its traditional roles. A number of flexible, temporary and self-
employment reforms were enacted during the late 1990s and early 2000s. (Unger 1999;
Pelinka 1999, Falkner 2001; Kittel 2000) This has had several effects including decline in
union density and membership. But it has also created a split between secure “core”
employees, tending to be unionized with higher wages and benefits, and less secure
“peripheral” workers whose employment stability, wages, and benefits are far lower.
(Unger 1999; Pelinka 1999) This has created new tensions between the Chambers of
Labor and OGB as their memberships become less and less overlapping. Liberalization of
the labor market was a very contentious but necessary set of reforms to keep Austrian
competitive in the European and global economies, as well as to provide a more flexible
labor environment for greater post-Fordist commercial, service, and technology sectors.
(Pelinka 1999)
In terms of the welfare state, there was significant compromise in the 1990s on
major reductions and changes to welfare provision and funding. This was negotiated by
the social partners both within and outside of the Joint Commission. The 1995 Savings
Package, or Sparpaket
,
consolidated several reforms into a single act including budget
austerity measures, lower taxes, wage cuts, increased employee and family contributions
to pension and healthcare plans, and streamlining or reduction of some elements of
welfare provision. (Falkner 2002) The most notable part was how quickly labor and the
left acquiesced to these changes that ran counter to their entire postwar Keynesian
orientation.
335
Unger argues that this reflected both labor’s resignation to the new European and
global reality but also a realignment of the social partnership that tended to be favorable
towards commerce and industry. Further, this undermines the whole principle of Austrian
social partnership that has been based on parity or proporz between labor and capital
interests. (Unger 1999) Katzenstein would alternately suggest that Austria was merely
becoming more Swiss, as it transited from a more social form of neo-corporatism to a
more liberal one as labor becomes weaker while business becomes more dominant.
(Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Unger 1998; Pelinka 1999)
There were also changes to the system of vocational training that had been
decisively under the auspices of the social partners until the 1990s. The Austrian system
of vocational training was officially under the authority of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, but much like in Germany, the administration and operation of the system was
primarily accomplished by the direct roles of the Federal Chamber of Business (WKO)
and Federal Chamber of Labor (BAK). Unlike Germany, where there was a rather equal
role for each social partner, the Austrian model tended to be dominated by the WKO.
(Kittel, 2000) Reforms in the 1990s were undertaken due to both government and labor
demands for greater oversight and roles. These emerged due to problems in the
vocational training system itself, including lack of available seats for younger workers
and lack of transparency in the finances of the system. The eventual reforms enacted by
1997 after protracted talks, negotiations, and bargaining nonetheless reflected a
compromise and consensus between the social partners and state. The system has adopted
higher levels of state financing and commensurate direct state influence in the direction
and operation of the system. Additionally, labor has a larger voice in the system as well
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Nonetheless, the WKO remains rather dominant in the vocational training system.
(Kittel 2000) The changes illustrate that while there are challenges to the structures and
institutions of social partnership, they may still continue to eventually find compromise
and that enacted reforms have been more incremental, a major characteristic of the
postwar system.
However, there have been increasing number of cases where compromise and
continuity have been less resilient. Debates over changes to working hours and increasing
flexibility of worker schedules have met with significant structural conflict since the
1990s. With neither side willing to make significant concessions, the state was forced to
step in and publicly announce its willingness to enact reforms without the social partners
if necessary. This threat allowed the government to oversee the remaining bargaining
process and eventually carve out a compromise that broke the stalemate. By 1997, an
agreement was reached between labor and business with the support of the major parties.
Nonetheless, while eventually a successful case of compromise and consensus in labor
market reforms, it required greater governmental interference and shepherding than had
been the norm during the immediate postwar era. (Kittel 2000)
The new international and European economic environment that Austria finds
itself is one with greater economic uncertainty. This stems from an increased pace of
financial and investment transactions, greater fluctuations in markets due to the increased
options and flexibility of supplies and distribution networks, a more speculative and fast-
paced global investment market, new transformational technologies that regularly change
the demands of production, training, and consumption, a greater demand for flexible and
adaptive workforces and labor supplies, and a far more competitive global and regional
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marketplace for all forms of production and service. (Unger 1999; Kittel 2000; Pelinka
1999) This has increased the number of “shocks” that the system confronts and also
changes the types of shocks confronted. While the 1960s and 1970s shocks were
primarily demand or inflationary shocks, new shocks are more likely to be structural,
organizational, or institutional requiring significant different policy responses by the
state. While the social partnership addressed the demands of inflation and other shocks
quite well from the 1940s to 1970s, the new shocks have been disruptive to the Austrian
social partnership itself. (Unger 1999) Most Austrians see little option other than to
globalize and integrate, yet most also feel that the results place more and more outside of
their control or influence. (Unger 1998)
As Kittel argues, despite the internationalization, liberalization, and
decentralization of the Austrian economy since the 1980s, this need not necessarily be
commensurate with a “retreat” of neo-corporatist policymaking and interest
intermediation in all areas. His research suggests that even into the late 1990s and early
2000s that the social partnership was still an effective force inside the Austrian socio-
economic policymaking process. In vocational training and work hours policy, the social
partnership has managed to adjust and continued to thrive, though in a less consensual
and cooperative manner. While there were strong divisions between the sides in both
these issue areas, the eventual results were attained within the structures and processes of
the social partnership (Kittel 2000; Falkner and Talos 1999) Kittel argues that in some
key areas, social partnership might continue to be an ideal form of policymaking even in
a liberalizing and globalizing economic and political environment.
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Disputing the notion that decentralization or markets (neo-liberalism) is always
more compatible, and provides greater flexibility, with a disorganization of interests
(pluralism) than organized and structured interests (neo-corporatism), Kittel and others
affirm that concertation and social partnership may actually increase efficiency and
flexibility. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Kittel 2000) Nonetheless, it also illustrates
the significant change in the central role of the social partnership in economic
policymaking. While it was once a consistently strong force, it is now an intermittent one.
The social partnership has showed strong continuity in addressing working hours policy.
But in vocational training while compromise was eventually achieved it was under far
less consensual and cooperative conditions. And finally, in privatization policy, the social
partnership seems to have collapsed as an effective institution altogether. Further, the
increasing role of the state in vocational training and managing the process of social
partnership suggests transformation as well. (Kittel 2000; Falkner and Talos 1994)
While the internationalization and Europeanization of the Austrian economy has
certainly contributed to the crises of neo-corporatism in Austria, there have also been
perceptible changes in the political conditions as well. Liberalization and globalization
certainly represent enormous changes to the Austrian economy and challenges to the
social partnership, yet these cannot be taken out of the changing domestic political
context in Austria.
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There have been enormous changes in the political behavior, parties, actors, and
institutions over the past three decades that are as likely, if not potentially more likely, to
explain the transformation of the Austrian social partnership. (Unger 1997, 1999) These
economic and political transformations are not easily disaggregated from one another and
certainly seem to be mutually reinforcing the challenges to the social partnership in
Austria.
Transformation of the Political Party System
Politically, the Austrian party system has undergone significant change. The OVP
and SPO have both seen erosion of their support and a decline in party identification and
membership ties, certainly affecting their ability to mobilize voters. (Pelinka and Plasser
1989; Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Fitzmaurice
1990; Pelinka 1998a) Party identification has shrunk in Austria from approximately 75%
of voters in the 1950s to less than 50% by the mid 1990s. (Plasser and Ulram 1991;
Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Luther 1992; Pulzer 1995; Plasser and Ulram
1995; Muller 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a) Voter turnout has also dropped from over 92%
in the 1970s to under 82% by the 1990s. 4 (Pulzer 1995; Muller 1996; Pelinka 1998,
1998a) The increasing importance of the FPO, Green Parties, and other smaller parties
has upended the traditional grand coalition formula frequently since 1986. (Fitzmaurice
1990, 1996; Pelinka and Plasser 1989; Crepaz 1994, 1995; Sully 1996; Pelinka 1998,
1 998a; Rose 2000) The shares of seats held by the two major parties, the SPO and OVP,
9
Turnout increased to over 84% in the 2006 elections.
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have shrunk from nearly 90% in the early 1950s to less than 60% by the 1990s. 10
(Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Pulzer 1995; Muller 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a;
Sully 1997) Perhaps, as Sully suggests, the traditional two-party system of Austria has
been “usurped by a pentagonal structure”. (Sully 1996, 1997) Elections have also become
more expensive, with each election outstripping previous totals. (Sully 1997; Muller
2000) Electoral changes in Austria, once small and incremental, have become larger and
slightly more volatile despite the electoral reforms of 1992 and 1993 that were intended
to punish smaller parties. (Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Pulzer 1995;
Fitzmaurice 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a; Saltiel 2000; Rose 2000; Sully 1996)
Jorg Haider, the FPO, and other parties have often expressed discomfort with the
elitism, proporz spoils system, and insularity of the decision-making process arguing that
majority politics and efficiency are more democratic than the system under the social
partnership. (Fitzmaurice 1990; Crepaz 1994, 1995; Sully 1996; Heilbrunn 1997;
Fairlamb 2000; Nagorski 2000; Pryce-Jones 2000; Rose 2000; Saltiel 2000; Marchant
2001 ) This more pluralist and anti-elitist turn paid large electoral credits in the 1990s as
the FPO gained significant ground with skilled and unskilled workers, farmers, the self-
employed, and retirees. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Plasser and Ulram 1995; Pulzer 1995; Sully
1996, 1997; Pelinka 1998; Rose 2000; Saltiel 2000; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998)
Of course critiquing the system is far different than governing. Once in
government as the coalition partner of the OVP, the FPO discovered that support for
major overhauls of welfare, pension, and industrial policy were potentially dangerous.
FPO and OVP plans for an Austrian “third way” of smaller government and lower taxes
10 The highest was 93.1 in 1971 and 1975 This has since rebounded to just under 70% in the last
parliamentary elections of October 2006. This percentage is important for constitutional
amendments and other special acts require a two-thirds majority for passage in the Austrian parliament,
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were revolutionary for many Austrians. (Rose 2000; Marchant 2001 ) The FPO eventually
backed away from many of its more radical platform items and support for OVP-
sponsored reforms on a number of issues. ( The Economist 2000a; Viebrock 2004)
This has been met with a concurrent loosening of ties between the interest
associations and political parties and increasing importance of parliamentary politics vis-
a-vis the social partnership. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988;
Pelinka and Plasser 1989; Muller 1992; Pelinka 1998; Karlhofer 1996) This de-alignment
of interests and parties has strong implications for the institutions of the social
partnership which have been built with strong linkages to what was once an
extraordinarily stable political party system.
The defection ofOGB and labor votes to the populist FPO, and of radical and
leftists to the Green Alternative, or Grime Alternative (GA), and the United Greens of
Austria, or Vereinte Grime Osterreichs (VGO), has weakened the SPO at national and
provincial levels. (Europe 1999; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998) In 1995 and 1999, the FPO
had become the major recipient of blue-collar workers in historically “red Vienna”.
(Trausmuth 2000; Rose 2000; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998)
The OVP is little better off having lost some VOI-business (especially small
business) and agrarian support to the FPO and Jorg Haider's new offshoot party, the
Bindnis Zukunft Osterreich (BZO) or Alliance for the Future of Austria. The OVP has
also lost support to some smaller nationalist or liberal parties such as the Liberal Forum,
or Liberales Forum (LF) (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Muller 1996, 2000; Adams 2001 ; Pulzer
1995; Sully 1996; Fitzmaurice 1990)
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As parties have “emancipated” themselves from neo-corporatist couplings, party
competition and parliamentary politics have assumed a much larger role in Austrian
decision-making than in previous neo-corporatist eras. (Crepaz 1994, 1995) This has
made maintenance of previous, as well as the current, grand coalitions more difficult. The
1995 and 2007 parliamentary elections resulted in SPO-OVP coalition. Nonetheless the
results showed the increasing complexity and declining consensus of the parties. While
the 1995 parliamentary elections resulted in the customary SPO-OVP coalition, the
negotiations, the second longest in postwar Austrian history, were quite turbulent and the
government that emerged was lacking “self-confidence” and the “will and capacity to
solve urgent problems”. (Sully 1996; Muller 2000) As many scholars suggest, grand
coalition in Austria functions under different conditions and different rules than in the
past. (Gerlich 1992; Pulzer 1995; Sully 1996; Saltiel 2000)
There are also fewer members of the interest associations in the leadership of the
political parties and in parliamentary seats. (Kunkel and Pontusson 1998; Pelinka 1998,
1999; Lauber 1995) Prior to the 1980s, over half of all parliamentary seats were filled by
persons serving in both political parties and interest associations. (Talos 1996) That
number has dropped below 19% by the late 1990s. (Karlhofer 1999; Viebrock 2004;
Pelinka 1999) This weakens the interest associations within the decision-making process
as well as within the major political parties. Numerous legislative and peak association
disputes, including the 1995 budget battle and the 2003 pension reform bill, highlight this
growing trend and the types of new political conflicts that may emerge from them.
(Crepaz 1994, 1995; Lauber 1995)
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Year Labor Business Agriculture Total
1973 31 9 12 52
1978 31 13 13 57
1987 25 10 9 44
1991 21 7 7 35
1995
Source:
11
Pelinka, 1999
5 5 21
Table 4: Representatives of Economic Interest Groups in the Austrian Parliament
In terms of political parties, while the Austrian system has certainly experienced a
slide in party identification, a weakening of the two major parties (SPO and OVP) at the
benefit of a number of third parties, and a decrease in party loyalty, Austria still
maintains numbers well above the European average in many categories. (Plasser, Ulram,
and Grausgruber 1992; Pulzer 1995; Miilller 1996) While party membership and the
decline of the major parties has implications for the stability Austrian politics and the
social partnership, the continuing strength in relative terms suggests that continuity is
certainly a possibility. Fitzmaurice argues that anything other than grand coalition has
often seemed “a deviation from the norm” and that many Austrians believe that it should
return. (Fitzmaurice 1996, 90) The FPO, while making large gams in the 1990s, has seen
those fortunes reversed in the last few elections. Consider that in the most recent
parliamentary elections of October 2006, the results created a new grand coalition
between the SPO and OVP similar to that of most of the postw ar Austrian political
experience. There are some significant differences as well including a much smaller
percentage of parliamentary seats and certainly a change in the membership, issues, and
support for both parties. (Fraser 2007; The Economist 2007; Marchant 2001
)
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In addition, even with changing electoral fortunes in Austria, the social
partnership can certainly exist in a more competitive or multiparty environment. Hence
while party politics in Austria has certainly more interesting than in the previous era the
threat to the stability of the social partnership is not automatically endangered. However,
if the parties and major interest associations continue to or increasingly seek to bypass
and marginalize the structures of the Austrian social partnership, greater party instability
and de-alignment certainly must ring an alarm for the neo-corporatist institutions in the
Austrian system. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Marchant 2001 ) Given the more conflict-oriented
and vicious tenor of the major parties during recent electoral cycles, it also seems clear
that both their willingness and ability to compromise and bargain has been diminished.
(Crepaz 1994; Sully 1996)
Pelinka and Ulram suggest three potential outcomes for Austrian parties that
would directly influence the social partnership. (Ulram 1990; Pelinka 1998a) The
Italianization of the Austrian system would result in a complete breakdown of the party
system and realignment along new cleavages, as happened in Italy in the early 1990s.
This would necessitate a total reorganization of the links and synchronization between
parties and interest groups in Austria. Netherlandization of Austria's party system would
emerge from the decomposition of existing large parties and the establishment of new
breakaway parties. As happened in the Netherlands in the 1970s with the dissolution of
its old pillar system of Catholic-Protestant-Socialist consociationa! and corporatist
arrangements, the Austrian party system could emerge as much more unpredictable and
with a stronger focus on parliamentary decision-making. This would sap power from the
institutions of the social partnership and would also require significant realignment
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between parties and interests. The third potential outcome is Switzerlandization in which
the system rolls along maintaining it proporz brand of consociationalism amongst the
major parties while slowly crumbling from the outside, eventually reaching a point of no
return. (Ulram 1990; Pelinka 1998a)
Transformation of Identities, Solidarity, Post-Materialism, and Post-Industrialism
Austrians have also begun to change their attitudes towards the social partnership
and the nature of its institutionalization in the Austrian political system. Public criticism
of the system has risen with many sharply disagreeing with compulsory or obligatory
membership. (Fitzmaurice 1990; Crepaz 1995, 1994; Markovits 1996; Rose 2000;
Howard 2000; Marchant 2001; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998) Increasingly, loyalty and
solidarity within interest associations has also been waning. Fewer members actively take
part in association elections for the federal and provincial chambers, while others openly
berate the chambers for lack of equitable representation and transparency, corruption,
nepotism, bureaucratic inefficiency, and lack of innovation. (Luther 1992; Crepaz 1994,
1995; Markovits 1996) Elections within the chambers have been experiencing significant
decline since the 1980s. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Crepaz 1994; Markovits
1 996) Voter turnout in Chamber of Labor elections dropped below 40% in 1994 and has
yet to significantly rebound. (Pelinka 1998) Voting in the Chamber of Business has also
shrunk to less than 62%. (Gerlich 1992) Many unions and workers under the OGB and
Federal Chamber of Labor umbrellas are less and less inclined to support the leadership
at the federal level. (Luther 1992; Crepaz 1994; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998) Union
membership and density is also in decline, further weakening their overall leverage in the
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system. (Pelinka 1998; Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Kunkel and Pontusson
1998; Heinisch 2000) Further, the OGB may also be failing to identify and organize new
workers, especially in the service sectors, to bolster their support The schisms within
labor may also include those between older and more protected or privileged workers
from heavy industries and younger ones in newer service-oriented and lower wage
employment. (Kunkel and Pontusson 1998; Heinisch 2000) Nonetheless, there have been
only a few changes to the system of centralized collective bargaining that is still
dominated by the chambers and large peak associations. This will be discussed in later
sections of this chapter.
Katzenstein's distinction between liberal corporatism, in which business is the
stronger force, and social corporatism, in which labor dominates, is relevant here. It
suggests that the decline in strength of labor unions does not necessarily mean an overall
decline in corporatism but merely a shift from social to liberal corporatism. (Katzenstein
1984; Lijphart 1999) However, the decline of membership and solidarity “weakens the
ability of labor unions to act on behalf of large numbers of workers and hence weakens
their influence in tripartite negotiations”. (Lijphart 1999; Pelinka 1999)
Labor may not be alone in facing both internal and external challenges to its unity
and monopoly. Solidarity to the partnership also appears to be in decline among Austrian
firms competing in the European and global marketplaces. As Austrian firms become
more European and global in orientation, customer-base, suppliers, ownership, and
stakeholders, their willingness to remain committed to an Austrian national economic
solidarity must diminish. Divisions between employers and firms, especially the gaps
between small, medium, and large firms, over globalization and European integration
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have divided the VOI and WKO significantly and more regularly. (Karlhofer 1999;
Heinisch 2000; Adams 2002, 2002a; Viebrock 2004) This has also benefited smaller
parties like the FPO, BZO, and LF who have irregularly promoted more libertarian,
liberal, neo-liberal, or pro-business agendas. Jorg Haider was able to significantly
increase his and the FPO share of business votes in the 1999 election by getting backing
from a number of private and family-owned businesses in Austria. (Kamitschnig 2000;
Crepaz 1994) Haider’s pro-business, pro-privatization, smaller government, anti-
compulsory chamber membership, and lower tax platform attracted many business that
had previous been reliable OVP supporters. This break between the OVP and business
interests from the VOI and Chamber of Business has ramifications upon the role and
power of the Joint Commission vis-a-vis parliament, the parties, and other political
institutions. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Heinisch 2000)
While more and more Austrians are “uneasy with and critical of the interest
associations”, many argue that there has not been a serious question as to the underlying
idea of the neo-corporatist system itself. (Ulram 1993) In polling, nearly 60% of
Austrians still regularly supported the social partnership by the mid 1990s, rising back
above 70% by 1999. (Karlhofer 1996; Heinisch 2000) However many groups have begun
to more seriously critique the social partnership which is perceived as a system of elitism,
cronyism, and inefficiency. (Fitzmaunce 1990; Crepaz 1995; Markovits 1996; Ladika
2000; Rose 2000) The social partnership is still seen by most actors and Austrians as a
desirable part of the political system and prefer a model on consensus-oriented
democracy. (Karlhofer 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1999) But whether it’s a necessary part of the
political system is surely a fundamental question that has not yet fully been answered.
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The inability of the social partnership to address new post-material issues and schisms
has hurt it viability. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1999) Many also note that elites and
Austrian society in general seem to be becoming less consensus-oriented. (Gerlich 1989;
Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Luther 1992; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998;
Fitzmaurice 1990; Rose 2000; Marchant 2001
)
The traditional Lager identities have also begun to weaken. (Plasser, Ulram, and
Grausgruber 1992; Crepaz 1995) The decline of Catholicism towards secularism and the
decline of socialism after the end of the Cold War have eroded the organizational basis
for segments of the social partnership as well. (Pelinka 1998) Social mobility, secularism,
and post-materialism have all contributed to a significant shifting of Austrian political
culture that supported the social partnership for the bulk of the postwar era. (Gerlich,
Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1998, 1998a, 1999; Markovits 1996; Luther 1992) The
affluence and modernization of Austria has diminished both religious and ideological
identities of its citizens. Fewer and fewer workers see themselves as proletarians and as
living standards rose, both blue and white-collar workers discarded more radical and
leftist ideological baggage. The Catholic Conservatives have met a similar fate as the
state and its citizens became increasingly urban, secular and more like other European
states. (Luther 1992) Within Austrian society, the new divisions are based on age,
education, and gender. These growing "post-material” and post-Lager gaps are
fundamentally and permanently altering the Austrian political cultural landscape.
(Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Crepaz 1994,
1995; Pelinka 1999) These new schisms and divisions do not align well with the existing
postwar social partnership's institutions, associations, and ties to political parties. (Luther
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1992; Plasser and Ulram 1995; Pelinka 1998, 1998a, 1999; Howard 2000; Gerlich,
Grande, and Muller 1988) Jorg Haider, the FPO, and other parties were able to make
gains with voters by attacking the old corporatist order, its compulsory nature, and its
privileged leadership. (Unger 1999; Marchant 2001)
The ability for the interest associations and parties to forge compromise in the
field of wages or economic and social policy is declining. (Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996;
Howard 2000; Marchant 2001) This has increased the importance of government and
parliament in the decision-making process. Interest associations’ relationships with the
political parties, while declining in stability, are nonetheless increasing in importance in
such an environment. The increased competition amongst the political parties has made
them more selective and discerning regarding legislation from the Joint Committee on
Wages and Prices, and has even led to many more instances of bypassing the social
partnership structure altogether. (Muller 1992; Crepaz 1994, 1995) Parliament, while in
the heyday of the social partnership in the 1 960s and 1 970s was more than happy to
rubber stamp many proposals of the Joint Committee has become far more likely to turn a
critical and perhaps rejecting eye since the 1980s. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1998;
Seidel 1996; Muller 1992; Gerlich 1992; Marchant 2001)
Even more notable has been the marked increase in labor disputes since the
1980s. While Austria had once led the world in the category of least disrupted economies,
it now ranks much lower (see figure 4 below), well behind Germany, Britain, Sweden,
and even the United States. (The Economist
,
2006) Most notable was the first country-
wide strike in over fifty years on May 6, 2003. Organized by the OGB, the strike clogged
public transport, closed schools and most of the largest firms in Austria. The strike was
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organized to protest the plan of Chancellor Wolfgang Schussel and his OVP-FPO
coalition in Parliament to overhaul the state pension system. As The Economist notes, the
old system of social partnership might be “falling apart” not only by the collapse of the
OVP-SPO grand coalition system but also by an increasing willingness of the
government to bypass the neo-corporatist institutions such as the Joint Commission and
legislate directly from parliamentary majorities with or without the consent of the social
partners. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; The Economist 2003) This certainly would seem to
increase the likelihood of more regularized public labor disputes. However, other than an
additional rail workers’ strike in the spring of 2003 there have been few additional major
strikes. (U.S. Department of Commerce 2007)
I Labour disputes
Iceland has the most fractious industrial relationsin the OECD. Its strike rate—the num-
ber of days lostto labour disputes per 1,000 employees-averaged 581 days a yearfrom
1995-2004. In 1995, its worst year, Iceland lost a l most two days to strikes for every
worker in the economy. The OECD strike rate of 39 i n 2004 was higher than the year be-
fore, but lower than its average over the preceding decade.
Source: Office for National Statistics
Figure 4: Labor Disputes
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Transformation of the Institutions and Structures of Social Partnership
While Austria may no longer be the “exceptionally pure” example of corporatism
it was touted to be, this does not necessarily imply that it will evolve into a pluralist
reflection of its former self. (Lijphart 1999) Rather, Austria may simply become more
like other European nations that tend to be more moderately or weakly corporatist.
(Gerhch 1992; Pelinka 1999) Given the strong social and political preconditions and
general public support for social partnership, wholesale rejection of the neo-corporatist
model is unlikely. Nonetheless, conditions and public support can change dramatically
under difficult political or economic circumstances.
The complex and extensive network of horizontal and vertical interaction between
the state, government, bureaucracy, legislature, political parties, and interest associations
has been gradually curtailed and decentralized. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988;
Pelinka 1999) One of the more gradual changes has been the marginalization of the
Chambers of Agriculture and the increasing power of the VOI at agriculture's expense.
VOI has increased its share of committee seats and begun to act as the “fourth chamber”
that was once reserved for agriculture. (Karlhofer 1996; Viebrock 2004) This does have
the tendency of increasing business and commercial power in the Joint Commission and
other institutions, perhaps swinging the structural balance away from parity and towards
a more pro-business orientation. (Karlhofer 1996) This may be one explanation for the
significant liberalization of labor market regulations in Austria since the late 1990s and
perhaps contributing to the ongoing decline of union density and membership. (Pelinka
1999)
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In November 1992, the presidents of the peak organization recommitted
themselves to the cooperative forums such as the Joint Commission and expressed that it
should become a ‘"special arena” for talks between all social partners and the state. (Talos
1996, 1 19) Hence while compromise and cooperation is more difficult to accomplish, the
basic willingness to pursue consensus may still exist. Yet, there is also growing evidence
that the search for compromise is in retreat and Austria is nearing “the end of consensus”.
(C'repaz 1994; Pelinka 1998; Rise 2000; Marchant 2001
)
Institutionally, there have been significant changes to the social partnership. In
1992, the Joint Commission changed the responsibility of the Subcommittee on Prices
from price control to studying prices and inflation. While the role of the subcommittee
had been in decline for decades, this was more than an incremental change. Price control,
one of the foundations of the Joint Commission, has been abolished from the auspices of
social partnership. (Pelinka 1999) It was eventually transformed into the Subcommittee
on Competition by the late 1990s. (Unger 1997) A new Subcommittee on International
Relations was also created to give the Joint Commission a more European and global
orientation as was a new permanent subgroup for environmental questions. Further, the
Minister of Finance was added as a non-voting member of conference committee.
(Pelinka 1998, 1999; Karlhofer 1996) The chart of the revised Joint Commission is
shown below.
Beyond restructuring, the chambers also accepted a number of important reforms
to their internal operations. The Chamber of Fabor simplified their electoral systems,
increased protection of minority rights, extended the franchise to new classes of
members, instituted new rights of petition and rights to internal documentation, a cut in
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bureaucratic staffing, ceilings for leadership salaries, and increasing transparency
of
chamber finances and spending. The business chamber also instituted important
reforms
during the 1990s including reform of finance methods, increased member services, and,
of course, changing their name to the WKO. (Unger 1999; Viebrock 2004)
The Structure of the Joint Commission
Formal
decision
Informal
decision
Preliminary
decision
Plenary Meeting of the
Joint Commission
_
f
Informal Meeting
( “Prasidentenvorhesprechung”)
of the four presidents
/ / V H
Sub-
committee
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Council of
Economic
and Social
Advisers
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committee on
International
Relations
n
Federal Chamber of Presidential Conference
Labor (former Diet of of Chambers of
Chambers of Labor) Agriculture**
Austrian Federation of
Trade Unions
Austrian Chamber of
Business (former Federal
Chamber of Commerce)
*According to the agreement of November 1992, the Subcommittee on prices will shift
its price control authority to the general observation of market conditions.
“The Chambers of Agriculture are of minor importance for business-labor relations.
They are members of the Joint Commission primarily to keep the balance between interest
groups dominated by the SPO and OVP.
SOURCE: Karlhofer andTalos 1996: 30.
Figure 5: The Structure of the Joint Commission
While this suggests continuity, it may also mask important changes to
the
salience, authority, and emphasis of the social partnership in the
Austrian policymaking
process. While the social partnership may have appeared to be
“continuing as usual
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closer examination revealed “strains and stresses which call the whole system into
question”. (Gerlich 1992, 132; Pelinka 1998; Karlhofer 1996; Crepaz 1994) In 1995 and
1996, the social partnership had to fend off its first significant formal challenge when the
federal government required the chambers to poll their members and ask their willingness
to continue having the chambers as their compulsory legal representatives. All the
chambers, especially labor, mobilized a large victory to maintain the compulsory system.
(Pelinka 1998) For the WKO. the 81 .7% approval seemed overwhelming, though voter
turnout was below 37%. For Labor, the OGB managed to compel higher approval and
turnout, 90.6% in favor with 66.6% turnout. (Viebrock 2004) Nonetheless, this was no
guarantee that “the siege is over” and dwindling approval and solidarity would not
continue to undermine the existing compulsory chamber system. (Pelinka 1998; Viebrock
2004)
The late 1990s saw additional efforts to reform, alter, and even dismember the
existing chamber system. In 1998, the VOI attempted to provoke another referendum on
compulsory membership while other employers proposed split of the WKO into two
parts, one compulsory and one voluntary. The basis of challenge by the VOI and other
complainants was the perceived sluggishness, bureaucratic inefficiency, and costs of
maintaining the WKO. The resulting reforms included some organizational changes to
the chamber, simplified and reduced membership fees, reduced basic service fees, and
professionalization of chamber personnel. (Viebrock 2004) In 1999, a group of FPO-
affiliated business leaders, under the “Modem Austria” initiative banner, demanded a
reduction of dues by an additional 40% and the outsourcing of a number of chamber
services. Without such reform within five years, the group threatened to initiate a new
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referendum of compulsory membership. The results, after a poll of the WKO
membership, were a series of reforms including a reduction of chamber dues (though less
than the 40% demanded), abolition of special entrance fees for new members,
bureaucratic streamlining, and a decentralization of some tasks to provincial level
chambers. Further reform in 2001 included streamlining the decision-making process
within the WKO, reducing the number of functionaries, and increasing transparency. This
has, at least temporarily, shelved future votes on compulsory membership. (Viebrock
2004) Nonetheless, this illustrates that the monopolistic control and centralization that the
chamber of business once held over its members had become quite tenuous and that the
organization has been significantly hollowed out.
Amongst labor, the OGB has also undergone important institutional change. As
organized labor decreases in power, members, and influence, the OGB has amended and
reformed itself regularly. In 1995, the internal electoral system was altered to simplify the
process and increase accountability to the trade unions and works councils. In 1999, the
federation also began allowing a greater decentralization of organizational competence to
the functional and territorial subgroups of the OGB and its member trade unions.
(Heinisch 2000; Viebrock 2004) This decentralization has led to considerably more
competition and conflict within the OGB, which has made their ability to represent a
unified and monopolistic trades union federation at the national level more difficult. It
has also subsequently weakened their ability to bargain and negotiate, even in the
centralized collective bargaining process. However, unlike the German system, this
decentralization has been more modest. (Crepaz 1995; Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000;
Viebrock 2004; Pelinka 1999) While a far more decentralized bargaining and wage
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negotiation process has emerged, especially since 1995, it is still amongst the most
centralized in Europe. (Viebrock 2004) While such change has shaken one of the
foundations of the Austrian social partnership, centralized, collective wage bargaining at
the national level, it has been able to weather the storm. The OGB and WKO remain
primarily responsible and influential over all sectoral and firm collective bargaining
proceedings.
In some cases, the interest associations and social partnership institutions have
remained vital in a number cases and policy areas in recent years. The 1992 reforms of
the Joint Commission, the 1993 reorganization or state employment and retraining
agencies, the 1994 EU referendum, and a number of other recent bills all reflect the
critical influence and compromises made by the interest associations within the structure
of the Austrian social partnership. (Pelinka 1998) In some cases, especially the 1993
reorganization bill, the neo-corporatist framework has actually been increased in
authority or extended into a new policy area. (Talos 1996; Heimsch 2000)
However, the overall trend has been a gradual, yet significant reduction of the
influence and authority of the structures of the social partnership and the peak
associations. Interestingly, much of this was voluntarily ceded by the social partners after
1995 in exchange for guaranteed advisory roles with the Austrian delegation to the
European Union in Brussels. (Pelinka 1999; Heinisch 2000) While this did get them a
seat, though purely advisory and non-binding, in Brussels, they did sacrifice tangible
institutional and structural authority in Vienna. This will be discussed in greater detail in
the following section on the effects of European integration.
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Public discussion of major reforms, changes, reorganization and even scaling
back of the social partnership is now fairly common. Future institutional and structural
reform of the chamber system seems likely. (Gerlich 1992; Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000;
Viebrock 2004) Nonetheless, the overall pattern is currently of incremental and gradual
decentralization and disorganization, quite distinct from what has occurred in
neighboring Germany as will be discussed in the next chapter. The future of the social
partners in Austria may take many potential paths and are discussed at the conclusion of
this chapter. Overall, there has been both significant continuity and change. (Viebrock
2004; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1999)
The European Transformation: Integration & Governance
The most notable transformation has been the integration of Austria into the
European Union. It is this transformation “which it cannot escape”. (Pelinka 1998)
Falkner suggests that the Europeanization of Austria has been one of moderate misfit,
adaptation, and controversy. This was especially true because of Austria’s special and
highly symbolic institutions and patterns of decision-making found in the social
partnership. These adaptational pressures have resulted in challenges to the social
partnership that have results in both continuity and change. (Falkner 2001
)
Austria’s initial interest in joining the European Economic Community in 1959
was ended by Soviet veto that effectively only ended after the conclusion of the Cold
War in the early 1990s. While Austria had been a member of European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) since its foundation in 1960, demands to further integrate Austria
into the European economy grew in the mid and late 1980s. (Falkner 2001) By the late
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1980s the European Community and Austria’s potential membership had become the
most important political and economic question in Austria. The first interests to
significantly seek Austrian membership in the European Community (EC) were the VOI
who, in May 1987, formally pressed for movement on Austrian membership from the
OVP, the junior coalition partner at the time. (Schultz 1992; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann
2000) Such a large project would require significant consensus by the bulk of the major
actors in the Austrian political system including the major parties, peak associations.
Lander governments, and eventually the electorate. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000;
Falkner 2001 ) Additionally it would need to pass a public referendum and supermajority
vote in both parliamentary chambers due to the necessary constitutional changes
accession would require. (Pelinka 1998)
In 1988, the Austrian government polled the social partners on their opinion
regarding possible European Community membership. 1
1
All of the chambers and the
OGB recommended that Austria join, emphasizing the economic necessities and
advantages of membership. Each also pledged to readily cooperate to assist in paving the
way for full integration. (Pelinka 1999) This was a remarkable change of opinion,
especially form the left and their strong political partner, the SPO. (Schultz 1992; Holl,
Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Heinisch 2000) Widespread distrust of liberalization, a
hallmark of the social partnership, was surprisingly muted. The general argument was
that while joining the EC would certainly diminish their own political weight, the
partners saw little option to full membership given the overwhelming costs of remaining
outside the organization. (Pelinka 1999) Once issues of Austrian neutrality had been
settled, it was relative easy sailing for Austrian membership that was supported by the
1
1
The EC changed its name to the European Union (EU) with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991
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major parties as well as the interest associations. (Jahn and Storsved 1995; Falkner 2001
)
In January 1992, Austria joined the European Economic Area (EEA). This step led to full
negotiations on Austrian membership between February 1993 and March 1994.
The negotiations over full membership brought out a more vocal number of
criticisms from the peak associations concerned over their fate once Austrian joined the
EU as a full member. Farmers and the Chambers of Agriculture were the most adamantly
opposed of the peak associations. Austria’s agricultural subsidies were currently higher
than those of the EC hence this was a rather easily cost-benefit calculation. (Schultz
1992) The expected effects of EU membership on Austrian agriculture were reduced
prices, lower subsidies, and declining employment. While some farmers initially
supported entry, the national chamber was less supportive. (Blithe, Copelovitch, and
Phelan 2002)
Popular support was not much better, varying between only 38 to 40% between
1989 and 1992. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) Opposition came from numerous
sources including environmentalists, nationalists, and other Austrian who felt that they
would be a net contributor to the EU and would pay in more than they would get back in
terms of benefits. (Blithe, Copelovitch, and Phelan 2002) Hence, manufacturing
consensus on Austrian membership in the EU was no small feat and would require
significant placation of the social partners.
Small and mid-sized businesses were also wary of losing the protectionist
umbrellas and having to fully compete in global and European marketplaces. Even large
firms felt that they might be “prey” for larger multinationals firms, especially those in
Germany. (Schultz 1992; Heimsch 2000) This was especially true in the food processing
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and textile industries that felt particularly vulnerable. (Biithe, Copelovitch, and Phelan
2002) However, the general positions of the WKO and VOI were uniformly in favor of
membership. The WKO ran a public campaign to drum up support for accession and
approval of the referendum pointing out a variety of economic investments including
lower prices, increased investment, and an upsurge in overall growth.
Labor, through the Federal Chamber of Labor (AK) and OGB were quite
concerned about potential wage cuts and the needs to privatize and liberalize the
economy. (Schultz 1992; Heinisch 2000; Biithe, Copelovitch, and Phelan 2002)
Nonetheless, the AK emphasized that their calculations suggested that the overall benefits
would be positive. While there were sure to be job losses in some sectors, these would be
offset by an overall increase. The AK, OGB, and SPO collectively endorsed accession.
The SPO ran advertisements that “EU Means Jobs!” to boost public support in labor and
the left. (Biithe, Copelovitch, and Phelan 2002)
However, through two years of negotiation and bargaining, the government and
social partners reached accords with the EU over accession. The negotiations themselves
were quite unremarkable, aside from the quickness in which they were accomplished.
Austria’s primary concerns were agriculture, transportation and Alpine traffic, and
regulations against the sale of property in Alpine regions. The negotiations reflected
much of the consensual groundwork that was taking place between the social partners,
provincial governments, and major parties prior to negotiations. Interestingly and
typically Austrian, parliament remained only rather indirectly involved in the process.
After concluding the negotiations, the government called for an early referendum date,
far ahead of the other Scandinavian candidates for membership
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While primary opposition came from the FPO, Greens, and Communists, these
encompassed few voters at the time. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Heinisch 2000)
Austrians came out, though in somewhat lower than average numbers, turnout was
merely 82.4%, and voted 66.6% in favor of the accession treaty on June 12, 1994.
(Karlhofer 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) It also then
required a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament to finalize the pact. The use
of the referendum in Austria has itself become an interesting effect of European
integration. Prior to the 1995 accession treaty there had only been two referenda in
Austrian history, the Anschluss in 1938 and a vote on the use of nuclear power in 1978.
(Jahn and Storsved 1995) Since that point, referenda have become more numerous and
not exclusively related to EU treaty matters.
Membership was expected to add a number of economic as well as political
advantages including lower prices and inflation, increased foreign investment, increased
exports, creation of jobs, higher economic growth, and increased security relationships
with NATO and the EU. (Schultz 1992; Neuhold 1998; Heinisch 2000) In fact this is
precisely what happened as prices in Austria dropped on nearly 50% of consumer goods
and foreign investment increased by $4 billion in 1995 alone. Most notable were
agricultural and food processing prices which shrunk by large margins within the first
few months of membership. Farmers and the Chambers of Agriculture suffered the most
significant pains of membership in the first years, seeing prices drop significantly and
driving many family farms to the brink of collapse. (Guttman 1995) Yet their support of
accession had been secured by the creation of several exemptions to EU rules on Alpine
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land usage and significant side payments by the Austrian state to compensate Austrian
agriculture for their predicted losses. (Blithe. Copelovitch, and Phelan 2002)
The calculation of the partners seems quite logical. To remain outside the EU
would make Austria even more economically isolated and unviable in the Europeanizing
and globalizing environment. Austria was already strongly influenced by EU decision-
making and integration despite its non-membership by being a small economy dependent
upon large trade partners inside the organization such as Italy and Germany. Being a
member of the EU would give Austria more power than states like Switzerland or
Norway remained outside the organization but must still navigate a Europe dominated by
the union. As Austrian Ambassador Gregor Woschnagg suggested, it was better to “sit in
Brussels” and “participate in the decision making and in the shaping of a new Europe”
rather than remain outside it. (Guttman 1995) Austria was going to be deeply affected by
Europe no matter. It seems clear that being a member and helping to make EU policy was
better than being forced to deal with EU policy as an outsider. (Pelinka 1999) Even
farmers calculated that the long-term benefits of EU membership and Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies would be worth the short-term transitional costs that
would be softened by Austrian and EU adjustment funds.
This would also give the state and Austrian interests a chance to help shape and
develop EU policy, and potentially mollify the negative externalities of globalization.
Austrian interests and political leaders calculated that they would be able to better
influence and control their future from inside the EU than from outside. This would also
mean promoting more neo-corporatist and consensual policymaking structures and social
democratic policies from inside the EU. As Wolfgang Schussel, then Vice Chancellor,
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argued, “along with Sweden and Finland, we are changing the approach and the cultural
balance of the EU” and move it in the right direction”. (Guttman 1995) Hence,
membership would give Austria a chip in the game that, along with other corporatist and
social democratic states, could collectively leverage a more Austrian-flavored future for
the EU and perhaps preserve some of the distinctly Austrian elements of consensual and
neo-corporatist policymaking. (Pelinka 1999; Unger 1999; Heimsch 2000) In essence, the
social partners would become “emissaries” or “modernization brokers” of the social
partnership at the EU and global level. (Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000)
Nonetheless, many argue that the disadvantages of accession were real, if
masked, by the peak associations, elites, and major parties. The lack of a fundamental
option other than membership resigned many Austrians to the fact that they had no choice
but to join, leading to a positive referendum but with quite low public participation.
(Unger 1999; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) Austrians also felt that they would pay
more than they would get out of the EU. (Guttman 1995) While the large majority vote
may have appeared as a ringing endorsement of accession, perhaps the referendum was
more a form of Austrian acquiescence or resignation of necessity. Franz Ceska,
Secretary-General of VOI suggested the majority was not because “people loved Europe
so much or the European Union, but people were aware of the negative consequences for
the country if we did not join” (Guttman 1995) In addition, as in the normal Austrian
mode, the negotiation and accession to the EU was primarily dominated by the elites of
the large parties and social partners who secured the overwhelming approval to the
accession referendum. (Karlhofer 1996; Neuhold 1998; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Heinisch
2000 )
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One of the more intriguing deals cut during the accession negotiations and lead up
to the referendum in Austria was between the peak associations and government. This
1994 agreement is the so-called Europaabkommen
,
or Agreement on Europe. The social
partners would be granted participation in “important, relevant, technical questions” in
Austria’s EU representation. Hence the Austrian delegation became the only mission in
Brussels to harbor both government and interest organization representatives in a single
house and extend neo-corporatism to the supranational level. (Karlhofer 1996) In fact, the
government attempted to secure the partners a number of seats in the working groups of
the Council of the European Union until the Commission noted that this would have
infringed upon EC law which limits only government representatives to the right to vote
and representation on the Council. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001
)
The peak associations of the social partnership and Joint Commission exchanged
a significant share of their authority and vested power in the Austrian policymaking
process for these guaranteed advisory seats in Brussels. While this seems potentially
illogical, to give up meaningful authority in Vienna for merely advisory influence in
Brussels, in many ways in seems quite brilliant. Given the declining efficacy.and utility
of the social partnership in Vienna, trading away declining resources for a potentially
growing one seems quite astute. In essence, the social partners assessed that Vienna was
going to have less and less autonomy and importance in Austrian policymaking vis-a-vis
Brussels once membership had been secured. Even possession of mere advisory and
consultative influence in the EU delegation would be far more valuable given their
European and global orientation for the future. (Pelinka 1999) This assumed that Brussels
would eclipse most national political structures in a range of issues salient to the social
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partners and the institutions of neo-corporatism. These interests had abandoned their
belief in Austro-corporatism and their ability to control their own future in a European
and global environment. (Pelinka 1999) Given the perceived lack of alternatives and
political and economic fatalism regarding the special Austrian way of politics, many
believed that the only future of the social partnership lay in Brussels rather than Vienna.
(Pelinka 1999; Heinisch 2000; Falkner 2001
)
The peak associations hoped to have a strong voice within the Austrian delegation
at the EU but they also wished to vitalize and utilize the existing structures of social
partnership at the European level, dubbed Euro-corporatism, including the Economic and
Social Committee and the European Social Charter. (Pelinka 1999; Gorges 1996) Hence,
this was a two-pronged strategy, outlined in a 1996 position paper, to influence
policymaking at the European levels by being influential through the formal Austrian
delegation and membership conduits and also through the neo-corporatist structures at the
European level. (Unger 1999)
In the first way, the social partners could become extended representatives of their
interests in Brussels and hopefully shape Austria's official negotiating positions and role
in the EU. (Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000) In practical terms this has occurred to some
extent as the social partners have been relatively important to the Austrian delegation and
its activities. The system has developed into a close and cooperative relationship in
Brussels between the governmental and interest representatives. (Karlhofer 1996) In
typical Austrian fashion, the will for consensus, even at the EU level seems to have been
played out conclusively.
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In the second, the social partners would use the existing Euro-corporatist
institutions to promote a grander and more neo-corporatist vision of Europe, and perhaps
the global economy as well. Pelinka even suggests that the only way to save the social
partnership was through the creation of more vibrant neo-corporatist structures at the
European level. This would include strengthening the EU Economic and Social
Committee, institutionalizing and incorporating well-defined and organized interests for
labor, business, and agriculture, and strengthening cross-country and regional European
Works Councils and other similar institutions. (Pelinka 1999; Unger 1999)
As Sully notes, this Austrian approach to dealing with the EU seemed almost
“Byzantine” in its neo-corporatist approach to dealing with the EU and membership
issues and appeared as “political archeology” unsuited to a new age of Europeanization.
(Sully 1996; C’repaz 1994) There were, and remain, serious doubts of the viability, utility,
and efficacy of the neo-corporatist structures at the EU level. In practical terms, the EU,
due to coordination and agenda-setting problems, really cannot allow national actors too
much control over the details of EU-level policymaking. (Falkner 2001) In addition, the
EU lacks the social, historical, and political preconditions as well as current exiting
conditions that would seem to provide a hospitable environment for the Austrian brand of
social partnership. Perhaps, as some have suggested, the idea of replicating the social
partnership in Brussels was wishful thinking. Unger suggests that Brussels was a “false
bride” for the social partners and lacks most of the fundamental conditions to support
large-scale neo-corporatism at the supranational level. (Unger 1999)
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There was little doubt that many domestic structures of the Austrian political
system were going to lose influence to Brussels, and the social partnership was amongst
the hardest to be hit. (Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2001) Hence, pulling up stakes in Vienna
and heading to Brussels seemed like a potentially smart move. Yet the results have been
mixed at best and many issues of EU membership seem less than settled in Austrian
politics. There are still fierce disputes between the parties, the social partners, and other
interests over how to manage Austrian-EU relations as well as the content of EU policy
itself. (Kramer 1998; Falkner 2001) EU membership has itself been an incredibly
disruptive element to Austrian politics with significant implications for the social
partnership. Integration into the EU has superimposed a “reality of antagonisms between
winners and losers” on top of the former Austrian model of stable, equitable, and
consensual parity. That there are now winners and losers has intensified political
struggles that were mitigated under the social partnership which ensured that everyone
won at least some of the time and that losses were incremental or offset. (Holl, Poliak,
and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001
)
The elections since 1994 illustrate that, despite the referendum, Europe and
European integration had become one of the most important schisms within the Austrian
electorate and polity. A unique brand of “Alpine” Euro-skepticism had made inroads with
many Austrians. (Sully 1996) Jorg Haider and the FPO tapped into a growing
disenchantment with the loss of sovereignty amongst younger and older workers who
tended towards more nationalist conceptions of economic and political identity. ( Jndt
1999) The FPO, Greens, as well as other parties and interests were critical of the
consociational and neo-corporatist appointment process of the Austrian delegation to
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Brussels that reflected the patronage of the existing coalition and government rather than
one based on merit. (Sully 1996) Nonetheless, polls initially showed that 85% of
Austrians opposed leaving the EU. (Guttman 1995) This number has dropped
significantly and new voices of Euro-skepticism have risen. The EU-14 Sanctions crisis
over Haider’s potential promotion to Chancellor and the OVP-FPO coalition after the
2000 election certainly hurt these numbers. (Falkner 2001 ) However, most Austrian
criticism of the EU is in regards to enlargement of membership and expansion of
competencies, widening and deepening if you will, rather than in opposition of Austrian
membership per se. (Falkner 2001
)
EU membership, while viewed as a necessary and unavoidable development for
Austria, was also viewed by some interests as a catalyst for undertaking structural reform
that would otherwise be difficult, or impossible, under the preexisting rules of Austrian
policymaking. As indicated earlier in this chapter, privatization, budget austerity, and
other structural reforms were slow to develop in the 1980s and the blame for this lack of
substantial reform often fell at the feet of the social partnership. (Crepaz 1994, 1995;
Pelinka 1998) Many interests saw the complex and more open decision-making process
in Brussels as an opportunity to bypass the national level and leapfrog to the
supranational level where swifter procedures and processes could be better accessed and
influenced. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) This was especially true of the VOI but
was even more so among the many unincorporated, disenfranchised, or otherwise
marginalized interests in the Austrian political system.
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The new and complex multi-level system of governance between the federal
government of Austria and the European Union posed significant challenges to the
Austrian state, parties, and interests. Adaptation to the EU required solutions to major
problems. First was the necessity of coordinating the Lander and parliament into the
government's EU policies. Formally, Austrian-EU relations were centralized in the
Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry. But both practical and political reality in Austria
necessitated the government to formalize better input and scrutiny by both provincial and
parliamentary institutions. The distribution of responsibilities and competences in
Austrian-EU policy to the Austrian bureaucracy, parliament, and provinces were
formalized in a number of agreements and statutes in 1994 and 1996. Initially these set up
a system of discussion, debate, consultation, codetermination, and accountability between
the government, parliament, and provinces. Also notable were the extension of
parliamentary powers to take part in personnel appointments to Brussels. (Holl, Poliak,
and Riekmann 2000) For Austria, this has meant an extended learning process in
navigating the multi-level EU governance environment. (Falkner 2001
)
The largest formal changes were a series of Constitutional amendments that
provided parliamentary rights in the EU policy arena, far stronger than those found in
many other member states. (Morass 1996; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner
2001 ) Articles 23e and 23f, introduced in December 1994 and ratified the following year,
obliged the government to inform parliament of any initiatives in the EU, requires
advanced agreement and parliamentary approval of all decisions that will require
constitutional amendments or changes to existing community treaties, and otherwise
limits the scope of autonomy of the government vis-a-vis parliament. This significantly
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increased the potential influence of parliament in EU policymaking. (Holl, Poliak, and
Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001 ) This coincided with an overall increase in parliamentary
influence due to changes in the political party system, social partnership, and the electoral
fortunes of the major parties. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1998) However, the
overwhelming amount of information and material that parliament must sift through from
the government and from Brussels has mitigated the full effect of these changes. In 1995
alone. Parliament was informed of over 17,000 EU initiatives of which only 100 were
subject to deliberation, and which only eighteen resulted in binding opinions. Initiatives
increased to over 37,000 over the next two years, with only eleven opinions issued. (Holl,
Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) By 2001, the total number of opinions was merely 34 and
the mandates made by parliament had become less detailed. (Falkner 2001 ) Parliament
has been able to handle only a fraction of the initiatives provided forcing it to be selective
and circumspect in most cases despite the creation of specific committees, in both
chambers, to exclusively concerned with EU affairs. Hence, this is far from a success
story of increasing parliamentary supremacy. (Holl. Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner
2001 )
In many ways, EU membership has worked against parliamentary power.
Parliament has become an “institutional loser” vis-a-vis the Chancellor and cabinet that
have emerged as the primary centers of influence over EU-Austnan relations. (Falkner
2001 ) This also has implications for the social partnership given its long and intricate
relationships with the major parties in parliament. The centralization of authority into the
hands of the government and bureaucracy marginalizes many of the potential influence
conduits once held by the social partners. The Austrian parliament would actually lose its
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monopoly on passing legislation due to the transfer of competencies to the EU level,
relegating much of its work to that of “notary”. (Marchant 2001; Falkner 2001) Some
Austrians suggest that 60-70% of their domestic legislative agenda is framed in Brussels.
( The Economist 2003) However, the Austrian parliament has responded by specialization
and the creation of specific EU Affairs Standing Committees in both chambers. This has
helped mitigate some of the flood of EU directive and policy and to give the parliament a
greater voice in shaping Austria’s functions and representation in Brussels. (Holl, Poliak,
and Riekmann 2000; The Parliament of Austria 2007)
Decentralization of authority and a greater role of the Lander in Austria politics
has also been one of the major changes of a European Austria. The Lander realized the
political opportunity with the looming EU membership process and were able to secure
significant structural reforms to Austria’s federal balance. The provincial governors,
Landeshanptleute
,
made accession approval dependent upon such reforms. In October
1992, an agreement between the federal and Lcinder governments included a commitment
to redistribute competences based on subsidiarity, a reform of the financial transfer
system, and a reform of the Bundesrat
,
the Federal Chamber and upper house of
Parliament to better represent provincial interests. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000;
Falkner 2001)
While many of these proposals were later dropped or reduced, a constitutional
amendment was proposed and later ratified that instituted some important changes to the
federal-provincial balance, especially in areas of EU policymaking. Article 23d imposed
new obligations upon the central government to consult with the provincial governments
regarding EU issues of direct relevance to the Lander. (Fitzmaurice 1996; Pelinka 1999;
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Falkner 2001 ) The Lander can issue a simple qualified opinion (five out of nine
provinces) from which the government may deviate after which the government must
justify its decision within eight weeks. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) However they
may also reach a joint or unanimous position on an issue creating a binding opinion that
the central government must accept. (Fitzmaurice 1996; Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2001)
Additionally, the Austrian provinces have also opened their own offices in Brussels not
unlike other subnational governments such as the Lander of Germany, Autonomous
Communities of Spain, Scotland, Wales, Flanders, and Walloma. The primary goal is to
be able to effectively lobby Brussels directly, bypassing their perceived weakness in the
Austrian federal relationship. (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001; Holl, Poliak, and
Riekmann 2000; Borzel 2001 ) Despite the continuing weakness of the provinces, they
have clearly made significant gains in the process of European integration and over the
past twenty year in expanding their influence and authority. (Pelinka 1998, 1999; Angerer
2002; Falkner 2001 ) This decentralization and Europeanization of power to the provinces
may certainly sap monopolistic authority and legitimacy from the federal government and
the social partnership in Vienna.
In administrative terms, Austria’s accession and adoption of the acquis
communautaire has been challenging in many ways. First, the legal and constitutional
adoption process has been extensive and lasting. Austria began adapting its legal system
to EC law as early as 1987, nearly eight years before official membership began This
required a series of guidelines to be adopted that must be applied to all new government
bills ensuring compliance and adaptability to EL law and standards. (Schultz 1992;
Potacs 1998) Accession to the EEA in 1992 required absorption of nearly 1600 EL
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regulations. While a useful test run for eventual EU accession, it failed to compare to the
mass that encompassed the acquis in 1994 and 1995 which numbered more than 4,000
regulations and 1,200 directives in almost every policy area. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann
2000; Falkner 2001 ) Austria initially had a less than stellar implementation record, with
over nearly 20% of directives going unsettled from 1994 through 1996, ranking last in the
union by 1997. However, by 1998 this implantation gap had dropped significantly and
Austria ranked in the top half of member states in terms of overall compliance. (Falkner
2001 ) The delays were due in part to parliamentary and judicial backlogs, staff reductions
due to budget austerity programs, and major reforms of Austrian economic administrative
laws. This has also required greater professionalization of the bureaucracy especially in
terms of EU and foreign language experience. Experience in Brussels is becoming a
necessity for advancement within the Austrian bureaucracy much like that in many other
member states. (Falkner 2001; Knill 2001; Paterson 2005) Whereas the Austrian
bureaucracy was once small, subordinated, and more politically temporal, the
bureaucracy of Austria is becoming a larger and more important power inside the
Austrian political system due almost entirely to the effects of European integration. (Holl,
Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001)
In judicial terms, Austria’s membership significantly altered the roles and
functions of the domestic court system, especially in areas of trade and commercial law.
The number of requested preliminary rulings from the ECJ has increased every year since
accession Since 1997, the number has jumped significantly as the legal system and
judges have become better accustomed to the process and the requirements of the EU
legal system The number of cases has also increased, most relating to the application of
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community law upon individuals, firms, and actors in Austria. (Holl, Poliak, and
Riekmann 2000) This has important ramifications for the social partnership and
policymaking process. As the Austrian legal system was once considerably more flexible
and deferential to the social partners and the institutions of the social partnership, the
judiciary and legal system have become far more consistent and procedural. While
previous eras would likely have seen the courts defer or divert decisions to arbitrated or
consensual extra-judicial bodies, the Austrian courts have begun applying a stricter
standard of law, and EU law, to many such cases.
The Stability and Growth Pact, adopted by the Commission in 1997 as adjunct to
the European Monetary Union, itself ratified in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, places
restrictions on the state's ability to independently budget. Marchant argued that Austro-
Keynesianism of the 1970s was killed off by the imposition of the Maastricht criteria of
tight fiscal regimes and austerity budgets of the 1990s (Marchant 2001; Falkner and
Talos 1994) The necessity to bring the Austrian budget deficit from 5% to 3% of GDP so
as to qualify for the European currency arrangement made negotiation points much more
entrenched amongst the parties and interests. (Sully 1996; Neuhold 1998) Nonetheless,
accords were eventually concluded on economic austerity, tax reform, and EMU policies.
(Muller 2000) Such budget constraints may limit the ability of the Austrian state to
absorb shocks to their economy. The only remaining tool tends to be wage controls that
almost always tend downward to adjust to crisis. (Unger 1999) Nonetheless, while
Austria must now submit preliminary and finalized budgets to the EU for review, Austria
had already committed to greater budget austerity and control of inflation before acceding
to the treaty. (Thomsen and Hadjimichael 2007; Unger 1999) Overall however, the Euro
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and the Stability and Growth Pact were quite unpopular in Austria in the late 1990s.
(Neuhold 1998) This has moderated as Austria's economy upturned and the Euro
stabilized by the mid 2000s.
Austria, like many other states, has seen a remarkable transference of
competencies from the national to the European level. (Angerer 2002; Schmidt 2006) In
many national parliaments, well over half the legislative work is enactment of EU
directives and policies into domestic law. Some argue that the Austrian parliament and
the social partners have become mere “notaries” of laws negotiated in the EU. (Marchant
2001 ) In some states this allows Brussels to be blamed for domestic policy failures or
impotence in many cases. But Austria is a bit unique in that most of the major Austrian
interest associations quickly and euphorically supported accession and immediately
began operating and thinking at the EU-level. (Unger 1998) The social partners became,
in effect, Europeanization “brokers”. (Heinisch 2000) Austria had been subject to the
bulk of EU regulatory authority prior to membership both through the European
Economic Area (EEA) Treaty of 1991 and through its significant trade dependence on
member states. The demise of the social partnership in Austria may also be a reflection of
the peak associations’ abandonment of Vienna for greener European pastures in Brussels.
Pelinka argues that strong corporatist states like Austria have been eroded by
European integration to a greater extent than weaker corporatist systems such as in Italy.
The Italian case, with a heavily decentralized system of industrial and labor relations,
lacks many of the compulsory, centralized, and nationalized peak associations and neo-
corporatist structures found in Austria. Pelinka argues that in the “new logic” of a
globalized and Europeanized economy, tripartite arrangements must be more specialized,
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functional, flexible, and decentralized to be successful. Hence a more “bottom-up”
approach may be more successful than the “top-down” method traditionally used by the
Austrian social partnership. (Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2001 ) Pelinka suggests that a more
federal Europe would potentially allow new, weaker social partnerships to thrive at a
more decentralized level by being better adapted to the new global and European
economic environment. Hence, the breakup of the highly centralized, synchronized, and
integrated social partnership between interests, parties, and government at the national
level may be the only way to salvage the social partnership. (Pelinka 1999) However,
others see reinvigoration of the Austrian social partnership through the integration
process. Integration itself requires significant policy and institutional reform, and the
Austrian social partners effectively became policy entrepreneurs in the process. (Heimsch
2000 )
These developments suggest fundamental ways in which the EU may influence
the decision and policymaking process in Austria. It significantly shaped and altered the
roles, actors, institutions, and behavior in the domestic setting. In other words, the EU
has significant “sticky” power that transforms member states even without explicit
instruction to do so. (Falkner 2001 ) Integration into the EU has brought forth a number of
significant challenges not only to the latitude and policy competencies of the social
partnership in Austria but also to the ways in which Austrian policy is made. The
significant “misfit” that existed between European and Austrian models of governance
and policymaking has been difficult to overcome. In the early and mid-1990s, Austria’s
overall adaptation to the EU and its structures fared poorly. But since the late 1990s,
there has been considerable adaptation, reform, and development towards a better fit with
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the EU. (Falkner 2000) This process continues and Austria is bound to continue to face
new adpatational pressures from Europeanization. Yet even the once antagonistic
Austrian citizenry has begun to more greatly see EU membership as a positive situation.
In 1996, just 30% of Austrians believed that EU membership was positive while that
number is now nearly 40%. ( The Economist 2007a) While this is hardly overwhelming
support, it is progress nonetheless.
The Europeanization of Austrian Labor Law & Social Policy
A number of relevant case studies of the impact of European integration on
Austrian policymaking are useful in assessing the kinds of impacts Europeanization is
having on Austria. Falkner and Leiber’s analysis of the impact of Europeanization upon
neo-corporatist governance of labor law in smaller European states including Austria,
Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden is notable as it posited that the states structural
changes in response to Europeanization were varied and dependent upon specific
institutional features of the legal and operational patterns of neo-corporatism. Denmark
exhibited the highest level of impact while the results were more moderate and mixed in
the other cases. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) Interestingly, while there was a preexisting
expectation of "dramatic change" due to Europeanization given the Streeck and Schmitter
hypothesis, the results were more modest. Compston argued that there was variation
amongst EU states and their utilization on concerted policymaking patterns following the
Single European Act of 1985 yet the general trend had been of little significant structural
change. (Compston 1998)
Overall, Falkner and Leiber discovered only “slightly convergent development” in
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labor law amongst their cases of neo-corporatism in Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, and
Sweden. While change was more notable in Denmark, change in the others was less
consistent and decisive. This does not mean that greater structural change would not
occur in other areas of social partnership competence where the impact of
Europeanization might be greater. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) However, it illustrates that
the overall impact of Europeanization on neo-corporatist patterns of governance and
policymaking is highly contingent upon the policy area, existing national patterns and
actors, and the prescribed methods of implementation that can allow considerable space
for the continued efficacy of social partners and partnership.
In areas of social insurance, Falkner, Treib, Harlapp, and Leiber demonstrated
that the social partnership remained quite dominant in its traditional core areas of
pensions, health insurance, employment policy, and other aspects of social policy. This
was primarily due to the “soft law” approach of the EU in areas of social policy where
member states were able to transpose and implement reforms through their existing
modes of governance and patterns of policymaking. The Austrian case has been notable
in that the Schiissel government attempted to unilaterally impose a more neo-liberal and
smaller model of social insurance by bypassing the social partnership entirely. The
general strikes that followed and the eventual dilution of the reform package suggest that
this had less to do with Europeanization than the domestic political conditions of the
OVP-FPO coalition government's agenda. (Falkner et al. 2005; The Economist
,
2003a)
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Conclusion: The Future of Social Partnership in Austria
The survival of the Austrian social partnership is certainly open for debate and
“the winds of change” have been in the air for nearly a quarter-century. (Karlhofer 1996)
Some have suggested that the total dissolution of the Austrian model is possible in the
near future or inevitable. (Gerlich 1992; Karlhofer and Talos 1996; Rose 2000) Others
posit that the most likely outcome is the survival of the institutions of social partnership
with a significant decline of salience and authority vis-a-vis parliamentary, judical,
administrative, governmental, and European decision-making institutions. In other words,
the social partnership of Austria is merely fading away. (Pelinka 1998; Fitzmaunce 1990;
Marchant 2001 ; Adams 2002, 2004) Pelinka even suggests that the only way for the
Austrian social partnership to survive is to become less strong and more decentralized.
(Pelinka 1999)
Others argue that the Austrian model of social partnership will become smaller
and weaker but will, in comparative terms, come to resemble more moderate models of
social partnership found in other states. (Talos 1996; Lijphart 1999) Or the social
partnership will continue on in some areas of efficacy but may completely disappear from
others. (Kittel 2000) Perhaps the Austrian social partnership is even in a “midlife crisis”
which will result in recognition that the peak of social partnership has passed, potency is
falling, and new opportunities, such as those found Brussels, now look more attractive.
(Unger 1999) Pelinka and others argue that “corporatism is not dead” and there is still a
space for it to continue to do work in an ever-Europeamzing and globalizing Austria.
(Pelinka 1998, 154; Karlhofer 1996; Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000) Few have argued that
Austria is in a better position than in other countries due to the institutional.
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philosophical, and historical experiences of the social partnership and that it will
overcome new challenges and continue. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Gerlich, Grande,
and Muller 1988; Heinisch 2000)
However, as the political system has been rapidly decentralizing and
Europeanizing by increasing the number of actors, reducing the centralization of existing
actors, and the increasing autonomy of actors from one another, it is bound to have
important and less predictable implications for Austrian politics. (Lauber 1996; Pelinka
1998; Crepaz 1994) Some scholars estimate that too many new forces and interests are
excluded by the existing social partnership for it to continue to maintain legitimacy. New
schisms on the issues of environment, minority rights, gender, culture, immigration, and
other post-material issues have eclipsed those of traditional left-right socio-economics
upon which the social partnership was founded. This has made the social partnership
seem outmoded. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Viebrock 2004) Yet some also conclude that there
is little alternative to the social partnership given Austria's social, political, and cultural
development (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Heinisch 2000) Despite these self-imposed
limits of imagination, there are certainly numerous alternatives to social partnership for
Austrian policymaking.
Corporatism will likely remain in the Austrian political system despite its
challenges and weaknesses. But the likelihood of its continued broad salience and
efficacy certainly hangs in the balance. As many cases suggest, the influence and power
of the social partnership has already become more variable and complex. While there is
continuity of the social partnership in some cases, there is wholesale rejection of it in
others Policymaking in Austria is now corporatist, pluralist, and somewhere in between
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corporatism and pluralism depending upon the issue. (Crepaz 1994; Kittel 2000; Gerlich,
Grande, and Muller 1988) As Gerlich, Grande, and Muller suggest, while social
partnership once dominated, policymaking is may be more likely done under mere
consultation, or outright party and governmental politics, than in the past. (Gerlich,
Grande, and Muller, 1988) In other words, Austria, much like Germany, has seen a
transition in the role of the state in economic governance and policymaking from a
tradition of postwar semi-sovereignty to sovereignty. (Crepaz 1994; Katzenstein 1987)
While Austrians have generally affirmed that they want reform of the chambers
system, the will to recast the social partnership seems to be in short supply amongst the
interests. (Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Gerlich 1992; Rose 2000; Marchant 2001;
Viebrock 2004) The types of issues that the Joint Commission and other structures of
Austrian neo-corporatism no longer seem as salient to the dilemmas of the 2T‘ century.
(Crepaz 1994, 1995) The interests themselves have become more fragmented over these
issues. (Karlhofer 1996; Crepaz 1994, 1995; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998) Perhaps
Austria is no longer “an island of the blessed” and is losing its distinct Austrian “flavor”.
(Pelinka 1999) This de-Austrification includes greater instabilities and uncertainties in its
culture, politics, and economics. Austria may have become less Austrian and more
European, Western, and perhaps American from numerous exogenous and endogenous
forces including structural economic change, Europeanization, globalization, and
immigration. (Kittel 2000; Pelinka 1998, 1998a; Bischof and Pelinka 2004; Markovits
1996; Rose 2000)
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This “westernization” or “Americanization” has included the growing importance
of constitutionalism, parliamentary politics, courts and judicial politics, provincial and
municipal governments, secularism, social mobility, greater individualism in lieu of sub-
societal identity, weaker political parties and less party allegiance, a multi-party system,
populism, and a more market-oriented and neo-liberal economic order. (Muller 1992;
Gerlich 1992; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998; Pelinka and Bishof 2004) This has also meant
a move away from Lager, proporz, nationalized industries, centralized power, and group
identity that helped make the social partnership a viable and powerful institution of the
postwar era. (Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Muller 1992; Crepaz 1994, 1995;
Rose 2000)
Decentralization of Austrian politics poses one of the larger challenges to the
future of the social partnership. (Pelinka 1999) As some scholars have suggested,
federalism and a stronger separation of powers may be incompatible with corporatism.
(Encamacion 1999; Lehmbruch 1979) Others believe that an Austria with less neo-
corporatism, with its paternalism and hierarchy, is preferable. A more decentralized,
democratic, and pluralist system may be better able to deliver important policy. (Crepaz
1994, 1995) On the other hand, Pelinka and others have argued that the decentralization
of Austrian politics will benefit the social partnership’s ability to thrive by increasing its
flexibility, innovation, and reflection of regional, political, and social distinctions within
the social partnership, (Gerlich. Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1999; Kittel 2000;
Heinisch 2000)
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One of the more intriguing developments of the crisis has been an assessment that
the Austrian social partnership, while once adept at speedily and flexibly reaching
consensus, has become more arthritic and inflexible. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Viebrock 2004;
Pelinka 2000) This contradicts many earlier assessments of the social partnership and its
success during the postwar era. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985)
The evidence is, at best, mixed. In some cases it seems clear that the social
partnership is not streamlining the policymaking process, rather it is more often a barrier
to flexibility and adaptation. And in other cases, the social partnership appears to very
much be operating as it was once expected. (Unger 1999; Kittel 2000) Reform of the
existing system is certainly a possibility, and one supported by a majority of Austrians.
(Pelinka 1999; Unger 1999; Viebrock 2004) These include increasing transparency and
accountability, reforming and better regulating chamber finances, increasing chamber-
member communications and enacting a more formal set of member rights. (Viebrock
2004; Heinisch 2000) Another suggested reform, the scrapping compulsory membership,
is often hailed as the primary method to democratize the chambers system. (Crepaz 1994,
1 995; Viebrock 2004) However, in total, these reforms might seriously undermine the
remaining ability of the social partnership to operate at the national level by diminishing
their representative monopolies, weakening their negotiation and bargaining positions,
subordinating the system to parliamentary or government control, eliminate their ability
to collectively speak for their sector, and otherwise dismembering the existing social
partnership. (Unger 1999; Viebrock 2004) In addition, reform has been slow to come and
often has to be forced upon the peak associations and structures such as the Joint
Partnership from either above or below. The slow adaptation of the institutional
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arrangements to the new post-industrial, post-material, European, and globalized
environment illustrates that only extreme shocks generate institutional change. (Unger
1999; Falkner and Leiber 2004)
But it is also the Europeanization of Austria that is causing change as well. The
entry into the European Union and the European Monetary Union has fundamentally
changed the environment and rules of Austrian politics and policymaking. (Falkner and
Talos 1994) It has fundamentally affected the perceptions and activities of the parties,
government, parliament, provinces, social partners, and other interest groups operating
inside, and outside, the Austrian political system. While Europeanization cannot be used
to singularly explain continuity and change in the Austrian social partnership, it has
played a significant role, as discussed earlier in this chapter. (Falkner and Leiber 2004;
Heinisch 2000) This will be explored and assessed more fully within the Europeanization
framework in the concluding chapter of this research.
Pelinka suggests that a federal or regional European Union may very well be the
salvation of corporatism at the supranational and subnational levels. While the Austrian
social partnership has clearly been diminished at the national level, it can find new homes
at the transnational or regional levels within the framework of the European Union.
Hence it has been suggested that the future of the Austrian social partnership lies in
Brussels. (Pelinka 1998, 1999; Heinisch 2000) Yet, as discussed in pervious chapters,
corporatism has mostly failed to make meaningful transitions to the supranational level in
the EU or other organizations. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991
)
385
Modem corporatism had been developed primarily as a national strategy of
economic policymaking and while it is impossible to dismiss the potential for
corporatism at the regional or supranational levels, the optimism regarding the viability
of corporatism in the EU institutions such as Economic and Social Committee, European
Works Councils, and the European Social Charter has not been well supported by EU
developments over the last two decades. (Sargent 1985; Pelinka 1999; Streeck and
Schmitter 1991)
Unger suggests that if the social partnership is to be revived, it must be done in
Austria rather than in Brussels. The EU lacks the preconditions and criteria for large-
scale social partnership. (Unger 1999; Pelinka 1999) While the monopolist centralism
and tightly bound policymaking process of the postwar era has passed, there are still
domestic compromises to be made and issues that would best, or only, solved through
social partnership. Brussels lacks the tripartitism, the repetition and regularity of
negotiation, status quo mentality, and consensual solidarity that the Joint Commission
and other social partnership structures possessed at the national level in Vienna. While
Austria may be far less the strong case than in was fifty years ago, it is still far stronger
than the EU that possesses almost none of the criteria for an engaged and effective social
partnership. (Unger 1999)
For the social partnership in Austria, this must certainly mean change. As many
have suggested, perhaps the social partnership has become a victim of its own success in
Austria. (Lijphart 1977; Luther and Muller 1992; Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1998) The
social partnership did seem to successfully solve many of the problems of the First and
early Second Republic. But those same structures and institutions often seem
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anachronistic in addressing the issues of affluent, post-industrial, European, and global
Austria. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1999) The Joint Commission and other existing
facets of the postwar social partnership were tremendous successful in “winning the last
war” but may be less so it addressing all existing and future Austrian schisms.
Yet the social partnership may also remain resilient and with potential. Many of
the institutions and structures of the paradigmatic case remain in place, even if in a
weakened or more limited condition. (Heimsch 2000) As Schmitter and Grote suggest,
corporatism is a Sisyphus that declines and rises on a regular basis. (1997) The
assumption that social partnership cannot coexist in an economically and politically
liberalized and Europeanized Austria has been disputed. (Pelinka 1999; Heinisch 2000;
Unger 1999) It is also argued that tlexibility can still be a product of the social
partnership and enhance competitiveness of the Austrian state. (Kittel 2000; Gerlich,
Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1999) As Heinisch suggests, while it is far from its
heyday of the 1960s, the social partnership's reforms of the 1990s have allowed the
partners to become “modernization brokers” retaining many of the roles and functions in
the Austrian political and economic system. (Heinisch 2000) Austria is certainly unlikely
to fully abandon the structures of social partnership, yet the meaning, importance, and
operation of those structures have changed. The Austrian social partnership, the once
paradigmatic case of strong neo-corporatism, has become a far more moderate exemplar
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CHAPTER 7
THE CRISIS OF GERMAN SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP SINCE THE 1980S
Introduction
The celebration of the German model was short-lived as the second oil shocks of
1 979 illustrated that Modell Deutschland was neither infallible nor impenetrable.
(Katzenstein 1987) Since the economic turmoil of the 1970s, the relations between labor
and business in Germany have deteriorated and the first fissures of the postwar German
industrial order emerged. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) The task of finding compromises
between the social partners, as well as with other actors, has become more difficult. (Vail
2003) Where once there was an “apparently unshakable tripartite consensus with business
and labor”, the ability to get primary interests to act in concert has diminished
significantly by the early 1980s. (Thelen 1991; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) Further, the
Kohl. Schroder, and Merkel governments have been more willing to act without the
consent and concert of the social partners more frequently and a range of policy issues
central to the social partners since the 1980s. (Gobeyn 1993; Wessels 2000; Vail 2003)
As The Economist suggests, the “clockwork mechanism” of the German model from the
early 1980s has started to seemingly break down. (2006)
Similar to the fate of Austria since the irud 1 970s, the German economy has
become more erratic with sluggish growth, increased inflation, higher unemployment,
and growing budget deficits. (Hancock 1989; Conradt 2001 ) The slowing of economic
growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and again in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
drove the interests further apart and created additional points of contention. (Harding and
Paterson 2000) De-industrialization, inflation, record high and lasting unemployment
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unwound forty years of cooperation rather quickly. Germany’s failure to rebound from
the shocks of the late 1970s and 1980s, as it had done in the early 1970s, brought Modell
Deutschland into question. (Hancock 1989; Markovits 1986; Gobeyn 1993; Thelen 1991)
The recessions of the late 1990s and 2000s, exacerbated by the tremendously high costs
of reunification from 1 990, had Germany emerge as an economic laggard through 2004.
German GDP growth was less than half the rate of most other European states while
unemployment remained immovably higher as well. Germany fell into an unenviable
position of low growth, declining employment, and high social welfare costs. (Kitschelt
and Streeck 2004)
By the mid and late 1990s Germany seemed much less likely to have the ability to
address major policy challenges including increasing unemployment, financing pensions
and healthcare, reforming education, integrating the east, and increasing the flexibility of
the workforce. (Wessels 2000) Much like the Austrian case, the German model of social
partnership took part of the blame. Given Germany's “painfully slow” and incremental
process of reform, many suggested that the social partnership itself had become a barrier
to efforts of economic and political reinvigoration rather than a pathway for consensual
and efficient codetermined policymaking. Conflict between the social partners had
become intractable and the willingness to compromise and bargain was diminished
(Gobeyn 1993; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Vail 2003) The economic and social
challenges of the recent era have focused, rightfully or wrongfully, on the German model
as the potential source of these economic woes. (Harding and Paterson 2000)
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Part of the system that has taken much blame for the rigidity and lack of
innovation has been the social partnership. It has been argued that the neo-corporatist
system of interest intermediation and consensual policymaking has become clogged by
the social partners who sought to defend their privileged positions and particular interests
at the expense of the state's overall demands for economic reform and flexibility.
(Streeck 1984; Vitols 2004; Vail 2003) However, there is some evidence to suggest that
the lack of reform was also a product of weak public perception of serious problems.
Many Germans reject the suggestion that structural reform of the welfare state has been
necessary or desirable. In a 1997 poll, less than one-third of Germans indicated a desire
for structural change while two-thirds opposed any changes to the existing system. (Cox
2001 ) This strong bias toward protection of existing structures and entitlements, in the
population, labor, business, and the state, have negatively affected significant reform to
address the sluggish economy, costs of reunification, rising unemployment, reduced
competitiveness, and higher deficit spending. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Vail 2003;
Cox 2001)
While the Kohl government was less enthusiastic about and dedicated to social
partnership, it nonetheless support some attempts to utilize some neo-corporatist
policymaking processes in a handful of reform and economic decision-making efforts in
the 1990s, especially regarding unification between the East and West. (Gobeyn 1993)
Reunification restored some levels of tripartite consensus and cooperation between the
major actors through the Solidarity Pact, but it was short-lived. (Streeck and Hassel 2004)
In 1995, IG Metall proposed a national alliance on employment (which would later
become the model for the Schroder government’s Alliance for Jobs) to seek national-
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level contracts between labor unions, employers’ associations, and the state. The Kohl
government was moderately supportive of the idea while it was also cautiously welcomed
by the BDA. The plan died due to a lack of support of industry and sectoral associations
and commercial interest groups that preferred a more decentralized system. (Casey and
Gold 2000; Bemdt 2000; Timmons 2000) This ended any attempts to reestablish a
national level institution of social partnership, similar to Concerted Action, during the
Kohl tenure. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Kohl tended to revert to and expand upon the model used by his predecessor,
Helmut Schmidt, and organized a number of Chancellor Rounds to intermediate between
the social partners on a range of economic, social, and unification reform issues and
proposals. (Timmons 2000; Padgett 1999; Goetz 2003) These showed some utility and
effectiveness but like the proposed Alliance, Kohl discovered growing inability to find
consensus and compromise between the partners. After a series of walkout by both labor
and business, the rounds became less frequent and Kohl’s economic reform proposals
became increasingly unpopular as he bypassed the social partners. (Timmins 2000)
However, the utilization of social partnership expanded dramatically under the
SPD-Green coalition government of Gerhard Schroder. Schroder revived much of the
spirit and structure of social partnership in seeking more consensual agreements between
the major interest associations. (Wessels 2000; Sturm 2003) Given the economic decline
and need for significant reform, this fits well into the German pattern of social
partnership. With increasing dissent between social partners and an inability to reach
compromise on urgent economic reforms, the state increased into role in the process and
emphasized the institutionalization of social partnership at the national level. Much like
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what occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s with Concerted Action, the Schroder
government recognized the need for more direct intermediation and coordination of the
social partnership by the state and created a national institution, the Alliance for Jobs, to
persuade, cajole, and moderate the partners to find consensually supported policy
prescriptions to declining economic fortunes. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003;
Wessels 2000; Timmins 2000)
The most important move of the Schroder revival of the national
institutionalization of social partnership was the creation of the Alliance for Jobs,
Training, and Competitiveness or Btindesfur Arbeit, Ausbildung, und
Wettbewerbsfahigkeit in 1998. (Lehmbruch 2003; Sturm 2003) This has been an
important element of the 1998 SPD electoral campaign and was based on a 1995 IG
MetalI proposal. It focused on the need to find consensual support for reforms amongst
the key social partners. (Wessels 2000) The Alliance for Jobs established a new and
permanent tripartite arrangement at the national level that would bring together the
government, unions, and employers’ associations to address lasting issues of
unemployment, vocational education and retraining, and other areas of German economic
competitiveness. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Wessels 2000) Clearly, the
Alliance for Jobs has a number of important parallels to Concerted Action in the late
1 960s and early 1 970s under grand coalition and subsequent SPD leadership. However,
the Alliance was significantly more narrowed in terms of agenda and scope than
Concerted Action. (Timmins 2000; Sturm 2003)
Importantly, Schroder also began expanding the membership and aegis of these
types of structures into areas beyond the traditional scope of the tripartite labor-state-
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capital social partnership. Women's rights, the environment, immigration, and other post-
material issue areas became fertile ground for the Schroder government’s use of neo-
corporatist models of consensual policymaking. The proliferation of these councils,
roundtables, and other advisory boards reflected Schroder's newfound affinity towards
the preservation of Germany's traditional postwar system of consensual policymaking.
Some suggested that his zeal for such institutions was a form of “deparliamentization" of
the German policymaking process. (Lehmbruch 2003; The Economist 2003a; Sturm
2003; Goetz 2003) This was a notable reincarnation of the neo-corporatist model by the
SPD and Schroder government unseen since the early 1970s.
Yet, the expansion of tripartite or multipartite institutions seems to correlate quite
well with both the tradition of SPD leadership, as it did under Brandt and Schmidt from
the late 1960s through early 1980s, and the typical German response to economic
turmoil. Schroder promulgated new commissions on ethics, municipal finances,
sustainable development, corporate governance, public pensions, nuclear power, labor
market reform, and healthcare. (The Economist 2003a; Streeck and Hassel 2004) While
not all reflected purely neo-corporatist organization, almost all were intended to provide
expert and consensus opinion of policy reforms and regulatory options.
Yet, many of these, especially those that w ere more strictly neo-corporatist in
organization and operation such as the Alliance for Jobs, failed to yield important reforms
and results and the Schroder government relied far more upon strictly unilateral or
parliamentary models of policy and decision-making to enact its economic reform
packages of the late 1990s and early 2000s. (Vail 2003; The Economist 2003a) This trend
has continued under the grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD led by Angela Merkel
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after the 2005 elections. A set of healthcare and tax reforms was pushed through
parliament in 2006 under the Merkel-led C'DU/CSU-SPD coalition government. These
were enacted despite little input by social partners such as the employers’ and healthcare
associations. ( The Economist 2006a)
While the model of incremental, consensual, and intermediated policymaking was
once considered a v irtue of the German system, the “exhausting grind of consensus” is
now more often considered a vice. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; The Economist 2003;
Vail 2003) Given the fundamental challenges facing the German state including lingering
costs of reunification, continuing high unemployment, decreased international and
European competitiveness, and growing budget deficits, the need and demand for
policymaking leadership and innovation has never been higher since 1945. Yet the role of
the social partnership, that was once so respected, established, and effective at providing
this kind of economic and policy governance, has failed to adjust and act. (Streeck 1984)
The German social partnership may be in the midst of a life-threatening crisis for its
survival in which the results are far from certain and even less optimistic.
394
Economic Transformations and Challenges
As indicated earlier, economic growth began to weaken by the 1970s. During the
1950s, West German growth was at a rate of 6.5% ofGDP per year, exceeding that of
France and Italy, as well as the United States. The rate fell to 4.4% during the 1960s,
falling a bit below the French rate of growth but still above the United Kingdom and
United States in the same period. Growth fell to 2.6% in the 1970s below France and the
United States. It was only 1 .8% through the mid 1980s, a bit higher than France, the
United Kingdom, and Sweden, but below that of the United States. (OECD 1988;
Hancock 1989)
Nonetheless, inflation was relatively moderate for the entire period. Much like
Austria, Germany maintained inflation well below OECD averages even into the 1970s.
While Germany averaged 5.9% annual inflation in the 1970s, the OECD average was
over 9%. (OECD 1988; Hancock 1989) Comparatively, the German economy began to
weaken several years earlier than the Austrian economy. (Casey and Gold 2000)
However, the initial responses by the social partners to the economic challenges of the
1980s resulted in further economic decline and greater diminishment of the social
partnership’s efficacy. The neo-corporatist partners responded to initial downturns in the
economy through early retirement and a lack of fundamental labor market reform.
(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003)
Despite a slight economic rebound in the early 1990s, the late 1990s brought
about the largest slump, in terms of time and growth rates, in the Germany economy
since the end of World War IT In the 1990s, German growth trailed virtually every other
major economy in the world, with the exception of Japan. Unemployment reached a
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historic high in 1997, 1 1.4% and remained above 10% well into 2003. Unemployment
was also becoming more structural as over 32% of all the unemployed between 1995 and
1999 had been on the rolls for over a year. (Vail 2003) It was argued that Germany has
exhibited the weakest competitiveness profile amongst the world's five largest economies
since the 1990s while it simultaneously was the lowest ranking EU member in terms of
both employment and overall performance by 2000. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004;
Wiesenthal 2004)
The incremental policy changes of the German social partnership which were
quite appropriate for the 1960s and 1970s seemed far less appropriate for the 1980s and
1990s and the new international and European context. (Gobeyn 1993; Katzenstein 1987;
Vail 2003) Importantly for the social partnership has been that the area of conventional
manufacturing, where the tripartite arrangements of collective bargaining, fulltime and
permanent employment, codetermination, and cooperative policymaking, are precisely
the sectors of low growth, decline, and contraction. While still a major industrial and
manufacturing power, and while still representing a strong share of the economy, these
core sectors of the traditional postwar German economy and social partnership are in the
steepest decline. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)
The German public “clamored for effective policy responses" to the declining
GDP growth, rising unemployment, and decreasing competitiveness of the German
economy. (Vail 2003) Though some suggest the demands were far less clamorous and
tended to be rather weak given the lack of willingness to make significant cuts to well
entrenched benefits or subsidies. (Cox 2001 ) Yet these economic challenges, similar to
those in Austria, resulted in little compromise or action by the social partners who
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seemed incapable and unwilling to compromise and reach consensus at the very time they
were needed most. Some argue that the social partnership in Germany is prone to
dysfunction during times of economic decline necessitating a much stronger and direct
role by the state as occurred during Concerted Action and under the Schmidt and Kohl
governments into the 1980s. (Streeck 1984, 1997; Vail 2003)
The response of the late Kohl and Schroder governments fit this pattern quite well
as both attempted to force the social partners to the bargaining table through an Alliance
for Jobs. Under Kohl, the Alliance never even emerged from the gate due to intransigence
from both employers and unions. Under Schroder, the Alliance became a reality and there
was much rhetorical and institutional optimism that consensus on to address the
fundamental economic and social reforms could be reached between the partners under
the watchful and now coordinating eye of the state. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003;
Sturm 2003) The results, however, were far less than expected and the future of the
German social partnership hangs in the balance. Several important transformations within
the German state have challenged the efficacy and viability of the social partnership to
address fundamental questions of German social and economic policy. The ability, of
lack of ability, to find innovative and consensual policy outputs to alleviate and address
these challenges will likely define the future of the social partnership in the German
policymaking process.
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Figure 6: Real GDP Growth in Gennany
Reunification
The suddenness of German reunification between 1989 and 1990 had tremendous
consequences for the German economy, society, and polity. Institutionally however, the
process of unification resulted in little initial structural and organizational change. The
Kohl model of unification seems to have been a rather elegant extension of the existing
institutions and structures of the Federal Republic into and upon the former East German
society, economy, and polity. (Padgett 1999) In less than a year between 1989 and 1990,
economic, monetary, political, and social union took place through the wholesale transfer
of the West German system of legal, social, economic, and political institutions upon the
Eastern framework. (Turner 1998; Wiesenthal 2004) The structures and institutions of the
Federal Republic initially remained remarkably unchanged and resilient in the face of
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what was a major social, economic, and political transformation of the German state. In
terms of interest groups and the social partnership, this pattern held firm as the West
German interest group system was quickly adapted and became the model for the unified
Germany, (von Beyme 1993; Wallach and Francisco 1992; Turner 1998; Padgett 1999)
The quickness of unification and the institutional continuity via the extension of
the existing system of interest representation, intermediation, and organization to the new
Eastern states briefly obscured several major stumbling points of the process and its
consequences. (Padgett 1999) Germany's already weakening economic performance was
significantly worsened by the assumption of the costs of reunification. The eastern states
were a tremendous burden upon the economy in almost all terms including social
spending, administration, healthcare, environmental regulation, unemployment,
education, and infrastructure. (Merkl 1993; Wiesenthal 2004)
The hopes that Eastern Germany could be quickly integrated into the Western
economy and reach near parity in a short period were never met and the reunification
project’s costs to government, business, and the German taxpayer were enormous. While
no one expected a miracle, the costs of reuimfication clearly appeared to have far
outstripped expected levels of social and economic outlays. This wrecked havoc with
Germany’s regional and global competitiveness that was further diminished by the
incorporation of a large mass of unprofitable and unsustainable Eastern industries that in
turn led to increasingly high social expenditures in terms of unemployment and
vocational retraining costs. (Merkel 1993; Padgett 1999)
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While Germany’s economy had been in relative decline prior to reunification, the
economic, social, and political costs of trying to integrate the East into the republic led to
enormous fiscal, monetary, industrial, labor, and social pressures. In terms of the social
partnership, unification served to temporarily forestall the decline of tripartite consensus
that had begun in the 1970s. The complexity and costs of unification required cooperation
between all major social and political actors of the federal republic and the social partners
of business, agriculture, and labor were critical in helping manage the difficult process.
The Kohl government, while generally unenthusiastic of social partnership and unions
especially, was eager to normalize relations with labor to aid in integrating the potentially
more radical unions and workers of the East into the more pragmatic and unified German
labor movement that had typified the federal republic since the end of World War IT
(Gobeyn 1993) Kohl’s initial partnership with the Chemical Workers’ Union and others
in the DGB, versus the more problematic IG Metall
,
helped form a more solid tripartite
basis to integrate east into west through what would become the Solidarity Pact. (Padgett
1999) In typical German neo-corporatist fashion. Kohl was able to absorb criticism of his
new pro-labor stance from business and employers and crafted strong consensus and
consent on Ins unification programs. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Merkl 1993; Wallach and
Francisco 1992; Turner 1998)
Despite the psychological and geopolitical benefits of reunification of the German
state, the process, due to its complexity, speed, and institutionalization, may have actually
stunted the emergence of major economic and political reforms to address the declining
German growth and employment. It has been argued that the very continuity of the
institutions that seemed to guide the unification process were far below the optimal
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course for German economic and political reforms. The surprising speed in which
unification took place eliminated the ability to experiment, tinker, or significantly reform
many of the preexisting institutions of the Federal Republic that could have helped pull
Germany more quickly from its economic malaise. (Wiesenthal 2004; Kitschelt and
Streeck 2004; Merkl 1993) However, there are some arguments that significant structural
and economic reform should have actually been much easier given the scope and
opportunity of unification. Cox argues that the Kohl government opted to avoid difficult
structural reforms and tended to overstate the need for continuity in the unification
process. (Cox 2001
)
The unification process absorbed so much economic, political, and social capital
that once completed, the will to continue a major restructuring of the German economic
and political policymaking process may have been significantly weakened. (Wisenthal
2004) Despite the continuity of institutions and structures, the collapse of the GDR and
reunification with the West under the federal republic meant significant changes for the
interest associations. While the system of social partnership was also extended to Eastern
Germany, this came at a time of significant challenge and tumult for the system. This had
major implications for the system of collective bargaining, policymaking, and the social
partners themselves.
For labor, the end of East Germany signaled the end of the Free German Trade
Union (FDGB), the Communist Party-controlled trade union federation in the east The
leader of the FDGB was arrested and later tried on corruption and malfeasance charges.
The unions of Western Germany quickly moved in to fill the void, but only half of all
workers decided to join, nonetheless, higher than the union density of the west that had
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hovered near 35% for the past few decades. The total number of workers represented in
the unions under the DGB umbrella went from just under 8 million in 1990 to nearly 12
million by 1992 almost exclusively on the inclusion of new East German workers into the
affiliated unions. (Turner 1998; Conradt 2001
)
In 1991, the first national level collective bargaining arrangements between the
unions and employers' went into effect in eastern Germany. These boosted wages for
most workers in the east despite their overall low levels of productivity and firm
profitability. (Wiesenthal 2004) This was closely watched and intermediated by the Kohl
government that hoped to use the agreements to more deeply integrate the east into the
processes and structures of the federal republic and to lessen eastern workers' overall
unhappiness with high unemployment levels. However, the end results of the collective
bargaining were disastrous. Nearly 80% of eastern enterprises, comprising 60% of all
eastern workers, either partially or entirely ignored the wage agreements. (Wiesenthal
2004; Turner 1998; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Padgett 1999)
In 1993 Gesamtmetall, the metal industry employers’ association, refused to
honor the existing collective agreements in eastern Germany. These had promised a 26%
pay increase for the year. IG Metal I responded by calling a strike of affected workers and
labor -capital unrest spread quickly threatening a wider series of strikes and lockouts. In
the end, the strike was ended and compromise was reached that generally favored
workers. IG Metall claimed victory. (Turner 1998) However, the negotiations had led to
fundamental changes in the collective bargaining process that allowed firm and regional
level variations from national or industry-wide collective arrangements in the east. Given
the traditional leadership role that IG Metall has historically played in both German labor
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and in setting the benchmarks for collective bargaining, this concession had deep
implications, probably more than initially predicted, upon the entire German collective
bargaining system. (Casey and Gold 2000; Padgett 1999)
Because of the collapse of the industry-wide collective bargaining agreements in
the east, unions and industry associations began to tolerate regional and firm specific
agreements known as “opening and hardship clauses”. (Auer 1997; Wiesenthal 2004;
Turner 1998; Bosch 2004) These have developed into a rather complex and differential
system of allowable variances and alterations to industry-wide or national collective
bargaining arrangements at the regional, local, firm, or plant level. (Bosch 2004) These
resulted in negotiated collective bargaining agreements that paid eastern workers
approximately 60-70% of the wages earned by western workers in similar or identical
trades. While this was done initially to protect employment in and the survival of less
productive and competitive industries in the east, it also extended to service unions and
other sectors such as hospital workers where the wage gap seemed to make less sense.
(Conradt 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Additionally, the unions had hoped that wages
in the east would gradually but quickly reach parity with those in the west and believed
the reforms to be of a short-term nature. However, as wages and employment continued
to remain depressed in eastern Germany, even through today, the opening and hardship
clauses have become permanent features of the collective bargaining process in Eastern
Germany. (Casey and Gold 2000; Turner 1998; Wisensthal 2004; Bosch 2004)
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This has led to both accelerated decentralization of the collective bargaining
process not only in eastern but also in western Germany while it has also led German
labor unions and employers' to become more divided on a number of wage, social policy,
and economic restructuring issues along east-west lines. (Conradt 2001; Auer 1997;
Bosch 2004) East German businesses and industry differed tremendously from those in
the west in numerous ways. The east lacked resourceful, large, and profitable
corporations. Many that survived unification were gobbled up by large western industries
through the Treuhandanstalt regime of privatization and liberalization of former East
German state assets. (Padgett 1999; Merkl 1993; Wiesenthal 2004) The BDI, BDA, and
other western-based employers’ and business associations were accused of biased and
unfair privatization and reorganization plans during the unification process by giving
preference to existing large West German firms rather than helping create new
entrepreneurs and firms in the east. (Conradt 2001; Padgett 1999)
While the process of transferring the institutions and structures of governance
from west to east initially seemed to require no major reform or reorganization, the long-
term institutional and structural consequences of reunification have become more visible
and pronounced. (Jacoby 2005) The Solidarity Pact and other Kohl efforts to develop
and institutional the structures of the west upon the east have not held up well. The
vitality of the federal republic’s institutions and structure in the new unified and eastern
environments is uncertain. The imposition of the western models and structures of
governance took place upon a “social and economic fabric that lacked the organizational
prerequisites” to truly adopt and benefit from them. (Wisenethal 2004; Padgett 1999;
Auer 1997)
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This seems quite applicable to the social partnership and the system of collective
bargaining. The East lacked many of the fundamental building blocks upon which the
Federal Republic and its social partnership were founded. (Padgett 1999) The perceived
lack of applicability and legitimacy of the western structures of governance have
continued to grow amongst eastern interests, firms, and workers, adding to the economic
and political crises of the German state. Importantly, this lack of “roots” in the east has
undermined the efficacy, vitality, and future viability of the social partnership to address
important issues of reunification and continuing east-west divisions amongst German
workers, firms, and peoples. (Wiesenthal 2004; Padgett 1999; Glaessner 2005; Wallach
and Francisco 1992; Merkl 1993; Auer 1997) However in some areas, including labor
organization and codetermination, there are signs of both successful transference of the
western model along with significant variation and adaptation to the underlying eastern
conditions. (Fichter 1997; Frege 1999; Leaman 2002)
Intnguingly, the specific institutionalization of social partnership in eastern
Germany has tended to follow along closer lines of the tripartism found in other post-
communist states than that found in western Germany prior to unification. The lack of the
fundamental social and economic preconditions of the western social partnership has
meant a very distinct hybrid of West German neo-corporatism and Eastern European
tripartism that is generally characterized by weaker economies, weaker social partners,
and shallow social roots. As Padgett suggest, the forms of tripartism that have emerged in
eastern Germany are far more numerous, and have been far more effective, at the meso
level between unions, industry, and the new eastern Lander governments. These are often
in the form of “crisis cartels” between provincial governments, unions, and firms but
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lacking the structural permanence and stability found in the traditional western model of
social partnership. The significant space for regional corporatism in the German system
flourished in the eastern states due to their particular geographical concentrations of
similar firms, a leftover of centrally planned communist economies, and their new found
federalism in which Land governments found themselves with significant authority and
organizational capacity to address economic problems of the unification and privatization
process. (Padgett 1999)
This division along east-west lines exists amongst workers, industry, and polity
continues to weaken and divide German interests and erodes the foundations and
functions of social partnership and consensual policymaking processes at the macro level.
(Padgett 1999) Examples include the Hartz IV reforms designed to shorten and lessen
unemployment benefits. While controversial throughout German labor and society,
workers’ and voters in the east were particularly critical of its harshness and perceived
larger impact upon the east with its significantly higher levels of unemployment. (The
Economist 2004)
This has had political ramifications for the major interests and parties. Worker
and voter support for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) increased as it merged
into the new Left or Links party and significantly increased its vote share in provincial
and local elections. The electoral success of the new PDS-Links alliance in the 2005
federal elections, led by former SPD leftist, Oskar Lafontaine, can be traced directly to
these new east-west divides over economic and political refonn. The far-right wing
German Nationalist Party (NPD) has also seen increased eastern support in federal.
Lander
,
and local elections since the late 1 990s. In general, unification and its
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consequences have pushed Germany party politics towards a more multi-party system
and significantly altered the underlying alignments of the major parties. (Kitschelt 2004)
Reunification may have made it more difficult for German policymakers and
interests to address the needs for political and economic reform that emerged by the
1980s. The costs, in fiscal, social, economic, and political terms, of unification limited
the policymakers' ability to significantly overhaul or change the institutional framework
of the social partnership and policymaking process since those institutions, amongst
others of the federal republic, were central to the wholesale integration of the east into the
existing constitutional, legal, economic, social, and political orders. The speed and
pressure to maintain existing institutions was quite high given the costs and scale of the
reunification process. (Merkl 1993; Wisenethal 2004; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)
However, some have suggested that unification was used as a convenient excuse to avoid
unpopular structural reforms that could have been implemented during the unique
opportunity provided to the Kohl government in the early 1990s. (Cox 2001
)
Nonetheless, even with the problems and issues of unification and eastern
integration, the social partners still remain influential actors in the east, even if not as
monopolistic and powerful as they were in the pre-unification past. While union density
continues to decline, they usually remain the unchallenged representatives of fulltime and
permanent workers in traditional industrial and manufacturing sectors including
metalworking, construction, and transportation. Public services and other service-based
employees remain highly unified in their respective unions as well. (Wiesenthal 2004;
Leaman 2002) Industry and business association are not quite as successful in the east as
labor. Industry and employers’ association membership has continued to decline and
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shows little sign of recovery. The decentralization of collective bargaining at the regional
or firm level has significantly limited Eastern enterprises perception of benefits extending
from peak association affiliation. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) This has been exacerbated
by lasting mistrust of larger Western-based business and industries by those in the East.
(Wiesenthal 2004) The argument that reunification could potentially increase the decline
and disorganization of social partnership in the German policymaking and collective
bargaining processes has borne out by creating new intractable schisms, lessening the
ability of social partners to represent unified interests, and decentralizing authority and
influence away from the peak associations. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Turner 1998)
Economic Liberalization
Liberalization of the German economy since the 1980s has primarily revolved
around streamlining the welfare state and increasing German competitiveness within the
context of increasing European and global competition. The Kohl government came into
power arguing for the necessity of major reform or turnabout, Wende. His government
instituted a number of reforms to liberalize the labor market, reduce public welfare
expenditures, and privatize partially or fully state-owned industries and utilities, such as
the railways and postal service, in the 1980s through 1990s. (Cox 2001 ) The initial efforts
of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government to gain consent from the major interests
tended to fail and resulted in greater marginalization of the social partnership in the
policymaking process.
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While the Kohl government did regularly hold advisory and tripartite meetings
and conferences to discuss and debate reforms, especially over reunification, it became
less and less likely to use such occasions to generate consensual policy outputs. (Hancock
1989; Heimsch 2000; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Gobeyn 1993) While Hancock,
Katzenstein, and others suggest that the Kohl reforms were not particularly radical and
did not significantly reverse many of the social democratic gains of the late 1960s
through early 1980s, these reforms did have significant implications for the social
partners and the partnership itself. (Cox 2001; Hancock 1989, Katzenstein 1987) The
areas of reform included labor markets, social insurance, and privatization that were all
within the traditional bailiwick of the social partnership’s policymaking and structural
competencies for the bulk of the postwar era. While bypassing the social partnership had
not been entirely uncommon in previous administrations, including those of previous
CDU Chancellor Adenauer, Kohl certainly set a precedent that would continue into the
current era. (Gobeyn 1993; Heimsch 2000; Vail 2003)
In the early and mid 1980s, Kohl enacted a number of rather moderate
liberalizations of the labor market and reductions in social spending. (Cox 2001 ) This met
with strong SPD and trade union opposition, notably led by IG MetalL and increased the
level of labor-capital conflict in Germany. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Streeck and
Hassel 2004) The dissent was successful in moderating government reforms over the late
1980s and into the early 1990s suggesting continuity of the social partnership model to
punish government that failed to get consent of the social partners and the tendency to
preclude radical policy shifts in favor of incrementalism. (Katzenstein 1987; Smith 1992;
Cox 2001
;
Vail 2003) What emerged was a patchwork of economic reform and
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liberalization that failed to achieve much structural economic transformation due
precisely to the lack of fundamental consensus amongst the social partners, especially
labor. (Schrim 2002; Vail 2003; Cox 2001 ) It has also been argued that unification
moderated the Kohl government's ability to enact such policy given its need for a wider
consensus on the programs to integrate the east. (Padgett 1999) This was also influenced
by a slight boost in the western economy during the early 1990s that reduced some of the
demand for large-scale structural change to the German economic and policymaking
models. However, that growth would not last, employment would not rebound, and the
German economy began to more rapidly decline by the mid 1990s. (Harding and Paterson
2000 )
Efforts to find consensus on a new range of economic and social reforms failed
when neither labor nor business could reach an agreement on forming the national
Alliance for Jobs in 1995. The proposed alliance, based on neo-corporatist organization
and principles similar to that of Concerted Action, though with a smaller mandate of
issues, was an attempt by German labor to increase its role in the otherwise pro-business
and conservative Kohl policymaking process. Kohl, seeing that the social partners were
failing to reach accord amongst their own bargaining and negotiation, hoped to use the
alliance to reach consensus on more wide-ranging economic reforms and to use the
government to leverage both unions and business to reach compromise. (Streeck and
Hassel 2004; Heinisch 2000) The failure of the Alliance to get off the ground drove Kohl
towards a more unilateral policymaking approach that put the government at odds with
the social partners from both sides as well as from the political opposition. (Vail 2003;
Cox 2001
)
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Starting in 1996, the Kohl government began enacting a series of deeper
economic reform measures that included cuts to the social insurance system, increases in
retirement ages, liberalization of the labor market, reduction of sick benefits, exemption
of smaller and mid size firms from some regulation, and privatization. The resulting
widespread opposition by German labor, the SPD, and even some business interests
eventually worked to limit many of these reforms and eventually led to the electoral
losses of the CDU/CSU in 1998. Again, as typical of the postwar German model of
consensual policymaking, the failure to gamer the consent of the social partners and the
bold unilateral policy initiatives of the Kohl government resulted in the dilution of the
reform’s content or its outright failure to be enacted. (Katzenstein 1987; Smth 1992;
Hancock 1989) It additionally increased the electoral opposition to Kohl and the
CDU/CSU amongst many moderate Germans who saw the failure of the Alliance and
Kohl's subsequent unilateralism was antithetical to the underlying intents of the social
market economy and social partnership that had served Germany so well for so long.
Labor Market Reforms
One of the key areas of economic liberalization begun under the Kohl government
was in reform and deregulation of the labor market. This has become the exemplary issue
for many in explaining the decline in German competitiveness, the growth of
unemployment, and the significant changes taking place in the German policymaking
process. As such it deserves special attention precisely because it has become the
emblematic case of the function, dysfunction, and marginalization of social partnership in
the policymaking and regulatory process. Much of the recent scholarship on German
social partnership and economic liberalization has been dedicated to analyzing and
learning from the German labor market policy process since the 1980s. But it is also a
critical area of government, economic, and labor interest due to the continuing structural
unemployment and reunification in Germany since the late 1970s. Hence the labor
market issue has emerged as the critical case of economic policymaking and the
perceived malfunction of social partnership.
With German unemployment well over the EU-15 average for much of the late
1990s and early 2000s, reaching an all-time high of 1 1 .4% in 1997 and hovering near
10% well into 2004, the primary goal of economic policymaking was to alleviate high
levels of unemployment. This would have significant benefits not only in providing
employment to jobless workers, but would also reduce demands on the social insurance
system which would in turn reduce the demands for government revenues and employer
contributions which would in turn would potentially lower tax burdens for German firms
and citizens, increasing investment, and making the German economy more competitive
with those in Europe and around the world, leading to economic growth and decreasing
unemployment. Additionally, unemployment remained strongly linked to the regional
disparity in Germany with rates much higher in the East. Hence, when viewed from a
particular perspective, labor market reforms in Germany could have the potential to
significantly address a wide-ranging number of reunification, economic, and social
pressures through a domino-like process. (Bemdt 2000; Vail 2003; Vitols 2004)
Unemployment was no longer a short-term and cyclical pattern dependent upon
business cycles and had become a structural problem by the 1980s. (Bemdt 2000) While
Germany had suffered through bouts of increasing unemployment in earlier periods, in
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the late 1960s, the late 1970s, and in the early 1980s, the type and longevity of
unemployment had changed. Rather than experiencing short bouts of high unemployment
followed by increased employment, unemployment was becoming a lasting feature of the
economy. Those that become unemployed remained unemployed for much longer periods
and in some cases dropped out of the workforce altogether. (Bemdt 2000; Vitols 2004)
Nearly a third of all jobless workers remained out of the labor force in excess of a year
between 1995 and 1999. (Vail 2003) The labor force participation rate declined amongst
many groups from the 1980s onward, including older workers, usually from industrial or
manufacturing sectors, women, and younger less-skilled workers. (Vitols 2004)
However, even in white-collar and service industries, unemployment was becoming more
frequent and longer lasting. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004)
One of the most daunting problems was that unemployment numbers failed to
significantly come down even during times of economic rebound in the early 1990s and
early 2000s. This may have been partially the fault of reunification and its absorption of a
large number of inefficient and unproductive East German firms that quickly led to
extraordinarily high unemployment. But even in the west and in areas of the economy
that seemed to be doing quite well, employment numbers remained soft. (Bemdt 2000;
Vail 2003) It was well argued by many that the German labor market policies, which
were highly protective of workers and strongly regulated the labor markets, were
contributing to employers' unwillingness to hire new staff even when necessary. The
long-term costs, in terms of benefits, salary, and taxes, to firms dissuaded new hiring.
More flexible employment, including temporary and part-time work, could have been a
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solution to both employers and the unemployed. Yet German labor law was extremely
discouraging of the use of atypical, temporary’ or part-time, employment. (Vitols 2004)
One of the key areas of social partnership authority and influence in the postwar
German policymaking system has been in employment and labor market policy. The
traditional forms of employment in postwar Germany were based on a model of
dependent, full-time, and unlimited employment between a worker and firm. These were
enshrined in sector-level collective agreements on wages, working hours, benefits, and
working conditions that were negotiated between sector-level unions and employers’
associations. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991 ) By the 1990s, these also included more
decentralized agreements between firm and plant-level employees’ works councils and
firm/plant management. Temporary employment, which lacks direct firm-worker
relations, is limited in tenure, and may often be at less than fulltime has been incredibly
atypical of the German labor market for most of the postwar era. (Vitols 2004; Kitschelt
and Streeck 2004)
Additionally, the social partners had been endowed with the primary roles in job
placement, vocation training and worker retraining through the Federal Employment
Office or Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (BA). The BA administered training and job
placement funded through a combination of federal revenues and, primarily, through
contributions from the social partners. The regional and local offices were operated
jointly by both labor unions and employers' associations and were amongst the most
notable quasi-govemmental roles of the social partnership in postwar Germany. (Vail
2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Vocational training was also an area of competency of
the social partners interaction with the education system primarily at the Lander and local
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levels. (Casey and Gold 2000) This system was an extension of the ideal of semi-
sovereignty as it required little state intervention and relied upon active and engaged
social partners to address labor market and training demands. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005)
Changes in the German economy seemed to suggest a greater demand for
temporary or atypical employment. It has been argued that the economic, social, and
technological changes that developed in the transition from an industrial to post-industrial
have necessitated a growing demand by employers and employees for temporary work.
Temporary employment has been strongly linked to modem and flexible models of
economic production and activity precisely because they can quickly adapt to and reflect
changes in the local, regional, and global economic cycles. Finns and sectors can respond
more effectively to changes in their production and supply chains, increasing efficiency
and profits by marginalizing the need to be overstaffed during periods of cyclical decline
or understaffed during periods of growth and expansion. (Vitols 2004) This has also
increased pressure for the decentralization of collective bargaining and other labor-capital
relations to the firm level as well and will be discussed in further detail later in this
chapter.
Temporary work could offer several advantages to employers on a number of
fronts. First, it provides them with flexibility so as to increase or decrease manpower
depending upon cyclical turns in demand as well as to cover short-term leaves by full-
time employees for vacation, family leave, medical leave, or other employment
interruptions. Second, the costs of hiring and firing employees from temporary
employment are far less than in full-time and permanent employment. These include not
only wages, but also employer contributions to pension, healthcare, and other social
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benefits. Finally, temporary employment provides a model of incremental integration of
new workers into existing industries and services. New employees, possessing higher
uncertainty in terms of adaptation, compatibility, and productivity, can be brought into
full-time employment in stages, mitigating some of the costs and risks to the employer.
(Vitols 2004)
Temporary employment may also have significant benefits for workers as well,
especially given Germany's lasting structural unemployment problems. It also provides
them with potentially flexible employment opportunities that may address seasonal or
cyclical patterns of unemployment or under-employment by workers in service,
agricultural, industrial or other industries that follow regularized patterns or seasons of
employment and unemployment. Temporary work may also a gateway to full-time and
permanent employment with a firm. It is argued that temporary work often provides
unskilled and under-educated workers opportunities to increase their work history and
experience that is likely to improve their chances of obtaining full-time and permanent
work with the same or other firms in the future. In other words, it helps create a portfolio
of work history for workers who might otherwise be excluded from the employment
ranks. Over 60% of all temporary work was taken by those currently unemployed,
unemployed for in excess of a year, or those who had never worked. Over 30% of
temporary workers are hired as fulltime and permanent employees following the
completion of their temporary contract. (Vitols 2004) Given the above average rates of
structural unemployment in Germany since the 1 980s, labor market reform was clearly
near the top of the agenda for German reform efforts.
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The lack of a strong temporary labor market in was identified by many as a major
barrier to reinvigorating the German economy and reducing unemployment, especially
since the 1990s. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004) The defense of permanent employment and its
compression into national and industry-wide coordination of wage bargaining meant that
wages usually remained high and suppressed employment across virtually every sector of
the economy. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) Yet very little policy change was
accomplished from the late 1980s through early 2000s despite increasing public and
government pressures. The social partners seemed unwilling and unable to reach
consensus on painful, but necessary, labor market and vocational training reforms. (Vail
2003) By 2003, temporary employment still comprised only about 1.2% of German
workers. (Vitols 2004) Vocational training institutions were also failing to create
sufficient training places leaving an extraordinary number of young German workers
without opportunities to gain necessary vocational experience and apprenticeship. (Vail
2003)
The reasons for lack of reform were numerous, but fell generally upon the social
partners and their lack of willingness to compromise on labor market and vocational
training policies. This was especially true for unions who were being pressured by the
domestic political and economic environment to make concessions to industry and
employers that would help lead Germany out of its economic malaise (Berndt 2000) But
employers and industries were also divided and unwilling to increase contributions to
vocational training programs and to allow greater variation from existing labor-firm
relationships. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Regulation of temporary work, job
placement, and vocational training had all fallen squarely under the social partnership's
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aegis for the bulk of the postwar era, and in the midst of economic decline when reform
and innovation were in highest demand, the social partners failed to act. (Vail 2003;
Vitols 2000)
German labor was generally opposed to temporary work for a number of obvious
reasons. First, unions felt that temporary work would undermine fulltime and permanent
employment. Temporary employment would place downward pressures on wages,
benefits, and working conditions while placing increasing pressures on working hours.
Further temporary employment undermined one of the most fundamental policy ideals of
labor and German social democracy, co-determination, resting upon the permanent and
lasting intra-firm relationship between employers and employees. (Markovits 1986;
Thelen 1991; Vitols 2004; Bosch 2004) The mobility and limited allegiance of temporary
workers to unions, firms, and codetermination would be incompatible with the goals and
ideals of the postwar German labor movement. Over 56% of temporary employment
contracts were for less than three months and temporary workers would also potentially
diminish union density since less than 5% of such workers are unionized. (Vitols 2004)
But even industry had been traditionally opposed to temporary employment for
most of the postwar period. Temporary workers have less experience, less education, less
training, and tended to have longer commutes to work than permanent employees leading
to increased instances of tardiness and more work-related accidents than full-time and
permanent workers.
In addition, by the nature of their temporality and lack of formal ties to the firm
through co-determination, many firms felts that temporary workers were less inclined to
adhere to standards of quality, workplace behavior, and commitment to efficiency.
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Hence, for many firms and sectors, the perceived overall costs of increased temporary
employment outweighed the estimated wage and flexibility benefits. (Frege 1999; Vitols
2004)
Under German labor law, the disinclination towards temporary employment was
well codified and institutionalized. Temporary agency employment was prohibited
entirely until the end of the 1960s due to the monopolization of private employment
exchanges under the Federal Employment Office or Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (BA). This
went unchallenged until 1967. A suit by a Swiss-based temporary agency was won
through a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court and effectively legalized temporary
work. The social partners and the major parties opposed this change and cooperated in
enacting the Act on Temporary Employment Businesses in October of 1972. (Vitols
2004) This act was quite restrictive on temporary work and temporary employment
agency practices. It severely limited the ability to make fixed-term or part-time contracts
and lessened the ability of employers to dismiss individual workers. This strengthened
the existing hegemony of permanent, full-time employment in the German labor market
and effectively ended growth in temporary employment for the next twenty years.
(Markovits 1986; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)
The law was reinforced in 1982 under the SPD-FDP coalition government of
Helmut Schmidt. The social partners had been an integral part of the process, shepherded
by the Schmidt government, in enacting the Work Promotion Law that established
additional limitations upon the duration and scope of temporary work, including banning
it from the construction industry altogether. (Vitols 2004) After the departure of Schmidt
and election of Helmut Kohl later in 1982, the new conservative government did set forth
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to moderately liberalize temporary employment. Under Kohl, restrictions on temporary
employment were incrementally modified by acts in 1985, 1994, and 1997. These
included extending periods of postings, loosened the regulations of the synchronization of
work contracts, and exempting smaller business from some of the more onerous
restrictions. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004; Vail 2003) Many of these changes
reflected similar policy reforms enacted in the Netherlands in the 1980s to address
increased demands for flexibility and to boost employment. The Netherlands had
previous encompassed a system that was primarily one of permanent and long-term
employment much like that in Germany. The Dutch reforms including the the Wassenaar
agreement and other changes in the 1980s liberalized the labor markets and increased
flexibility and were often cited as sources of similar efforts in Germany. The utilization
of Dutch-style reform seemed potentially useful if also significant limited. (Delsen and de
Jong 1998; Timmins 2000)
Nonetheless, rules limiting temporary employment were only moderately
loosened, and the general legal and economic structure tended to continue to dissuade
employers from utilizing temporary employment despite increasing market and cyclical
pressures to do so. (Vitols 2004; Cox 2001 ) Nonetheless there were small and steady
increases in temporary labor utilization from the late 1980s into the 1990s under the
auspices of the Kohl government reforms. (Bemdt 2000; Vitols 2004)
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However, by the late 1990s and under the modified conditions enacted by Kohl,
the 1972 law remained the primary legal basis on restricting the growth of temporary
employment in the German economy. The social partnership was frequently criticized for
its efforts to retard temporary labor market reforms that could decrease unemployment
and increase German firms’ competitiveness. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003)
Upon entering office. Chancellor Gerhard Schroder instituted his promised, and
German labor supported, tripartite Alliance for Jobs, Training, and Competitiveness in
1998. While temporary work had not been on the initial agenda of the alliance, it was
quickly added with strong government support. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004;
Timmins 2000) Over the next three years, the Alliance for Jobs became the central locus
of state-intermediated negotiation on labor market reforms between labor, represented by
the DGB, and employers' associations represented by the BD1 and BDA, as well as by
the specific sector associations that represented temporary agencies, the Federal
Association of Temporary Employment Agencies or Bundesverband Zeitarbeit Personal-
Dienstleistungen (BZA) and the Interessengemeinschaft Deutsche/-
Zeitarbeitsunternehmen (IGZ). (Vitols 2004; Vail 2003)
The story of labor market reform in the Alliance for Jobs from 1998 to 2001 is
one that ends in general failure. The Alliance for Jobs hardly fulfilled any of its intended
expectations to achieve meaningful negotiation, bargaining, and compromise over
important economic policymaking. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004) Both the
DGB and employers' associations eventually stonewalled the proposed agreements
within the Alliance over labor market reform. The DGB rejected it on the basis of
changes to the process of collective bargaining while employers were divided between
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large and small-medium sized firms and could not reach a unified compromise position.
(Vitols 2004) The failure of the Alliance for Jobs has become emblematic of the
problems and failures of the social partnership in the German policymaking and
governance system. (Vitols 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) The inability of
peak associations to comprehensively unify and represent their membership and the
inability and unwillingness of the social partners to reach compromise and agreement on
urgent issues of economic reform have increased pressure to reduce or replace the neo-
corporatist frameworks in the Gentian system. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004)
The response by the Schroder government also is indicative of the transformation
of the German policymaking process that began under the Schmidt and Kohl
governments in the 1980s. The government, given its inability to utilize the Alliance for
Jobs as an effective policymaking tool to find consensus amongst the social partners, has
begun to assume the responsibilities of economic and social governance that once were
reserved for the social partners. (Vail 2003) The willingness to depart from the dominant
postwar German model of semi-sovereignty, incremental and consensual reform, and
social partnership increased under the Kohl government but has become more
dramatically commonplace under the subsequent Schroder and Merkel governments.
(Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
With the failure of the Alliance to produce compromise and actionable policy,
Schroder decided to act unilaterally and passed a reform act, known as the Job-AQTIV
Law (Job-Activation, Qualification, Training, Investment, and Placement), that
liberalized temporary employment in terms of contact durations and guaranteed equitable
wages and working conditions for temporary workers in positions lasting over twelve
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months. In many ways, the Schroder legislation addressed labor and employers’ demands
simultaneously, though both sides eventually criticized it. (Vitols 2004; Vail 2003)
Nonetheless, the important consequence of the act was that the social partners, by failing
compromise and come to agreement on labor market reforms were being excluded from
the policymaking process on an issue central to their historical core of postwar economic
governance. (Vail 2003)
Following the Job-AQTIV Law in 2002, there was further political impetus to
enact greater reform in the labor markets due to upcoming elections as well as recent
discoveries ofjob reporting fraud inside the Federal Employment Office, the BA. (Vail
2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) The Schroder government, disappointed by the lack of
productivity and consensus in the Alliance for Jobs, gave up on the tripartite institution
and significantly bypassed the social partners by assigning the tasks of labor market
liberalization policy to an independent expert commission, the Commission on Modem
Service Delivery on the Labor Market which became known as the Hartz Commission as
it was directed by Volkswagen’s Personnel Director, Peter Hartz. The social partners had
a small voice in the commission with only three total seats including two union
representatives and only one from the business associations. (Streeck and Hassel 2004;
Vail 2003) The Hartz Commission set about a major overhaul of the regulations and
limitations on temporary work in the German economy. The major policy ideas were the
creation of the concept of flexicurity, or a combination of flexibility in labor contracts for
employers with greater employee security in terms of wages, benefits, and working
conditions. (Lehmbruch 2003) The plan also included numerous incentives for temporary
workers to more easily gain entry into permanent employment through a system of
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subsidy to the placement agencies. (Vitols 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004) These were
further enhanced by developments in the labor markets of the Netherlands, Scandinavia,
and an overarching effort within the EU under the Lisbon agenda to improve
competitiveness and reduce unemployment.
The results of the Hartz Commission were a complete end to the 1972 Act on
Temporary Employment Business and hence strongly liberalized the temporary labor
marketplace. But it also provided for collective wage bargaining for temporary workers
and higher levels of protection for such workers. Employers' associations, the DBG, and
more moderate affiliated unions initially supported the proposed law. Small and mid-
sized businesses of the Mittelstand were less enthusiastic over the increases security
through wages and benefits required despite the overall liberalization of temporary
employment. In addition, the law required national collective bargaining that the smaller
firms felt violated the “sacrosanct principle of Tarifautonomic”
.
(Vail 2003) The more
radical unions, such as IG Metall, were also less than satisfied by the proposal that they
felt gave away too much to the employers and would generally place too much downward
pressure on wages and benefits in the German workforce. As the parliamentary vote
neared, the split within labor became more vocal as some unions organized protests in
opposition to the law. Schroder eventually gained the grudging support from the DGB
and a highly divided SPD for the law's approval (Vitols 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
For the social partnership however, the First Law on Modem Labor Services on
the Labor Market of 2004 had important and perhaps lasting implications. While the law
had been debated, created, and passed by bypassing the social partnership, its
implementation rested squarely on the social partners. The Schroder government made
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clear to the unions and employers that the law would fail if they did not reach collective
wage agreements for temporary workers. Intriguingly, and in many ways reflecting the
traditional postwar social partnership, the law forced the social partners, despite their
absence from the policymaking process, to accept responsibility for regulating and
maintaining the temporary employment industry lest the state intervene and regulate it
directly. (Vitols 2004) In a sense, the Schroder government was forcing the unions and
employers' associations to reestablish social partnership in the area of temporary
employment on the threat of future exclusion. (Vail 2003)
The gambit has actually somewhat worked. Unions that had little or no past
interest in temporary workers quickly began organizing within the temporary worker
industry. In an ironic twist, the Hartz reforms, enacted through a marginalization of the
social partners and representing a significant overall diminishment of social partnership
in the German policymaking process, actually created, for the first time in the postwar
era, a common national vehicle for collective bargaining. The DGB, BDA, and the
temporary work agencies' associations, the 1GZ and BVA, were able to reach accords in
2004. (Vitols 2004) The law and the Hartz Commission were lauded as successes by the
SPD-Green government and temporary employment has been increasing in the German
economy. There has been an upturn in temporary employment of unskilled workers in
many firms and industries, quite dramatic given Germany's reticence towards atypical
employment in the past. German unemployment has also begun to decline in the last
three years suggesting a possible correlation as well.
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However, in terms of the social partnership, the story of labor market reform is a
useful example of the currently poor state of neo-corporatism in the German
policymaking process. Clearly, despite the attempted reinvigoration of social partnership
through the Alliance for Jobs by the Schroder government, the failure to achieve
meaningful bargaining and compromise suggests a declining efficacy and future viability
of social partnership in the German policymaking process. While the social partners
continue to maintain roles in the expert commissions, parliamentary committee work, and
other policymaking avenues, the heyday of strong and national policy concertation and
consensus has been decimated by the lack on consensus and unwillingness to pursue
innovative and tough reforms. As the results of the Hartz law suggests, the German state
still relies upon the social partners to perform some of their traditional roles in collective
bargaining and quasi-regulatory activities. This was actually enhanced by the law as it
established a unified national bargaining process between peak associations in the area of
temporary employment. (Vitols 2004) However, from the policymaking perspective, the
labor market reforms suggest a significant weakened and marginalized social partnership
having been replaced by a more active, direct, and aggressive role of the government.
This was then replicated in areas of vocational training and pension reform by the
Schroder government. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005)
Changes in the Political Party System
The increasing importance of and share of votes by the smaller parties including
the FDP, Greens, PDS, and Links may indicate a good level of vitality and health for
German democracy but it also challenges institutions of the social partnership (Hancock
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1989; Smith 2003) The increasing share of the electorate by small parties rests on a
number of interrelated and reinforcing trends of the past two decades. The greater
influence of post-material identities and politics has eroded the traditional left-right
schism represented by the SPD and CDU/CSU. The greater importance of issues of
immigration, nationalism, European integration, women's and gay rights, and other new
social movements has challenged the hegemony of the left-right pattern prevalent in
Unification with the East has also created a new pattern of social, political, and economic
division within the German polity. (Kitschelt 2004; Inglehart 1977; Dalton 2003)
However, the SPD and CDU/CSU have not been entirely unsuccessful at
absorbing new social movements and new issues into their manifestos. Environmentalism
is a notable example that has been widely adopted by not only the Greens but also by the
SPD, Links
,
CDU/CSU, and even FDP parties. Hence, the mere existence of new social
movements and the development of a more post-industrial and post-material electorate
will not necessarily weaken the dominance of the major two parties into the future.
Nonetheless, German parties and politics has become far more competitive in the past
two decades with much greater voter mobility and a more pluralistic system of interest
alignment. (Conradt 2001; Dalton 2003; Kitschelt 2004; Giaessner 2005)
This has numerous implications for the social partners and their traditional
allegiances to the major parties. Clearly German labor has been more divided between
support for the three parties of the left, the SPD, Greens, and Links. The Links party, and
its predecessor the PDS, have attracted support among union labor and workers in eastern
Germany as well as more radicalized workers and leftists in the West. The Greens are
somewhat less successful at getting the union vote. Nonetheless they have been able to
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gamer support from some labor leaders and leftists in the primarily urban areas of Berlin
and major western cities. (Dalton 2004; Conradt 2001 ) However, the major unions and
the confederation of the DGB still tend to be allied strongly with the SPD.
The DGB and sectoral unions remain well entrenched in the SPD party
organization and parliamentary caucus and continue to provide both electoral and
material support to the SPD and its campaigns. (Markovits 1986; Hancock 1989; Conradt
2001 ) In 1998 the DGB spent over $6 million to help the SPD and Schroder campaign
while those amounts have continued to increase in recent elections. (Conradt 2001; Smith
2003) In recent campaigns, unions strongly supported the Social Democrats, helping
Schroder survive the 2002 electoral results. As DGB leader Michael Sommer suggested
in 2002, Germany under Schroder was “on the right path”. Further, nearly 75% of the
SPD's parliamentary delegation to the lower house is affiliated with the labor movement
while former union officials sit in many important SPD cabinet and sub-cabinet seats.
( The Economist 2002) This has meant that organized labor may have become a far more
influential force in the SPD due to the changed and more competitive electoral and
political climate. That has made the party more susceptible to the demands of German
labor than in the past and perhaps driven elements the party towards less consensual and
moderate positions on economic and social policy. This was certainly demonstrated by
the latter campaigns of the Schroder government. (Conradt 2001, 2004)
However, while Schroder and the SPD were able to maintain and even increase
the support of the unions and labor confederation in recent elections, whether the
membership of the union follows is another matter. There is increasing evidence of union
members ignoring their trade union associations' recommendations and endorsements of
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the SPD and Social Democratic candidates for those in the Links, C'DU/CSU, and even
FDP parties. Decreasing party identification and increasing voter mobility has been a
strong characteristic of the past twenty years and organized labor has been losing its
ability to deliver all its votes to the SPD as it once did. (Padgett. Paterson, and Smith
2003; Conradt 2001; Dalton 2003)
Amongst business interests, the staunch support for the CDU/CSU remains high
despite some defection of employers and firms to the FDP who have been significantly
increasing their share of the vote at the expense of the CDU/CSU in the past few
elections. (Smith 2003; Kitschelt 2004) Nonetheless, the major employers’ and business
organizations are still strongly tied to the CDU/CSU at very high levels. Agriculture also
remains dominantly tied to the conservatives through their connections in the Green
Front. In many ways, agriculture remains the most stable of the social partners and their
maintenance of strong ties to the political parties. (Conradt 2001
)
The more important side of the equation has been the declining power of the
social partners to influence the parties. The general smallness of agriculture in the
German economy and electorate has allowed the CDU/CSU to ignore the more extreme
demands of the Green Front. However, both labor and employers remain large segments
for the population and electorate and cannot be summarily ignored or marginalized. Yet,
both the SPD and CDU/CSU have become more autonomous of the labor and industrial
social partners due to their declining organizational and political capacities that are
discussed later in this chapter. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) The greater decentralization,
dissent, and decline of the peak associations has allowed the major parties the ability to
more regularly ignore or marginalize the social partners in the electoral and policymaking
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processes. Chancellors Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel have subsequently relied upon the
organized social partners in both policymaking and electoral terms than those in past eras.
(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003)
Despite these challenges for the social partners and their connections to the major
parties, increasingly competitive elections and a multi-party system will likely have less
effect in Germany than Austria. As indicated earlier, the linkages between interests and
parties were always weaker in the German model than in the Austrian. While the
dominant Austrian interests and parties were virtually inseparable during long periods of
grand coalition and proporz
,
in Germany there has also been a more fluidic interest
association-political party relationship. Hence moderate changes in the party system have
had less overarching consequences for the German institutions and structures of social
partnership than in Austria. Nonetheless, changes in the party system and the weakening
of the links between parties and interests have certainly contributed to the growing
erosion to the ideals and practices of social partnership.
The emergence of grand coalition government following the 2005 elections while
perceived as an opportunity move to improve consensus building and resurrect social
partnership has followed a far more party-dominated pattern of development. Unlike the
first period of grand coalition from 1966 to 1969, the current period has seen no call for a
re-visitation of Concerted Action or other similar institution. The CDU/CSU-SPD
coalition government has been able to use straightforward bipartisan negotiation and
bargaining to enact policy without significant need of or consent from the social partners.
The parties, while still close to and having an advisory and representative relationship
with the social partners and still often seeking their consent, operate under the premise
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that consent is no longer a requirement of policymaking as it once was. (Katzenstein
1987; Vail 2003) However, the declining share of voters between the SPD and
CDU/CSU, which once garnered nearly 90% of the electorate, illustrates that the
continuing improvement of the smaller parties has hurt the two large parties. (Conradt
2001; The Economist 2006; Dalton 2003) The ability of the SPD and CDU/CSU to regain
their vote share would likely require a major realignment or renewal of previous
alignments of interests. Given the weakening status of the major interest associations in
Germany, this seems unlikely though certainly not implausible in the near future.
Challenges to the Organization of German Interests
One of the major challenges to the social partnership has been the increasing
weakness of the peak associations to represent their respective interests as well as to
reflect the most important and critical underlying interests of German society. While
Germany never possessed the compulsory chambers system found in the Austria model,
the Green Front, DGB, and its affiliated unions, and the BDI, along with the BDA, DIHT,
and affiliated employers’ and business associations, had maintained high levels of
absolute members and membership density over their respective constituencies of
agriculture, labor, and employers' during the postwar era. (Braunthal 1965; Thelen 1991;
Markovits 1986; Conradt 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
But by the late 1980s, both industry and labor associations were beginning to lose
their nearly monopolistic positions. By the early 2000s, it was clear that a rising number
of German industries, firms, and workers were operating under the traditional form of
neo-corporatism in only a very limited manner eschewing the formal peak associations
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more frequently. (Bemdt 2000) The only peak association that has seen little
diminishment in member density, despite a drop in overall member numbers, has been
the Green Front. In policymaking terms, agriculture remains strongly unified, well
entrenched, and strongly centralized in the German policymaking process. (Conradt
2001 ) Yet, despite the declines in the other major peak associations, it should be noted
that both union and employers' association density remains high by relative standards and
that even in union membership, where the decline has been more dramatic, there have
been a number of counter-trends that suggest some continuing union vitality and even an
increasing role in representing worker interests and quasi-regulatory roles.
Some suggest that, paradoxically, the decreasing capacity of unions and
employers’ associations to attract members may only be overcome by making successful
deals at the national level through concerted action. Hence programs like the Alliance for
Jobs were important efforts to salvage and reinvigorate social partnership at the national
policymaking level. (Wessels 2000) Others suggest that the only hope for the social
partnership lies in its traditional core sectors of industrial and manufacturing
employment. The decline of neo-corporatism in these traditional sectors are the
ideological and functional leaders of social partnership in other sectors and if these are
lost no amount of reinvention or reinvigoration can save it. (Bemdt 2000) The case of the
temporary labor market might support this suggestion since it was only through state-led
pressure on the social partners at the national level that the reform package was
implemented The result was a greater role and increased membership opportunities for
both labor and employers' and could be construed as a somewhat successful, though
limited, example of reinvigoration of the German social partnership. (Vitols 2004)
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However, other scholars suggest that the role of the social partnership in
collective bargaining between labor and industry is itself a barrier to coping with the new
forms of global and European economic activity that require greater flexibility and
adaptability to changing markets. (Gobeyn 1993) There has been greater pressure on both
labor and business to deviate from or completely bypass the existing national and sectoral
institutions of collective bargaining and neo-corporatist social partnership in lieu of a
more decentralized and flexible system of wage bargaining, codetermination, and
policymaking. There is also significant evidence that the organizational capacities of
unions and business associations are showing signs of “accelerated decay”. (Kitschelt and
Streeck 2004) This has tremendous implications for the future vitality of the peak
associations and of the social partnership’s ability to fulfill its expected roles in collective
bargaining and the policymaking process.
Unions: Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained?
Even as early as 1982, the divisions within German labor and its growing
weakness began to become more visible. In 1982 and 1983, as the new Kohl government
began to institute a series of cautious reforms in fiscal and industrial policy, IG Meta/I
embarked upon a campaign for reduction of work hours and full employment policies.
(Thelen 1991 ) This campaign split the DGB, as five unions under the leadership of the
chemical workers' union sought early retirement benefits in contradiction of specific IG
Metal
I
demands. In the short term. Kohl used this division to weaken labor demands from
both and to push through a number of liberalizing reforms. In the long term, this becme
an illustration of the growing divisions within German labor and the DGB affiliate unions
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that continue to present. Eventually, IG Metall prevailed after the 1984 national strike
and won a gradual introduction of the 35-hour workweek. Yet the victory may have been
quite limited given its concessions on working time flexibility and work-effort
calculations. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Since the 1990s, German unions have had to face dramatic economic challenges
from both reunification and globalization. De-industrialization and deunionization, while
affecting other advanced economies, was avoided by Germany for most of early the
1980s. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991) Yet it was only delayed, as these trends emerged
as major factors by the 1990s. This weakened the traditional core of occupations and
constituencies of labor that had been firmly rooted in industrial and manufacturing
sectors of the postwar German economy. The proportion of unionized workers had
remained approximately stable from the early 1960s through 1980s, hovering near 35-
38%. (Markovits 1986) Reunification had briefly propped up union membership by
encompassing a large mass of workers from the former East Germany into the unions of
the Federal Republic, yet these numbers declined immediately as many Eastern firms
were dissolved and unemployment skyrocketed. By the late 1990s, union membership
had dropped to close to 30%. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Bosch 2004)
By 2000, the German trade unions were losing between 30,000-40,0000 members
per month as industrial employment shrunk and older workers retired. By 2000 union
membership in a unified Germany was equal to that of only West Germany in 1 990,
losing almost four million members in a single decade. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) While
losses were stronger in the east, losses in the west were mounting as well. Union density
also began to decline dramatically, as membership in IG Metall alone dropped from
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nearly 66% of all workers in the electrical and metalworking sectors in the 1960s to less
than 43% by the late 1990s. Less than 51% of Eastern and 68% of Western workers were
covered by industry-level agreements by 1998, down from 56% and 72%, respectively, in
1995. (Wessels 2000; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) Overall union density in the
private sector fell from 27.3% in 1980 (for West Germany) to only 17.3% by 2000.
(Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Worker dissatisfaction with union administration and union membership grew
sharply due to higher levels of unemployment, longer periods of layoff, and the
increasing perception of a disconnection between the national and local levels. Members
are far more likely to leave the union once unemployed and fail to return even after
regaining employment. (Bemdt 2000) Younger workers are also far less likely to join the
unions than in the past due to divergent career and social expectations. (Streeck and
Hassel 2004)
Union employment is also changing based on the structure of the German
economy. While the DGB had once been dominated by industrial unions such as IG
Metall, the increase in the white-collar union membership as a share of the whole has
provided some important internal challenges to the German labor movement. (Bemdt
2000) The largest services trade union, Verdi (also known officially as Ver.di in trying to
reflect the new technological focus of the union) is beginning to challenge IG Metall in
the rankings of the largest German union. Nonetheless, even white-collar union density
has shrunk in the past fifteen years by over 13%. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) The inclusion
of temporary workers, many in the service industry, also suggests a fundamental
challenge to the existing internal organization and power relationship inside the DGB
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However, even under the conditions of the 2004 law regulating temporary employment,
the expansion of other non-traditional, part-time, and informal employment methods are
eroding the collective coverage and authority of unions. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Bosch
2004)
Many smaller unions have also begun to merge with each other and larger unions
to increase their leverage and political power. The DGB now only comprises 8 member
unions down from 16 in 1990 and 17 in the 1960s. (The Economist 2006; Katzenstein
1987; Thelen 1991; Markovits 1986) In 1996, IG Metall absorbed the much smaller
textile workers' and wood and furniture workers’ unions. In 1995, the chemical workers'
union absorbed the leather workers' union and then merged with the mining union in
1997 to create the IG BCE. (Heinisch 2000) These mergers were completed so as to
combat membership losses and pool their remaining collective assets. While temporarily
being able to address declining membership and other institutional losses, the overall
merger activity indicates a weakening overall picture for industrial and blue-collar
unionization in Germany. (Conradt 2001
)
More problematic, the unions have begun to more regularly contest one another
over disputed economic sectors and employment that does not neatly fit into the existing
union organizations. IG Metall has been involved in several disputes with Verdi and IG
BCE over membership jurisdictions for employees in a number of fields that defy simple
categorization. This has been most remarkable in the information technology sectors
where new activities and outsourcing of existing IT services has led to overlapping
jurisdictional claims by the major unions. (Bosch 2004) This has increased conflict
amongst the remaining unions, further weakening their collective power. (Heinisch 2000)
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But even white-collar unions are not exempt from such changes. The new service
sector “mega-union” Ver.di or Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft is itself the 2001
amalgamation of five public sector service unions, including public service and transport
(OTV), commercial, banking, and insurance workers (HBV), postal workers (DPG),
white-collar workers (DAG), and media and telecom workers (IG Medien) who were
once public employees but are now in the private sector after privatization in the 1990s.
(Berndt 2000; The Economist 2001; Bosch 2004) DAG, the longstanding white-collar
competitor to the DGB came under the Verdi umbrella in 2001 Beyond mergers of
unions, almost all of the unions have all undergone important internal reorganizations to
streamline administration, reduce overhead costs, and expand membership opportunities.
(Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Heimsch 2000) While the results of the mergers,
reorganizations, and changing internal structures of German labor have been mixed the
overall evidence suggests major dilemmas for union power and vitality.
There have also been a number of internal scandals amongst the largest labor
organizations, especially IG Metall, whose former leader, Franz Steinkiihler, was forced
to resign due to disclosures of insider trading while sitting on the supervisory board of
Daimler-Benz in the early 1990s. Bad investments and poor management of union funds
and firms have also been endemic over the past decade. (Conradt 2001 ; Heinisch 2000)
The labor movement has been under increasing criticism from the left in recent years for
its willingness to concede to the government and industry on a number of issues. Left-
wing intellectuals allege that the DGB and its occasion allies in the SPD are too
conservative, especially in areas of education, civil rights, foreign policy, and criminal
code.
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Membership of DGB affiliated unions, 2004—2005
This table shows the membership figures of DGB's affiliated unions in 2005, distinguishing between men
and women and comparing membership changes with 2004 data.
Trade union
Total
members
Men Women
Women
as % of
total
Change
2004-
2005
(%)
Change
2003-
2004
<%)
German Metalworkers’ Union
(Industriegewerkschaft Metall, IG
Metall)
2,376,225 1,943,660 432,565 18.2 -2.0 -4.0
United Services Union (Vereinte
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, ver.di)
2,359,392 1.943,660 432,565 49.6 -4.3 -5.7
Mining, Chemicals and Energy
Industrial Union
(Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau,
Chemie, Energie, IGBCE)
748,849 606,057 142,795 19.0 -2.8 -3.8
Union for Building, Forestry,
Agriculture and the Environment (IG
Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt, IG BAU)
391,546 330,405 61,141 15.6 -7.8 -7.9
TRANSNET (TRANSNET GdED)
(railworkers)
259,955 205,699 54,256 -3.8 -4.6
German Union of Education
(Gewerkschaft Erziehung und
Wissenschaft. GEW)
251,586 78,885 172,721 68.6 -1.2 -2.4
Trade Union of Food, Beverages,
Tobacco, Hotel and Catering and
Allied Workers (Gewerkschaft
Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststatten, NGG)
216,157 130,345 85,812 39.6 -4.1 -4.7
German Police Union (Gewerkschaft
der Polizei, GdP) 174,928 138,082 36,634 20.9 -3.3 -1.8
Total Confederation of German Trade
Unions (DGB) 6,778,638 4,620,365 2,158,064 31.8 -3.3 -4.8
(Beese 2006)
Table 5: Union Membership In Germany
They are also criticized for being too allegiant to the status quo and too willing to
accommodate business interests at the expense of labor. (Conradt 2001 ) This has split the
left considerably, becoming most notable with the recent electoral gains by the Greens
and Links parties that have catered to more radical and socialist-oriented voters. Adding
the increasing importance of relatively affluent, w hite-collar unions within the DGB and
438
labor movement generally, despite the mergers and reorganization, organized labor in
Germany is becoming less organized and more fragmented by ideological, jurisdictional,
and structural disputes.
A critical change had been the decentralization of collective bargaining from the
sector level to the firm or plant level. (Casey and Gold 2000; Kuhlmann 2004; Bosch
2004) Previously, the national unions such as IG Metall had been the primary locus of
power to negotiate and bargain sector-based collective wage and benefit packages with
employers. The results of their efforts created a convoy that the other sectoral unions and
employers’ would tend to follow. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Heinish 2000) Starting
in the 1990s, especially after reunification and the collapse of the collective agreements
in the metal industry in eastern Germany in 1993, more bargaining and negotiation has
been done at the regional, firm or plant level through works councils. (Bemdt 2000;
Streeck and Hassel 2004; Turner 1998; Heinisch 2000; Kuhlmann 2004) Most unions
agreed to “opening and hardship clauses” to provide concessions on wages and working
hours that deviated from sector-wide collective bargaining agreements. Since 1990, the
number of workers under such exceptions went from zero to 6.6 million by 2004. (The
Economist 2004a) While initially hoped to insulate workers from large-scale layoffs and
to adjust for significant divergences in standards in living between eastern and western
Germany, decentralization has expanded dramatically in both eastern and western sectors
of the economy. Employers and many employees have been pushing for, and getting,
greater autonomy from national agreements since the 1990s as well. (Heinisch 2000;
Streeck and Hassel 2004; Bosch 2004) This has given employers significant leverage in
their relations with German labor.
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A notable example was the Volkswagen “5000 x 5000“ bargaining between 1999
and 2001 . The automaker proposed building a new model of minivan in a new German
facility if and only if labor costs were reduced below the existing collective bargaining
agreements to which the firm was committed. These labor cost reductions included a
system of pay for fixed output rather than for hours, hence workers could have had to
potentially work up to 48 hours per week for the same base pay they would receive for
40. In addition, no premium would be paid on overtime, night, or weekend work.
Negotiations were torturous and broke down on several occasions. The final agreement
was signed in August 2001 and while having some compromise from both sides did
provide that the workers would be earning less than in other Volkswagen enterprises in
Germany and would have to meet fixed output and quality standards that could extend
work weeks to 42 hours with no additional pay. While some premium would be paid for
overtime and weekend work, none would be paid for night work and all would be below
current firm and industry-wide levels. (Bosch 2004)
Another growing sign of labor weakness is the increased use of seconded foreign
workers, mostly from Eastern Europe, in German industries. This is best described as a
system of internal outsourcing by which foreign workers are allowed to participate in
particular industries usually at lower rates of pay and benefits. This has been notable in
the German construction industry that has traditionally been dominated by high levels of
regulation and strong labor agreements between the social partners. However, since the
1990s, the German government has concluded agreements with thirteen central and
eastern European states that establish quotas for and allow seconded workers. While their
base pay should be equal to that of German workers in the same industry, the agreements
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allow much reduced entitlements to benefits, sick pay, paid holidays, and other perks.
This has been additionally exacerbated by the growth of illegal foreign workers from
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. (Bosch 2004)
Privatization has also increased decentralization of the collective bargaining and
labor-capital relationship since the 1990s. In areas of railways, telecommunications,
utilities, postal services, transportation, the effects of privatization have been to end the
longstanding relationships between the public sector unions and the state and provincial
governments that once provided and monopolized such services. (Bosch 2004) This has
been replaced by relationship with dozens of firms and employers requiring the
expansion of the system of decentralized works councils and increasing the opportunities
for variance from national industry-wide collective agreements.
The expansion of decentralization of collective bargaining and the growing
importance of firm or plant-level agreements was created a new system of workplace-
based Alliances for Employment at the firm or regional levels based on works councils.
(Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) This has reduced the
power of the national unions by permitting greater deviation from national industry-wide
bargaining and standards. The coverage of national sectoral collective agreements had
dropped to 44% of all employees by 1999, and continues to decline while the number of
firm-level agreements has skyrocketed to 39% by 2000, up from 27% in the early 1990s.
(Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) The numbers continue to
grow into the nnd 2000s. (Bosch 2004) This has weakened the overall importance of not
just the DGB, which had little authority in the sectoral union-employer level bargaining
process to begin with, but of the eight sectoral unions that traditionally dominated the
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German collective bargaining system and were major players in the institutions and
processes of social partnership. This has profoundly changed the relationship between
labor and capital, perhaps even ending national corporatism in the area of the collective
bargaining process in all but temporary employment. (Bemdt 2000; Casey and Gold
2000; Heinisch 2000; Kuglmann 2004; Vitols, 2004; Bosch 2004)
This decentralization process has led the unions to undertake numerous efforts to
try and re-centralize collective bargaining at national levels. (Turner 1998) The 1995 IG
Metall proposal to create the national-level Alliance for Jobs was designed to re-
centralize some collective bargaining power back into the national and industry-levels.
(Bemdt 2000; Timmins 2000; Bosch 2004) Through the Alliance for Jobs, sectoral
unions would have negotiated wage concessions in exchange for more employment and
an end to planned social insurance cuts by the Kohl government. (Streeck and Hassel
2004; Timmins 2000) While this effort failed in 1996 from a lack of support by both the
Kohl government and sectoral business and industry associations, it would be
reestablished and institutionalized under the Schroder-led SPD-Green coalition
government once it took office in 1998. However, the Alliance for Jobs, as noted earlier,
has generally failed to do much in either creating viable consensus building or to
reestablish the centrality of the national union organizations. (Vail 2003; Streeck and
Hassel 2004; Bosch 2004)
Additional pressures come from the declining importance of the unions in
providing benefits to workers. Under Article 9, Section 3 of the German Constitution,
closed shops are prohibited which means that unions have historically recruited new
members by offering access to tangible and concrete benefits packages including
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unemployment insurance, healthcare, disability and accident insurance, and pensions.
(Conradt 2001) By the 1980s, many of these had been assumed under the aegis of the
state as public goods, leaving less for unions to offer prospective members. (Markovits
1986; Conradt 2001)
This trend has increased considerably under the Kohl and Schroder governments
as the state has begun to provide, finance, and administer, usually through the Lander
governments, more social insurance and labor market programs that once fell under the
control of the social partners. (Vail 2003) This differs significantly from Austria where
closed shops have been the norm and benefits have remained primarily provided directly
through the OGB or Chamber of Labor. This has pushed German unions to innovate and
drive for programs such as the thirty-five hour workweek, flexible work hours, early
retirement, and greater codetermination rights as a way to attract and retain members.
Additionally, unions have begun seeking more power in vocational training and the
administration of social welfare programs to reestablish the salience and efficacy of the
unions to workers. (Conradt 2001) Yet new recruitment strategies and retention programs
have been rather unsuccessful at stopping the hemorrhage of workers from union
membership since the 1980s. (Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Yet writing off unions in Germany is not warranted at this point. Germany
remains significantly more industrial than other European states, including Austria. While
the DGB has seen losses through industrial attrition, there has been a resurgence of
activity and influence by the largest German unions such as IG Metal! and Verdi, the
services trade union. IG Metal
I
has been the most aggressive in pursuit of renewed vigor
and momentum. (Bosch 2004) Under its new president as of 2003, Jurgen Peters, the
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union has pursued a much more vocal program of labor and social democratic policy
aims and the wish to defeat major labor market and liberalization reforms under the
Schroder and Merkel governments. (The Economist 2003, 2005) While there has been
some significant shrinkage in unionization, the unions have begun increasing enrollment
drives and moving into new areas to attract younger workers. Yet this has also required
unions to become more flexible, as 1G Metall has by allowing company-level exceptions
to industry-wide wage deals, and as Verdi has accepted more merit and performance
based pay schemes for public employees. They have both hoped to take a larger role in
vocational training and want to adapt to the less industrial and more diverse workforce.
Given that DGB membership has been in rapid decline since the 1990s, such efforts seem
logical, if still ineffective. (The Economist 2006a, 2001a; Bosch 2004)
The DGB had hoped to increase its profile through participation in the Alliance
for Jobs created by Gerhard Schroder after his promotion to Chancellor in 1998. (Bosch
2004) The Alliance provided the DGB a role it otherwise would have lacked in the
national policymaking process. This was especially important given the increasing doubts
of the confederation's efficacy coming from its affiliate members. (Behrens, Fichter, and
Frege 2003) In addition to the Alliance for Jobs, the DGB also was chosen to represent
labor interests on a number of other Schroder-organized ad hoc committees and councils
dealing with a range of economic and social policy questions. Nonetheless, the failure of
the Alliance for Jobs was a setback for such ambitions by the DGB. (Streeck and Hassel
2004; Vail 2003)
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There have been some gains by German labor since the 1980s. One was the
unions was the expansion of the Works Constitution Act, originally enacted in 1972 and
the primary legal framework for labor representation in the workplace through
codetermination. The 2001 revision, widely opposed by employers, extended works
council into smaller and mid-size firms, extending labor’s reach into the larger tier of
German Mittlestand. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Vail 2003; Kuhlmann 2004;
Bosch 2004) That the legislation was passed despite vocal employers and industry
opposition, especially from the medium and small firms of the German Mittelstand
,
and
outside of tripartite negotiations that would normally have an undeniable voice in such
decisions only a decade earlier. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) This was certainly
a boost for union power if also a concurrent slight of social partnership.
Similarly, the DGB and German labor were mostly marginalized from the
remainder of Gerhard Schroder’s Agenda 2010 program of reforming pensions,
unemployment benefits, and other social insurance benefits. Labor generally balked at the
perceived severity of the reforms, which eventually recommended and included a
reduction of the period of initial unemployment benefits, elimination the second phase of
aid, and making benefits flat rate, means-tested, and requiring regular re-certification.
Agenda 2010 was primarily designed to reign in the costs of unemployment benefits,
which were far more generous than in the Netherlands, France, and Sweden, and provide
impetus to unemployed workers to more quickly enter the workforce. The benefits
remaining would still be generous by comparative standards, but much more in line with
the other European economies with which Germany competes for investment and jobs.
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The DGB and German labor were influential in some of the important early
drafting of the laws through their influence in the SPD in parliament but never had a
formal or official role in drafting or enacting the legislation. The Schroder government
eventually succeeded in passing the legislation despite a bitterly divided SPD and an
unhappy German labor movement. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) This illustrated the
increasing willingness of the Schroder government to “contravene the preferences of his
traditional political allies” and even disregard the concerns of the unions more frequently.
(Vail 2003) The debates and fights over the legislation became externalized as a series of
protests by labor and the left continued into 2004. (The Economist 2004a, 2006b)
Despite decreasing influence and vitality through the social partnership and inside
the SPD, German labor remains relatively important and powerful within the political
system as a whole. (Conradt 2001 ) However many argue that the German labor
movement lacks a long-term or strategic plan of remaining vital and resilient given the
pressures of economic globalization, liberalization, and significant restructuring of the
German economy. Many suggest that German labor has failed to evolve and missed
important opportunities to expand into new sectors and into new types of employment.
(Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Kuhlmann 2004; Bosch 2004) The slowness in which
the DGB and member unions recognized the demand and ability to organize in temporary
workers was just such an occasion. (Vitols 2004) Further, the DGB and sectoral unions
have been slow to develop lasting and useful relationships with new social movements
despite numerous shared concerns. While some of the larger unions have staff and
resources dedicated to awareness and rhetoric on issues of the environment, women’s
rights, anti-racism, and anti-globalization, none has built any lasting coalition or
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partnership with such groups that have become more powerful and active players in the
German policymaking process since the 1960s. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003;
Dalton 2003)
The DGB efforts to reintegrate itself into the core of the social partnership’s
policymaking process through the Alliance for Jobs have also largely failed. Unions are
facing growing decentralization of collective bargaining, further weakening unions at the
national level. The dominant trend for unions has been the need to seek more regional,
local, firm, and plant-level deals since the 1990s. (Turner 1998; Bemdt 2000; Streck and
Hassel 2004) Some suggest that the future of German labor lies at these intermediate or
firm levels, and efforts to Europeanize and revitalize labor must come from the firm and
regional levels first and foremost. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Kuhlmann 2004)
Works councils have become the “de facto grass roots union organizations” of German
labor due to the decentralization of collective bargaining and the repositions of labor-
capital relations at the firm and plant levels. (Bosch 2004; Lee, Lee, and Katz 2004)
In conclusion, labor unions remain powerful and influential, and perhaps
irreplaceable elements of the German policymaking process both within and outside of
the social partnership. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Conradt 2001; Frege 1999; Turner
1998) Despite the relative loss of authority and prestige over the past thirty years, and the
challenges the unions continue to face in the post-unification, post-industrial. post-
Maastricht, German political economy, they continue to possess some resiliency. A series
of influential strikes in February 2006 by service unions, led by Verdi, illustrated their
continuing influence. It was the largest public sector strike in fourteen years. ( The
Economist 2006a) Yet strikes could suggest desperate rather than strength depending
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upon one’s perspective. Given their existing influence, the range of potential reforms, and
new strategies to reinvigorate the labor movement, the future of organized labor, while in
doubt, remains stronger than in many advanced post-industrial states. (Kuhlmann 2004)
German Industry & Employers: A House Divided or Crumbling?
The solidarity amongst and centralization of business and employers’ interests has
also been in steady decline since the 1980s and 1990s. While the BDI and BDA once
operated as partners is a highly coordinated and powerful network of business and
employers’ associations and firms, the economic challenges of reunification, European
integration, globalization, and structural economic change have driven wedges between
those in the employers' and business camps. This is a far cry from the 1960 and 1970s
when the BDI and BDA operated in tandem and even shared a common president,
Hanns-Martin Schleyer. (Braunthal 1965; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
After a brief period of restored unity amongst business and employers during the
unification process, the business and employers' associations began to more greatly
dissent with one another on a range of issues. Most notably, BDI took a far more neo-
liberal and confrontational tact starting in the 1990s and began challenging its
counterparts in the more traditionally conservative employers’ association, the BDA.
(Streeck and Hassel 2004) This was exacerbated by growing schisms between the larger
multinational corporations and the Mittelstand of small and medium-sized firms on a
range of issues including social insurance contributions, temporary employment,
healthcare, globalization, vocational training, European integration, immigration,
subsidy, and taxation. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
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The institutionalization of the employers’ and industry associations into eastern
Germany has not gone well and further weakened business and employers centralization
and unity. There have been increasing defections and variances by eastern firms from the
sectoral collective bargaining agreements that dominated the postwar social partnership
between labor and industry. (Bosch 2004) Eastern enterprises are also reluctant to join or
continue membership in the employers’ and industry associations. In the metal industry,
the traditional leader in setting the national collective bargaining benchmarks and
standards, membership in the sectoral employers’ association has dropped from 58% in
1980 to 35% by 1998 and continues to fall. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; The
Economist 2004; Lee, Lee, and Katz 2004)
While much of this decline has been in eastern Germany, where after unification
many firms refused to join or eventually terminated their membership, there is also
growing dissent and decline amongst western firms since the late 1990s. (Bemdt 2000)
This has also been met with an increasing number of regional associations and other
sectoral associations terminating or abrogating the benchmarks and standards established
in the sectoral collective bargaining agreements. More firms are frequently bypassing,
ignoring, evading, or breaching existing industry-level membership and collective
bargaining in all sectors. (Bemdt 2000; Turner 1998; Heinisch 2000; Lee, Lee, and Katz
2004)
Even amongst western enterprises, employers' and business associations are
becoming more fractious. Small and medium sized firms of the Mittelstand have begun to
more vocally challenge for the leadership of the employers' and industry associations that
have typically been dominantly by Germany's largest firms and producers. (Streeck and
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Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) This has led more militant employers' and smaller firms to
eschew both major business peak associations, the BDA and BDI, and to even affiliate
themselves with smaller opposition parties such as the liberal Free Democrats. (Streeck
and Hassel 2004)
Employers' association have been weakened by these firm and plant level
bargaining structures through a reduction of the solidarity and dependency of individual
firms to sectoral and employers' associations at the national level. (Bemdt 2000; Streeck
and Hassel 2004) Recent strikes of the past two decades have driven many smaller firms
to leave employers' associations and, especially but not exclusively in the east, ignore
industry-wide collective bargaining arrangements. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) Employers
and industry associations have also been pursuing structural and re-organizational
reforms to improve their membership density and collective authority in the collective
bargaining process. (Bosch 2004) But much like labor, the continuing forces of
decentralization have made such reforms seem insufficient. Weak employers’ association
paradoxically bode poorly for German unions at the national level for it removes the
natural negotiation and bargaining partner and results in even more decentralization. As
one IG Metall official put it, the preference would be to continue to negotiate and bargain
with industry at national sectoral level but would “go from plant to plant” if necessary.
( Bemdt 2000)
This illustrates how interlocked and interdependent the social partners have
become inside the German social partnership. Declines in either national unions or
employers' and industry associations undermine their overall central authority and
influence in collective bargaining systems. (Bemdt 2000) Hence, strong unified labor
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requires strong unified employers’ while weakness in either seems to result in weakness
for both. Both labor and industry have been heavily decentralized in the German
collective bargaining system since the 1990s and unification. More important bargaining
and negotiation activities are taking place at the regional, firm, and plant levels strongly
diverging from the sectoral model that dominated the postwar social partnership in
Germany as well as from the heavily centralized and nationalized Austrian model of
labor-capital relations that continues to maintain representative monopolies, or near-
monopolies, by the five large peak associations. (Heinisch 2000) Disorganization of both
German business and labor reinforces the erosion of cooperation in both collective
bargaining and the policymaking process and reduces the social partners' abilities to
simultaneously represent specific constituent interests and the public good. (Streeck and
Hassel 2004)
Importantly, the weakness of the social partners also results in a growing role for
the state, political parties, parliament, provincial and local governments, and other
interests to shape and conduct economic and social policymaking and governance. The
decentralization of labor and industry fundamentally challenges the model of semi-
sovereignty given that the social partners were critical in the quasi-regulatory governance
patterns of the postwar federal republic. (Schmidt 2006) As they have declined in
authority, importance, and organizational capacity, other actors must step in and assume
such responsibilities in providing economic governance. More and more frequently it has
been the state or new interests that fundamentally challenge the previous neo-corporatist
order. (Vail 2003; Dalton 2003)
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New Social Movements and Changing Identities in German Politics
Starting in the late 1960s, German politics began a gradual decentralization away
from the traditional left-right ideological schism that had dominated the pre- and postwar
eras. The growth of new social movements concerned with the environment, nuclear
power, human rights, foreign workers, feminism, education, aging, and other post-
material issues did not neatly fit into the left-right framework became more important in
German politics. (Inglehart 1977; Dalton 1989) In many ways, the social partnership had
become a victim of its own success. By ensuring and providing stable democracy,
economic growth, and relative affluence, German citizens became less divided on class
material issues and were free to debate and split over new post-material issues.
From the 1970s onward, the German political system has relied less on elites and
has emerged as far less stable than in previous decades. The new social movements of the
late 1960s and 1970s made the German political system more participatory and
pluralistic. (Dalton 1989; von Beyme 1993) The proliferation of grass-roots citizen
lobbies, Biirgerinitiativen
,
emerged in many post-material policy areas from the early
1970s onward. (Hancock 1989; Dalton 1989) These challenged the preexisting social,
economic, and political institutions that were primarily elite-driven and modeled on the
socio-economic divisions of the late 19'
1
’ and early 20 lh centuries. (Inglehart 1977; Dalton
1989) It was a transformation of priorities from addressing the material “social question"
to the post-material “new social questions”, (von Beyme 1993)
This new wave of participation also challenged the perceived undemocratic
elements of neo-corporatism including elitism, exclusion, and a lack of transparency.
(von Beyme 1993) Arguments that the German social partnership could successful
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manage these new social movements have generally not borne out. (Wilson 1990) In
Austria, the social partnership has generally been more successful at expanding its base
of issues and competence, mostly through the Committee on Social and Economic
Questions, into many post-material policy areas. Neither the social partnership nor social
partners seemed so able in the German context.
These new social movements also spawned a wave of new parties, including the
influential Greens and, after unification, the PDS (now Links) that would eventually
upset the traditional two-and-a-half party system between the SPD, CDU/CSU, and FDP.
(Dalton 1989; Kitschelt 2004) Yet, as noted earlier, the impact on the party system has
had less impact in Germany because of the traditionally weaker links between the parties
and interests. Hence changes in the party system have not fundamentally affected the
social partnership to the extent it has in other states. The very decentralization of the
German system of interests and politics has provided a form of flexibility and shock
absorption. Parties were often much more the drivers of policy in the German system in
areas outside the core of the social partners, unlike in Austria where the social partnership
was more deeply engrained in a wide range of policies beyond its original aegis, (von
Beyme 1993)
The growing importance of interests not represented and accommodated by the
existing structures, including foreign workers, environmental groups, women’s
organizations, consumer groups, as well as new information industries and service
sectors, has challenged the German social partnership's legitimacy and vitality. (Dalton
1989; Wilson 1990) The effects of unification, European integration, and globalization
are also creating new schisms that divide German firms, interests, and its peoples in ways
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that the existing system of social partnership governance was never designed to address,
and may be incapable of addressing, without remarkable structural reform or
reinvigoration. (Langguth 1999) The institutionalized and hierarchical character of the
peak interests and their intersection with the state, political parties, and governing
bureaucracies may be a hindrance to increasing the participation and democratization of
the political process. New interests and new social movements often feel excluded from
the process and concurrently feel that the privilege granted to older interests is patently
unfair. (Dalton 1989; Wilson 1990; Conradt 2001) This exclusion also means that
German policy, as a product of the existing social partnership, would likely lack efficacy
and viability in addressing new social and economic problems that fall beyond their
representative aegis and expertise.
Along with the challenge from new social movements and new political parties,
the deterioration of labor-business relations has created a vicious cycle of declining
membership and greater inter-partner conflict. (Markovits 1986; Conradt 2001 ) Similar to
the fate of Austria, the slowing of economic growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
and again in the late 1990s and early 2000s, drove the interests further apart and created
additional points of contention between and within the social partners. De-
industrialization, inflation, record high and lasting unemployment unwound forty years of
cooperation rather quickly. (Conradt 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Labor and industry
sought greater and more radical policy corrections that created an ever-deepening rift
between the social partners and lessened the ability to find compromise and consensus on
issues. While amongst the lowest in the advanced world, Germany has, nonetheless,
begun to experience greater labor-business conflicts more and more extensively.
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However, Austria has seen a far more dramatic increase in strikes and lockouts since the
1980s comparatively. Germany ranked first in least number of days lost to labor disputes
(see table four in previous chapter). However, Germany also has an extensive and
complicated legal prohibition against strikes and lockouts except under extraordinary
conditions. (Heinisch 2000) Without such juridification and extensive levels of
codetermination, neither found in Austria, it seems likely that labor-capital disputes
would be quite higher. Hence, the scale of the crisis of social partnership in Germany
may far exceed that of Austria.
Solidarity within and between groups has diminished significantly. The results of
increased temporary employment, the relaxing of traditional shop practices, and the
increase in foreign ownership has changed the model of workplace relations
tremendously. Firm and plant-level bargaining diminishes the ties between the firm and
sectoral and national levels for both workers and management. Finn-level works
councils, free from sectoral and national-level collective bargaining limitations, are less
likely to view themselves as part of a greater or broader labor movement. This weakens
the labor movement’s overall cohesion and ability to demand and obtain collective
benefits. For firms free from sectoral or industry-wide agreements, the necessity of
remaining dependent upon or allegiant to employers' or industry associations has also
diminished. The combination suggests a cyclical reduction of solidarity not only to labor
and industry associations but also to the social partnership and German economic model
as a whole. Hence capital-labor relations in Germany may be undergoing transformation
away from fundamental social and economic preconditions of social partnership. (Bemdt
2000; Heinisch 2000)
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Transformation of the Institutions and Structure of Social Partnership
Under CDU Chancellor Kohl, despite his lack of affinity for the social
partnership, the German government did hope to organize some form of social consensus
on a range of economic and welfare reforms in the early and mid 1990s, notably on
unification. Kohl did manage to obtain significant tripartite agreement upon the terms of
unification with the east in 1990, the so-called Solidarity Pact, so there was some
optimism that additional negotiation and compromise by the social partners would be
possible in addressing the worst economic conditions Germany had faced since the end of
the war. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003; Padgett 1999) With rising unemployment,
decreasing productivity, sub-par growth, and increasing budgetary pressures. Kohl and
the CDU-led government sought consensus through compromise and bargaining from
both labor and industry. While labor was fully behind the creation of an Alliance for
Jobs, proposed by IG Metall officials initially, that would negotiate wage constraints in
exchange for higher employment and reductions in proposed social insurance cuts by the
Kohl government, both the government and employers’ were divided. (Timmins 2000)
While an agreement was almost reached in 1996, the negotiations fell apart as the
FDP-allied members of the BDI and members of the government itself demanded greater
concessions from labor. Labor left the negotiating table effectively ending this brief
attempt at the alliance. The failure to get consensus and the subsequent failure to get
significant consent for his unilateral packages of economic and social reforms led to
unprecedented union upheaval and the CDU/CSU electoral defeat in 1998. (Streeck and
Hassel 2004; Heinisch 2000; Timmins 2000) While this may suggest continuity in the
operation and structure of the social partnership, there is strong evidence that Kohl's
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willingness to bypass and marginalize the social partners became more frequent and a
model for future governments. Hence the failure of social partnership to manufacture a
consensual policy program of economic reforms was beginning to transform the structure
of the German policymaking process by altering the adherence to the norms, processes,
and institutions that had exemplified the postwar German model. (Vail 2003)
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder made the Alliance for Jobs, Training, and
Competitiveness a cornerstone of his campaign platform on economic reform and created
the institution upon his election to the Chancellery in 1998. (Cox 2001; Lehmbruch 2003;
Timmins 2000) The alliance, discussed in detail earlier in this chapter, was a significant
attempt to support and reinvigorate the institutions and structural power of social
partnership. By addressing the critical issues of the lagging German labor market,
unemployment, competitiveness, and vocational training, Schroder hoped to not only
generate consensual policy outcomes that would boost the German economy and reduce
unemployment but also revitalize the staggering social partnership, by empowering the
DGB, affiliate unions, and the peak employers’ associations at the national level. (Streeck
and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) Klaus Lang of IG Metal/ suggested, audaciously, that the
alliance could have the potential to create wholesale “change in politics” and could solve
Germany's economic troubles. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003)
The Alliance for Jobs was never fully accepted by the left and many in organized
labor. The more radical left of the SPD, led by Oskar Lafontaine, and many in the unions
felt that under the SPD-Green coalition negotiation with industry was unnecessary and
that parliamentary majorities were sufficient to enact policy, much like Kohl did in the
1980s under CDU/CSU-FDP government. Hence the left was less enthusiastic of
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instituting tripartite arrangements and felt little need to compromise or bargain with
employers, industry, or the CDU/CSU given the electoral and parliamentary majority
enjoyed after 1998. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Timmins 2000; Sturm 2003)
The Alliance, while organized by the Chancellor's office, would run via an
elaborate system of committees overseen by a steering committee chaired by aides and
cabinet members close to Schroder. The organization suffered operational and
organizational difficulties from the start that were never fully solved including
overlapping and competing jurisdictions of committees and internal disarray. Schroder
had used the Alliance concept as an effective campaign slogan but struggled to
implement this promised institution. (Cox 2001 ) Additionally, boycotts by Lafontaine,
w ho would later leave the SPD to becoming a founding member of the Links party, and
other in the more radical left of the SPD, Greens, and German labor movement made the
alliance less effective and representative. Further, the Schroder government had difficulty
brining unions to heel on important compromises since the SPD had made numerous
electoral promises to labor and the left in the 1998 campaign. The result was that most
major demands of the unions were granted without commensurate need for tough labor
concessions. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003)
While the Alliance for Jobs failed in most respects, it did help shape some
eventual reforms of the labor market reforms. (Vitols 2004) Nonetheless, the results of
the Alliance have been generally considered meager or disappointing at best. (Behrens,
Fichter, and Frege 2003) The alliance failed to end deadlock between labor and capital
over important economic and social reforms and provided the Schroder government few
identifiable assets during its first term (Timmins 2000) Worse, there had been no
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discemable attempts at comprehensive trilateral bargaining and negotiation on any of the
major government projects or legislative proposals. Not a single package deal or
collective agreement was reached in the first two years of the Alliance. (Streeck and
Hassel 2004)
The second term provided fewer successes from the Alliance for Jobs as both
unions and employers’ saw a progressive erosion of their organizational capacities and
willingness to compromise from the late 1990s and into the early 2000s. The tripartite
meetings, held twice a year, became little more than “public ritual'' and an “empty shell’’
of photo opportunities for the Chancellor while contributing modestly to only two years
of modest union wage restraint, beginning in 2000, that even then required significant
governmental incentives to offset. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) From the summer of 2001,
the Alliance took on a purely ceremonial character and in March 2003, Schroder called
the final meeting of the Alliance for Jobs and dissolved the institution permanently. The
failure of the Alliance to reach compromise of needed reforms led Schroder to announce
that all future reforms would be done on the government's own accord. (Kitschelt and
Streeck 2004; Vail 2003)
Divergent perspectives over the role and function of the institution by the social
partners contributed to its failure. (Schrim 2002) Clearly the government was interested
in finding consensual policy prescriptions to address a wide range of issues from labor
markets, unemployment benefits, pensions, and social insurance. Labor, both at the
confederation level of the DGB and sector level including IG Metall, viewed the Alliance
as a way to resist globalization, reinvigorate national-level union authority and reign in
capital and employers via labor and SPD-led social partnership. But labor was also
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organizationally divided between the leadership ofIG Metall and IG BCE, the chemical
workers' union, which differed in the negotiation and intermediation process as well as
on the content of wage and employment policy. (Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Employers' associations had a very different vision for the Alliance that was
based on improving employment via competitiveness and instituting regulatory changes
that would significantly liberalize the labor markets, reduce employer revenue
contributions, lower taxes, and be a force for global and European integration. (Vitols
2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Yet there was little agreement within the employers’
camp as the BD1 and BDA relationship was poisoned beyond repair and small and
medium firms became increasingly vocal in their opposition to the larger firms’ positions.
(Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Employers’ were happy to have a seat at the table, but given their divided
orientations towards labor market reform and wage restraints, they were often unable to
find a common position to either defend or bargain upon. The broader hope of finding
compromise between labor and employers’ seems to have been nearly impossible under
these conditions. The SPD-Green government’s parliamentary program that included
significant promises to labor and eventually culminated in the amendment of the Works
Constitution Act in 2000 also weakened the employers’ commitment to the Alliance that
had no oversight over these pro-labor policies that passed without the consent of industry
or employers and was wildly opposed by the Mittelstand employers in the BDI and BDA.
(Streeck and Hassel 2004) With no tripartite or even bipartite bargaining or negotiation
over one of the more important recent changes to German workplace relations, it is not
hard to understand business and employer frustrations with the Alliance.
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Given the divergent attitudes towards the Alliance and the gap between policy
preferences, it is not surprising that the Alliance mostly failed to meet expectations and
generated little of the consensus to which it was tasked. Yet the failure of the Alliance
also suggests a fundamental lack of willingness and solidarity over compromise,
bargaining, and the core mission of social partnership in the German policymaking
process. Kitschelt and Streeck suggest that the dissolution of the Alliance had much
higher costs for German labor that was already facing greater decentralization and decline
of policymaking influence inside the SPD and government as a whole. Since Schroder
could not count on the DGB and member unions to provide any room for consensus,
compromise and bargaining, the government had little option but to abandon the tripartite
institutions and seek reform via unilateral parliamentary action as well as through
political dealings with the CDU/CSU. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Vail 2003)
Schroder was aided in this unilateral approach by the division of German labor
union and employers as well as the scandal over the Federal Employment Office (BA),
one of the cornerstones of German neo-corporatism. As described earlier in this chapter
during the discussion of labor market reform, the BA was jointly run by the trade unions
and employers and was tasked by the state to connect those seeking work with jobs in the
private sector. However, it emerged in 2002 that it had become common practice to
falsify job placement figures so as to over-represent the importance and efficacy of the
agency. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Sturm 2003; The Economist 2004; Busch 2005) This
provided Schroder additional cover for his reform packages given the discrediting of the
social partners by the scandal and the role of public opinion in supporting reform even
without their consent. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
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The scandal gave the momentum Schroder enact elements of his Agenda 2010
program including the Hartz labor market reforms while bypassing the historically
expected consent process of the social partners. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004)
But the BA scandal also increased the role of the state in job placement and vocational
training policies at the expense of the social partners. As noted earlier, the BA and
vocational training were areas of exclusive social partnership governance between labor
unions and employers’ who primarily funded and operated the regional offices of the BA
with almost no direct government intervention or management. However, in light of the
scandal and the increasing inability of the social partners to find compromise to address
deficits in both employment and vocational training, Schroder took the initiative and
boldly restructured and reformed the BA and vocational training programs with little to
no consent from the social partners. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005)
The resulting series of legislation in 2002 and 2003 had significant implications
for the role of the social partners in the governance of the BA and vocational training.
The new laws increased the financial responsibility of the state to fund the BA. It also
changed the executive board of the office to make it directly appointed by and
accountable to the federal government. Simultaneously, this new financial and
administrative role allowed the Schroder government to apply new standards to
jobseekers. This included greater pressure on the jobseekers to accept available
“reasonable” employment and make concerted efforts to find work or face potential
suspension of unemployment benefits. This was a remarkable foray of state intervention
into an institution that had been almost beyond the government's reach only a decade
prior. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005)
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In vocational training, the Schroder government acted in a similar vein by
instituting the JUMP (Immediate Programme for the Reducement of Youth
Unemployment or Jugendsofortprogramm) program to boost youth training and
employment. Much like the measures to reform the BA, the JUMP program provided a
larger financial and administrative role in training, apprenticeship, subsidies for firms to
hire young workers, and job counseling services. Again, for most of the postwar era, this
type of governance was left exclusively in the hands of the social partners. But with high
youth unemployment, shortages of apprenticeship slots in the vocational training schools
across Germany, and the relevant BA scandal, the Schroder government boldly
implemented JUMP and hugely increased the state role in vocational training with little
consent from the social partners. From 2003 the BA, now subordinated to the federal
government, and the Uabor Ministry would jointly manage the vocational training
programs rather than leaving it in the hands of the social partners. (Vail 2003)
The failure of the Alliance drove Schroder, perhaps the biggest proponent of high-
level social partnership since Helmut Schmidt to abandon the pact altogether and seek
unilateral, parliamentary, and inter-party policy prescriptions in lieu of consensual
negotiation of the peak interest associations. ( The Economist 2003a) Schroder himself
discovered that the concerted efforts between labor, the state, and industry are too often
confined to defensive coalitions seeking to protect existing privilege and benefits rather
than seeking innovation, reform, and grander national goals. (Bemdt 2000)
Instead, the Chancellor focused his energies in the specialized commissions and
panels, such as Hartz, that became the backbone of major reform and policy efforts.
(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004) Given the payoff of actual debate, compromise.
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and eventual policy implementation, the failure of the Alliance and success of Hartz
boded poorly for the social partnership during the remainder of the Schroder tenure. Not
only was the unilateralism of the policymaking by the Schroder government
revolutionary, but the increasing role, status, and authority of the government in
managing these programs suggested a permanent break from the past in which the social
partners retained significant quasi-regulatory and powers of governance. (Busch 2005)
Until its electoral loss in 2005, the Schroder government continued to assume significant
authority and direct operation of labor market responsibilities at the expense of the social
partners. Schroder's lack of confidence in the social partners to negotiate and find
consensus, and their continued failure to provide innovative and effective governance in
the labor market led to these remarkable structural reforms of the German social
partnership. This also created a more confrontational and exclusionary posture for the
government vis-a-vis the social partners. (Vail 2003)
The CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition government under Chancellor Angela
Merkel since 2005 has continued to encourage the social partners to undertake reform.
But when this continues to fail to create compromise and actionable policy, the state has
been increasingly willing to exert its own direct policy and administration prerogatives
into areas of labor market, vocational training, and social insurance where the pararpublic
institutions of the social partnership had once dominated. This is strongly antithetical to
the traditional semi-sovereign role that the German state was content to follow from the
1 950s onward. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005) This more complex and salient role for the state
is a major departure from inherited patterns of social partnership and the German model.
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The government has displayed a degree of interventionism unthinkable only two decades
ago. (Vail 2003)
Under Merkel the process of marginalization of the social partners has continued
in numerous areas including healthcare and tax reform. The CDU/CSU-SPD grand
coalition shut out major healthcare, and business interests from the decision-making
process. This was difficult for several members of the parliament who were concurrently
heads of employers' federations and healthcare associations that had to choose between
their parties and their peak associations. In the end. the Merkel government was able to
push the legislation through with bipartisan coalition support. ( The Economist 2006b)
This illustrates the more frequent recognition by the German government, especially
since the failure of the Alliance for Jobs, that social partners can indeed be obstacles to
reform and compromise.
Another area of increasing structural challenge has been the increasing role of the
Lander in the economic and social policymaking process. While the German federal
system had always relied upon a rather intricate system of cooperative federalism
requiring high levels of consultation and compromise between central and Lander
governments, the accelerated changes in the German economy, the unification with
eastern Germany, and integration into the European Union have met with increasing
interests, roles, and intervention by the Lander in economic and social policy. (Jeffert
2003) In the east, some Lander have taken on more direct roles by becoming partial
shareholders in major firms at the same time the federal government was divesting its
remaining holdings in the private sector.
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The Lander have also been at the forefront of changes to unemployment, pension,
and healthcare policies due to the impact of these reforms upon the roles and functions of
the provincial governments that often directly provide such benefits to German citizens.
(Deeg 1996; Jeffrey 2003) The Lander have also become more active in shaping EU
policy by both their direct participation in the German policymaking process but also
through direct lobbying and representation in Brussels through the regional institutions of
the EU. (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001 ; Jeffery 2003; Dyson 2003) For the social
partners, this has several potential implications. First, it increases their need to actively
work at the subnational level to implement and intluence policy. While this has typically
been the case due to the style of German federalism, the scope, scale, and importance of
Lander-level relations has grown tremendously since the 1980s. Secondly, it provides an
additional outlet for the social partners to influence policy at the national and
supranational levels. Hence, the Lander are now also viewed as potentially important
allies or conduits to the policymaking process in both Berlin and Brussels, far more than
they had been in previous eras. (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001; Deeg 1996; Dyson 2003;
Green and Paterson 2005; Borzel 2002, 2002a)
The European Transformation: Integration & Governance
The 1980s began a major increase in the widening and deepening of European
integration and governance. For Germany, one of the most ardent supporters of the
European Union and further integration, this should have been good news. However,
given the economic and political challenges of structural economic transformation,
unification, and severe economic recession, there has been evidence that requirements
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and limitations of EU membership and integration have compounded many German
economic and political difficulties. This has altered Germany’s relationship with the EU
by significantly challenging the social partners’ support of European integration and
governance policies since the 1980s. (Paterson 2005)
Since the Single European Act of 1985 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, there
have been increased pressures and schisms within the German economy, society, and
polity over the meaning and implications of further European integration. (Compston
1998; Auer 1997) The nature and impact of European governance and policymaking have
become far more controversial and contested within the German political system.
(Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Paterson 2005; Schmidt 2006) The new supranational forms
of economic and monetary governance have significantly limited the German government
and its industrial, fiscal, monetary, and social policies at a time of extraordinary
transformation of the German polity and economy due to unification and post-industrial
transformation. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Merkl 1993; Wallach and Francisco 1992)
This has increased the perception amongst many more Germans that the EU and
integration might be bad for Germany, a significant break from the dominant pro-
European prerogatives of the 1950 through 1970s.
The adoption of the Euro and the new power of the European Central Bank
through the European Monetary Union and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact
have hindered potential German fiscal and monetary policies that could have otherwise
moderated the impact of both unification and post-industrialism by possibly inspiring
economic growth and mitigate some of nastier effects of the recent economic downturns.
(Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Jeffery and Paterson 2004) But the burdens ofEMU and the
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EC'B have severely limited the monetary and fiscal options. (Dyson 2003) In addition, the
new rules after Maastricht reigned in state aid to small and mid-sized Mittelstand
enterprises that had been traditionally funneled through the provincial and municipal
banks and savings associations, the Landesbanken. (Jeffery and Paterson 2004; Casey
and Gold 2000) Additionally, the EU quashed efforts by the provincial government of
Saxony to aid Volkswagen, again limiting governmental influence in the economic,
monetary, and fiscal policies. (Schmidt 2006)
The Europeanization of monetary and economic policies through the EMU
obviously placed limits on German autonomy in terms of wages, fiscal, and monetary
policies. (Dyson 2003) Yet European integration may also create new demand for social
partnership within member states by creating the mechanisms by which states can
implement measures to meet membership criteria in a consensual and negotiated way.
( Wessels 2000) However, the German position on European integration has become less
consensual and more conflicted since the 1980s on issues of employment, budgeting, and
social policy as well as immigration, common foreign policy, and expansion, especially
relating to Turkey. The once unified positions on EU relations and policy have evolved
into a fractious domestic political atmosphere. (Paterson 2005) The 1980s and early
1990s were an important era for change in German economic decline and increasing
pressure to Europeanize markets and concentrate more power in the hands of EU
institutions in Brussels. (Auer 1997; Compston 1998) Germany has become so enmeshed
with the institutions of Europe that its public officials and EU delegations were often
accused of undermining German labor and business interests in favor of European
programs that could cause both short and long-term costs to the German economy. Some
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governments and ministers were caught in the difficult middle ground, no longer being
able to decide alone to offensively pursue aggressive export and trade policy or
defensively maintain national standards of protectionism and subsidy. (Katzenstein 1987;
Paterson 2005)
Debate and division amongst the social partners over Europe intensified as
European integration and governance began to eliminate the “wiggle room” for actors in
the German policymaking and collective bargaining process. With stricter rules on state
subsidy, large implications from eastern enlargement, controversial immigration policies,
and more limited fiscal, monetary, and legal outlets for German policymakers, the once
monopolistic solidarity and consensus amongst social partners on issues of European
integration has diminished. (Jeffery and Paterson 2004; Dyson 2003; Paterson 2003,
2005)
This has meant greater contestation over Germany's European policy in the
domestic arena and, in some cases, divisions amongst and within the social partners over
the scope, process, and content of EU policy. (Paterson 2003; Padgett, Paterson, and
Smith 2003) The gaps between elites and rank and file members of all peak associations
in labor, industry, and agriculture, have grown dramatically in the last twenty years.
While in some areas, notably second and third pillar issues of EU competency, there is
still strong German support and solidarity on integration issues, in the economic and
single market pillar there has been less agreement and far less consensus in determining
German preferences. (Jeffery and Paterson 2004; Paterson 2003) Positions have hardened
and German interests are becoming more self-interested and willing to challenge the
government's pro-integration affinities. (Paterson 2005)
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German labor has becoming more decidedly split over European integration and
EU policy since the 1980s. The consensus that existed for much of the postwar era
diminished as the pace and scope of European integration increased and German
economic performance decreased over the past twenty-five years. (Paterson 2003, 2005)
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the consensus that existed was tenuously rested on
the ability of the state to placate union and worker uncertainty over integration's effects
on w ages, benefits, and codetermination rights of German workers. Unions had little
objection to European integration given the strong growth patterns of the economy and
increases in workers wages, benefits, and representation rights from the 1950s through
1970s.
However, by the 1980s the environment had changed. First, economic decline had
begun to place downward pressures of wages and social insurance. The Kohl
government, while never seriously considering a reversal of existing codetermination
laws, was w illing to make important liberalizations of the German labor market, tax
system, and social insurance systems that increased the dissatisfaction of unions and
workers with both Kohl and the perceived costs of integration. (Katzenstein 1987;
Conradt 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2004) This also meant that the German state was less
likely to continue to subsidize or offset costs of further integration, exposing German
workers to the full impact of market expansion. Second, the expansion of the competence
of the EU institutions and of EU membership heightened the uncertainty of labor that
integration would be positive for both workers and the German economy as a whole.
While there had been strong belief from the 1950s, by the majority of unions and labor
leaders, that integration would benefit Germany and subsequently benefit its workers and
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unions, that faith had eroded since the beginning of the more tumultuous economic eras
of the 1970s. The accession of Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1980s introduced
members with significantly lower labor costs, increasing the perceived threat of a fully
integrated European internal market and the inclusion of even poorer and cheaper labor
states from Southern, and soon Eastern, Europe. (Markovits 1986; Markovits and Otto
1992)
From the 1990s, German labor has been more divided on European integration as
the EU has expanded in authority and membership through the important expansions
under the treaties of Maastricht and Nice and the accessions of 1995, 2004, and 2007.
The DGB and member unions have begun to split over support or opposition to
continuing integration as well as the types of strategies that should be pursued to address
the new challenges of European integration and governance. The split has fractured much
of the once unified consensus of labor over European integration on several fault lines
including those between the DGB and the individual sectoral unions, between activist-
radical and conservative-accommodationist unions, and between sectors based on
perceived benefits or losses due to greater market integration. (Markovits and Otto 1992)
The DGB, as the confederation of unions, has attempted to take the lead on
European integration and EU-relations for German labor. While concerned with the
ability to safeguard working conditions, wages, and codetermination rights, it has also
been generally in favor of integration since the 1980s as a "positive and necessary
development”. (Markovits and Otto 1992) To counter these potentially negative trends,
the DGB, as well as some of the specific sectoral unions, has been amongst the stronger
supporters of increasing cross-border collaboration and dialogue through European-level
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labor and social partnership institutions such as the European Social Dialogue, European
Works Councils, and Interregional Trade Union Committees. (Gorges 1996; Sargent
1 985) Hence the DGB has attempted to lead its underlying unions through its vocal
willingness to develop and pursue "political opportunity structures” at the European
level. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) These include strong participation in the
European Trade Union Federation (ETUC) where the DGB is amongst the most well
represented national labor federations in the European labor movement. (Markovits and
Otto 1992)
The DGB, as well as IG Metal I and other sector unions, have also increased cross-
border agreements with Dutch, Belgian, French, Swiss, and Austrian unions hoping to
improve interregional and transnational cooperation on a range of labor issues. These
have included regular cross-national meetings as well as coordinated activities at the
national and European levels. These have been supported by the creation of European
Works Councils that facilitate informal and formal connections between unions spanning
national frontiers. (Bemdt 2000; Fitzgerald 2004) As a former leader of the DGB
suggested, "the overcoming of national traditions should be the guiding line of our
European strategy, otherwise we will no longer have the power to influence, let alone
resist”. (Bemdt 2000)
While the DGB and member unions have begun to identify the growing potential
importance of EU- or transnational-level organization and activity, the supranational
level has yet to provide tangible results. (Sargent 1985; Schmitter and Streeck 1991
;
Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) There has been little movement in generating Euro-
wide collective bargaining or wage agreements and the effectiveness of the EU
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institutions of social partnership have been quite lackluster at best. Without an organized
EU-wide labor organization, or EU-wide industry associations with whom to negotiate,
the opportunities for action at the national level clearly outweigh those at the European
one. While Europe offers the possibility of union renewal in Germany, it is still rather
underdeveloped and still highly uncertain. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003)
Nonetheless, the DGB's position on European integration and governance has been
dominantly positive as it has sought opportunities to increase its own representative
authority at both the national and supranational levels by attempting to institutionalize its
own position through the labor and neo-corporatist institutions at European levels.
While the DGB remains rather consistently in support of European integration,
there has been increasing dissent amongst Germany’s sectoral unions over the process
and consequences of deeper and wider European governance. For many unions, the
ideological opposition to European integration and governance stems from strong
antipathy for market-based economic mechanisms and neo-liberal capitalism that are
often felt to be consequences of the expanding European market. This is true amongst the
more activist and more aggressive unions such as IG Metall and IG Medien, the media
workers' union now part of Verdi, that have been historically more suspicious of neo-
hberalism and have concerns that European integration will weaken social democracy in
Germany and throughout the EU. The beliefs of these unions and their leaders are that
that integration would create a race to the bottom in terms of downward pressure on
wages and workers' rights such as codetermination. As Markovits and Otto suggest, for
IG Medien, which could see benefits from a wider and larger European market, ideology
has tended to trump calculated material gains. For IG Metall, opposition to integration
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has both ideological and material bases in that there has been greater uncertainty over the
impact of the EU on the metal and automotive industries. (Markovits and Otto 1992) The
results have generally led IG Metall and IG Medien to oppose further European
integration not only via the institutions of the German social partnership, but also by
creating ad hoc alliances with new social movements, anti-globalization, and anti-
integration groups both within Germany and throughout Europe. These have also
included other more radical and anti-establishment labor organizations in France, Italy,
and elsewhere. (Bemdt 2000; Markovits and Otto 1992; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege
2003)
On the other side, there are unions that have generally been accommodating to the
German state's affinity towards further European integration. The chemical workers’
union, IG BCE, and the NGG, the food workers’ union, have been in favor of greater
integration and expansion since the 1990s. Both unions have had longer histories of
commitment to both the social partnership and a less confrontational relationship with
industry and the state. Hence there is an institutional explanation for their support. The
chemical industry was expected to see some boost due to further integration, yet the
uncertainty of this growth was high. For food workers, despite the general agreement that
the industry was likely to see both profit and job losses due to intra-European
competition, the NGG eventually supported both 1992 and other integration efforts.
(Markovits and Otto 1992) The NGG and chemical workers, along with the DGB, also
have pursued greater participation in the European level social partnership institutions
rather than directly confronting European integration from an outsider strategy such as
that by IG Metall. (Markovits and Otto 1992; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003)
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The end result has been that since the late 1980s, German labor has become
decisively divided over the issues of European integration and governance. While the
unity of German labor has always been overestimated, the kind of consensus on
integration that the German state could count on in the 1950s and 1960s has disappeared.
The ability of the DGB to put forth a coherent and unified policy preference for German
labor has diminished. This has allowed the German government under both Schroder and
Merkel to marginalize labor’s say in the EU-policymaking process and continue to pursue
a generally pro-integration foreign and domestic policy agenda. However, on issues such
as immigration and expansion to Turkey, German leaders are being far more constraints
by sizable dissent within the German electorate and their political parties, so they are far
from free in terms of autonomy. (Paterson 2005)
On the other side of the social partnership, industry and employers have become
just as strongly divided on issues of integration. Given the growing divides between the
BDI and BDA as well as the decreasing membership density of firms in the employers'
and industry associations, the German state has been able to effectively bypass employers
as much as they have been able to with labor. The BDI and BDA have become
significantly divided between member firms tending to support and those tending to
oppose further integration and European level governance of industry and business
relations and trade. The larger firms, with a more European and global orientation have
tended to support European integration and expansion efforts as to improve their
competitiveness, market shares, and export opportunities. They have also become more
greatly involved in EU-level lobbying and consultation such as in the Transatlantic
Business Dialogue which is discussed in a later section of this chapter. The smaller and
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mid-sized firms of the Mittelstand are less secure about their ability to survive in a
broader European marketplace and have lost some measures of protectionism and subsidy
by the imposition of strict fiscal and anti-subsidy policies from Maastricht and EMU.
The only interest that seems to have remained rather unified in stating its
preferred European policies is the Green Front of agriculture. The Green Front has had a
relatively inconsistent position on European integration that has rested solely on the
maintenance of high subsidies through the Common Agricultural Policy. The Green Front
was dominantly favorable towards the EU and integration in the 1950s and 1960s as it
was promised continuing subsidy by the German state that has been higher than those
promised through CAP. fJowever, since the 1980s, the Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel
governments have been increasingly critical of CAP and have pushed for some EU
agricultural reform. This has generally been moderated by the Franco-German pact
within the EU and hence German governments have not pushed for such demands very
hard. Nonetheless, this has shifted Green Front support away from the government's
positions on integration. Since the 1980s, they have increased contacts with agricultural
groups in other EU states including France and Italy to collectively lobby for the
maintenance of the existing system of subsidy in opposition to the German state's EU
policy preferences.
Chancellors since the 1990s, including both Schroder and Merkel, have attempted
to become more prominent in brokering deals on EU policy between the major interests
and cajoling the social partners, and other relevant actors, to accept compromises.
(Jeffery and Paterson 2004; Paterson 2005) Yet they are meeting fiercer resistance than in
previous eras and are often forced to bypass the social partners and make deals on Europe
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policy across the aisle with opposition parties. This was especially true under Gerhard
Schroder who, after abandoning the Alliance for Jobs, sought consensus with the
CDU/CSU on major domestic and European policy initiatives. Angela Merkel, leading a
grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD has continued this trend with success so far.
In essence, the increased pace and scope of European integration and governance
has dynamically changed the social partners' positions on the EU since the 1980s and has
made compromise and consensus quite difficult to secure on a range of domestic and
European policy issues. Europeanization has been most costly in dividing the peak
associations internally, between those in favor of greater integration and those opposed.
This has made policymaking at the national social partnership level even less successful
given that peak associations can rarely find internal consensus much less be able to
compromise with the interests across the table. Given its economic challenges and the
increasing scope and pace of Europeanization, commitment to the EU and integration has
become more generally contested throughout the German political system. (Padgett,
Paterson, and Smith 2003; Paterson 2005) In 1996, belief that membership in the EU was
a good thing for Germany had dropped to less than 40%. Yet by 2006 this had rebounded
to just below 60%, well above the 40% found in Austria. (The Economist 2007) Hence
while Europeanization is certainly dividing more Germans than in previous eras, there
remains a rather strong overall support for the project and its institutions far greater than
has been found in its southern neighbor.
There have been a number of investigations into the impact of European
integration upon elements of the German social partnership. These cases illustrate a
significant variation in the impacts and policy outputs of Europeanization upon the
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German policymaking system and its social partnership. Nonetheless, these provide
significant evidence to help test and assess the Europeanization framework and its
theoretical propositions.
The Europeanization of German Procurement Policy
Martin Lodge explored the impact of Europeanization upon the public
procurement process in Germany. The system of public procurement had tended to be
one that favored “national champions" and cartels of German firms in providing goods
and services to the state. This became a deeply ingrained tool of the state, through the
Federal Cartel Office, to both subsidize and regulate German firms that signed
procurement contracts with the German government. This was strongest in the
construction and food service industries that would gain government contracts for major
infrastructure projects and food service at public facilities. Europeanization provided both
formal and informal pressure to make the procurement process more competitive that
would likely concurrently reduce government influence over German firms, assuming
that more procurement would be done from other European or global firms, and would
reduce the de facto subsidies that German firms, especially those in smaller and medium
sized industries had long enjoyed. (Lodge 2000)
The German state and major interests, including both labor and industry, resisted
accommodation and harmonization to the EU’s legal and informal competition policies
for quite some time. In construction, German construction firms sought protection from
foreign competition especially low bidding firms from Southern, and later. Eastern
Europe. The construction workers’ unions also opposed change given the greater
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likelihood of non-German firms using more non-German labor. Hence many domestic
interests were opposed to significant reform. However and intriguingly. Lodge uncovered
significant indirect pressures to harmonize government procurement policy including
greater professionalization of the German bureaucracy and the increasing willingness of
the German courts to defer to and cite ECJ rulings on competition policy in German cases
despite the lack of explicit legal conditions to do so. (Lodge 2000)
The eventual reforms that passed in 1998 moderately liberalized the competition
process for procurement in Germany and illustrated both the impact of Europeanization
in attempting to harmonize or converge domestic procurement policies but also reflected
domestic protectionist interests in maintaining some levels of preferential procurement
from German firms. EU legal and bureaucratic terminology were integrated into the new
directives of the procurement system and created greater administrative and legal
oversight of the operations of the cartel office and its operations. However, some
protections for smaller and mid-sized firms remained intact, especially in the construction
industry. Many of these compromises were devised due to strong efforts of the trades and
crafts associations related to the legislation. As Lodge argues, the importance of domestic
sources of reform were as, if not more, important than the forces from the supranational
level. (Lodge 2000)
The Transatlantic Business Dialogue and the BDI
Cowles asserts that the creation of a distinct European level of business-
government relations has results in significant changes in the domestic orientation of
German firms in both the policymaking process and in peak industry associations such as
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the BDI and specific sectoral interest associations. Her study of the Transatlantic
Business Dialogue (TABD) posits that these forms of informal transnational and EU-
level trade and business alliances are undermining the national and domestic sectoral
associations by changing the focus of German businesses away from the domestic to the
European level of lobbying and coordination. The increasing role of the EU in
representing the community in trade negotiations with GATT, the WTO, the United
States, other regional trading blocs such as Mercosur, and in other bilateral talks such as
with Japan, China, and India has exacerbated this trend. This dilutes the relevance of
domestic national industry and sectoral associations and creates a reinforcing misfit
between domestic and EU levels of interest representation and mediation. (Cowles 2001
)
TABD, unlike the formally recognized peak association of business in the EU,
UNICE, has demonstrated a much closer relationship with the European Commission on
a range of issues but most importantly in trade where it as emerged as “the voice of
European business”. These close linkages between TABD and the Commission have
resulted in what Cowles terms as “elite pluralism” at the EU level. (2001
)
Cowles argues that TABD and neo-corporatist patterns found in the German
system, specifically the highly centralized BDI, results in a lack of direct lobbying in lieu
of concertation. The decentralization of the BDI and of German industry on a range of
issues, including European integration and trade, has led to a pattern of greater individual
firm lobbying at both the EU and national levels. (Cowles 2001 ) This diverges strongly
from the traditional German model in which “direct lobbying by private firms and the use
of professional lobbyists” was both “uncommon” and raised “suspicions of the
inappropriate political manipulation by capital interests”. (Kohler-Koch 1993, 27)
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This has led to problems for the BDI in effectively representing German business
interests at home and at the EU level where they had traditionally worked through
UNICE. The result has been an increase in the BDI involvement in TABD though being
far from substantial. Major German firms such as BASF, DaimlerChrysler, Hoechst,
Bayer, ThyssenKrupp. and Siemens have demonstrated increasing willingness to bypass
the BDI and UNICE for the TABD and other more informal but more influential patterns
of lobbying at the EU level. This had led to increasing willingness of the firms to do the
same at the domestic level where direct lobbying and pluralist interest representation was
once quite rare. Hence Europeanization has had a number of indirect effects on the actors
and institutions of the German social partnership by altering the methods and modes of
operation of German firms that were learned and replicated from those at the EU level.
(Cowles 2001; Schmidt 2006)
The Europeanization of German Transport Policy
The case of the Europeanization of German transport policy is also notable. The
extension of EU directives and legislation to include the liberalization of trans-border
road and rail transport after 1985 and 1991 created direct and indirect pressure on the
German systems of road haulage and railway governance. Interestingly, there were few
precise or explicit directives from the EU on transport policy, giving member states
significant latitude in addressing and reforming access and competition within their
systems. Nonetheless, even the modest additional pressure helped swing the balance of
existing reform efforts. (Kerwer and Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001; Teutsch 2001; Hertier
and Knill 2001; Dyson 2003)
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The EU began addressing competition in rail and road haulage sectors after the
Single European Act of 1985 and Maastricht Treaty of 1991. The directives and
overarching trends of liberalization and removal of barriers to transnational economic
activities altered the preexisting political will and coalitions organized around German
transport policy and governance. The existing road haulage and railway systems were
characterized by high levels of state intervention and strong sectoral neo-corporatism
between the major transport interests. Despite increasingly uncompetitive trends
including higher transport costs, taxes, fees, and decreasing flexibility, change was quite
slow in developing until the late 1980s. (Teutsch 2001
)
The existing road haulage system was one that severely limited and regulated
long-distance and short-distance trucking through restrictive licensing procedures, rate
controls, and later high usage fees. The system tended to be subordinated to the
maintenance of the national rail system through the imposition of taxes and fees that
protected the rail system's competitiveness and protected small and mid-sized trucking
enterprises. While overseen by the Transport Ministry, the system was dominated by the
social partners of the transport sector including the business association of haulers or
Bundesverband des Deutschen Giitenfernverkehr (BDF) that has been known as the BGL
or Bundesverband Giitenfernverkehr and Logistik since 1997, the drivers' unions, as well
as the national railway and their employee's trade unions that all benefited from a rather
uncompetitive and closed system of road haulage.
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The Transport Ministry was also staffed by many former members of the road
haulage industry and labor unions. This created a very close-knit and nepotistic
policymaking and governance process. The agency responsible for oversight, the BAG,
was dominated by the haulers association and unions as well.
Railways in Germany were even more concentrated within a narrow
policymaking and governance process. The railways, Deutsches Bundesbahn (DBB), and
later renamed Deutsche Bahn (DB) after the merger of the western and eastern railway
systems, had remained one of the few primary nationalized services of the postwar era.
While strongly stressing the need of DB to fulfill its public service obligations to the
German state and its citizens, the railways had strong autonomy over its operations. Its
administrative council, responsible for almost all of the internal decision-making of DB
was compromised of railway union representatives, industry and agricultural
associations, provincial governments, and road transport and inland shipping
associations. (Teutsch 2001 ) Hence both road haulage and railways generally reflected a
traditional sectoral-based neo-corporatist model of governance and policymaking.
Reforms to both road haulage and railways began in the late 1980s but sputtered
until the 1990s. Teutsch and others argue that Europeanization was a decisive factor in
overcoming national opposition to liberalization and reform. This was more so in road
haulage than in railways where there was less explicit EU-level pressure to reform.
(Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001 ) Nonetheless, the changes in both areas of
transport were due to the ability of Europeanization to refraine the debate over reform
and change the coalition of domestic actors in favor of either continuity or change.
(Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001, Hertier and Knill 2001)
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Hence the impacts were primarily indirect rather than direct as they influenced the
domestic political actors rather than requiring a specific institutional or policy
transposition or act.
In road haulage, the Common Transport Policy of the EU was rather weak in
terms of directives or new forms of regulation from Brussels. However, the implicit
threat of Europeanization and the need to liberalize road haulage became a decisive factor
in altering the domestic coalitions of political actors in favor of such reform. (Teutsch
2001; Schmidt 2006) The increased economic pressure of integration and new
opportunities for pro-liberalization actors at the EU-level provided the impetus to enact
change. At the EU level during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Germany’s position was
initially rather opposed to road haulage liberalization. However, judging that they were
outnumbered in the Council of Ministers, they began to tentatively support road haulage
liberalization proposals if and only if they were accompanied by tax and usage fee
harmonization by others members. This was opposed by the Netherlands where lower
taxes and fees on road haulage constituted a comparative advantage over Germany’s
haulers they did not wish to concede. Germany was only partially successful in its efforts.
There was some limited fiscal harmonization on road haulage policy, the best Germany
could achieve given the overwhelming majority in favor of liberalization in the Council
of Ministers. Nonetheless, the resulting directives provided significant latitude in how the
German government would implement reforms. (Teutsch 2001)
In railway policy, Germany was able to more successfully defend existing
national protectionism and interventionism at the EU level by finding stronger allies in
Italy and France. (Kerwer and Teutsch 2001 ) Nonetheless, EU legislation, overarching
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concerns over German railway competitiveness, and abiding by overall EU competition
policy led Germany to seek significant reform at the domestic level by the mid 1990s
even without an explicit call from the EU to do so. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill
2001 )
There had been a number of actors seeking reforms in both road haulage and
railways prior to the movements within the EU. Yet these were outnumbered or mitigated
by other transport interests and their legal or factual vetoes over the policymaking and
governance process in the transport sector. Notably, German manufacturers and
industries had been increasingly critical of the high transport costs within Germany that
hampered their regional competitiveness in the European markets. While the Kohl
government had been in favor of deregulation and liberalization, it was unable to gamer a
sufficient consensus from the vested social partners in the transport associations and
unions to enact major reforms. These domestic veto points effectively slowed reform
efforts until the mid 1990s. (Teutsch 2001)
By the late 1990s however, the Kohl government was able to utilize the changing
circumstances of Europeanization to manufacture sufficient consent for reform of the
system. This was still difficult and required significant governmental shepherding, yet as
Teutsch argues, without the additional pressures of Europeanization the reforms would
have likely remained mere proposals. In road haulage, industrial and manufacturing
associations, blocked from the rail and road haulage sectoral governance, were able to
press, with the support of the Kohl government, the issue through the European Court of
Justice where it was expected that they would rule against the existing system as an
infringement on European competition rules. The explicit threat of an upcoming ECJ
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ruling provided cover for many in the Transport Ministry, parliament, unions, and haulers
associations to accept the need for reform and push forward. Interestingly, the ECJ case
failed to achieve the ruling as expected, nonetheless, by that time the scales had already
tipped in favor of reform and liberalization that was enacted in 1998. (Teutsch 2001;
Dyson 2003)
In railways, the impact of the EU was less pronounced than the impacts of
reunification and the general state of German rail and industrial competitiveness. There
was no overarching directive or impetus from the Council of Ministers or ECJ to enact
rail reforms. Nonetheless, there was an important indirect implication from
Europeanization that did help built a consensus over national rail reform. Ongoing
discussions at the EU-level on railway liberalization paralleled those at the national level.
The implicit threat and argument was that there was eventually going to be a directive to
liberalize or reform the railways and there existed a short “window of opportunity” in
w hich to address the longstanding problems of the system. The previously formed
German Transport Forum, comprised of major enterprises, academics in transport
economics, and other pro-liberalization actors, found a more congenial atmosphere for
their demands both in the government and in the vested rail interests. Outright opposition
to rail reform became difficult and resulted in the eventual privatization and split-up of
DB in 1993. Hence while EU railway policies did not initiate German reforms, they did
reinforce existing trends by boosting the pro-liberalization interests' agenda and
providing sufficient impetus to enact reforms. (Teutsch 2001
)
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The new road haulage rules in Germany included (he abolishing of the restrictive
licensing and rate controls, allowed free access to foreign haulers (provided that they met
relatively high EU and national standards), and a reassignment of the duties once
performed by the neo-corporatist bodies such as BAG, which was abolished, to a new
government oversight agency. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001 ) This also included
incorporating new environmental standards directed by EU requirements for best
practices into the road transport industry. (Hertier 2001) The results of liberalization of
road haulage potentially marked the end of sectoral corporatism through the loosening of
the private-public relationship and transformation to direct state administration and
finance of oversight. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001 ) This paralleled the changes
made in the vocational education system discussed in chapter seven that concurrently
reduced the role of the social partners in lieu of a larger state function in administration
and financing. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Overall, the developments in road
haulage in Germany make it less likely that the sectoral interests of transport will
continue the privileged access to the policymaking and governance process into the
future. (Teutsch 2001)
In railways, the results were quite different. The railways workers’ unions and
other sectoral interests supported moderate reforms and limited the extent of
liberalization and reform. The unions. Lander, and other interests ensured a continued
state role in major railway decisions including infrastructure, pensions and healthcare of
existing and retired workers, and the necessity of large offsetting side-payments to unions
and Lander as a result of the privatization program. While the railways were privatized
and administration of rail policy switched to direct state oversight, sectoral interest
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associations were able to shape and regulate the privatization process and limit the levels
of liberalization seen in road haulage reforms. The unions were able to gain large
codetermination powers in the newly spun-off private enterprises of DB while industry
and pro-liberalization interests saw an increasing capacity for flexibility and competitive
rates. (Teutsch 2001
)
The tw o cases of road haulage and railways illustrate that Europeanization does
not even have identical implications for policy within the same political system. The
specific sectoral institutions and structures of road haulage and railways generated
differentiated responses in the policymaking and governance process. Additionally,
Europeanization was not equally as influential in each policy area dependent upon the
specific types, levels, and urgency of directives from the EU. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and
Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006)
German implementation programs also differed from those in Britain, France,
Italy, and the Netherlands, reinforcing the idea of differential responses to
Europeanization as dependent upon specific national institutional factors. (Teutsch 2001;
Hertier 2001; Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006) While there had been some domestic pressure to
reform road haulage and railways policies prior to the establishment of new EU
directives, these pro-liberalization forces were checked by existing privileged interests
and actors. The consequences of EU demand for reform tipped the balance in the
liberalization camp’s favor. The system was one that had primarily rested upon the
cooperation of public and private actors, typical of German semi-sovereignty.
Nonetheless, there was a higher degree of state intervention and oversight than many
other areas of governance, a common practice in regards to transport policy, especially in
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national rail systems. (Teutsch 2001 ; Hertier 2001 ) The specific responses of the German
government, actors, and social partners strongly illustrate the mixed and contingent
results of Europeanization on domestic structures of governance and neo-corporatism.
(Dyson 2003) Importantly, domestic forces of economic transformation, unification, and
endogenous pushes for reform may have been the primary explanation for structural
change, but Europeanization had an important and perhaps decisive role in road haulage
and perhaps a slightly more reduced function in railways reform. Structural change in
social partnership due to Europeanization is likely to be exacerbated or mitigated by other
endogenous or exogenous political and economic developments within the member
states, such as German reunification or changes in the Austrian coalition government.
The changing of government and governing coalitions, domestic economic changes,
changing interest group priorities may be quite important in either limiting or amplifying
the pressures of Europeanization upon social partnerships. (Hertier 2001, Falkner and
Leiber 2004; Lodge 2000; Hix and Goetz 2000; Dyson 2003) This also supports the
Europeanization hypothesis that the primary determinants of structural change are the
specific institutional characteristics and patterns of social partnership at the national level.
(Hertier 2001)
Conclusion: The Future of Social Partnership in Germany
The future of social partnership in Germany seems bleak, far more so than in
Austria. While there has been less institutional change this is because the German social
partnership has less institution than the Austrian model. (Casey and Gold 2000) However,
in terms of overall structural change, it would appear that the German model has suffered
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a more critical break from the past and has experienced significant structural dissolution
of the social partnership at almost every level. As some suggest, the social partnership, as
part of the overall German model, has taken, rightfully or wrongly, much of the blame for
the past two decades of economic decline and increasing social conflict. (Harding and
Paterson 2000)
Nonetheless, many suggest that the social partnership can and will remain a vital
and influential part of the German policymaking and collective bargaining process into
the foreseeable future. Hancock suggests that the social partnership ofjoint govemment-
employer-labor relations could become more specialized and sector-oriented and
reinvigorate corporatism in Germany by creating a more dynamic and flexible version.
(Hancock 1989; Turner 1998) In many ways German social partnership, because of its
decentralization and lack of formal and rigid institutionalization has been far better at
withstanding some of the economic, political, and social pressures that weakened the
Austrian social partnership. The slightly weaker ties to political parties and the more
pluralistic policy-making framework have made it slightly more maneuverable.
However, the preexisting institutions of social partnership, having been
challenged by the economic, social, and political pressures of the last thirty years, may no
longer be commensurate to the tasks of reform. The very “stability and incrementalism”
that was a major asset provided by the social partnership for the bulk of the postwar era
now appears as a barrier to constructive reform and response in a changed global,
European, and German economic and political order. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) The
exogenous conditions that made the social partnership so valuable and effective from the
1940s through 1970s have changed Since the 1980s, the economic and political
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environments continue to transform themselves while Germany’s political institutions
became barriers to “productive adjustment” and innovation. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004;
Vail 2003) These exogenous shocks, including the oils shocks of the 1970s, the end of
the Cold War and unification, increasing globalization of the economy, and rapid
widening and deepening of European integration have certainly ended the trends that
signified the German economic miracle. Whether this implies the end of Modell
Deutschland is another question. (Harding and Paterson 2000)
In terms of Europeanization however, the German social partnership has probably
faced fewer challenges than that in Austria. This will be discussed in significantly more
detail in the next chapter. The long-term integration of Germany into the EU since the
1 950s presented a very different dynamic that that which Austria faced by the 1 980s and
1 990s. The mere size of the German economy and its importance in international and
European trade has also insulated it from the same types of concerns and dilemmas that
faced Austrian interests in the 1980s.
As a major center of industry, trade, and commerce and an important and
influential member of the EU, Germany and its political system remain tremendously
important in domestic, European, and global politics. Austrians cannot say the same and
viewed integration as an unavoidable necessity and understood their integration to be
from a position of weakness. German interests in labor, business, or agriculture, all
recognize that Germany has, does, and will have a large and important national economy
as well as an integrally important European and global economy. The stakes of national
politics in Berlin are far greater than those in Vienna leading to far less resignation over
the future of the national policymaking level. Hence while unions, business, and
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agriculture certainly see the policymaking arena as a two-level game, or in the case of
strongly federal Germany a multi-level game, the importance of both levels is perceived
as high. Austrian business and labor clearly saw the eclipse of the national system by
Brussels and opted to sacrifice some national authority for a seat at the supranational
level. German interests chose to continue to operate strongly at both.
An additional possible continuity for the social partnership in Germany has been
the central role of the Chancellor in organizing, sustaining, and moderating the
consensus-building process amongst the peak associations. The continuity of Chancellor
Democracy in the Federal Republic under both CDU and SPD leadership has created an
informal, but structural set of expectations, interactions, and coordinated policy debate
that all actors have come to rely upon. Unlike the Austrian model that was dominated by
the links between the chambers and major parties, the German system is less dependent
upon the political transitions that have changed the party system and relies more heavily
upon stable executive leadership. This may make the system less autonomous and more
likely to be shaped by the political and economic leanings of the person seated in the
Chancellery. However, under subsequent chancellors from Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel
there has been an increasing trend of marginalization of the social partners by the
government. This peaked during the latter stages of the Schroder government as he
abandoned almost all the structures of social partnership for unilateral policymaking and
a stronger state role in economic governance previously unseen in the semi-sovereign
federal republic. (Vail 2003; Streeck 2005)
The German model of social partnership was never the monopolistic or even
always dominant model of decision and policymaking in all policy areas of the federal
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republic. It has coexisted with more pluralist, executive-driven, and party-oriented
policymaking processes for much of the postwar era. (Casey and Gold 2000; von Beyme
1993; Fuchs and Koch 1991; Fichter 2005) Yet in critical areas of economic governance
including the labor market, vocational training, collective bargaining, and consensual
policymaking the social partnership was nearly supreme. This model seems to have been
fully discredited by the increasing decentralization of collective bargaining and worker-
firm codetermination and the eventual marginalization from the policymaking process by
the Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel governments in areas of labor market reform, vocational
training, and social insurance that fell squarely under the direct governance of the social
partners during the bulk of the postwar era. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004) Even worse, the
quasi-regulatory and administrative roles in operating vocational training and job
placement have been permanently placed in the hand of the state, further reducing the
efficacy and legitimacy of the social partners in providing services directly to German
workers, industry, and citizens. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) Perhaps the most
notably portent of the decline of neo-corporatism and social partnership has been towards
the weakening of the ideal of semi -sovereignty as the state has taken on higher levels of
direct responsibility and governance in the German economy since the immediate
postwar era. (Green and Paterson 2005; Busch 2005; Streeck 2005; Katzenstein 2005;
Schmidt 2006)
Some still remain optimism and suggest that the German way of neo-corporatism
is “condemned to succeed”. (Wessels 2000) Just a decade ago even those who felt the
system was in decline felt that neo-corporatism would likely remain in some
circumscribed and salient form for the foreseeable future. (Gobeyn 1993; Kuhlmann
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2004) The general mistrust of the neo-liberal model suggests that Germany will remain
distinct from any Anglo-American model, yet the significant decentralization and de-
legitimization of the social partnership and social partners suggests a continuing crisis.
( Bemdt 2000) Probably the one area where the social partnership is most secure is co-
determination. There has been little attempt to fundamentally alter or reduce worker
representation in firms, quite to the contrary codetermination laws expanded during the
past decade despite increasing opposition from the Mittlestand. Nonetheless, the system
of works councils and codetermination between workers and firms seems quite stable.
(Harding and Sorge 2000; Turner 1997) While it seems clear that state-capital-labor
relations in Germany will continue to exhibit their own distinct institutional tendencies
towards social partnership, its future does not seem secure and is at risk to wholesale
abandonment. (Fichter 2005)
The poor records of Concerted Action and the Alliance for Jobs suggest that if
social partnership has a future in Germany it will likely not emerge as a national-level
institution as it remains in Austria. (Fichter 2005) The increasing decentralization of
collective bargaining and the disorganization of the peak associations of labor and
business further weaken such potentialities. (Casey and Gold 2000; Bemdt 2000) The
increasing w illingness of governments to bypass or circumvent the social partners and to
enact policy under Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel governments shows little sign of
reversing. In fact, given recent reform efforts over the labor market, healthcare, pensions,
and European integration, the evidence suggests an even stronger momentum away from
social partnership.
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However, as the end result of the labor market reform through the Hartz
Commission illustrated, the social partners were an important part of the implementation
of the policy. (Vitols 2004) Social partnership remains influential in the German political
system even under its more circumscribed and reduced role by the early 21
s1
century.
Neo-corporatism has maintained some resilience and utility in some areas of collect
bargaining and codetermination even though it has lost significant influence and control
over economic governance of labor markets, vocational training, and social insurance.
Unions and business interests remain crucial players in the German political system due
to their size and importance. While still influential in the policymaking process, they
have perhaps permanently lost their once guaranteed and integral positions common to
the postwar German model. The overall concern that the social partners and the social
partnership are failing to address and promote the kind of consensual innovation and
compromise that made the system so successful in previous eras has been at the heart of
their decline. (Casey and Gold 2000)
The belief that the social partners are merely defenders of preexisting privilege
and are dedicated to continued insulation of their own interests alone undermines the
normative and social underpinnings of the social partnership as a means to achieve a
positive, national solidarity on economic and social policy. (Bemdt 2000) Some are even
more pessimistic and suggest that the German system, due to the inability to quickly
adapt and adjust is likely to continue to face a scenario of declining economic and social
vitality for the foreseeable future as interests and parties are trapped in a “joint decision
trap”. (Scharpf 1988; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) New problem-solving capacities,
institutions, and structures may be required to address the issues of the post-industrial.
495
post-unification, post-Maastricht German political economy, and it is unclear whether the
social partnership can remain viable in such a changed environment. (Fichter 2005) This
has potentially resulted in the “German disease” where the search for innovation and
reform is ossified by the institutional and structural power of past success and entrenched
actors. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; The Economist 2006a)
However, the resilient power of institutions and norms will likely be critical to the
future of social partnership in the German political system. (Turner 1998; Fichter 2005)
The 2005 elections have generally reflected the German electorate’s wish to seek
consensus on major economic and political reforms through the promulgation of grand
coalition. Polling in 2005 and 2006 suggested that German voters preferred grand
coalition as the best way to find and implement meaningful consensus between the major
interests and divisions in German society on urgent policy reforms. Even after the
Alliance for Jobs failed to make any meaningful headway in labor market or social
insurance compromise, 72% of the population believed that it was “a good institution”.
(Schrim 2002) Social partnership, for all its failings may still reflect the implicit German
political and social demands for consensual and collective decision-making above other
considerations.
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CHAPTER 8
ASSESSING CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN
SOCIAL PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE EUROPEANIZATION FRAMEWORK
Introduction
The comparative analysis in the last four chapters provides some of the
evidentiary data necessary to utilize and test the applicability of the Europeanization
framework as well as a general assessment of the development, institutionalization, and
changes in the German and Austrian social partnerships. According to the theoretical
model of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, the institutional and structural variations amongst
the German and Austrian cases are vital in understanding their fit or misfit to the impact
of Europeanization, as well as the structural changes that may or may not arise from such
adaptational pressures. As noted in the preliminary chapter, the Europeanization literature
endeavors to determine if, how, when, and to what extent European integration and
governance correlates to or causes domestic change or continuity and to assess the
variation in such continuity or change from state to state. (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse
2001 )
This concluding chapter will accomplish several tasks. First it will assess how
well the Europeanization framework developed by Cowles, Risse, and Caporaso applies
to the cases of German and Austrian social partnership. The findings below suggest that
while the framework provides a formalized theoretical model for evaluating
Europeanization that may have some utility, the evidence from the social partnership
illuminates significant deficits and failings. Consequently, this chapter shall also discuss
and suggest, in light of the Austrian and German experiences, future or more appropriate
strategies of analyzing, exploring, and explaining the process and implications of
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Europeanization. Second, this chapter will assess to what extent the social partnerships in
Austria and Germany have been transformed by pressures emanating from the European
level of governance and policymaking. Here the findings are also mixed. The results
show that while in some policy areas and sectors, such as monetary, fiscal, and
competition policy, there has been pressure and some subsequent change due to
Europeanization. However, depending upon the issue, the policy and structural outputs
have been so variable and differentiated to mitigate any generalization. This is
complicated by two additional factors. The ability to quarantine the impacts of Europe
versus other endogenous and exogenous forces is problematic given the interrelated and
interdependent qualities of the multi-level European political model. The lack of a hard
and uniform model of European policymaking and governance also suggests that member
states have extraordinary potential to adapt, reform, or continue existing patterns of
governance to a large extent.
Third, this chapter will conclude with an assessment of the future of the social
partnership and neo-corporatist patterns of governance and policymaking at the domestic
and European levels. Whereas the scholarship pessimistically predicted an almost
deterministic decline in neo-corporatism since the 1990s, it has shown remarkable
resiliency in many cases, especially in Austria, but even in some sectors of the German
system as well. In some cases, including European Monetary Union (EMU) and the
Growth and Stability Pact, European integration has certainly achiveied significant
limitations on neo-corporatist as well as many other forms of governance. Competition
policy has also undermined many of the once tight relationships between the state and
social partners in a number of sectors. This was especially true in Austria where
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significant privatization was part of the integration process. Yet, as will be discussed in
later sections of this chapter, integration has continued to allow significant space of social
partnership at both the EU and national levels. Notable is the Lisbon Strategy, developed
from 2000, to promote employment, social cohesion, and a more competitive knowledge-
based economy. This has stabilized social partnership in many European states as well as
providing a potential boost for such structures at the EU level. While it has certainly seen
a decline throughout Western Europe, neo-corporatism has not become extinct nor lost all
efficacy in spite of the numerous challenges it has weathered over the last three decades.
Assessing Misfit Between European and Domestic Neo-C’orporatist Governance
There has been a general argument that European integration and governance
have significantly contributed to the decline of neo-corporatism over the past two
decades. As Streeck and Schmitter suggested “the resurgence of European integration, as
signified by the Single European Act and the internal market project, was more than just
incidentally related to the demise of national corporatism in the 1980s”. (Streeck and
Schmitter 1991, 144)
Additional integration efforts in the 1990s including Maastricht and EMU would
intensify this trend. Streeck and Schmitter’s works of the early 1990s suggested an
inevitable marginalization of national patterns of neo-corporatist governance linked to the
growing importance and pluralism at the supranational level. The governance patterns in
Brussels emerged as "more pluralist” than neo-corporatist or corporatist leading to both
the eschewing of the few neo-corporatist institutions created at the European level as well
as the increasing marginalization of national patterns of social partnership. (Streeck and
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Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991; Hix and Goetz 2001; Dyson 2003) In terms of neo-
coiporatist institutions at the EU level, Streeek and Schmitter argued that Euro-
corporatism had “failed” and that the interest representation and policymaking process
was more organizationally fragmented, less hierarchical, internally competitive, and
“much more pluralist” than national political systems that utilized neo-corporatist
arrangements.
The supranational institutions in Brussels that were created to reflect neo-
corporatist and neo-functionalist organization, interest representation and intermediation,
and policymaking lacked the viability, influence, solidarity of members, and veto
authority that social partners found in their national models of neo-corporatism. (Streeck
and Schmitter 1991; Dyson 2003) The European Economic and Social Committee, while
a part of the Treaty of Rome meant to establish a form of neo-corporatist representation
and policy influence at the EU level, never accomplished meaningful influence and failed
to generate consistent support and solidarity amongst the EU-level social partners. The
partners themselves, represented by ETUC, UNICE, and others lacked cohesion,
commitment to the EU-level interest umbrella organizations, and rarely found consensus
and compromise with each other. The overall decline of unions and the increasing
decentralization of business and industry throughout Europe added to their inability to
functionally operate as social partners at the EU level. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991;
Streeck 1991)
In terms of neo-corporatism at the national level, Streeck and Schmitter were no
more optimistic. The “heyday of corporatism” was a decidedly “national response” to
exogenous economic conditions, and after the 1980s those conditions had changed as
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Europe was seeking transnational mechanisms of cooperation and governance to address
issues of integration, global competitiveness, employment, and monetary policy. National
neo-corporatism was antithetical to European integration, initially slowing the process
through the 1970s. By the 1980s, when the will for European integration returned, it was
due precisely to the failure of neo-corporatism to adjust to the changing international
economic environment. The necessity of expanded European integration efforts was due
to the declining ability of social partnerships to provide the kinds of successful economic
governance that they had from the 1950s. But European integration meant a transfer of
“effective sovereignty” to the European level in areas such as monetary policy that were
already reduced versions of the past Keynesian capacities of the member states. This
“supranational pooling of eroded national sovereignties over economic policy” resulted in
the eventual “devaluation” of domestic political resources of the social partnership. While
some structures may “remain viable for some time”, neo-corporatism as it was known
had become “a matter of the past”. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991, 150) Hence one of the
primary and direct explanations for the decline of neo-corporatism was the rise of
European level governance.
Streeck and Schmitter are effectively arguing that neo-corporatism and European
modes of governance possess a strong misfit or misalignment. The challenges from
supranational pooling of sovereignty, a more pluralist policymaking process, reduced
national monetary autonomy, increased roles for subnational governments, reduced
efficacy of EU-level neo-corporatist institutions, and a de-emphasis of social rights and
industrial citizenship all suggested a continual decline of neo-corporatism at the national
level and little hope of reversing such tides at the EU level. Streeck and Schmitter did not
501
place the comprehensive decline of neo-corporatism purely at the feet of European
integration, citing increasing post-materialism, post-Fordism, decentralization of interest
associations, and de-industrialization as other important forces. (Streeck and Schmitter
1991, 147) These shortcomings themselves helped create the conditions for increasing
demands for European integration during the early 1980s. Nonetheless, the integration
efforts themselves seem to be the primary institutionalization away from neo-corporatism
at the national level in lieu of more pluralist modes of governance at the European level.
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991 ) As Streeck suggests, the results of European
integration were “at least equal” to those of other domestic trends that reduced neo-
corporatist efficacy. (Streeck 1991, 22)
Despite Streeck and Schmitter's assessment of significant misfit between
domestic neo-corporatism and European level pluralism, evidence since the 1990s
contradicts or mitigates the severity of these claims. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Compston
1998; Falkner 1997, 2000; Hertier 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt
2006) As noted in chapter three, while there may be some misfit between national level
neo-corporatist systems and multi-level governance in the EU it may actually be modest
m relative terms. While European and national systems of neo-corporatism do differ, the
fragmented and diverse policymaking systems of the European Union are predicated on
more soft approaches to ensure compliance and allow considerable room for
differentiated national adaptation. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Hix and
Goetz 2000; Hertier and Knill 2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) The EU has exhibited
some neo-corporatist tendencies both in the policymaking and implementation stages of
governance further enforcing the premise that the level of misfit is relatively less than
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previously argued. Compston argues that the decade-long effects of the 1985 Single
European Act actually caused “no general decline” in national neo-corporatist structures
during the period. ( 1998)
The disputes of the Streeck and Schmitter hypothesis stem from two directions.
First, some scholars suggest that the institutions and processes of neo-corporatism at the
EU-level have been incrementally gaining new influence and authority. This has been
more notable in the areas of the European Social Dialogue and European Works Councils
that have far more binding and forceful levers of influence than the European Social
Committee and its mere advisory roles. (Benedictus et al. 2003; Mangenot and Polet
2004; Obradovic 2004; Weber 2004; Fitzgerald 2004)
Additionally, the peak association umbrellas at the EU level have shown some
increasing role and vitality over the past decade. (Dolvik and Visser 2001 ; Berger 2002;
Compston 2001; Greenwood 2003, 2003a) This has especially been true in the better-
organized and funded business and industry associations, usually organized along
transnational sectoral lines including pharmaceuticals, aviation, and energy. (Schmidt
2006; Greenwood 2003) But rather than neo-corporatism, Cowles suggests that this is
more a case of “elite pluralism" and constitutes a misfit between neo-corporatist social
partnership such as that found in Germany and the new modes of governance at the EU
level. (2001
)
Even with these modest improvements in organizational capacity and autonomy,
there remains a dearth of centralized and highly influential institutions and practices of
social partnership at the EU level. Nonetheless, there has been a growing trend at the
Commission level of the EU to begin to include more civil society groups and organized
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interests in the policymaking side of the process. This has been intended to address
complaints of the democratic deficit of the EU, but also to improve in the net efficacy and
acceptance of EU-level policymaking by the major interests in the EU. In this case, the
EU has often helped establish and even finances the operations of organized interests at
the EU level including those of women's rights and others that have been traditionally
underrepresented at the EU level. Hence one can claim that there is a nascent neo-
corporatism or “functional representation” model beginning to emerge at the EU level as
it seeks to find, and if necessary create, license, finance, and otherwise support peak
associations, so as to bolster its perceived inclusiveness and democratic credentials.
(Schmidt 2006) One could imagine, that given the large level of business and industrial
influence at the EU level, that the institution may be tempted to bolster other non-
business interests such as organized labor, the environment, minority groups, and others
so as to suggest greater parity in the lobbying and policymaking process. If so, the
institution would be moving towards a remarkably more corporatist model of
policymaking and interest intermediation.
The second, and more compelling counterargument to the Streeck and Schmitter
hypothesis is the growing recognition that European modes of policymaking and
governance are not nearly so pluralist or dominant as suggested. While the European
Union policymaking process and forms of governance are certainly somewhat pluralist,
what Schmidt calls semi-pluralist, they also exhibit a tremendously diverse and perhaps
unique combination of models. The EU system of policymaking and governance seems
that of a hybrid system. (Falkner 2000; Borzel 1999; Cram 1997; Sbragia 1992; Dyson
2003; Schuppert 2006; Hertier 2001; Schmidt 2006) As Falkner and others suggest.
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depending upon the issue, European governance exhibits pluralism, statism, corporatism,
and others unique forms of governance simultaneously. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and
Fieber 2004; Schuppert 2006; Schmidt 2006)
While Streeck and Schmitter and others characterized the EU process as
fragmented, and hence analogous to pluralism, Falkner suggests that the fragmentation
has patterns that allows for multiple and concurrent forms of governance that shift
depending upon the policy area, member preferences, and existing patterns of national
governance. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Hertier 2001 ; Falkner 2000; Falkner and
Feiber 2004; Hertier and Km II 2001)
Schmidt suggests that while the policymaking and debate side of the process is
decidedly more pluralist, the transposition of such policies is highly differentiated and
gives member states incredible latitude in utilizing statist, corporatist, or other models of
governance as the tools of implementation and national adaptation. (2006) Hence while
European integration may challenge neo-corporatism in some areas of policymaking and
governance, it actually might be quite adaptive in others, and possible even enhanced in
some specific policy competences. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and Feiber 2004; Schmidt
2006)
As discussed in chapter two, European governance may have both negative and
positive consequences for social partnerships. (Hertier and Kmll 2001 ; Falkner and
Feiber 2004; Schmidt 2006) EU directives may set explicit conditions of implementation
by member states that may either enhance or detract from domestic social partnership and
partners. These include a range of options. First directives may explicitly call on states to
use their social partners to implement new policies and reforms. Second, provisions in the
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directives may encourage member states to use existing social partners or even create
new social partners to accomplish implementation. These include a growing number of
directives suggesting that the “best practice” of implementation of directives in some
policy areas be through social partnership. Finally, EU directives may set specific
conditions that require full or uniform applicability of new rules that may contradict
national patterns of variation and differentiation amongst social partners. (Falkner and
Leiber 2004; Hertier and Knill 2001) Hence, Europeanization may have both negative
and positive implications for the continued efficacy and necessity of social partnership
and social partners.
Falkner has identified at least four distinct forms of interest intermediation
patterns in EU-level governance and policymaking based on the stability and degree of
interest group involvement: Statist Cluster, Issue Network, Traditional Policy
Community, and Corporatist Policy Community. The models are an increasing scale of
interest group participation and authority in EU policymaking. In the statist cluster
model, public-private interaction is marginalized or excluded. These tend to be rare and
in a very limited number of arenas including foreign policy, justice, and home affairs. In
the issue network mode, interests groups are in lobbying or consultative relations only
and these tend to be more pluralistic in their openness and diversity. While having
significant public-private contact, there is no binding role or permanency for interest
groups. The traditional policy community tends to encompass a rather stable private-
public network of interest groups in a particular policy area and allows greater
participatory influence in shaping decisions and policies. Finally, there is the corporatist
policy community that provides an exclusive and stable group of interest actors that have
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decisive roles in the making and implementation of policy. (Falkner 2000; Schuppert
2006; Kohler-Koch 1999) Hence the EU policymaking system may not only be multi-
level but also “multiform”. (Schmidt 2006)
Statist Issue Traditional Policy C’orporatist Policy
Cluster Network Community Community
Interest Group
Membership Unstable Rather Stable Extremely Stable
Interest Group
Involvement Insignificant Consultative Participatory Decisive
Table 6: Four Modes of Interest Intermediation at the EU-Level
The implications of these multiform modes of European policymaking upon
domestic structures of interest intermediation and governance are potentially critical in
understanding how Europeanization can potentially undermine neo-corporatism at the
domestic level. EU policy modes can cause domestic change three ways. First, interests
will act at both the national and European levels and will lead to cognitive, normative,
and strategic changes in their behavior and activities. (Hertier and Knill 2001 ; Falkner
2000; Dyson 2003) Second, new norms regarding governance patterns will be transferred
between levels. Hence interest groups may learn to look differently at long practiced and
accepted national modes. Third, alliances of interests at the EU level may have
consequences at the national. (Hertier 2001 ; Hertier and Knill 2001 ; Falkner 2000)
This creates a multi-level system of ad hoc alliances and networks capable of
logrolling or cooperative tradeoffs that are common to pluralist models of governance
found in the American Congress and similar institutions. However, the transnational and
multi-level patterns found in the EU and the lack of a common policymaking model
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suggests a rather unique and new form of interest group activity. These closely parallel
the mediating factors of Europeanization that will be discussed in the next section. Most
importantly however is that these EU policy patterns each have differentiated effects at
the national level. The continued stability of the national level structures of
policymaking and governance are highly dependent upon what type of Europeanization it
is facing.
As Falkner's hypothesis suggests, the potential for fit or misfit, is quite contingent
on the specific policy area as well as the model of European policymaking appropriate to
the sector or policy issue. (Falkner 2000; Schmidt 2006) Table 7 below suggests the
potential for continuity or conflict between different modes of European and national
policymaking patterns.
ELI Models of Policymaking
Statist Issue Traditional Corporatist
ClusterNetwork Policy Policy
Statist Confirm/ Lobbying More Stable/ More Stable/
Cluster Reinforce Involved Involved
National Issue Confirm/ More Stable/ More Stable/
Model of Network Lobbying Reinforce Involved Involved
Policymaking
Traditional Less Stable/ Less Stable/ Confirm/ More Stable/
Policy Less Involved Less Involved Reinforce Involved
Corporatist Less Stable/ Less Stable/ Less Stable/ Confirm/
Policy Less Involved Less Involved Less Involved Reinforce
Table 7: Direction of Domestic Impact of EIJ Policymaking Modes
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As this illustrates, there is generally more instability and less involvement of
domestic social partners in three of the four modes of European governance and
policymaking. This would suggest considerable adaptational pressure on structures of
neo-corporatism at the national level in EU member states. (Schmidt 2006) In this way,
the competence and efficacy of the social partnership would seem to be quite limited.
Yet, in practice, while reduced, there has been considerable continuity of the social
partnership in states and in some key areas of competence since the 1980s. Many EU
directives specifically cite the use of national patterns of social partnership as a means of
institutionalization and enforcement. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) Hence, while
Europeanization may generally contribute to a decline in the efficacy and viability of
neo-corporatist patterns at the national level, it is quite differential and there is still
significant space within the EU policymaking and governance modes to allow social
partnership to continue to survive. (Dyson 2003)
As Falkner suggests, the overall impact of these EU modes of policymaking and
governance has been to promote “moderate diversity” in domestic structures of
policymaking and governance. In other words, the larger gaps between contending
policymaking and governance models are narrowed but not so much as to compel
convergence or isomorphism to high degrees. Differences in patterns of public-private
interaction and interest intermediation will continue though in more moderated forms.
(Falkner 2000) In essence, Europeanization leaves room for national neo-corporatism to a
larger extent than Streeck and Schmitter suggested. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck
1991; Falkner 2000; Schmidt 2006) This has been especially true in areas of key social
partnership authority, including labor law and social policy. (Falkner et al. 2005; Falkner
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and Leiber 2004) The EU has allowed much greater independent authority amongst
member states to transpose, implement, and administer such EU directives and policies.
(Schmidt 2006) This translates into less overall misfit between domestic social
partnerships and supranational governance than has been previous argued. (Falkner 2000;
Knill 2001)
Further, the policymaking process at the EU level itself is strongly conditioned by
the necessity of high levels of consensus and negotiation. While the Single European Act
of 1985 changed the voting system in the Council from unanimity to a qualified majority
system, the use ofQMV is restricted to some policy areas while unanimity remains
entrenched in others. Further, the general underlying principle of legislation has been to
seek and maintain unanimity even when it is not required. Hence states and national
actors are able to project their preferences, interests, and goals into the legislative process
of the EU at several stages including the Council, Commission, Parliament, and ECJ. The
resulting legislation is far less likely to result in highly decisive misfit between the EU
and national patterns. While in some cases, such as monetary policy and anti-trust policy
there has been fare less “wiggle room” for national institutions and actors, in most other
areas, the policymaking outputs and the methods of transposition, implementation, and
administration have been relatively soft. (Schmidt 2006)
Despite the relatively lessened impact that Europeanization has likely produced
upon social partnership, there have been measurable effects, especially in certain policy
areas, that have contributed to the decline of social partnership in national policymaking
and governance. As Schmidt suggests, the effects of Europeanization are strongly
divergent from sector to sector. (2006) These will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Yet, compared to the impacts of globalization, structural economic change,
increasing decentralization of the economy and social partners, German unification, and
other endogenous and exogenous changes and pressures, the implications of misfit with
Europeanization seems a bit less significant that Streeck and Schmitter suggested.
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991 ) However, within the patterns of the Europeanization
literature and scholarship this more moderate impact is rather close to the norm. (Hix and
Goetz 2000; Hertier and Knill 2001; Teutsch 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003)
There is also the issue of differentiated misfit amongst the German and Austrian
models of social partnership. As demonstrated and argued in chapters four through seven,
the Austrian model of social partnership has certainly been more institutionally and
structurally embedded in the policymaking and governance process than in the German
model. (Heinisch 2000) Falkner suggests that “the EU... impinges most directly on strong
forms of corporatism” versus weaker or mixed models. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) The
Austrian social partnership existed in formal and permanent institutions at the federal
level and had a relatively expansive competence over issues not only relating to capital-
labor relations but also social insurance, trade, transportation, prices, the environment,
and education.
In light of Falkner’s model of the domestic impacts of differential modes of
European governance and policymaking, it would be logical to assume that given the
larger institutional and policy competence under neo-corporatist structures in the Austrian
system, Austria's social partnership is facing much stronger adaptational pressures than
that in Germany where the social partnership shared more of the policymaking and
governance process with pluralist and other patterns. (Falkner 1997; Falkner and Leiber
2004; Teutsch 2001; Paterson 2003; Dyson 2003) Heinisch also contends that Austria
should generally be more vulnerable due to its smaller economy, larger exposure to
external economic pressures, and smaller voice in the EU compared to that of
neighboring Germany. (2000)
This has been exacerbated by the specific divergent processes of accession to the
EU by Germany and Austria. As supported by the evidence in chapters four through
seven, Germany’s gradual integration into the EU commenced in the early 1950s and has
been an accepted and indisputable part of the German political system ever since. The
social partners and social partnership have been making gradual and incremental
adjustments to integration for over fifty years. Membership was also not an issue for
overall dispute as the Adenauer and successive governments ensured an overarching
consensus that European integration was a non-negotiable assumption of postwar German
foreign policy. (Schmidt 2006) Austria and the Austrian model of social partnership have
had a far more compressed adjustment period since its early integration reforms in the
late 1980s and eventual accession in 1995. Membership wasn't seriously considered until
the mid 1980s and was then strenuously debated and divisive within the Austrian political
system and amongst its interests. As Heinisch argues this amounted to a “shock therapy”
of sorts. (2000) This suggests, and is supported by the evidence in the previous chapters
and below, that the pressures of European integration and governance have been much
stronger on Austria and its model of social partnership than the German form.
Bulmer, Katzenstein, and others have argued that EU-German congruence was
always rather strong in areas of constitutional order, norms, conventions, policy goals,
and even patterns of meso-level governance. This has meant that Germany has been far
more amenable to and congruent with EU modes of governance since the 1950s with
their shared emphasis on federalism, decentralization, sectoral organization, and mixed
policymaking traditions. (Buhner 1986, 1997; Katzenstein 1997; Paterson 2003; Dyson
2003) Schmidt suggests that the EU has not “significantly altered the traditional
architecture of the German state”. (2006) This does not necessarily mean that the German
model has experienced no pressure from Europeanization.
As Dyson argues, Germany's incongruence with the European modes of
policymaking and governance became more pronounced from the late 1980s onward.
Sectoral regulation and neo-corporatist governance, which were earlier exempted from
EU competition laws as well as German parliamentary regimes, had difficulty navigating
the new and more pluralist institutional environments at the EU and domestic levels.
Hence, despite a longer tenure of membership, the integration developments of the past
twenty years have been quite a challenge to the German model of policymaking and
governance. (Dyson 2003)
As argued throughout this research the particularistic institutional and structural
characteristics of the Austrian and German social partnerships are deterministic of the
existence, scope, scale, and methods of domestic structural change, hence misfit or fit
alone is not enough to explain why change or continuity ensues. (Hertier and Knill 2001;
Dyson 2003) This is in spite of differentiated adaptational pressures between the two
states.
Hence, while it has been found that the Austrian model is likely facing much
stronger challenges from European integration and governance than the German model,
the responses and net structural changes in both systems are, according to Cowles,
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Caporaso and Risse, dependent upon their specific institutional characteristics found
within the Europeanization framework that are detailed in the following sections. (2001
)
Respondinu to Adapatational Pressures from Europeanization
Even if adaptational pressures on neo-corporatism are less than those argued by
Streeck and Schmitter, Falkner and others have demonstrated there still exists a moderate
level of misfit between European modes of policymaking and governance and domestic
social partnerships. ( Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Falkner 200 1 ; Falkner and Leiber 2004;
Hertier and Knill 2001 ; Schmidt 2006) Hence, this misfit, even if modest, places some
adaptational pressures upon the German and Austrian models. (Borzel and Risse 2003;
Schmidt 2006)
For actors at the national and subnational levels, European integration may
change the “opportunity structures” of the political environment and force them to “adapt
their existing political strategies”. (Hertier and Knill 2001; Traxler and Schmitter 1995;
Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) This, in addition to the transfer of competence to the EU-
level. has implications for the overarching patterns of neo-corporatist policymaking and
its continued efficacy and viability. But domestic structural change is typically not
uniform or isomorphic despite increased adapational pressures. (Lodge 2000; Hertier
2001 ; Hertier and Knill 2001; Knill 2001 ) While the framework assesses how
Europeanization places adaptational pressure on states to converge with European
standards, it stresses that state-level responses to pressures are dependent upon the
presence or absence of particular domestic characteristics. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill
2001 ) The adaptational pressures on neo-corporatist systems likely results in some
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convergence amongst social partnerships of the member states of the EU but with
continuing “moderate diversity”. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Hertier 2001;
Hertier and Knill 2001)
In part this is due to the unique process of transposition and implementation of
EU policy and preferences into national political systems. The EU’s jurisdiction and its
exercise of authority over member states are under “continuous negotiation” between and
amongst the EU and its member states. The EU exerts a more “soft power” that often
relies upon member states implementing, administering, and policing European policies
and preferences themselves. The legislative and administrative requirements of the EU
have actually served to strengthen the capacities of domestic actors and national
structures in numerable cases. Schmidt argues that this is due to the highly compound
nature of the EU governance system that disperses authority across multi-level authorities
and institutions. (2006, 20) This supports the argument that “domestic adaptation with
national colors”, dependent upon existing variety in institutional and structural
characteristics, is the primary Europeanization mechanism for structural change in
national neo-corporatist patterns and models. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso
200 1 ; Hertier 200 1 ; Hertier and Kmll 200 1 ; Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill 200 1
)
The Mediating; Factors of Structural Change or Continuity
The variety in institutionalization includes five mediating factors at the state-
level: multiple veto points, facilitating formal institutions, organizational and
policymaking cultures, differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning.
(Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 2) For Hix and Goetz, the likelihood of
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domestic change increases when domestic actors, institutions, or processes have
increased opportunities at the European level in three areas: new exit pathways, new veto
powers, and gaining informational advantage. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 13)
This section’s primary goal is to assess and analyze the institutional colors of the
German and Austrian social partnerships and how they help explain their structural
changes or continuity in the face of the pressures of Europeanization. Because of the
differential institutionalization and structures of social partnership at the national level in
these states there has also been a commensurate differential structural response by the
systems to the pressures of Europeanization. While German and Austrian social
partnerships certainly share pressures of Europeanization, the structural change and
continuity of their systems are exclusively dependent upon their distinct national patterns
of neo-corporatist governance.
Multiple Veto Points
Structural or policy change stemming from Europeanization can be conceived in
terms of a "process of overcoming an institutionally defined number of formal and
factual veto points. (Herder 2001, 5) Vetoes may be formal or factual.(Herder and Knill
2001; Radaelli 2003) Although actors may be powerful in the domestic system, actions
can be blocked by public opinion, veto players in the policy process (as a result of
corporatist policy styles) or institutional mechanisms that prevent action without an
“oversized political majority”. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 12; Guliani 2003; Dyson 2003) The
existence of multiple veto points has two implications for Europeanization. For actors
currently invested with veto powers, this provides them a way to block potential reforms
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from European integration and governance or to significantly shape them. For those
without veto powers but seeking change or those that want to avoid the domestic veto
gauntlet altogether, Europe may provide a new exit pathway. This will be discussed in
later sections.
The existence of multiple veto points in a given state-level structure impedes
structural adaptation by decentralizing power across the political system and allowing
more actors to have a say in political decision making. Policy adjustment will be more
difficult to introduce, enact, and administer. (Hertier 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003;
Guliani 2003; Dyson 2003) The more power is dispersed, the more difficult it is to create
a domestic coalition to introduce and implement changes necessary to reduce the
adaptational pressures of European-level governance. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and
Caporaso 2001, 9) Scharpf, Heritier, and others have argued that certain decentralized
features of the German and Italian political systems and policymaking process have
slowed or blocked implementation of structural adjustment to European-level pressures in
transport policy and governance as well as in other sectors. (Heritier 2001; Scharpf 1985;
Borzel and Risse 2003; Dyson 2003)
Hence, systems that institutionalize powerful and multiple veto points might be
particularly susceptible to stalemates that inhibit structural reform. Conversely, states
with fewer veto points may have “relative institutional ease” in which European policy
demands are accommodated. (Hertier 2001
)
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The overall Germany political model is notable for its many veto points including
neo-corporatist interest associations, national, and provincial levels of government, and a
generally decentralized, semi-sovereign policymaking and governance process. This
constrains the freedom of the government in terms of European policy by forcing
reconciliation with many distinct veto actors at different levels of governance. This
creates a far more veto-oriented political order. (Dyson, 2003)
In the case of German road haulage and railways reform, the importance of veto
points was significant. (Hertier and Knill 2001; Radaelli 2003; Borzel and Risse 2003) In
road haulage reform, there were several veto points including the existing structures of
governance that were dominated by the sectoral associations, trade unions, and other pro-
protectionist interests in the Transport Ministry, and SPD. Corporatist arrangements in
the transport sector and the delegation of powers to quasi-govemmental agencies run by
the social partners, increased the government and pro-reform interests' needs to bargain
with and accommodate with the entrenched actors when planning and implementing
reform. (Hertier and Knill 2001 ) These veto points of the representative monopolies of
the peak associations had effectively stymied reform until the late 1990s. However, the
German government was able to eventually gamer enough support on the pro-
liberalization side of the debate to institute major deregulatory reforms. As Teutsch
argues, the increasing pressure of Europeanization opened new channels of influence at
the EU-level and changed the strategic options of the domestic interests. (Teutsch 2001
;
Hertier and Knill 2001
)
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In the area of haulage, the German Transport Ministry and the parliamentary
committees with oversight of road haulage were most affected. The net result ended up
being a nearly complete marginalization of the preexisting sectoral arrangement in the
policymaking process followed by a total abandonment of the neo-coiporatist model of
governance of the sector. The unwillingness of the social partners to agree to reforms and
compromise in the face of additional European pressure forced other institutions and
actors, namely industry associations, parliament, and the transport ministry, to bypass the
veto points of the social partners altogether and legislate a reform package that
effectively ended neo-corporatism in governance of the sector. (Teutsch 2001 ) Hence in
this case Europeanization was an influential catalyst in circumventing the existing veto
points through a coalition of governmental and private interests using the threat of ECJ
rulings and potential violations of ELI competition policy as justification of significant
liberalization. (Hertier and Kmll 2001; Teutsch 2001 ) Haulers were able to delay major
liberalization for several years, but in the end, the domestic coalition for liberalization,
spurred on by European-level developments, succeeded in enacting significant structural
reform. (Teutsch 2001)
In railways policy, there were even greater numbers of veto points including the
three railway unions, the administrative board of DB, the transport and economics
ministries, parliament, and, importantly, the Lander governments that needed to approve
the constitutional amendments to enact the reforms. Yet here, there was less pressure
from Europeanization as there were few concrete directives and policies from Brussels
and the actors were less threatened by potential EU-level sanction or legal action. The
end result was a moderate series of reforms including privatization that were completed
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with the overarching and broad consensus of all the relevant actors including the social
partners. While there was a net loss of neo-corporatist governance through the
transference of regulatory duties from the DB board to the new Federal Railway Agency
(EBA), unions, industry, and transport sectoral organizations were moderately satisfied
by large scale compromise and payoffs by the state. Hence, the combination of less
European-level pressure plus additional veto points made the changes less far reaching
and forced the state to bear a higher fiscal burden for the changes made. (Teutsch 2001
;
Hertier and Knill 2001 ) Overall, the social partners exerted strong pressure on the shape
of the reform package due to their veto positions and willingness to participate in the
process. (Teutsch 2001)
In the case of labor market liberalization, the social partners had initially been
brought into the Alliance for Jobs by the Schroder government so as to provide a
consensual set of reforms to increase German competitiveness. The factual veto powers
of the employers’ associations and DGB seemed relatively strong. However, the lack of
progress and the failure of the social partners to adequately manage the Federal
Employment Office (BA) led the Schroder government to bypass the Alliance for the
Hartz Commission. The eventual reforms were passed unilaterally suggesting again that
neo-corporatist veto points can be overcome but usually only when there is a strong and
powerful coalition of other governmental and non-governmental actors to press the case.
(Vitols 2004; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004) A similar series of
events led to the reform of the vocational education system well, as the Schroder
government was able to bypass the social partners and institute significant reform. (Vail
2003; Busch 2005) Chancellor Merkel’s recent healthcare reforms followed a similar
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line. ( The Economist 2006b) However, in all these policy areas, Europeanization seems to
have had a much lower impact than domestic political and global economic competitive
pressures.
In the Austrian cases of Europeanization, there are far fewer veto players and veto
points due to the centralization of the social partnership at the federal level. However,
these are relatively powerful veto players with wider policy competencies than their
German counterparts. The case of accession is notable due to the strong role of the social
partners in shepherding and implementing the referendum and membership process. In
their veto positions, they were able to negotiate for a larger voice in the Austrian
delegation in Brussels and in Austria’s EU policymaking process. In return they gave up
some of their wider policy competences in price controls, the environment, education,
and elsewhere. (Heinisch 2000) However, in areas of social insurance, labor law, and
other core elements of the social partnership the Joint Commission, Committee on Social
and Economic Questions, and the peak associations have remained powerful and
entrenched actors.
Privatization did illustrate the declining power of the social partnership in Austria,
especially in organized labor, as the OGB was marginalized from much of the
privatization process and debate. Increasing parliamentary and bureaucratic power has
sapped some of the once expansive authority of the Joint Commission and Committee on
Social and Economic questions. (Kittel 2000) Nonetheless, in many areas of core social
partnership, it has remained well entrenched. (Heinisch 2000; Falkner et al 2005) Hence,
the informal veto powers of the social partners still remain even if somewhat
circumscribed from the apex during the 1960s and 1970s.
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In the end, the veto points in Austria allowed the social partners to become the
brokers of Europeanization, while in Germany, due to their decentralization and sectoral
divisions, are somewhat more likely to be bypassed and marginalized as they were in
road haulage. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001; Heinisch 2000) However in both railways and
public procurement policy, the existing neo-corporatist veto players remained salient and
involved in the reform process. Hence the overall existence of multiple veto points,
especially factual vetoes as found in neo-corporatist systems, seems not to suggest
particular outcomes. Hertier and Knill argue that there is no static or mechanistic link
between the number of veto points and the probability of reform. The process is quite
dynamic and is contingent upon the types of actors, political leadership, and reform
capacity that existed prior to, during, and after the impact of Europeanization upon the
reform process. (Hertier and Knill 2001 ) In Austria, the social partners used their veto
roles in the existing political constellation to maintain the social partnership though in a
reduced form. In Germany, the results have been mixed. In some areas the veto players of
the social partnership worked to encourage and shape reforms and structural change
while in others the neo-corporatist arrangements collapsed altogether.
Differential Empowerment of Domestic Actors
Because structural change will likely lead to a redistribution and reorganization of
political capabilities in a state system, the relevant actors and the differential
empowerment of such actors is also influential upon the direction and intensity of
structural change or continuity. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 1 1 ) While
some have argued that European integration has led to greater autonomy of national
522
executives over other domestic actors in areas of European policy, Europeanization can
lead to a redistribution of powers amongst a variety of actors including national
executives, legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, regional governments, interest
associations, and firms. (Goetz 2000; Moravcsik 1998; Schmidt 1996; Hertier 2001;
Borzel and Risse 2003) Hence Europeanization may change the power relationship
between actors and the state. (Cowles 2001; Kitschelt 1986; Borzel and Risse 2003)
Similar to the rational institutional arguments of Hix and Goetz, actors or groups of
actors may seek structural change to increase their net political power at the expense of
others who likely oppose such reform for obvious rationale.
Groups that were once marginal actors at the national level may find greater
success at the EU level. As Schmidt suggests, citizens and interests may “have more
influence in Brussels when lobbying as organized interests than when voting or protesting
in national capitals”. Hence groups that might be losing measures of national influence,
of those that had little in the first place, can move up to the EU level and gain levels of
influence through these supranational portals. (Schmidt 2006)
In the Austrian system, there has been some move by women's groups,
environmentalists, and others to take their issues to the EU-level. However, the reforms
to the social partnership in the 1990s have significantly pluralized some elements of the
Austrian policymaking system as the Joint Commission and Committee on Social and
Economic Question reduced their overall competence in the Austrian system (Unger
1999; Karlhofer 1996) By significantly withdrawing from all but their core competencies,
this has actually helped stabilize the system and reduce criticism of the system due to its
once perceived exclusivity. While this was part of the EU accession and implementation
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agreement between the government and social partners, it should be noted that the
realignment had already begun well prior to membership negotiations as the declines in
union and membership density in the OGB and V01 had begun well beforehand in the
1 980s. Hence Europeanization may have provided a unique opportunity for structural
reform, yet it was within the context of an already changing environment for the social
partners.
In other areas, there has been more change. The growing influence of the Austrian
Lander governments, while still well below that in neighboring Germany, and the
concentration of more negotiating and regulatory authority in the executive and
bureaucracy have certainly occurred but not at extraordinary levels. Austrian firms have
also begun to more prominently lobby at the EU and national levels outside of the
Chamber and VOI. (Pelinka 1998; Falkner 2001 ; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000)
However, the chamber remains a compulsory institution and the Joint Commission still
maintains a strong presence in the core of labor-business-state relations. The most notable
change has been the empowerment of Austrian business interests that were once more
checked by both the strong organization of labor and a strongly social democratic system
of nationalized industries and heavy regulation.
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Hence Europeanization has certainly had an impact in changing the distribution of
power across the Austrian system, the social partners are in a more circumscribed and
limited position than they were twenty years ago and there is a pattern of increasing
decentralization and pluralization. (Muller 1992; Gerlieh 1992; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka
1998; Pelinka and Bishof 2004) Europeanization was a fundamental impetus to
undertaking significant reform. Yet those reforms have not ended the social partnership
nor moved the partners out of their traditional core competencies.
The distribution of power both within and amongst institutions has changed in
Germany due, in part, to Europeanization. There has been significant evidence of new
activism from actors including environmentalists and the Lander seeking to upload their
preferences to the EU level, changing the balance of power in the German policymaking
process. (Dyson 2003) For the social partners, this has had some implications. Yet it has
been highly differentiated and contingent upon specific meso-level and sectoral
arrangements, political conditions, and economic trends rather than an overarching
redistribution of power amongst the neo-corporatist actors. (Hertier 2001 ; Schmidt 2006)
The German road haulage and railway reforms illustrate the impact of differential
empowerment in Europeanization. In road haulage, Europeanization provided the pro-
liberalization interests access and power they would otherwise not have possessed. The
system of policymaking and governance was rather closed to the sectoral partners in the
road haulage industry, preventing reform and other actors from direct participation.
However, by using the ECJ and general threat of EU competition policy, they were able
to empower themselves to an extent unavailable at the purely national level. This changed
the balance of coalitions in the parliament and transport ministry towards liberalization.
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eventually bypassing the social partners and dissolving the long-lasting sectoral
corporatist system of governance. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001; Schmidt 2006) In
railways, there were a broader number of powerful actors in the German system that
would be required to instigate reform and less pressure from the European level. This
limited the scope of the reforms and liberalization as the unions. Lander
,
and sectoral
interests remained powerfully entrenched in the policymaking process and could not be
bypassed by increasing European pressures to reform.
.
(Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001;
Hertier and Kmll 2001
)
In labor market and vocational education reform, the lack of consensus and action
by the social partners increased the willingness of the state and other interests to bypass
the entrenched system entirely. By utilizing the Hartz Commission and direct
parliamentary action, the German government was able to effective disenfranchise the
social partners from the process. This led to solutions, much like in road haulage that
resembled an absolute collapse of the sectoral corporatism that had dominated the
postwar era. (Vitols 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) In the TABD, large
German firms that felt constrained by the sectoral and national industry associations and
the necessity of bargaining both within such associations as well as with labor, sought
lobbying opportunities at the EU level. This more informal but influential pattern allowed
large German firms a greater voice at the EU level of trade negotiations than it would
have had through the BDI or sectoral associations within the German political system
where the strong interests of the Mittelstand of small and mid-sized German enterprises
as well as German labor could effectively dilute trade negotiation and economic policy
outputs. (Cowles 2001
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Hence Europeanization may provide empowerment to excluded or weakened
actors when there is pressure to reform or adjust to EU directives and policies or even
when pressure is absent but yet perceived. It may also allow greater autonomy of firms
and other interests to elude their traditional national peak associations for unilateral or
new transnational alliances at the EU level. (Cowles 2001 ; Schmidt 2006) It can also
provide additional allies and legal and regulatory ammunition within the domestic arena.
Road haulage in Germany was such as case. However, in cases of weak or imprecise EU-
level directives and policies, there is less ability for the less empowered to shape policy
and level the playing field. This leaves reforms and adjustment in the hands of the
existing entrenched and empowered interests, as was seen in German railway reform.
(Teutsch 2001 ) As Hertier and Knill suggest, the distribution of power amongst actors in
the domestic arena is strongly affected by the entrance of new actors and the
empowerment of existing actors through their activities at the European level. (Hertier
and Knill 2001
)
Facilitating Formal Institutions
The existence of mediating formal institutions may work much like the existence
of multiple veto points in allowing actors to introduce and matriculate structural change
at the domestic level. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 10: Borzel and Risse
2003) Institutions comprise specific rules, norms, and limits on behavior that can be
effective in facilitating and implementing change and reform. Institutions provide a stable
environment for actors and interests and limit transaction costs. (Hertier 2001; Guliani
2003) Institutions may often be broadly defined to encompass both formal and informal
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patterns and norms. Hence, pressures for Europeanization can be transposed and
conditioned through national level institutions that may either facilitate reform and
structural changes or attempt to minimize and restraint such efforts.
States that lack institutions that can introduce and manage structural change may
find adaptation far more problematic. (Schmidt 2006) However, institutions have their
own momentum and context that will shape and color the eventual policy outcomes and
reforms. (Herder 2001 ) In the German case, the existing neo-corporatist institutions of
road haulage, vocational education, and labor markets failed to enact reform and were
barriers to change. Hence, the government and other interests eventually bypassed and
marginalized the social partners in these sectors and enacted reform that fundamentally
liberalized road haulage and temporary employment and reorganized vocational
education, while simultaneously dissolving the preexisting neo-corporatist patterns of
policymaking and governance in both road haulage and vocational education with the
creation of a new state run and financed agencies. (Teutsch 2001; Vail 2003; Streeck and
Hassel 2004) In temporary employment, the social partners, while excluded from the
policymaking process, remained important elements of the implementation process by the
government’s insistence that the DGB and employers' and industry associations proceed
with national collective bargaining. Hence, the institutions of social partnership were
actually reinforced by the eventual policy output. (Vitols 2004) In railways policy, the
institutions resolved to implement reform and the actors, including social partners, were
able to maintain their roles and function, even if somewhat circumscribed, and condition
and shape the eventual policy output. While the new Federal Railway Agency would
accrete some of the powers once reserved the DB board and the social partners, industry.
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unions, and the Lander governments got significant concessions and protections from the
federal government so as to provide some critical continuity to the existing system.
(Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001 ) The corporatist mediation of
diverse interests allows for considerable adaptational flexibility and adjustment if
properly aligned and motivated to act. These reforms tend to be more incremental, such
as in German rail reform. (Hertier and Kmll 2001
)
In Austria, the Joint Commission and Committee on Social and Economic
Questions became the primary mechanism by which the social partners helped shape and
lead the Europeanization process. The lack of such an overarching system in Germany
has meant a sectoral and highly decentralized process of Europeanization with
tremendously divergent results. Yet in Austria, the social partners remained engaged and
marshalling forces in implementing accession and EU policy and have retained a strong
role in the national policymaking process despite a general trend of decentralization and
pluralism. (Heinisch 2000; Unger 1999; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Blithe, Copelovitch,
and Phelan 2002) Further, they willingness to negotiate a reduction of their competency
in the domestic system of policymaking and governance was bargained for access to the
EU-level where, though far less than the hoped, the social partners do have relatively
unique access to the Austrian delegation and the policymaking and governance process at
the European level. (Unger 1999; Karlhofer 1996; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000;
Falkner 2001)
529
Heinisch argues that this is precisely why the social partnership have survived the
Europeanization process better than the German model, the centralization allowed the
neo-corporatist institutions to play a central and pivotal role in the Europeanization
process while in Germany, the very decentralization of the social partnership made such
coordination impossible. (Heinisch 2000)
Institutionalization certainly would seem to matter. In the case of Austria, the
strong and centralized role of the social partners in the Joint Commission and other
institutions allowed them to shepherd and broker the Europeanization process. (Heinisch
2000; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001) While certainly reducing their
overall aegis in the Austrian policymaking system, the offsetting influence at the EU-
level could be considered a worthwhile trade given their overall declining institutional
and organizational powers. In Germany, the lack of strong national institutionalization of
the social partnership has resulted in a highly differentiated response to European
pressures. (Heinisch 2000) In some sectors like railways, social partners respond to and
adapt through reform, privatization, or other structural change while in areas such as road
haulage or public procurement the social partners have failed to lead or engage the reform
process. Hence it seems difficult to assert that strong institutionalization will always lead
to managed structural change or that weak institutionalization will either block or slow
implementation. The German cases seem to illustrate that the particular domestic political
conditions and coalitions are far more likely to explain change or continuity that the mere
existence or absence of formal institutions. Therefore the role of formal institutions in
quite variable and may or may not be instrumental in adaptation. It appears primarily
contingent upon the specific actors and politics of that institution and their adopted role
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as either Europeanization brokers or blockers in the policy area. This would seem to
suggest that formal institutions while potentially influential in the Europeanization
process cannot be easily generalized.
Organizational and Policymaking Cultures
Political and organizational cultures refer to the “prevailing collective
understandings of appropriate behavior” often based upon informal, normative, social,
and political cultural structures that guide and constrain political action. (Risse-Kappen,
Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 10; Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill 2001 ) As Schmidt
suggests “culture, which frames all institutions, as does history” makes for “different
ideas infusing actors’ understandings of their actions and interests within institutions”.
(2006) Hence the “prevailing belief system” within the member state will help determine
the direction of reform and the limits of acceptable restructuring. (Hertier and Knill 2001
;
Knill 2001 ) “Political culture and other informal institutions exist” that will either be
conductive or restrictive of European-inspired change. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill
2001 ) These can be assessed and measured in the formal and informal mechanisms of the
policymaking and implementation process. Most notable are the systems of consensual or
cooperative decision-making cultures found in Germany, Austria, Scandinavia, and the
Netherlands, the historically confrontational relationships between the regions and the
central governments in Spain and Italy, the statist centralization of France, the social
democratic solidarity of Sweden, the strong church-state ties in Ireland, the history and
adherence of direct democracy in Switzerland, and populist nationalism in Poland.
(Borzel 2002; Einhom 2002; Katzenstein 1984; Lijphart 1975; Zeigler 1993)
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These features of states' political cultures, norms, and collective understandings
play an important role in determining the appropriateness of some actions versus others.
(Hertier 2001 ) Hence, some of the pressures of European integration may fail to be
translated into change precisely due to their sharp conflict with existing political and
organizational cultures that consider such reforms, even under strong pressure,
antithetical to national identities and ideals and beyond what is politically acceptable and
appropriate. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill 2001
)
The system of strong neo-corporatism is well entrenched in the Austrian society
and polity. For both political cultural and institutional rationale, the Austrian model of
policymaking and decision-making after World War II emerged as the paradigmatic case
of democratic corporatism in Western Europe. Despite all the pluralizing and
decentralization forces of the last thirty years, the Austrian political system is still highly
invested in neo-corporatist methods of interest intermediation and much higher levels of
centralization than neighboring states. While Austria is clearing going through some
significant “westernization” or “Americanization” it is far from thorough and complete.
(Pelinka and Bishof 2004) Many of the core elements of Austrian corporatism remain and
provide critical context to their Europeanization processes and implementation.
This has been most notable in the utilization of the social partnership as one of the
primary brokers and shepherds of Europeanization and modernization. (Heinisch 2000)
Despite the decentralizing pressures of the past three decades, the peak associations
remain amongst the most compulsory and have the highest membership density in
Europe. There is a lasting impact from the neo-corporatist method of policymaking and
governance that will not be easily overturned in a single generation. (Pelinka 1999; Kittel
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2000) Additionally, the soft transposition and implementation standards of EU policy
have allowed the Austrian social partnership a role, sometimes even mandates by the EU
directives, in the governance and administration of EU norms and policies in the Austrian
system. (Falkner 2000) In key areas of social insurance and labor-capital relations, the
social partnership remains entrenched and powerful despite occasional efforts, some
successful some not, to bypass the neo-corporatist institutions. (Falkner et al. 2005;
Unger 1999; Heimsch 2000)
This unique style of administration and policymaking has even been replicated at
the EU level as was stipulated in the accession agreement between the social partners and
Austrian state in the early 1990s. The representation of the social partners within the
Austrian delegation in Brussels may help mitigate the feedback that might otherwise
drive bureaucrats and other Austrian officials with Brussels experience towards more
pluralist, statist, or other ideals of policymaking. As Austrian Ambassador Gregor
Woschnagg suggested, it was better to “sit in Brussels" and “participate in the decision
making and in the shaping of a new Europe" rather than remain outside it. (Guttman
1995) Austria was going to be deeply affected by Europe no matter. It seems clear that
being a member and helping to make EU policy was better than being forced to deal with
EU policy as an outsider. (Pelinka 1999) As Wolfgang Schussel, then Vice Chancellor,
argued, “along with Sweden and Finland, we are changing the approach and the cultural
balance of the EU” and move it in the right direction”. (Guttman 1995) Hence,
membership would give Austria a chip in the game that, along with other corporatist and
social democratic states, could collectively leverage a more Austrian-flavored future for
the EU and perhaps preserve some of the distinctly Austrian elements of consensual and
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neo-corporatist policymaking. (Pelinka 1999; Unger 1999; Heimsch 2000) In essence, the
social partners would become “emissaries” and “modernization brokers” of the social
partnership at the EU and global level. (Unger 1999; Heimsch 2000)
German administrative style during the postwar era was typically reflected in the
concept of the semi-sovereign state. (Knill 2001 ) Schmidt suggests that this style should
be strongly amenable to EU modes of governance given their shared compound natures.
(Schmidt 2006) The German policymaking model tended to be multiform in its
concurrent use of meso-corporatism, federalism, pluralism, and Chancellor democracy,
(von Beyme 1993; Schmidt 2006) Yet the German model has undergone tremendous
strain since the 1980s due to reunification, globalization, economic decline, and
Europeanization. The area where much structural change has occurred as has been in the
commitment to and maintenance of Germany's neo-corporatist institutions.
Decentralization of the social partners, especially labor and industry, resulted
primarily from the results of reunification and exceptionally bad German economic
conditions over the past two decades. The pressures to increase competitiveness, the
division of Germany, in political, economic, and social terms, between east and west, and
the overall unhappiness with German economic growth and stability led to far more
disenchantment with the old models of consensus and concertation. In eastern Germany,
those levels may have never existed in the first place. (Wiesenthal 2004; Pagdett 1999;
Auer 1997) This has had significant repercussions into the sectoral corporatism of the
Gennan social partnership.
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In collective bargaining, the integration of the east has effectively begun a process
of significant decentralization of agreements to the firm and plant levels throughout the
country. This has consequently weakened all national peak associations in the eyes of
their constituents and has led to greater variation and non-adoption of sector-wide
national standards in both unions and industry. (Auer 1997; Wiesenthal 2004; Turner
1 998; Bosch 2004) This decentralization and growing weakness has been transmitted
through many sectors and has resulted in greater willingness to bypass the social partners,
as in road haulage, vocational education, and labor market liberalization. (Teutsch 2001;
Vitols 2004; Vail 2003) In the case of German railway reforms, the reforms required
existing actors, especially the unions, to adopt new behavioral norms over the role and
function of the rail system. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001) While intrinsically
part of the state and serving a public function, the privatization process required many
actors to re-think the legal, social, and political status of the railways as a more client-
oriented, market-oriented, and quasi-private sector. The belief that the state would always
be the final arbiter and guarantor of the railway system was deeply engrained in the
railway unions, provincial governments, and DB board, as well as much of the public.
(Teutsch 2001
)
Overall, the German and Austrian models have become increasingly less
coqxiratist than it was just two decades ago and it is also reflected in the growing changes
in the organizational and policymaking styles that are becoming more pluralist or more
decentralized. Comparatively however, the decentralization and dissolution of the
commitment to neo-corporatism in both theory and practice has been greater in the
German case. While neo-corporatism was never as entrenched and centralized in
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Germany as it was in Austria, it was nonetheless amongst the strongest proponents and
adherents to neo-corporatist patterns and processes. Yet the overall style and form of neo-
corporatist institutionalization clearly has mattered in both cases and helped explain the
differential responses of the German and Austria social partnerships to the challenges of
globalization, structural economic change, and Europeanization. (Heinisch 2000)
Learning
The fifth and final mediating factor for Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso is learning.
Rather than merely reflecting given empowerment and preferential interests of actors and
institutions ate the domestic level, Europeanization may also lead to transformations of
the actors' interests and identities. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 12;
Borzel and Risse 2003) The effects of Europeanization upon citizenship, identity, and
interests may fall far more into the social constructivist and social learning literature of
international relations but there is are important implications of such change upon
domestic structures of governance. European integration itself may lead to new political,
social, and economic identities that fundamentally alter existing domestic structures that
rely upon static actor and institutional roles. (Checkel 2001; Marks and Steenbergen
2004; Risse-Kappen 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003) As Schmidt suggests, one of the
diffuse impacts of Europeanization may be institutional “learning, mimesis, and
imitation” of EL) patterns by national actors. Interest groups are the most notable actor
affected by such changes as their experience at the EU-level of lobbying alters their
domestic outlooks and operations. (Schmidt 2006)
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The most notable examples might be the Europeanization of business interests.
Firms once grounded and co-opted into national economic interests and policymaking
structures, have become far more European in outlook, market penetration, foreign
investment, logistics, production, distribution, and have often adopted a more European
identity in the stead of a national one. (Coen and Dannreuther 2003; Schmidt 2006)
While these firms pursue and promote an ever more European identity with multinational
interests and goals towards freer regional trade, other firms and business interests, such as
farmers, small businesses, partially state-owned or heavily subsidized firms, may pursue
even more protection from competition. European integration itself may cause a split
amongst existing firms, interests, and associations along integrationist and Euroskepticist
lines. (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Cowles 2001)
The European Union may exert strong normative pressures upon member states to
promote and converge towards EU policy and practices. Hence, there is also an indirect
impact from member state, as well as closely linked non-members and candidate
members, to alter their perceptions and behavior to the European nonn. (Hertier 2001
)
Cognitive effects of Europeanization may also result in new methods of framing and
agenda setting in domestic policy contexts. The Europeanization process alters what is
desirable, possible, and is to be avoided. (Dyson 2003)
The Austrian and German cases are replete with such changes. Clearly the
policymaking universe in both Austria and Germany has become more pluralist and more
challenged by European-level governance. Actors, both state and non-state, have learned
how to operate within a two or multi-level governance environment and have adpisted
their behavior accordingly. In Austria, the social partnership itself adjusted to the new
537
environment during the negotiation and accession process so as to leverage losses in the
domestic arena for gains at the European. (Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000) Nonetheless,
other acts in the Austria system including parliament, the Lander, firms, unions,
environmentalists, farmers, and others have begun to adjust their behavior, interests, and
strategies to coincide with the new European and global environment. While this has
certainly had implications for the social partnership, it does not mean its eventual demise.
Clearly the social partnership has emerged as a more circumscribed force in the Austrian
system, nonetheless, it remains rather strong in its core competencies. This certainly
seems to suggest a learning process but one that still faces limitations of entrenched
political cultural, institutional, and policymaking preferences.
In the case of Germany, learning to adjust to the new European and global
environment has also had a significant impact. Among business interests, EU-level
lobbying may weaken ties between firms and their national peak associations. (Schmidt
2006) As Cowles demonstrates with her study of the German Trans-Atlantic Business
Dialogue (TABD), German firms regularly opted to pursue unilateral or sectors lobbying
of the EU rather than participate in the national trade peak associations and formats.
(Cowles 2001 ) Hence German firms are learning that they can operate beyond sectoral
and national business and employers' organizations at the EU level and are then
replicating this behavior at an increasing level in the domestic sphere. This would be
supported by the declining membership density of the BDA and BDI and also in the
sectoral associations such as in the metal industry.
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Yet this decentralization has been primary linked to the effects of unification, the
decline of national unions and national employers' associations in the collective
bargaining process, the growth of works councils, globalization, and other endogenous
and exogenous developments not merely Europeanization.
The cases of German railways and road haulage reform reflect the increasing
learning of many actors in the policymaking process. The primary impacts have been a
permanent incorporation of European-level integration and governance forces in the
domestic arena. Despite the absence of strong and compelling directives, German
transport policy began to accommodate and consider existing as well as potential
application of EU-level transport and competition law and EC'J rulings on domestic
structural changes. This has also occurred in areas of public procurement. (Teutsch 2001
;
Knill 2001 ) There have also been less successful efforts by the DGB and other trade
unions to operate in a more multi-level manner. The decentralization of German
collective bargaining has made this more difficult. Nonetheless, other actors including the
Lander, environmental groups, and other interests have learned that multi-level
governance. Hence the impact of Europe had become a regular feature condition of
domestic reform and change for all German actors and institutions.
Overall learning to adapt and operate in a multilevel European environment has
had significant implications for the social partnerships in both Austria and Germany. In
both cases, actors and institutions have altered, to variable extents, the strategies,
interests, and modes of operation in a multi-level pattern of policymaking and
governance. This does not mean to suggest that this new knowledge will entirely replace
the old, quite to the contrary, the new learning is often an addition and annex to
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preexisting modes of policymaking and governance. However, in some cases, where
operations at the European level have been fruitful for particular interests, there is an
increasing likelihood of greater multilevel and multiform behavior of actors. This may
help erode much of the dominance of social partnerships, but does not necessarily suggest
a total dissolution of existing national patterns, just a significant increase in its
complexity.
New Exit Pathways
These last three factors are predicated upon domestic actors and interests
willingness and ability to engage in a two-level game. As discussed in chapter two, this
highly institutional and rational choice perspective suggests that actors who see an
advantage in doing so will see a multi-level game so as to achieve their particularistic
goals. (Putnam 1988; Hertier 2001 ) In short, European levels of governance provide a
new opportunity structure, access points, veto points, and informational advantages for
domestic actors. Domestic actors can use Europe as a resource or advantage for their
political and economic interests. (Hertier and Knill 2001 ) This can be through any of the
EU institutions such as the Commission, Court of Justice, Parliament, or Council of
Ministers. Groups that were once marginal actors at the national level may find greater
success at the EU level. As Schmidt suggests, groups that might be losing measures of
national influence, or those that had little in the first place, can move up to the EU level
and gain levels of influence through these supranational portals. (Schmidt 2006)
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While derived from Hix and Goetz, these also closely resemble some of the
mediating factors posited by Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse. Hence there is often overlap
amongst the eight overall mediating factors of the Europeanization frameworks.
However, Hix and Goetz have focused far more on the rational choice and actor level
than that of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse whose framework and mediating factors were
far more structural and in some cases constructivist. Nonetheless, the Hix and Goetz
criteria deserve some individual exploration.
The creation of a multi-level model of governance and policymaking has had
strong implications for both the Austrian and German cases of social partnership. The
European level of policymaking and governance provides a conduit for domestic actors to
exit the national pattern of policymaking. For groups that have been regularly blocked,
excluded, or marginalized at the national level, the European level may ultimately
provide more success. For groups without veto powers, or for those with veto powers but
who regularly have their efforts quashed by other veto players, the European level would
potentially provide an alternate route to influence the policymaking process by bypassing
the national level and lobbying or governing at the European one. If interests can achieve
their desired policy outcomes at the European level, they may choose to exit or reduce
their role in the domestic policy arena. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Borzel and Risse 2003) This
might be especially relevant in neo-corporatists systems due to their reliance upon
consensual patterns of policymaking and governance and the de jure or de facto veto
powers that social partners may have in the model. (Hix and Goetz 2000)
This has been most notable amongst multinational firms and enterprises that have
been strong promoters of the single market program and trade liberalization through
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European integration. (Hix and Goetz 2000) These large multinationals have been
amongst the most effective and active interests at the EU level, far surpassing that of
organized labor, smaller and medium-sized business, and other interest groups.
(Greenwood 1997, 2003, 2003a; Greenwood, Grote, and Romt 1992; Schmidt 2006;
Cowles 2001 ) This has given large firms considerable willingness to bypass or abandon
national neo-corporatist policymaking patterns, where they were forced to compromise
and find consensus with organized labor, the state, environmentalists, and others, in lieu
of the policymaking structures at the EU level. This can be overstated, most firms would
never fully abandon the national level and would rather likely operate at multiple levels,
nonetheless the existence of supranational levels of governance provides exit
opportunities that did not exist during previous eras.
The Austrian case of social partnership should be potentially more susceptible to
the creation of multi-level exit pathways specifically because of its high levels of
compulsory and centralized peak association membership. Compared to the decentralized
and more voluntary German model, Austrian interests should have much higher
perceptions of the value of going outside of the existing peak associations and neo-
corporatist policymaking patterns. However, the Austria case has actually not exhibited
such trends to an overwhelming degree. First, the voluntary reduction of the social
partnership’s competencies and the greater pluralization of the overall Austria
policymaking process has effectively meant less defection from the neo-corporatist model
since that model is now more circumscribed and focused on a few key areas of
competence including social insurance and labor law. (Heimsch 2000; Falkner 2000;
Falkner et al. 2005) Second, in those areas or remaining competence, the compulsory and
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monopolistic organization of the chambers and other peak associations has actually been
enforced through effective negotiation and entrenchment at both the domestic and EU
levels.
The Austrian peak associations including the OGB and VOI remain dominant,
despite recent decentralization, in their respective constituencies by all comparative
European standards. Hence, unlike in Germany where both labor and industry
associations have been easier to pick off due to their decentralization, the Austrian peak
associations have been able to maintain an effective institutional basis of authority and
influence. (Heinisch 2000) Notably, the VOI has been rather successful at limiting the
defection of larger Austrian firms from its ranks unlike the German BDI. It has
accomplished this in several ways. Most notable are its limitations on the impact of small
and mid-sized Austrian firms from the organization and its continuing dominating of the
Federal Economic Chamber. The German BDI and other peak associations were always
rather divided between the larger firms and the Mittelstand of small and medium
enterprises. Hence decentralization has allowed German firms to pursue their interests
beyond the BDI. But in Austria, the VOI remains dominated by the largest firms and
hence still reflects their primary interests and concerns. Smaller and mid-sized firms, in
Austria and elsewhere, have been less successful at finding opportunities to lobby and
influence policy at the EU level compared to their larger brethren. (Schmidt 2006;
Greenwood 2003, 2003a)
Austrian collective bargaining and labor law also remain dominantly in the
purview of the OGB with only slight decentralization of wage bargaining and social
insurance to the firm or sectoral levels. Hence, the very continuity of centralization has
543
provided fewer successful or viable exit pathways to the EU level for Austrian actors or
institutions and allowed the social partners to remain key players in the Europeanization
and modernization processes. (Heinisch 2000; Pelinkal998; Unger 1999)
For Germany, the existence of new exit pathways at the EU level has had a
significant effect in firms, provincial governments, social groups, and other interests.
German firms are most notable and have been quite adept at entrenching themselves at
the EU level. By 2005, German industry controlled just under 30% of the secretariats of
the technical committees of the European Committee for Standardization and were large
presences in the EU-level trade and industry associations. (Schmidt 2006) Even the
German trade union federation, the DGB, has been the most involved an organized in the
ETUC and other EU-level labor organization. Other national interests have been less
likely and less successful at organizing and operating at a transnational level inside the
EU. As Schmidt and others suggests, non-business interests, or small businesses, often
have problems assessing the possible payoffs and gains from EU level lobbying and also
struggle to reach across national frontiers. (Schmidt 2006; Imig and Tarrow 2001 ) There
are some notable exceptions including environmental interests, linguistic and identity
groups, and others who are notable more organized at both grassroots and transnational
network levels. The notable deficit is in organized labor that, while having ETUC as a
potential supranational peak association, has lacked a pan-European level of support and
is much like “a head without a body”. (Schmidt 2006)
The cases of German transport policy, discussed below, fit quite well as they
created a two-level game for both private and public actors. Those that were in-line or
aligned with the new strategic opportunities at the European level were able to leverage
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them into a strengthened domestic position. It also assisted in the creation of new
coalitions and alliances of interests and actors at the European level. (Hertier 2001
;
Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001) German interests, especially large multinational
firms, have been increasingly attracted to exit opportunities ate the European level. Firms
like Siemens, Bayer, and others have begun to pursue more American-style lobbying
efforts in Brussels while simultaneously committing far less to the peak associations such
as the BDI in the domestic realm. (Dyson 2003) For German interest groups,
Europeanization has had tremendous implications, especially for business associations
who have seen increasing incentive to directly lobby and operate at the EU level,
eschewing the peak association system. (Dyson 2003) This has weakened their loyalty to
the national patterns of governance while simultaneously increasing their influence and
role at the supranational. (Dyson 2003)
The role of the new pathways was significant in German road haulage and public
procurement reform. In road haulage, the interests in the domestic arena that had failed to
instigate serious reform through the 1980s and early 1990s used the ECJ and Commission
as outlets for their demands. The explicit threat of Europeanizing the debate and
potentially losing at the EU-level of governance accelerated a change in the domestic
coalitions on both sides of the reform issue. (Kmll 2001; Teutsch 2001 ) In this case, the
lack of movement by the haulage industry association and unions was exacerbated by the
looming threat of EU action and led the transport ministry and parliamentary committees
to act even without their consent. The complaint before the ECJ and expertise and
testimony of larger German industrial and manufacturing enterprises before the
Commission provided significant pressure on domestic interests to act soon. This
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heightened awareness stemmed directly from the pressures of Europeanization and the
creation of supranational access points to the policymaking process for the actors that
supported liberalization but had previously been excluded in the sectoral corporatist
system. (Teutseh 2001; Schmidt 2006) Transport users were provided new exit options in
access to foreign haulers and the EU policymaking process itself. (Hertier and Knill
2001 ) In public procurement, the implicit threats from EU competition policy, led several
excluded actors, including foreign firms and service providers, to pressure the German
government for change. (Kmill 2001
)
In railway policy, there was a similar series of events but with less pressure from
the EU-level and the government and other pro-liberalization interests were less free to
sidestep the multiple veto players. The German Transport Forum was able to somewhat
effectively use the EU and the potentially future threat ofjudicial or commission action
through competition policy and liberalization to sway a few votes on the issue. Yet,
Europeanization played a rather small role in providing exit pathways in this case, hence
the changes were less severe. (Teutseh 2001 ) Nonetheless, the decisive impetus that
tipped the scales in favor of reform was a result of general pressures of Europeanization
and the implications of a multi-level system of governance.
Clearly, actors may use the EU as an exit pathway from their domestic
policymaking patterns and regimes. For neo-corporatist systems this is more problematic
given their “closed” or regulated patterns of organization and operation. The exit
pathways to the Commission, ECJ, and other EU-level institutions and actors allow
domestic actors options that were unavailable in the past. Finns, provincial governments,
environmental interests, women’s groups, minority groups, and others once excluded or
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limited by the neo-corporatist patterns of policymaking have been increasingly successful
at the EU level through lobbying and legal action. When such pathways are open and
likely to exert influence over the domestic system, they have and will continue to have
significant implications for the German and, to a lesser extent, Austrian social
partnerships.
New Veto Powers
Having lost at the national level, actors may now also seek a veto of domestic
policymaking and governance outputs by operating at the EU level. This occurs when
actors, usually marginalized or heavily constrained by the existing political order or
conditions, can find means and allies within the EU to help achieve goals that they could
not do so alone at the national level. Seeking redress through the ECJ is the most
common such tactic. While domestic administrative and legal institutions might limit
such actions, the ECJ and Commission provide venues where domestic “losers” can re-
fight the issue and potentially win at the supranational levels. (Hix and Goetz 2000)
In the Austrian case, there has been significant evidence of interests and actors
jumping to the EU level to seek a reversal of a defeat. Austrian compliance with EU law
and policy was notorious low through the late 1990s and a plethora of cases, complaints,
and assertions were transmitted from the domestic to the European level during this time
by foreign and domestic firms, farmers, labor groups, environmentalists, women's
organizations, and provincial governments. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner
200 1 ) However, since the late 1 990s, compliance complaints decreased and Austria has
moved towards the upper half of the EU in terms of compliance, likely helped by the
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expansions of 2004 and 2007 as well. (Unger 1999) Nonetheless, the initial problems of
Austrian accession seem to have been overcome and it is emerging as a more “normal’'
member state.
However, compared to Germany there has been far less of the level-jumping
activity in the Austrian model. The reduction of the competence of the social partnership
alleviated some such pressures that could have developed after accession, but the
continuing viability of the social partners to find compromise and the ongoing
compulsory and dominant positions of the OGB, VOI, and chamber systems tends to
limit both the demand and necessity of Europeanizing debates and disputes. However,
there has been a general trend of increasing Europeanization of legal and administrative
policy that suggests an important limitation of the social partnership from its past
incarnations. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001
)
The German model has exhibited far more willingness of actors to seek redress at
the EU level and to bypass or leapfrog the domestic legal and political institutions. In
German road haulage and public procurement reform, the government and pro-
liberalization interests found new potential veto points in the ECJ and Commission. The
explicit threat that the ECJ would rule against the existing road haulage and procurement
regimes sparked sufficient movement in parliament and the respective ministries to enact
reform. The actors in favor or liberalization, in road haulage including large German
industry and larger German haulers organized in the VKS, and in procurement included
larger and foreign construction firms, used European policies to strategically limit the
domestic policy options and drive the reform process. The perception that the German
government would no longer be able to stop reform in the Commission and with the
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onerous legal conditions that could be passed down by the ECJ, caused many actors to
resign themselves to the necessity of liberalization. The European level had become a
new area of veto points in the system. (Teutsch 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003)
In German railway reform, the railway workers' unions had previously been
public employees with far more limited abilities to strike, which were generally illegal for
public sector workers, and to collectively bargain with the state. Privatization and reform
allowed the unions to become private sector unions with significant additional rights to
strike, negotiate, and importantly, representation on the DB governing board through
codetermination laws that would become applicable to the new private firm. Once the
state promised to cover costs of pensions, healthcare, and pay-levels of existing and
retired employees, the unions readily agreed to the reforms. (Teutsch 2001 ) But overall,
Europeanization had been influential in getting the unions, Lander, and DB board to
agree to reforms. Here the threat was more implicit from the German Transport Forum
and government, that without reform, EU action or sanction was inevitable. This
provided impetus amongst unions, provincial governments, and the board to accept the
need to reform. (Teutsch 2001; Schmidt 2006)
The impact of the TASD also reflects the growing ability of German firms to seek
influence and redress at the EU level outside of the domestic policymaking process and
their national peak associations. The increased influence to shape trade policy allows the
firms participating in TASD to bypass their national political institutions and potentially
contribute to EU level veto or marginalization of other domestic considerations. (Cowles
2001) Overall, the EU institutions, specifically the Commission and ECJ, provide new
veto locations in the policymaking process that did not previously exist. The willingness
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of actors to pursue such options has grown tremendously since the 1990s in both
Germany and, to a lesser extent, Austria. The divergence between the two is a reflection
of their differential forms of social partnership and the particular issue or sector involved.
(Heinsich 2000) Nonetheless, the existence of these new veto points at the European level
have certainly increased the complexity and affected the considerations and calculations
of domestic actors and institutions in the policymaking and governance process. In
essence, one cannot ignore the potential dimensions and implications European
governance upon the once sovereign domestic realm.
Gaming Informational Advantage
Actors may enhance their power and influence by gaining an informational
advantage by operating at the European level. As information and data are always
valuable commodities in the policymaking process, no matter what level, those with
precise, technical, timely, and valuable expertise in a policy area are likely to be more
successful in gaining access, framing agendas and debates, and shaping final policy than
those interests that cannot produce comparable counterevidence. This asymmetry may
then be replicated at the national level, as those interests with a privileged and prime
position in Brussels will exert greater influence and advantage at the domestic level given
their ability to predict and frame the European consequences of domestic policy
prescriptions. Hence actors that are entrenched at the European level will likely become
more influential at the domestic level given their multi-level expertise. (Hix and Goetz
2000) This has emerged amongst the bureaucratic corps of domestic system between
those that have extensive Brussels experience and those without. (Knill 2001; Mangenot
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2004) But it also extends to executive, political parties, parliamentarians, and subnational
governments. Elites within parties, governments, interest associations, and other political
institutional actors may increase their informational advantage over external as well as
internal challengers. Hence multinational firms, due to their deep penetration of the EU-
level governance and policymaking systems are potentially advantaged at the national
level over environmental or union interests, undermining parity or consensual patterns or
structures. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Greenwood 2003; Schmidt 2006)
The Austrian case of social partnership provides a remarkable variation due to the
fact that the social partners have themselves become entrenched at the European level
within the delegation of the Austrian state. The 1994 Europaabkommen
,
or Agreement on
Europe, secured the social partners participation in “important, relevant, technical
questions” in Austria's EU representation. Hence the Austrian delegation became the
only mission in Brussels to harbor both government and interest organization
representatives in a single house and extend neo-corporatism to the supranational level.
(Karlhofer 1996) The peak associations of the social partnership and Joint Commission
exchanged a significant share of their authority and vested power in the Austrian
policymaking process for these guaranteed advisory seats in Brussels.
Under this system, the social partners could become extended representatives of
their interests in Brussels and hopefully shape Austria's official negotiating positions and
role in the EU. (Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000) In practical terms this has occurred to a
more limited extent as hoped yet the social partners have been relatively important to the
Austrian delegation and its activities in some key areas of social policy and labor law.
The system has developed into a close and cooperative relationship in Brussels between
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the governmental and interest representatives. (Karlhofer 1996) Hence in the Austrian
case, the peak associations were able to secure an informational advantage at the EU
level while simultaneously reinforcing their own domestic institutionalization. (Heinisch
2000; Unger 1999) This has led to a more parity amongst the actors of the social
partnership in terms of informational advantage and has helped stabilize and maintain the
existing system
This was not the case in Germany where the lack of centralization, the long period
of gradual integration, and the lack of direct participation in the German delegation to EU
has created a more competitive condition with far less parity and far less social
partnership. (Heinisch 2000) Large German firms and the Lander governments have been
the most notable success stories of gaining informational advantages at the EU level to
reinforce or increase their power in the domestic policymaking process. (Schmidt 2006)
In German railways and road haulage reforms, the roles of the industry
associations played an important role in cajoling other actors towards reform. Their
ability to navigate the ECJ and Commission provided then significant leverage inside the
transport ministry and parliament to lobby for reform. Their expertise on the costs of not
reforming the systems, and their perceived specialization in the application of EU
competition law framed the agendas for reform. These new European channels of
information that linked German interests w ith those in other member states changed the
relative strength and influence of the pro-liberalization actors in the domestic arena.
(Teutsch 2001 ) As Hertier and Knill suggest the higher “levels of regulatory change in
German transport policy can be traced to the mutual reinforcement of national and
European-induced reform pressures.” (2001 ) Domestic reformers were extended support
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and increased their influence by their expertise and legitimacy at the European level.
(Hertier and Knill 2001 ) Most notable here has been the role of the TABD to give large
German firms both access and influence at the Commission level on issues of trade and
industrial policy. (Cowles 2001
)
The role of Europe in the domestic policymaking process has certainly been more
challenging in Germany than in Austria in terms of informational advantage. While the
Austrian social partners were bale to establish themselves in total in Brussels through the
Austrian delegation, the German social partners, due to their decentralization, were less
successful or uniform at entrenching themselves. (Heinisch 2000) While German industry
has made a successful jump this was done beyond the social partnership, peak
associations such as the BDI, and even the German government itself. Hence, the
situation, unlike Austria, is one of far less parity and far more competition and perceived
benefits to bypass the social partnership.
Assessing Structural Implications of Europeanization upon Social Partnerships
Austria
Despite the expectations of much of the scholarship from the late 1980s through
late 1990s that predicted the imminent collapse of the Austrian social partnership, the
system has made a number of critical adaptations that has allowed it to retain efficacy and
viability despite a more limited role and scope in the policymaking and governance
patterns. (Heinisch 2000) Falkner and Leiber discovered “no direct Europeanization
effect” on Austrian social partnership in the area of labor law and elsewhere. The
tripartite concertation was actually enhanced by Europeanization in many ways by
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somewhat expanding the system to Brussels where the social partners have been, in
special cases, directly represented in the Austrian delegation to the EU. At the domestic
level, there was little misfit between EU labor law directives and the existing tripartite
order in the Joint Commission and Austrian model of governance precisely because the
peak associations willingly reduced their overall competence and remained focus on their
core areas of social insurance and capital-labor relations. Falkner and Leiber argue that
Europeanization actually stabilized the social partnership in light of the 2000 elections
that swung the Austrian government to the right and their greater hostility to policy
concertation. EU-level directives actually required or strongly suggested utilization of the
existing neo-corporatist modes of governance to adapt to EU law, hence the Schussel-led
OVP-FPO government was actually limited in their ability to bypass the social partners in
labor and social policy. (Falkner and Leiber 2004)
Nonetheless, there have been significant indirect effects of Europeanization upon
the Austrian patterns of social partnership. More pluralist patterns of interest group
behavior have expanded dramatically in the Austrian political system. This is especially
true in areas of transportation, environment, and education that were once under the
expansive aegis of neo-corporatist institutions of the Joint Commission and Committee
on Social and Economic Questions. While there has clearly been a rescaling of the
authority and influence of social partnership in the Austrian policymaking and
governance system, it has not been wholesale.
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In areas of labor-capital relations, labor law, and social insurance there has been
continued vigor and efficacy of the social partnership. (Falkner et al. 2005) While more
and more of their work is dedicated to administering and implementing EU directives, it
nonetheless provides the social partners roles as Europeanization and modernization
“brokers”. (Heinisch 2000)
For the Austrian case, Europeanization has had some direct implications overall.
The social partners became the primary vehicles in support of accession and have since
their entry in 1995 been leaders in the implementation and EU policymaking process in
certain policy areas. The primary change has been an overall reduction of their broad
competency that typified the system in the postwar era. The social partnership operates
strongly, but in a more narrow range of policy areas directly relating to labor-capital
relations and social insurance. Additionally privatization, monetary union, and the
increasing importance of the judiciary in the Austrian political and economic system have
meant an erosion of some of the liberties and flexibility that were once characteristic of
the Austrian brand of social partnership. The impact of Europeanization has been more
indirect as it has changed the strategies, priorities, and interests of Austria’s major social,
economic, and political actors, eroding the strong and defined corporatist system.
Europeanization is certainly contributing to these changes, but it is not alone.
Globalization, domestic party politics, social and economic post-industrialism, and other
endogenous and exogenous forces are playing a large role in reducing the scale and scope
of social partnership as well.
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Hence, while the evidence suggests some moderate direct impact of
Europeanization upon the Austrian model, it has been less pronounced and less direct
than many in the early 1990s suggested it would, and the social partnership has adapted
to the new environment. (Streeck and Schmiiter 1991 ) The social partners adopted
“novel” strategies, what Sully termed “Byzantine”, to accede and operate in the new
European atmosphere. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Heinisch 2000; Sully 1996) They
surrendered some policy competence and authority in the domestic arena for a guaranteed
voice at the European one, and have maintained their role and function over their core
competencies. More narrow and circumscribed, and certainly more politically contested
and contentious, the Austrian social partnership nonetheless remains rather stable for the
foreseeable future. (Kittel 2000) Austria has become more moderately corporatist and
Europeanization has tangibly contributed to that structural transformation. (Pelinka 1999)
Germany
In Germany, the collapse of the social partnership in many sectors has been
extensive and perhaps lasting. Due to its increasing decentralization, it has appeared less
capable of addressing the significant issues and challenges of the post- 1980s era and has
been subsequently marginalized and excluded to greater degrees by successive German
governments. (Heinisch 2000; Knill 2001) This decentralization and marginalization
however is harder to link directly to the influence of Europeanization. It appears that
Europeanization has had some important indirect and magnifying influence on the
decentralization and marginalization of the German social partnership, but has had a far
more modest impact than that in Austria in terms of inciting structural change in the
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social partnership. The increasing decentralization of the social partners seems linked
more strongly to both reunification and the lackluster economy of the 1 990s and 2000s
rather than strictly from European integration. As Schmidt argues, in some areas, the
social partners have remained vital, involved, and enfranchised in the implementation of
EU directive and policy within the German system. (2006) However, the overall results
are quite mixed.
As Lodge illustrated in his study of public procurement, the social partners were
rather reduced from influencing the reform packages. Only at the very end were industry
and labor peak associations able to gamer compromises that provided some levels of
protection for German workers and firms. The overall impact was a liberalization of the
procurement process with a greater role of the German legal and bureaucratic system at
the expense of the social partners. This illustrates the growing weakness of the social
partners in general, and the increasing influence of Europeanization in driving policy
changes through non-concerted modes of governance and policymaking. (Lodge 2000)
Unlike the Austrian case, the social partners failed to adapt and lead in the post-Single
European Act and post-Maastricht due to their entrenched and lasting inability to
generate compromise. Whereas the social partners and partnership actively became part
of and an adjunct to the Europeanization process within the Austrian system, in Germany
there was no such development. (Heinisch 2000)
This was also true in German road haulage reform where they government was
able to bypass the existing neo-corporatist system in enacting policy but also effectively
ended sectoral corporatism by removing the functional governance roles from the social
partners and placing it under direct aegis of the state. (Hertier and Knill 2001; Schmidt
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2006) Vocational education reform followed an almost identical pattern. However, the
impact of Europeanization was more indirect than direct in the case of road haulage and
railways reform. The directives and policies coming from Brussels were rather vague and
granted great leeway in the implementation of reforms, especially in railways. German
unification, structural economic change, and declining German competitiveness were
more primarily responsible for such reforms even if Europeanization provided the
important position of tilting the domestic interest coalitions towards reform. The
necessity of rail reform had existed and been progressing since unification and the need
to reorganize the East and West German rail networks and systems. (Hertier and Kmll
2001 ) As Teutsch suggests, in railways reform, European legislation was an additional
incentive for reform, and perhaps was the final straw that broke the back of continuity,
but not its primary cause. (Teutsch 2001
)
This also occurs in electricity and banking sectors where the breakdown of the old
corporatist order resulted from a fractured and divided number of social partners
incapable of finding consensus or split over the necessity or scope of proposed reforms.
(Schmidt 2006) The significant decentralization and disorganization of the German social
partners and partnership in many sectors provided a limited institutional or foundational
role for the regime in the Europeanization process. While Austria was suffering from
some similar forces, they were not as severe and the peak associations remained rather
monopolistically entrenched and institutionalized at the national level. Despite efforts by
both German unions, employers’ and business associations to revitalize their membership
and representative authority, these efforts have fallen short as the collective bargaining
system quickly moved to the sectoral, regional, and firm levels in the 1990s. The
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decentralization of German labor and the split between the BDA and BD1 further
weakened the ability of the peak associations to play a decisive and leading role in
Europeanization.
Hence there has been on some adaptation of the German social partnership to
address the new issues of Europeanization while the Austrian model pursued a
fundamental reorganization of the social partnership at the national and EU levels so as to
adapt to the new post-material, post-Maastricht environment. (Heinisch 2000)
In Germany, there has been a rather mixed assortment of significant structural
change along with cases of social partnership remaining intact. (Dyson 2003) The
system's unique sectoral or meso-corporatism has shown tremendous variation in
response to European stimuli. (Schmidt 2006) Importantly, many of the cases, from
TABD, railway reform, road haulage, decentralization of collective bargaining, labor
markets, vocational training, and public procurement show modest direct influence from
Europeanization. Reunification of east and west and the declining German economy seem
more strongly linked to the erosion of social partnership more than any particular
European directive, act, or pressure. While Europeanization certainly played a role in
many of these reforms, it was as an adjunct or additional pressure rather than as a primary
pressure. Even in the TABD, the decentralization of industry associations had begun in
Germany at the domestic level well before leading to that at the EU level. While the
TABD had certainly increased the decentralization pressures, it must be viewed within
the wider context of the German economic, trade, and political environment of the 1990s
and 2000s that was already strongly moving in that direction due to domestic political
and global competition challenges. In essence, while the German social partnership has
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seen far more structural change and significantly more erosion than the Austrian system,
it is far less linked to Europeanization than to other exogenous and endogenous
challenges and forces such as reunification, globalization, and economic decline.
The Utility of the Europeanization Framework
The overall assessment of the impact of Europeanization on the social
partnerships of Austria and Germany, and neo-corporatism as a whole, has been quite
mixed. Some suggest that the impact of Europe has been towards “light convergence” or
“moderate diversity” of neo-corporatist patterns of governance at the national level and in
the moving of strong corporatist systems, such as in Denmark and Austria, to the center.
(Falkner and Leiber 2004; Schmidt 2006) Despite these changes, social partnerships
remain vital in the “semi-Europeanized” areas of national social and economic policy that
reflect and remain strongly influenced by national prerogatives and patterns. Other
endogenous political, social, and economic features may reinforce or mitigate change
induced by the EU or European pressures may reinforce, mitigate, or alter preexisting
endogenous or exogenous pressures as well. Hence convergence, change, or continuity
primarily depends on “specific internal constellations” within and amongst member states
and the EU. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill 2001
)
The cases of German road haulage and railway reform illustrate the significant
variance and relativism of the force of Europeanization upon domestic change. In road
haulage, it was more decisive and probably was responsible for creating the conditions
that made reform more likely to succeed. In rail policy, European pressure was less
significant in instigating or implementing reforms, though it was still important in
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creating an atmosphere that made reform imminent and vital. Nonetheless, as suggested,
it would be difficult to say that European directives or policy was directly responsible for
the actual content of the changes or reforms. The EU has rarely been responsible for
automatic changes at the domestic level in most policy areas. These were much more the
products of the domestic institutional and policy environment and the existing political
constellations and conditions. It required an alignment of domestic forces and European
forces for reform or change to be successful at the domestic level. (Teutsch 2001
)
As Hertier and Knill suggest, the most puzzling characteristic of Europeanization
is the utterly divergent responses of member states to relatively similar or identical
European policy demands and pressures. Depending upon the political conditions and
constellations arranged towards reform or continuity, European policy may strengthen the
case and process of reform or results in greater opposition to EU-level demands Hence
the mere existence of mismatch between European and domestic regimes is not enough to
explain the specifics of change or continuity, the existing “reform capacity” of the
national system is a necessary condition for pressures of Europeanization to effectively
generate change. (Hertier and Knill 2001; Radaelli 2003; Knill 2001
)
The results of Europeanization are a differentiated picture. It seems clear that
European governance and patterns of policymaking leave a mark on and influence
domestic reforms or continuity, but it is so primarily contingent upon the existing
domestic constellations of actors, interests, institutions, norms, styles, and patterns that it
is hard to suggest a monolithic or singular role for Europeanization. (Hertier and Knill
2001; Falkner et al. 2005) European policy may mean different things to different actors
in different domestic environments, even within the same member state. Schmidt argues
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that the ELPs sectoral effects vary so greatly that they defy macro-level categorization.
(Schmidt 2006) Hence the scope and direction of domestic change stemming from
Europeanization is contingent and dependent upon distinctive regulatory, ideological, and
institutional factors, making generalization both difficult and unwarranted. Herder and
Knill stress that Europeanization “cannot be considered to be the single and decisive
factor in bringing about domestic regulatory change” in the cases they examined. (Herder
and Kmll 2001, 292)
European directives and legislation tend not to prescribe a specific model of
domestic adaptation and provide a range of options for the state to pursue in the
policymaking and implementation process. (Schmidt 2006) European legislation, in areas
or transport, was vague. The more important impact was the indirect alteration of the
institutional opportunities and constraints on existing domestic actors and coalitions that
changed the distribution of power resources by operating at multi-levels of governance
and increased their access, influence, and prestige. (Herder and Knill 2001 ) These
“change agents” are products of the domestic political system but can be mobilized to
change the preferences and interests of others due to their Europeanization expertise,
focus, or specialization. (Borzel and Risse 2003)
For most of the Europeanization scholarship incongruence or misfit constitutes a
necessary condition for domestic change. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, and
Risse 2001; Hix and Goetz 2001 ; Knill 2001 ) But others challenge that assumption
(Herder and Knill 2001; Falkner et al. 2005) Even if systems fit, change may result from
Europeanization as was found in German railway policy.
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Additionally since misfit doesn’t necessarily lead to any specific change or
reform, as it remains dependent upon domestic institutional and political structures, it
begs the question as to whether misfit or fit are useful or necessary distinctions. Falkner,
Tneb, Harlapp, and Leiber illustrate that in areas of social policy, misfit or fit matter far
less than domestic institutions and existing politics. (Falkner et al. 2005; Schmidt 2006)
Hertier and Knill suggest that the frameworks are less useful than suggested and that
perhaps a more basic approach would be to consider Europeanization as a basic input in
the domestic political process. (2001)
This author is inclined to agree. The Europeanization framework model of
Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse is far too much of a one-size fits all rubric for an
extraordinarily diverse and contingent constellation of domestic political systems and
forms of governance. The framework's dependence upon measuring fit is far less likely
to consider the roles of policy entrepreneurship, leadership, innovation, changing political
conditions and norms, and other nuances of complex domestic and multi-level
policymaking and governance patterns. (Hertier and Knill 2001 ; Radaelli 2003; Borzel
and Risse 2003; Dyson 2003) In addition, the existing framework lacks the ability to
specify the exact linkages between interests, ideas, institutions, and policy leadership,
weakening its overall applicability. (Dyson 2003)
Where the framework achieves its best results is in the assessment and influence
of mediating institutional factors. Here, the particular political and institutional
characteristics of national patterns of governance are illuminated. In these areas, the role
of vetoes, differential empowerment, learning, facilitating institutions, organizational and
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policymaking cultures, new exit and veto pathways, and informational advantages all
play important roles in determining the process and outcomes of Europeanization.
However, even here the results do not lead to any generalizations about the impact
of the particular factors. The mere existence of any particular characteristic does not
result in a particular outcome. The results of Europeanization are so variable and
differentiated to suggest that an overarching theory or model that hopes to predict
outcomes is not supported. In using the social partnership as a test of the Europeanization
framework, this research must conclude that it is less than adequate to the task.
The Europeanization approach has significant potential for understanding the
comparative dimensions of convergence and divergence in a post-Maastricht European
environment. Yet it has yet to develop into an ever-useful framework due to the misuse
and misconception of the process and forces at work. Too much of the emphasis is on the
top-down context of Europeanization. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, and
Risse 2001 ; Hix and Goetz 2001 ) The focus on Europeanization may obscure other
variables that may be more greatly responsible for structural change. There is generally
too large a belief in a monolithic and directive-driven EU as a source of change rather
than of Europeanization as a process between multiple levels of governance where
differentiation and diversity are the norm and convergence and isomorphism are rare.
Europeanization may be overused and overemphasized in all elements of European
domestic political change. (Raedelli 2003; Dyson 2003)
This research began with just such a misconception, a suggestion that
Europeanization was broadly and importantly causing structural change in the social
partnerships in Germany and Austria. Yet in the end, the results are mixed at best. It
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seems clear that Europeanization is a “two-way street" between levels of governance, and
the Europeanization framework fails to reflect this complex, dialogic, perpetually
negotiated and re-negotiated policymaking and governance regime. (Dyson 2003)
As Haverland suggests, it is often difficult, and perhaps impossible, to fully
demonstrate that European integration and governance causes domestic structural change.
(2005) The difficulty in disaggregating Europeanization from other forces such as
globalization, structural economic change, post-materialism, and other exogenous and
endogenous forces poses a significant barrier to assessing the singular impact of the EU.
(Hix and Goetz 2000) Many studies explicitly indicate such limitations and result in
conclusions that reflect Europeanization as not being the primary source for structural
change. (Haverland 2005) In his critiques of studies assessing the impact of European
integration upon changes in executive power and practices, Goetz concludes that
Europeanization was not a major independent source of change. Schmidt also admits
“forces other than Europeanization have also been at play, including external pressures
related to globalization and internal dynamics related to modernization, devolution,
corruption, and even ‘post-industrial’ values”. (2006, 3) Many such studies had not
disentangled the European effect from others that had stronger explanatory power in the
case of executive change and tended to operate under the assumption that there was a
significant impact a priori. (Goetz 2000) In many ways this research probably began with
a similar assumptive error. Haverland and Goetz suggest more rigorous case selection
and disentanglement of potential independent variables. (Haverland 2005; Goetz 2000;
Hix and Goetz 2000) While this research concurs and has achieved some measure of
disaggregation of Europeanization from other forces, this goal may be ultimately futile or
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unproductive given the strong interconnections of globalization, Europeanization,
postindustrialism, and post-materialism. (Hix and Goetz 2000) There are significant
limits to the social sciences and its ability to de-link variables given the socially
constructed and highly interdependent nature of complex social and political systems.
In this vein, this research will continue this trend. It seems unlikely that
Europeanization is the sole or unilateral force of transformation and decline of the
Austrian and German social partnerships. (Falkner 1997; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)
There are too many additional and critical forces taking place that are concurrently
impacting the German and Austrian polities, economies, and societies to make a
grandiose assertion on the primacy of Europeanization in instigating structural change.
(Hertier and Knill 2001 ) Studies of structural change amongst European states suggest a
number of alternate primary sources and explanations such as globalization, endogenous
political and social changes, and other exogenous forces. (Schmidt 2002; Verdier and
Breen 2001; Goetz 2000; Hix and Goetz 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001; Teutsch 2001
)
The threats to national level neo-corporatism originate at national, European, and global
levels and are mutually reinforced by and influential of one another. (Falkner 1997;
Hertier and Knill 2001 ; Knill 2001 ) Hence fully disaggregating these forces is quite
difficult and perhaps ultimately impossible.
However, there is differentiation between the two cases. While Europeanization
might be only one of several forces that have instigated structural change in the social
partnership, it seems to have clearly had a larger impact on Austria than Germany. In
many ways this is counterintuitive since there has actually been far less structural change
in the Austrian model than the German. However, the structural change that has occurred
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in the Austrian model appears to have much stronger connections to the negotiation,
accession, and implementation process of EU membership since the late 1980s. Hence, in
this way Europeanization may have actually helped reinvigorate social partnership in the
Austrian model by providing a new area of competency and new missions in shepherding
the integration process inside the Austrian political, economic, and social systems.
(Heinisch 2000; Falkner 1997) This is not the only such case as there have been similar
developments in Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and elsewhere. (Andersen 1995; Traxler
1995; Falkner 1997) Additionally, integration has led many states, including Portugal,
Spam, and Italy, to attempt to reinvigorate income and labor market policy concertation.
(Royo 2002; Falkner 1997)
In conclusion, the overall case of the Europeanization of the social partnership has
shown the paucity of the existing theories and models. Europeanization is both top-down
and bottom-up; it is a dialogic process between and within multiple levels of governance.
While the Europeanization scholarship of the last decade has provided valuable insight
into the top-down forces of European integration and governance upon domestic political
structures, it has failed to fully encompasses and make room for the extraordinarily
complex, constantly negotiated and re-negotiated, highly differentiated, system that
currently exists. Intriguingly, the element most omitted has been the bottom-up and
national roles in the negotiation, bargaining, and implementation in the European
policymaking process which was the hallmark of the early functionalist, neo-
functionalist, and intergovemmentalist approaches that the Europeanization literature
initially railed against. While these approaches were dominantly concerned with the
bargaining, negotiation, and compromise between member states at the level of the EU,
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their weakness was the failure to consider the structural implications of such behavior at
the national level and to assume relatively rational unitary actors at the supranational
level. Europeanization was an attempt to correct that omission, yet in retrospect, the
pendulum has swung too far.
Europeanization, much like mtergovemmentalism, has failed to fully encompass
the totality and complexity of multi-level European governance as top-down, bottom-up,
and mutually constituted and reconstituted on a rolling basis. As such, Europeanization
and mtergovemmentalism should likely be used in a similar manner, as heuristics, in
understanding the European integration and governance process. What Europeanization
should endeavor to achieve is the consideration, weighing, and implications of the EU
and multi-level governance on particular states, actors, interests, policies, sectors,
structures, and polities as well as their impact on the European integration process itself.
The framework and theory of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse fails in this regard to virtually
the same extent of the intergovernmental approach.
As a heuristic, Europeanization has and should continue to demonstrate incredible
value in understanding the European dimensions of domestic political activity and
behavior. While certainly less formal and definitive than the models and theories of
Europeanization promoted by much of the scholarship including Schmidt, Cowles,
Caporaso, Risse, Hix, and Goetz, it will likely land more accurate reflections of how
European integration and governance impact, alter, change, or continue domestic patterns
of policymaking and governance, including that of neo-corporatism. The figure by
Schmidt included below seems like a far more utilitarian and simplified representation of
the two-way and multi-level process. The Schmidt framework illustrated the intertwined
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processes of Europeanization and accounts for both top down and bottom up processes.
This framework suggests some broader heuristic use as a way to conceptualize the
Europeanization process. While still an oversimplification, it provides a far more useful
framework than that of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse by which to potentially consider the
multi-level and mutually constituted process that is Europeanization. (Schmidt 2006)
Figure 7: The Europeanization Framework of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse (2001)
EU polity and policymaking
European
(
integration
Member-states EU adaptation
projection of pressures
preferences on on
EU Member-states
* Europeanization
Member-states’ adaptation of policy and polity
Figure 8: Schmidt’s Framework of European Integration and Europeanization (2006)
The Future of Social Partnership in Multi-Level Europe
As noted earlier in this research, there has been a generally dismal forecast for the
future of neo-corporatism. The pressures of supranationalism through European
integration have tended toward the creation of transnational pluralist models of decision
and policymaking over national modes of neo-corporatist policy concertation. (Streeck
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and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991) National competencies have been transferred to the
European level where neo-corporatist structures are weak and domestic social partners
had tremendously diluted influence. The policymaking environment of Brussels has been
far more mixed in terms of interest representation and fragmentation. (Hix and Goetz
2001; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Schmidt 2006) The institutions and structures of neo-
corporatism that do exist at the EU-level tend to be quite weak in terms of influence,
authority, and membership density compared to those at national levels of social
partnership. (Sargent 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Keller and Platzer 2003; Nugent
2006) Even while there has been some growth in the influence and impact of such
structures in the last decade, there is a significant chasm between the forms of social
partnership practiced at the national and supranational levels in Europe. (Weber 2001;
Dolvik and Visser 2001, Compston and Greenwood 2001; Benedictus et al. 2003) This
has in turn placed pressure upon domestic political structures to adapt to the European
modes of governance. Increasing global pressures to adopt neo-liberal and pluralist
models of economic policymaking magnifies this intra-European trend. In the end, many
scholars contend that Europe, at both the supranational and domestic levels is beginning
to follow an American-style pattern of pluralism. (Streeck and Schmitter 2001; Hix and
Goetz 2001; Dyson 2003)
Yet there is some evidence that the prognoses of collapse are only part of a larger
picture. While there may certainly be a general decline in the efficacy and utilization of
neo-corporatist structures and patterns at national and supranational levels, there is also
some significant persistence of the preexisting neo-corporatist patterns of governance as
well. (Dyson 2003) Plus the form of pluralism being adopted has some significant
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limitations in terms of private interest-public concertation and limited the inclusion to a
small handful of actors. Hence much of the new “pluralism” that is taking place at the EU
and national levels is actually a mix of elements from both pluralism and neo-
corporatism. (van Waarden and Lehmbruch 2003; Falkner 1997, 2000; Knill 2006;
Schmidt 2006; Schuppert 2006) As many suggest, the policymaking process inside the
EU is extraordinarily complex given the range of local, regional, subnational, national,
supranational, global, private, public, semi-public, sectoral, social, economic, political,
intergovernmental, intra-govemmental, non-governmental, quasi-govemmental,
corporate, industrial, commercial, technological, labor, agricultural, and post-material
actors, interests, institutions, and structures attempting to shape and interact within the
system. Labeling the system pluralist seems remarkably reductionist given the evidence
of overlapping, multiple, and new policymaking patterns. (Greenwood 1997, 2003;
Greenwood and Ronit 1994; Sbragia 1992; Schmidt 2002, 2006; Hooghe and Marks
1996, 2001; Hooghe 2001; Schuppert 2006)
Europeanization may reinvigorate social partnership by providing a new area of
competency and new missions in shepherding the integration process inside the domestic
political systems, much like the Austrian case. (Heinisch 2000; Falkner 1997) There have
been similar, if limited, developments in Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and elsewhere.
(Andersen 1995; Traxler 1995; Falkner 1997) Additionally, integration has led many
states, including Portugal, Spain, and Italy, to attempt to reinvigorate income and labor
market policy concertation. (Royo 2002; Pelinka 1999; Falkner 1997) The need to
administer and enforce EU policy may inspire greater social partnership at the national
level between actors and the state as they work to consensually adopt and enforce new
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and existing EU measures. (Guliani 2003; Kohler-Koch 1996) Hence there is growth
potential at both the EU and domestic levels. (Schmitter and Grote 1997) The pressures
of the ECB and requirements Stability and Growth Pact have often increased demand by
governments to find consensual solutions to budgetary and competitive pressures and
often turn to neo-corporatist patterns of policy creation. (Knill 2001; Falkner 1997, 2000)
Importantly, Europeanization has also potentially affected the institutional actors
of the social partnership by changing the conditions of the domestic neo-corporatist
policymaking process. This can occur through the creation of new or exacerbation of
previously existing schisms within and between social partners and the state. European
integration has become a critical and divisive issue that splits and weakens unions,
business and employers' associations, agricultural groups, political parties, governments,
and other state actors. (Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) This has created additional
contestation points and intractable conflicts within the structures and actors of social
partnership. The creation of a European level of governance has also changed the
calculations of actors within and commitment to national neo-corporatist policymaking
structures.
This pattern of renewed neo-corporatism does differ from previous domestic
models in the primary impetus for the structures. While it has been argued that social
partnership developed primarily through demand-side efforts of strongly organized and
engaged social partners in the postwar era, new modes of neo-corporatism tend to be
more supply-side affairs that are structured to provide a national edge in competitiveness
in the European and global marketplace. While demand-side social partnership exhibited
572
strongly integrated peak associations acting through permanent high-level and exclusive
formal institutions or patterns, supply-side is focused on a more decentralized, ad hoc,
and intermittent patterns of concertation and policymaking. (Traxler 1995; Falkner 1997;
Crouch 1995; Crepaz 1994; Katzenstein 2003)
If the EU is regarded as state, its institutions are remarkably close to the
consensus model of democracy. (Lijphart 1999, 34; Schmidt 2006) New issues are
frequently negotiated in the familiar corporatist manner among the relevant interest
groups—representing teachers, doctors, nurses, retired persons, and environmentalists—
and the government.” (Lijphart 1999, 174) The potential for effective neo-corporatism at
the European level is certainly within the realm of possibility. The creation of explicit
institutions and patterns of social partnership, while still rather weak and unfulfilled,
suggests that as the EU continues to be institutionally and structurally transformed by
enlargement, constitutionalism, and other exogenous and endogenous forces, these may
have more functional and effective authority in the future. (Falkner 1997, 2006; Pelinka
1999) The institutions of social partnership at the EU are already there. Social partners
have centralized organizations such as the ETUC, UNICE, and C’EEP that could become
more representative and effective. The institutions of the European Social Dialogue,
European Works Councils, and Economic and Social Council could be empowered or
demand greater influence. (Pelinka 1999; Ottaway 2001; Keller and Platzer 2003; Falkner
2006) In essence, the European policymaking model has not reached a system of stasis by
any stretch of the imagination. While the system may currently appear more pluralist,
which its is contestable, with weak structures of social partnership, which seems quite
accurate, the future modes of European level policymaking certainly could tilt towards
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the neo-corporatist given optimal social, economic, and political conditions and
opportunities. (Falkner 2006; Schmidt 2006)
There have already been some important efforts to accomplish neo-corporatist
policy concertation at the EU level on several fronts. The Maastricht Treaty established
and expanded the institutions of social partnership at the European level. Post-Masstricht
efforts on employment, industrial, and fiscal policy are notable, if still limited. (Visser
2004) There is some evidence that EU Commission President Jacques Delors preferred an
inclusion of even more neo-corporatist elements within the Maastricht Treaty in areas of
vocational education and training, labor market flexibility, and non-wage labor cost
reduction. While these were eventually rejected by some national delegations, there were
notable efforts to provide informal concertation in precisely these areas through the
Council through the mid to late 1990s. (Falkner 1997; Compston 2001 ) This trend may
be continuing as the EU seeks out new social partners to reduce the perceived democratic
deficit and to provide balance to groups underrepresented in EU policymaking. (Schmidt
2006) This has been especially true under the 2000 Lisbon Agenda to enhance
employment, competitive knowledge-based economies, and greater social cohesion.
Under the Lison process, the EU is actively seeking social partners to aid in the
policymaking and implementation process. (Adnett and Hardy 2005) Of course, the lack
of success and of reaching many of the Lisbon goals suggests the continuing limits to
social partnership at the EU level as well.
In addition, the process of integration is itself a product of the states and their
actors. (Hertier 2001; Knill 2001; Schuppert 2006) As Dyson convincingly argues
Europeanization consists both of “downloading” of EU-level policies, directives, norms,
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and forces as well as the “uploading” of domestic preferences, demands, and institutional
modela. (Dyson 2003) Hence the EU may become more amenable and interested in neo-
corporatist modes of policymaking. While Brussels certainly seems more pluralist
currently, the future is not entirely devoid of potential neo-corporatist tendencies.
(Schmitter and Grote 1997, Hix and Goetz 2001 ) “European effects are soft, not hard. .1
conclude that Europeanization and continued, though constrained, national diversity are
mutually compatible. Corporatism, concertation, conutology, and the community method
are all important components of one political process.” (Katzenstein 2003) Some have
even argued that Europeanization does not change empowerment of some groups over
others but rather makes them mutually interdependent and increases the need for
cooperative forms of governance so as to enact and implement Europeanization reforms
and changes. (Kohler-Koch 1996; Guliani 2003; Falkner 2006) Schmidt has
demonstrated that the EU is increasingly interested in nurturing and involving social
partners to increase legitimacy and input in the policymaking process. (2006) In the end,
Europeanization is a process not an end result. There may likely never be some
teleological end point of convergence or isomorphism. Europeanization is a complex
multi-level model of governance stemming from both supranational and national levels.
The success of the German and Austrian social partnership may very well be determined
by how well they are able to upload their particularistic modes and preferences to the EU
level. (Dyson 2003)
As many suggest, the future of European integration and governance is unwritten
and there may always be a dynamic contestation over the modes of Europeanization.
(Dyson 2003; Schuppert 2006; Lodge 2006; Aalberts 2004; Herder 2001 ) Neo-
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corporatism has a “dynastic continuity punctuated by periodic demise and subsequent
resurrection". (Schmitter 1989, 72; Schmitter and Grote 1997) While globalization and
Europeanization may limit “government capacity to act effectively in economic policy, in
particular in macro-economic steering of the economy”, the changed environment may
actually create greater demand for consensus and cooperative policymaking. (Armingeon
1997, 165) Katzenstein uses precisely the same argument to explain, not the decline but,
the growth of corporatism, and why it developed in the smaller European countries and
Germany (Lijphart 1999, 174; Katzenstein 1984, 1985) Katzenstein’s analysis suggests
that the negative influence of globalization or Europeanization on corporatism is not
inescapable and that in the longer run it may reverse course. (Lijphart 1999; Katzenstein
1984, 1985, 1987)
Overall, neo-corporatism is clearly in decline but reports of its death have
generally been exaggerated, if only slightly in some cases such as Germany. (Dyson
2003) Even here, Schmidt suggests that Germany remains “primarily corporatist” despite
the weakening ties in a number of sectors and even a few where it has fully “burst apart".
(2006) While the general decline in neo-corporatism has certainly taken place, there are
significant counter-examples of continuity and even increased efficacy. As Falkner
suggests, there is no “unidirectional decline” in neo-corporatist governance even if the
current patterns are more limited in function and scope than during its peak in the 1950s
and 1960s. ( 1997) There is evidence that the corporatist Sisyhus has found many new
hills to climb, probably steepest in Germany.
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